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Introduction 
 
Europeanisation research is a mushrooming field of inquiry. It has gathered 
momentum in the past two decades with the gradual consolidation, at the European 
level, of the political, legal and institutional structures of the European Union (EU), 
the intensification of inter-organisational and inter-governmental relations in Europe 
and the growing permeability of international, European and national systems of 
governance. Once limited in their international diffusion, individual and collective 
ideas, in today’s world, travel across national borders with unprecedented ease. In 
Europe, they permeate states’ politics, policies and polities in an ordinary manner. 
Their transformative power keeps puzzling the academia, and provides a series of 
exciting questions for researchers willing to explore the political ecology of European 
governance and the transformation of the state.  
 
The potential of Europeanisation research is impressive, if one considers the scope 
and depth of the changes that have affected European governance structures over the 
past few years. No policy field, no bureaucracy, no level of governance has remained 
immune to the changing environment in Europe. Even those competences that used to 
be considered as the prerogatives of the state, have become pervious to exogenous 
changes and have been affected by the international diffusion of ideas. Researchers in 
the field, through their numerous writings, have described, studied and accompanied 
this changing reality for almost two decades now. But their work did not swept off all 
the issues at hand. Europeanisation research remains a heterogeneous field of inquiry, 
and by no means a well-structured sub-discipline of political sciences. Perhaps it is 
not due to become more than a “fashionable but contested term”1. Perhaps it is 
doomed to remain “faddish”2.  
 
What is certain, yet, is that the area is fraught with existential pitfalls. Conceptually 
first, the concept of Europeanisation remains poorly bounded in the literature, not 
least because of its peculiar genealogy with EU integration theories 3 . Is 
Europeanisation, after all, reducible to EU-isation? Is it nothing more than the 
adoption of EU norms? Spatially, then, Europeanisation research remains dominated 
by an academic interest for EU member states alone. When non-EU states are the 
object of research, Europeanisation is often reduced to conditionality studies. 
Methodologically, the field continues to suffer from the “no variation issue”4 and an 
overreliance on deductive approaches, both tending to inflate, or prejudge, the 
explicative role of the EU at the expense of other variables. Is it, after all, really 
possible to isolate the impact of the EU from alternative variables? 
Phenomenologically, it remains unclear what Europeanisation entails in general terms, 
beyond the all-embracing notion of change. Too many definitions of Europeanisation 
do not enable researchers to unambiguously recognise the specific occurrences of the 
phenomenon. And an aetiology (not to mention a theory) of Europeanisation is still 
missing.  
                                                 
1 Olsen, J. P. 2007. Europe in Search of Political Order: An Institutional Perspective. p. 68. 
2 Featherstone, K. 2003. ‘Introduction: In the Name of 'Europe'.’ In The Politics of Europeanization, 
eds. Featherstone, K. and Radaelli, C. M. p. 3. 
3 Marciacq, F. 2012b. ‘The Political Geographies of Europeanisation: Mapping the Contested 
Conceptions of Europeanisation.’ Journal of Contemporary European Research vol.8 (1). 
4 Haverland, M. 2003. ‘Methodological Issues in Europeanisation Research: The ‘No Variation’ 
Problem.’ Conference paper. 
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This PhD thesis, written between October 2009 and September 2013, takes stock of 
these existential pitfalls, and provides a tentative response to some of the challenges 
faced by the community of Europeanisation researchers. Conceptually, it proposes to 
adopt a more progressive approach to concept formation, drawing from governance, 
rather than EU integration perspectives. This positioning suggests that 
Europeanisation is more than EU-isation, and that some definitions are better than 
others in terms of conceptual utility. Spatially, it targets a domain that has long 
remained underexplored: non-EU Europe. It includes, but is not limited to 
conditionality studies. Methodologically, it follows an inductive approach combining 
holistic and individualistic perspectives in a comparative design. It embraces a social 
constructivist and thick interactionist stance towards institutional change in a multi-
level governance (MLG) system, which replaces actors at the core of the research. 
This approach relaxes the widespread commitment to state-centric rationalism, and 
opens avenues to interpretivist accounts. Wary of the risk of prejudging the role of the 
EU, the thesis avoids reifying EU integration as the neo-positivist cause for states’ 
transformation. EU norms, after all, have much in common with international norms -
they overlap with each others and respond to one another. The thesis therefore 
considers that the interplay between the two set of norms (and the questionable 
genuineness of EU norms) should be part of the inquiry. Phenomenologically, the 
thesis claims that Europeanisation, in its current condition, is a catch-all phenomenon 
with too little internal consistency to be recognised without further specifics. The 
thesis therefore prescribes the use of better delineated terms in operational research, 
keeping in mind both the conceptual contestability and utility of Europeanisation as 
organising concept. Beyond the so-called “European interaction structure”, which 
arguably gives shape to the Europeanisation phenomenon in an essential manner, the 
thesis posits few genuinely distinctive characteristics, which might help recognise 
Europeanisation. It argues, instead, that the phenomenological fuzziness, being part of 
the Europeanisation phenomenon, is also part of the Europeanisation puzzle. 
Aetiologically, the thesis finally explores a wide spectrum of forces possibly 
underpinning Europeanisation. Its inductive design opens avenues for a more 
inclusive understanding of diffusion mechanisms. 
 
In order to give shape to its argument and make an empirical contribution to the field, 
the thesis adopts two research foci: a sectoral one (national foreign policy) and a 
politico-geographical one (non-EU Europe). Foreign policy, first, is a policy field, 
where the EU has a limited acquis –a state of affairs that necessarily complicates the 
research, and forces to question the conceptual and methodological choices 
underpinning the bulk of the literature. If, for instance, one considers the inter-
organisational cooperation between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (Nato) in the field, or the enmeshment of EU and international norms of 
regional security, the formation of a concept of Europeanisation reducible to the 
impact of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on national foreign 
policies is at best illusory. The choice of foreign policy is also advantageous for 
another reason. It is commonly considered as one of the core prerogative of sovereign 
states –a prerogative often assumed to be immune to the international diffusion of 
ideas. Meanwhile, it acknowledges the strength of international sources of foreign 
policy, especially in a European, post-statal context marked by the blurring of 
boundaries (e.g. between domestic and foreign policy environments, between high 
 3
and low politics). An examination of the “second image reversed”5 in this policy field, 
then, is a potent illustration of the depth of the transformation of the state in Europe. 
Choosing non-EU Europe as geographical field of inquiry, finally, creates room to 
overcome the “no variation issue”. Non-EU European states are bound to the EU and 
other regional organisations though different types of arrangements, placing them at 
variable institutional distance from EU membership. This variability calls for 
elaborating a more comprehensive research design capturing the widest spectrum of 
forces underpinning Europeanisation –a spectrum that is not reducible to forces 
emanating from EU membership.  
 
The thesis explores the Europeanisation of national foreign policies in non-EU Europe. 
More precisely, it wonders which changes in the institution of national foreign policy 
can be attributed to those interactions performed on a European interaction structure 
by national, international, supranational and transnational foreign policy actors; what 
the prevailing forces behind Europeanisation are; and what factors decisively support 
and constrain the phenomenon. The empirical research, in practice, follows a two-step 
process. It includes, in the first place, a descriptive analysis, intended to delineate the 
explanandum phenomenologically. The question is: how did Europeanisation affect 
the governance structures of the object under scrutiny? In the second place, the 
research presents an argumentative analysis shedding light on the aetiological forces 
underpinning the Europeanisation phenomenon. The question, then, is: what were the 
forces or mechanisms underpinning the Europeanisation phenomena singled out in the 
descriptive analysis? The methodological techniques used in the empirical part of the 
thesis combine quantitative and qualitative methods for the descriptive analysis 
(statistical measurement, time-sensitive content analysis) and qualitative methods for 
the argumentative analysis (correlational analysis, semi-structured interviews and 
discourse analysis). 
 
The thesis is built as a comparative case study between Serbia and Macedonia. The 
comparative design is intended to address the Europeanisation puzzle in its two 
dimensions. It allows a better description of what Europeanisation is (or not) in 
phenomenological terms, while creating space for drawing aetiological conclusions on 
the forces underpinning the phenomenon. The choice of Serbia and Macedonia first 
answers the methodological call in the literature for extrospective research. European 
non-EU states display larger variations in their relationship with the EU and other 
regional organisations than EU member states. There is, furthermore, a lack of 
empirical research on Western Balkan countries (as opposed to Turkey for instance). 
The thesis is also a contribution to the field. In the region, Serbia and Macedonia, 
finally, best respond to the need to select cases that are information-rich and display 
meaningful similarities and differences. Both countries have woven extensive 
relations with the EU over the past two decades, as part of the overarching 
Stabilisation and Association process. But their integration in European structures has 
not been concomitant. Macedonia made rapid progress in the first half of the 2000s, 
before being stalled because of its dispute with Greece. Serbia, on the other hand, 
made hesitant progress at first, before catching up with Macedonia despite a difficult 
context. Both countries, furthermore, have been pursuing their foreign policy with 
outstanding dynamism, whether on the bilateral, regional, European or international 
                                                 
5 Gourevitch, P. 1987. ‘The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.’ 
International Organization vol.32 (4). 
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level. Both countries, finally, are confronted to highly sensitive foreign policy issues –
the Kosovo issue for Serbia and the naming issue for Macedonia.  
 
The thesis is organised as follows. The first section (following this introduction) is a 
review of the literature. It examines how national and European foreign policy is 
conceptualised in modern and post-modern writings and presents a framework for 
their analysis. The literature review continues with a more specific part devoted to the 
Europeanisation of foreign policy. It reviews the definitions of Europeanisation used 
in this strand of the literature, as well as the empirical findings yielded by the 
scholarship. The literature review finally zooms in on the Europeanisation of foreign 
policy in non-EU Europe. For that purpose, it discusses the concept of non-EU 
Europe, and examines the findings of the scholarship in this specific area.  
 
The second section of the thesis is the research design. Its elaboration is grounded on 
the literature review. It starts with a conceptual framework specifying the definiendum 
(what Europeanisation denotes) and the definiens (how Europeanisation is defined). 
Then, it formulates the research questions, and advances a research strategy that 
tentatively responds to the challenges identified in the literature review. The thesis 
then specifies the analytical framework it will use, in accordance with its conceptual 
and strategic choices. For the descriptive parts of the research, the research design 
explains its reliance on the framework of foreign policy analysis already presented in 
the literature review. It identifies four dimensions constitutive of national foreign 
policy, which will be subject to empirical research (foreign policy outputs, actors, 
contexts and instruments). For the argumentative parts of the research, it develops a 
multi-dimensional framework consisting of three levels of analysis reflecting different 
epistemological positions of the structure-agency debate. This multi-dimensional 
framework is intended to capture the different logics of social action underpinning 
Europeanisation. It includes first a structural analysis, which aims at unveiling the 
structural constraints and enabling factors, located above all in institutional settings, 
to which a causal effect can be attributed. It focuses, most notably on the objective 
conditions informing and guiding foreign policy choices. It includes then a 
dispositional analysis, which aims at unveiling the normative inclinations vested in 
actors’ system of causal and principled beliefs. It intends to shed light on the reasons 
(as opposed to cause) for action in foreign policymaking. And it includes, finally, an 
intentional analysis, which aims at unveiling the teleological underpinnings of actors’ 
motivations –i.e. what foreign policy actors sought to achieve, when they made 
certain decisions. The research design finally presents its methodological framework 
(comparative case study), and details the methodological techniques used in 
descriptive and argumentative research. 
 
The third section of the thesis is the empirical research on Europeanisation. Its first 
chapter explores Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy behaviour in the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE). It researches the diplomatic behaviour of both states over the past 
fifteen years, looks for patterns of convergence towards EU positions, infers 
Europeanisation from foreign policy coordination and examines the causes, reasons 
and teleological underpinnings of their differential alignment, as well as the 
constraining factors. The second chapter explores Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign 
policy organisations. It researches the transformation of inter-sectoral, intra-sectoral 
and outreach coordinative structures in both countries, the extension of diplomatic 
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networks, and the inter-organisational, especially Euro-atlantic, dimension of 
Europeanisation, in the field of technical capacity-building. The third chapter explores 
Serbia and Macedonia’s border regimes. It researches Serbia and Macedonia’s 
respective approach to border disputes, infers Europeanisation from a certain practice 
of good neighbourliness and compares the role of the EU in the 2001 FRY-Macedonia 
and 2009 Kosovo Macedonia border dispute settlement processes. The fourth chapter 
explores Serbia and Macedonia’s approach to critical foreign policy issues. It focuses 
on Serbia’s Kosovo issue and Macedonia’s naming issue, explores the national 
positions of the two countries and their possible inflections over time as well as the 
negotiating frameworks and their outcome. The chapter infers Europeanisation from 
the participation of the two countries to European frameworks for the settlement of 
neighbourly disputes, although these European frameworks overlap with international 
frameworks. It examines the conditions weighing on Serbia and Macedonia, the 
domestic politics of dispute settlement and the intentions underpinning the inflection 
of national positions. The fifth chapter explores Serbia and Macedonia’s arms export 
controls policy. It describes the different path followed by Serbia and Macedonia’s 
administrations towards harmonisation, infers Europeanisation from the amplification, 
by the EU, of international norms, and examines the role of the EU’s conditionality 
dialogue with Serbia and Macedonia, the role of the dynamic of European integration 
and some constraining factors.  
 
The fourth section of the thesis is a conclusion. It builds on the empirical findings to 
tentatively advance knowledge in the field. It starts with a conceptual argument 
advocating a departure from EU integration perspectives. Europeanisation, it argues, 
is best conceptualised through governance approaches as distinct from EU-isation. It 
can accordingly be defined as “the transformation of political systems based on 
national governance into systems constituted by actors operating through the prism of 
European governance”. The conclusion then makes a argument on what 
Europeanisation entails (more intersubjectivity, more nodality and more homogeneity) 
and what it does not entail (uniformity, ineluctability). It finally presents a multi-
theoretical approach to Europeanisation, which does not elude the issue of complex 
causality, argues that Europeanisation, in the end, is a form of political learning, and 
distinguishes three mechanisms through which is ensues: mechanistic learning, which 
responds to structural objective necessities, contextual learning, which builds on 
shared beliefs, and organismic learning, which is propelled by dissatisfaction.  
 6
 
1. Literature review 
 
1.1.  Reviewing the literature on foreign policy 
 
1.1.1. Defining foreign policy 
 
1.1.1.1. National foreign policy 
 
Although there is in the literature a “relatively stable consensus about the subject 
matter of foreign policy analysis”6, the definitional debate surrounding the concept of 
foreign policy is not fully settled. Ontological and meta-theoretical bones of 
contention endure in two aspects of the question. First, should foreign policy be 
understood as a capacity to act, or as an action? As a “capacity to make and 
implement policies abroad […]”7, foreign policy refers more to the organisational and 
functional structures, procedures and processes necessary at home to act in 
international politics. It denotes “that area of governmental activity which is 
concerned with relationships between the state and other actors […]”8, and suggests 
that the domain should primarily be conceptualised as an actor’s “capacity to act” 9. 
Elsewhere, however, foreign policy refers to “the substance of an actor’s international 
policy”10, that is the “actions (broadly defined) taken by governments which are 
directed at the environment external to their state […]”11. Here, it is not the capacity 
to act which is important, but the very “actions which, expressed in the form of 
explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental 
representatives acting on behalf of sovereign communities, are directed toward 
objectives, conditions and actors –both governmental and non-governmental- which 
they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy”12.  
 
The difference between the two approaches goes beyond distinguishing substance and 
procedure in the analysis. It denotes a disputed positioning with regards to the 
structure agency debate, or, as Carlsnaes put it, “the classical ontological choice 
between holistic and individualistic approaches to social sciences”13. Proponents of 
the Handlungsfähigkeit conceptualisation of foreign policy emphasise the structuralist 
sources of purposive behaviour, and refuse to narrowly reduce the “effects of social 
                                                 
6 Carlsnaes, W. 2002. ‘Foreign Policy.’ In Handbook of International Relations, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et 
al. p. 335; White, B. 2004. ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe.’ In Contemporary European 
Foreign Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 11. 
7 H. Smith, H. 2002. European Union Foreign Policy: What It Is and What It Does. p. 8. 
8 White cit.in Smith, K. E. 2004a. The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe. p3.  
9 Harnisch, S. and Stahl, B. 2009. ‘Einleitung: EU-Aussenpolitik Und Aktorness.’ In Vergleichende 
Aussenpolitikforschung Und Nationale Identitäten: Die Europäische Union Im Kosovo-Konflikt 1996-
2008, eds. Stahl, B. and Harnisch, S. 
10 Hocking, B. 2004. ‘Diplomacy.’ In Contemporary European Foreign Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et 
al. p. 115. 
11 White, B. 2004. ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe.’ In Contemporary European Foreign 
Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 11. 
12 Carlsnaes, W. 2002. ‘Foreign Policy.’ In Handbook of International Relations, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et 
al. p. 335. 
13 Carlsnaes, W. 2004b. ‘Where Is the Analysis Fo European Foreign Policy Going?’ European Union 
Politics vol.5 (4). p. 504. 
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structures […] to independently existing agents and their interactions”14. Structures 
and institutions, because they determine agents’ capacity of action, are the keystone of 
foreign policies. By contrast, an individualistic ontology of foreign policy assumes 
that the effects of social structures find their explanation reducibly in the attributes of 
the actors involved in foreign policymaking. Researching “actions” rather than 
“capacity to act” therefore suffices to embrace the concept of foreign policy. Of 
course, the “ontological polarity between individualism and holism” in 
conceptualising foreign policy does not reflect a perfect dichotomy15. Structures and 
agents are in reality both involved in conceptualising foreign policy, not least because 
structures and agency constitute each other, either intrinsically (structurationism) or 
across the different levels of analysis, with the structures at one level becoming agents 
at a higher level and vice versa16. One of the most notable challenges that foreign 
policy analysts then face is the elaboration of a synthetic conceptualisation of foreign 
policy based on ontological pluralism.  
 
The second contentious issue that can be indentified in the literature concerns the 
“foreign” dimension of foreign policy. Definitions of foreign policy are very much 
impregnated by the Westphalian state-centric tradition that still prevails in 
international politics. It follows that it may seem difficult to foreign policy analysts 
“to separate the notion of foreign policy from the idea of a state with a set of interests 
identified by a government”17. And indeed, many of them take a restrictive stance on 
the actors that can possibly be involved in foreign policy and presume the absolute 
primacy of state actors. For instance, Krippendorff defines foreign policy as “actions 
of a particular state in the pursuit of its interests towards other states”18. States and 
governments, in this state-centric perspective, are the primary loci of foreign 
policymaking –they take actions “which are directed at the environment external to 
their state with the objective of sustaining or changing that environment in some 
way”19, and regulating “relationships between the state and other actors, particularly 
other states, in the international system”20. Alternatively, foreign policy involves the 
“national government”21. The difficulty posed by conceptualising foreign policy in a 
state-centric manner arises when “no clear boundaries between internal and external 
                                                 
14 Wendt, A. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. p. 26. 
15 Carlsnaes, W. 2002. ‘Foreign Policy.’ In Handbook of International Relations, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et 
al. p. 335. 
16 Hollis, M. and Smith, S. 1991. ‘Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations.’ 
Review of International Studies vol.17 (4). 
17 Allen, D. 1996. ‘Conclusions: The European Rescue of National Foreign Policy?’ In The Actors in 
Europe's Foreign Policy, ed. Hill, C. p. 303. 
18 [die Aktionen eines bestimmten Staates in Verfolgung seiner Interessen gegenüber anderen Staaten]. 
cit. in Harnisch, S. and Stahl, B. 2009. ‘Einleitung: EU-Aussenpolitik Und Aktorness.’ In 
Vergleichende Aussenpolitikforschung Und Nationale Identitäten: Die Europäische Union Im Kosovo-
Konflikt 1996-2008, eds. Stahl, B. and Harnisch, S. p. 17. 
19 White, B. 2004. ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe.’ In Contemporary European Foreign 
Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 11. 
20 White cit. in Smith, K. E. 2004a. The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe. 
p.3. 
21 Hudson, V. M. 2008. ‘The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis.’ In Foreign Policy: 
Theories, Actors, Cases, eds. Smith, S., et al. p. 12. 
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policy environment” exist 22 , or when the boundary between domestic and 
international politics is blurred, e.g. through globalisation or regional integration23.  
 
This is especially the case in Europe, where transnational processes, stimulated by 
European integration, render states’ territorialities increasingly porous24. The foreign 
policy of European states towards other European states, for instance, cannot be 
considered as typically “foreign”, as suggested by the renaming, in some European 
states, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) into Ministry of Foreign and 
European Affairs25. And national foreign policies do not always seem to be mutually 
exclusive –they may even be shared, as suggested by the EU’s fledging Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. This denotational alteration of the concept of foreign 
policy necessarily called for reconceptualising the field in a less state-centric fashion. 
For instance, H. Smith elliptically refers to “policies abroad which promote the 
domestic values, interests and policies of the actor in question”26. Those “actors” are 
defined more specifically by Carlsnaes as “representatives acting on behalf of their 
sovereign communities”, and the recipients of foreign policy as “actors –both 
governmental and non-governmental –which […] lie beyond their territorial 
legitimacy” 27 . This definition is not inconsistent with the insights brought by 
sociological constructivism and the governance turn in political sciences. Contra 
Krasner 28 , “sovereign communities” shall not necessarily be based on hard 
conceptions of territoriality29, and foreign policy may therefore also be exercised by 
representatives of political communities, the sovereignty of which is socially 
constructed on soft- or non-territorial premises30. When state borders do not coincide 
with the distribution of national communities, on specific issues, foreign policy may, 
for instance, subordinate the pursuit of state interests to the defence of national, trans-
border approaches. Another example is the case of imagined communities that are 
constituted on postnational premises, as, arguably, the European Union. European 
foreign policy, indeed, is neither built on a national nor a territorial basis. And yet, it 
                                                 
22 White, B. 2004. ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe.’ In Contemporary European Foreign 
Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 11, 25. 
23 Checkel, J. T. 2008. ‘Constructivism and Foreign Policy.’ In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, 
eds. Smith, S., et al. p. 77. 
24 White, B. 2004. ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe.’ In Contemporary European Foreign 
Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al; Jørgensen, K. E. 2004. ‘European Foreign Policy: Conceptualising the 
Domain.’ In Contemporary European Foreign Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al; Sjursen, H. 2004. 
‘Security and Defence.’ In Contemporary European Foreign Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al; Müller, 
H. 2002. ‘Security Cooperation.’ In Handbook of International Relations, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al; 
Smith, K. E. 2004a. The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe; Hocking, B. 2004. 
‘Diplomacy.’ In Contemporary European Foreign Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. 
25 Austria, for instance, but also Slovakia and Croatia. 
26 Smith. European Union foreign policy: what it is and what it does. p. 8., emphasis added; see also 
Harnisch and Stahl. ‘Einleitung: EU-Aussenpolitik und Aktorness.’ p. 17; Hocking. ‘Diplomacy.’ 
27 Carlsnaes, W. 2002. ‘Foreign Policy.’ In Handbook of International Relations, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et 
al. p. 335. 
28 Krasner, S. D. 1993. ‘Sovereignty, Regimes and Human Rights.’ In Regime Theory and International 
Relations, eds. Rittberger, V. and Mayer, P. p. 142 ff. 
29 Biersteker, T. J. 2002. ‘State, Sovereignty and Territory.’ In Handbook of International Relations, 
eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 164-167, 172. 
30 Jørgensen, K. E. 2004. ‘European Foreign Policy: Conceptualising the Domain.’ In Contemporary 
European Foreign Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 32-34; Aalberts, T. E. 2002. ‘Multilevel 
Governance and the Future of Sovereignty: A Constructivist Perspective.’ Working Papers Political 
Science vol.04/2002; Rittberger, V. and Mayer, P. eds. 1993. Regime Theory and International 
Relations. 
 9
can hardly be fully isolated from the foreign policies of the EU’s member states –i.e. 
European nations and territories.  
 
In conceptualising foreign policy, territorial lines continue to be meaningful, even in 
the most post-modern approaches. This is understandable, since territorial lines 
remain an essential marker of sovereignty for many communities. But the new 
literature on foreign policy studies argues that these are not the only marker; that 
foreign policy is not the preserve of territorial states; and that the conceptual domain 
of foreign policy cannot be once for all delineated through territoriality31. That is why 
taking a governance approach to the study of foreign policy can be considered as 
beneficial to the field. It may help bridging the conceptual gap between national and 
European conceptions of foreign policy, and developing foreign policy approaches 
that are suitable both for Europe, as international actor, and European member states.  
 
1.1.1.2. European foreign policy 
 
Why is it important to disentangle foreign policy from territorial sovereignty? Among 
all the identities available to states, sovereignty is the only intrinsic one constituting 
them32. The recognition of states’ sovereign equality by other states is a keystone of 
their state-ness –a sine qua non to the full-fledged pursuit of their foreign policy on 
the world scene33. However, the reverse is not true: states are not the only actors that 
can be identified as sovereign –and thus, not the only operators of foreign policy. 
Non-statal or post-statal polities may be sovereign in some aspects of their relations 
with other actors, and thereby wield the authority to conduct foreign policy on the 
world scene34. Sovereignty, in this sense, is not a reified attribute of state; it may be 
“shared”, “mixed” or “fragmented”35 –a characteristic that is essential to understand 
what European foreign policy is in a governance perspective.  
 
As this thesis intends to shed light on “europeanised” foreign policies –whatever this 
concept possibly means at this point of the review, defining foreign policy in the 
realm of European governance is an essential step. It is commonly admitted that the 
member states of the European Union are not the only actors involved in European 
foreign policymaking. Although the scholarship does not agree on the explanation and 
the extent of this phenomenon, it seems to be consensusal on the ontological existence 
of a European foreign policy that is not reducible to the sum of the member states’ 
                                                 
31 Smith, M. E. 2004e. ‘Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy-Making: Multi-Level Governance, 
Domestic Politics, and National Adaptation to Europe's Common Foreign Security Policy.’ Journal of 
European Public Policy vol.11 (4); Keukeleire, S. and Justaert, A. 2008. ‘Policy Networks and the 
Analysis of EU Foreign Policy.’ Conference paper. 
32 Wendt, A. and Friedheim, D. 1996. ‘Hierarchy under Anarchy: The Informal Empire and the East 
German State.’ In State Sovereignty as Social Construct, eds. Biersteker, T. J. and Weber, C. p. 252. 
33 Wendt, A. 1994. ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State.’ The American Political 
Science Review vol.88 (2). p. 385; Malanczuk, P. 1997. Akehurst's Modern Introduction to 
International Law. p. 17-18. 
34 Biersteker, T. J. 2002. ‘State, Sovereignty and Territory.’ In Handbook of International Relations, 
eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 170-171. 
35 Wallace, W. 1999. ‘The Sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox.’ Political Studies 
vol.XLVII; Schwarze, J. ed. 2001. La Naissance D'un Ordre Constitutionnel Européen: L'interaction 
Du Droit Constitutionnel National Et Européen; De Witte, B. 2008. ‘The Emergence of a European 
System of Public International Law: The EU and Its Member States as Strange Subjects.’ In The 
Europeanisation of International Law: The Status of International Law in the EU and Its Member 
States, eds. Wouters, J., et al. 
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foreign policies. The extent to which the European foreign policy (EFP) differs from 
member states’ foreign policies remains debated, not least because of the Europe’s 
lack of sovereignty, centralised decision-making structures, military capacity, 
functional differentiation and effectiveness 36 . Defining European foreign policy 
remains problematic owing to the “nature of the [European] beast” 37 , although 
scholars concur in thinking that “a common EFP actually does exists, and has existed 
for a considerable amount of time”38.  
 
A definitional taxonomy of European foreign policy may rely on three types of 
‘Europe’, each constituting a particular “set of linked environments or arenas for 
negotiation and for the formation of policy”39. European foreign policy may first be 
defined as an attribute of the “Europe of boundaries”. In Krahmann’s wording, 
European foreign policy then “pertains to the decisions and actions of core European 
states and the multilateral organizations which are primarily concerned with the 
welfare of the region”40. This definition underlines the maintenance of hierarchies 
throughout European governance, with the member states remaining decisive actors in 
negotiations. European institutions are not characterised as supranational actors, but 
as multilateral fora – they facilitate competitive bargaining. The second definition of 
European foreign policy rather appeals to the “Europe of layers” of M. Smith, in 
which “issues of competence and linkage are salient” 41 . In this understanding, 
European foreign policy is produced through the adjustment at the European-level of 
interests stemming from agents operating at various levels of governance42. It refers to 
“the universe of concrete civilian actions, policies, relations, commitments and 
choices of the EC (and EU) in international politics43. These actions are cooperatively 
“(1) undertaken on behalf of all the EU states toward non-members, international 
bodies, or global events or issues; (2) oriented toward a specific goal; (3) made 
operational with physical activity, such as financing or diplomacy; and (4) undertaken 
in the context of EPC/CFSP discussions (although the EC can also be involved)”44. In 
a similar, albeit less precise vein, the EFP is “the activity of developing and managing 
relationships between […] the EU and other international actors, which promotes the 
domestic values and interests of the […] actor in question”45. The third definition of 
European foreign policy derives from the conceptualisation of Europe as set of 
                                                 
36 Smith, H. 2002. European Union Foreign Policy: What It Is and What It Does. p.; 1-7; see also 
Smith, K. E. 2003. European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. p. 3-5. 
37 Risse-Kappen, T. 1996. ‘Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations.’ Journal of 
Common Market Studies vol.34 (1). 
38 Jørgensen, K. E. 2004. ‘European Foreign Policy: Conceptualising the Domain.’ In Contemporary 
European Foreign Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 34. 
39 Smith, M. 2004b. ‘Foreign Economic Policy.’ In Contemporary European Foreign Policy, eds. 
Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 77. 
40 cit. in Carlsnaes, W. 2004b. ‘Where Is the Analysis Fo European Foreign Policy Going?’ European 
Union Politics vol.5 (4). p. 500. 
41 Smith, M. 2004b. ‘Foreign Economic Policy.’ In Contemporary European Foreign Policy, eds. 
Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 77. 
42 Smith, M. E. 2004e. ‘Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy-Making: Multi-Level Governance, 
Domestic Politics, and National Adaptation to Europe's Common Foreign Security Policy.’ Journal of 
European Public Policy vol.11 (4). 
43 Ginsberg cit. in White, B. 2004. ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe.’ In Contemporary 
European Foreign Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 15; Carlsnaes, W. 2004b. ‘Where Is the Analysis 
Fo European Foreign Policy Going?’ European Union Politics vol.5 (4). p. 500. 
44 EPC stands for European Political Cooperation. M. Smith cit. in Carlsnaes, W. 2004b. ‘Where Is the 
Analysis Fo European Foreign Policy Going?’ European Union Politics vol.5 (4). p. 501. 
45 Smith, H. 2002. European Union Foreign Policy: What It Is and What It Does. p. 8. 
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networks, disseminating ideas through communication, fostering problem-solving 
behaviour, and building shared understandings across territorial boundaries and layers 
of governance. As explained by Keukeleire & Justaert, European foreign policy is 
also based on the “functional specialisation and division of tasks through noticeable 
yet informal small groups of actors”46. This means that the actors operating European 
foreign policy are not necessarily unit-like; they are “networks” spanning across 
levels of governance47.  
 
Another definitional taxonomy has been proposed by B. White 48 , who defined 
European foreign policy (EFP) as the overlapping sum of three different “EFP 
subsystems”, each characterised by “different sets of actors and policy processes”49. 
European foreign policy can accordingly be collapsed into the foreign policy of the 
European Communities (e.g. common commercial policy), the foreign policy of the 
European Union (e.g. common foreign security policy) and the foreign policies of the 
EU member states. This definitional taxonomy can be considered as an elaboration of 
the layer-based definition of M. Smith. Its weaknesses are that the distinction between 
the three subsystems may sometimes be difficult to establish (e.g. in cross-cutting 
areas) and that it is rather EU-centric. Its advantage is that it stresses 1) that EU 
member states continue to conduct their foreign policy within and in addition to the 
EU, and 2) that European foreign policy includes EC external actions.  
 
1.1.2. Analysing foreign policy 
 
Foreign policy is not per se a policy field to be treated in a fundamentally different 
way from all other areas of public policy50. Although it is directed at the external 
environment, it has its domestic sources of policymaking, and therefore, “can never 
be abstracted from the domestic context out of which it springs”51. Foreign policy, in 
a word, is concerned by both “domestic sources of foreign policy” 52  and 
“international sources of domestic politics”53 –two reasons not to consider foreign 
policy as an idiosyncratic activity that lies beyond the analytical scope of public 
policy studies.  
 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is built on “the hypothesis that the outputs of foreign 
policy are to some degree determined by the nature of the decision-making process”54. 
It aims at explaining the process and outcomes of foreign policy decision-making by 
investigating “those factors that influence foreign policy decision-making and foreign 
                                                 
46 Keukeleire, S. and Justaert, A. 2008. ‘Policy Networks and the Analysis of EU Foreign Policy.’ 
Conference paper. p. 2; Smith, H. 2002. European Union Foreign Policy: What It Is and What It Does. 
p. 8. 
47 Keukeleire, S. and Justaert, A. 2008. ‘Policy Networks and the Analysis of EU Foreign Policy.’ 
Conference paper. p. 2. 
48 White, B. 2001. Understanding European Foreign Policy; White, B. 2004. ‘Foreign Policy Analysis 
and the New Europe.’ In Contemporary European Foreign Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. 
49 White, B. 2004. ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe.’ In Contemporary European Foreign 
Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 15-16, 25. 
50 Carlsnaes, W. 2002. ‘Foreign Policy.’ In Handbook of International Relations, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et 
al. p. 332 ff. 
51 Hill, C. 2003. The Politics of Foreign Policy. p. 37-39. 
52 Rosenau, J. N. 1967. Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy. 
53 Gourevitch, P. 1987. ‘The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.’ 
International Organization vol.32 (4). 
54 Hill, C. 2003. The Politics of Foreign Policy. p. 10. 
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policy decision-makers”55. Those factors, according to White56, Carlsnaes et al.57 and 
Hill58 are as follows: First, the unitary and collective actors that are involved in the 
foreign policymaking process, and therein act (purposively or routinely) as 
individualistic agents and principals. Second, the material and ideational contexts 
within which foreign-policy is made. These contexts, which include cultural and 
linguistic institutions, transnational contexts and historical path-dependencies, can be 
understood as structures, in that they “make up the multiple environments in which 
agents operate, and they shape the nature of choices by setting limits to the possible 
but also, more profoundly, by determining the nature of the problems which occur 
there, by shaping our very life-worlds”59. Third, the processes of foreign decision-
making themselves, which are underpinned by various types of cognitive models and 
procedural rules. Fourth, the instruments of foreign policy, which foreign policy 
actors have at their disposal –empowering them to translate foreign policy choices 
into policy actions. And fifth, the output-dimension of foreign-policymaking, which, 
having a normative dimensions, raises questions as to how to assess foreign policy’s 
success and failures, and how to anticipate success.  
 
1.1.2.1. Actors in Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
Foreign policy executives are the architects of foreign policy. They are, most notably, 
the foreign minister, the head of state, and those individuals in the administration that 
hold “the powers of initiative, convening meetings and (in the case of the head of 
government) also appointment of colleagues”60. In traditional statal organisations, the 
type of relationship between the foreign minister and the head of government may 
vary considerably from equality to subordination. Sometimes, the head of government 
also holds the function of foreign minister. Foreign policy top executives are assisted 
by a circle of trusted advisors (e.g. in the Cabinet or Security Council). These 
constitute an éminence grise in charge of communicating professional and informed 
opinions on strategic and specific issues. The top executives also rely on a 
bureaucracy, usually characterised by a “strong sense of elite status and esprit de 
corps”61, most notably the MFA. In addition to contributing to policy-making per se, 
the MFA performs information-gathering tasks and upholds continuous relationships 
with the outer-world through its diplomatic services62. Other foreign policy actors 
include intelligence services, which sit “in the middle of the civil-military relation”, 
and perform information gathering tasks that cannot be double checked by foreign 
policy decision-makers63; the military, the actions of which can constitute “a form of 
parallel foreign policy” and the economic agencies dealing with external economic 
activities (e.g. trade, finance, foreign aid)64. This fragmentation of foreign policy 
actors is a challenge to the efficient pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Hence the 
                                                 
55 Hudson, V. M. 2005. ‘Foreign Policy Analysis Actor-Specific Theory.’ Foreign Policy Analysis 
vol.1. p. 2. 
56 White, B. 2004. ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe.’ In Contemporary European Foreign 
Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 26. 
57 Carlsnaes, W., et al. eds. 2004. Contemporary European Foreign Policy. 
58 Hill, C. 2003. The Politics of Foreign Policy. 
59 Ibid. p. 26. 
60 Ibid. p. 65-66. 
61 Ibid. p. 76. 
62 Ibid. p. 76-82. 
63 Ibid. p. 66-67. 
64 Ibid. p. 82 ff. 
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essential need to for vertical (intra-sectoral) and horizontal (inter-sectoral) 
coordination. 
 
1.1.2.2. Contexts in Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
Actor-oriented approaches to FPA cannot ignore the socio-institutional contexts in 
which foreign policy actors are embedded. As noted by Hudson, “culture, history, 
geography, economics, political institutions, ideology, demographics, and 
innumerable other factors shape the societal context in which the decision-maker 
operates”65.  
 
The socio-institutional context is made of regulative and constitutive structures. The 
extent to which these structures determine foreign policy behaviour has been the crux 
of research in many international relations theories (English School, neo-realism, 
dependency and theories, and even Wendt’s constructivism). These theories share a 
joint commitment to structuralism. Without denying the advantages of a holistic 
ontology, an FPA actor-based perspective should nevertheless deconstruct these 
structures, which are layered at various levels of governance66. They should study the 
dialectical interplay between actors’ strategies and the multiple contexts in which they 
are embedded. Deconstructing foreign policy contexts implies identifying the 
structural factors that matter most to foreign policy-makers.  
 
These policy contexts are first material, i.e. geographical, contexts. Geography 
“imposes costs, limits and difficulties; […] it shapes attitudes and decisions by 
providing, in interaction with politics and technology, differentiated opportunities”67. 
There are, second, semi-material contexts, i.e. those human-made factors that impact 
upon the significance of material ones in the pursuit of foreign policy goals. 
Technology, transport infrastructures and the facilities enabling the extraction or 
processing of natural resources greatly influence foreign policy actors’ capabilities, 
and thus choice. There are, third, political contexts, which are constructed through 
interdependencies, and have a strong relational dimension. And there are finally 
cultural contexts, which are embedded in actors’ strategic doctrine and security 
identity. Those cultural contexts have a strong normative dimension.  
 
1.1.2.3. Process in Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
An actor-oriented analysis of foreign policy actions should also examine the 
procedures and rationalities upon which foreign policy actors rely. Rationality, unlike 
determinism, implies that choices are made as a result of a cognitive process, enabling 
actors to anticipate the impact of their decisions. Many different ideal-types of 
rationality have been exposed in the literature; they are sometimes presented in 
dichotomous terms, e.g. procedural vs. substantive 68 ; individual vs. collective 69 ; 
                                                 
65 Hudson, V. M. 2008. ‘The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis.’ In Foreign Policy: 
Theories, Actors, Cases, eds. Smith, S., et al. p. 20. 
66 Hollis, M. and Smith, S. 1991. ‘Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations.’ 
Review of International Studies vol.17 (4). 
67 Hill, C. 2003. The Politics of Foreign Policy. p. 170. 
68 Simon, H. A. 1978. ‘Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought.’ The American Economic 
Review vol.68 (2); Simon, H. A. 1982. ‘From Substantive to Procedural Rationality.’ In Decision 
Making: Approaches and Analysis, eds. McGrew, A. G. and Wilson, M. J. 
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analytic70; bounded71. In many classical theories of foreign policy, rational choice 
models are applied to explain actors’ behaviour. They assume that policy-makers are 
capable of “generat[ing] subjective probability estimates of the consequences of the 
options that they consider, to update these estimates as they consider new evidence, 
and to maximize their subjective expected utility”72. Rational choice models also 
expect that policy-makers are capable of experiential learning73.  
 
Although widely used in FPA, rational choice models are not without limitations. 
First, the cognitive frames used by decision-makers to appraise a foreign policy issue 
tend to be simplified, or bounded. Nuances and subtleties are neglected, which 
restricts the policy-options available. Second, actors tend to resist rational 
counterfactual facts, if those facts are inconsistent with their a priori beliefs74. An 
interesting distinction can be made in this respect between “foxes”, who are inductive 
cognisers, searching for new information but lacking of an overarching consistent 
understanding of foreign policy dynamics, and “hedgehogs” are more deductive 
cognisers, systematically vetting their arch-theories with empirical facts, which they 
tend to manipulate so that they fit into their models. Foxes are believed to make 
foreign policy more adaptative than hedgehogs75. Foreign policy actors, third, rely on 
simplified cognitive structures, when they process information and frame their 
decisions76. These provide a cognitive map that is flawed by different types of biases 
(representativeness, availability or anchoring), resulting in the impairment of rational 
choices77. Foreign policy actors may, for instance, fail to act rationally when their 
choice on am issue is determined “with regard to a so-called reference point (often 
status quo), in terms of which they are risk-averse with respect to gains, and risk 
acceptant with respect to losses”78. Other cognitive biases, having similar implications 
                                                                                                                                            
69 Hill, C. 2003. The Politics of Foreign Policy. p. 97 ff; McMahon, C. 2001. Collective Rationality and 
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McGrew, A. G. and Wilson, M. J. 
71 Selten, R. 2001. ‘What Is Bounded Rationality.’ In Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, eds. 
Gigerenzer, G. and Selten, R; Keohane, R. O. 2005. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the 
World Political Economy.  chap. 7. 
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Models.’ In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, eds. Smith, S., et al. p. 103 ff. 
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Styles and Historical Reasoning.’ American Political Science Review vol.95 (4). 
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76 see Vertzberger, Y. Y. I. 1990. The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and 
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77 for an overview, see Tetlock, P. E. and McGuire, C. J. 1986. ‘Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign 
Policy.’ Political Behavior Annual vol.1. p. 152 ff; Vertzberger. The world in their minds: information 
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al. p. 338; see also Farkas, A. 1996. ‘Evolutionary Models in Foreign Policy Analysis.’ International 
Studies Quarterly vol.40 (3). p. 345 ff. 
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and benefiting from the lack of accountability of foreign-policy actors, can be 
mentioned (e.g. fundamental attribution error, hindsight biases)79.  
 
1.1.2.4. Instruments in Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
Implementation is a critical phase of any policy-process that is not self-executive, but 
this is perhaps even more the case in the field of foreign policy, where the stakes, in 
terms of security, are high. Resources, when operationalised through technology or 
expertise, provide foreign policy-makers with capabilities. But for them to be 
projected on the external environment, instruments need to be devised. Foreign policy 
instruments may mobilise a variety of capabilities (e.g. political, military, economic, 
cultural and ideological). Analytically, they can be hierarchised on a soft-hard power 
continuum. Soft power refers to more intangible forms of power exhibiting “the 
ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences 
or define their interests in ways consistent with its own”80. It is exerted through 
cultural and ideological attraction (or persuasion) or manipulation of 
interdependences, especially within international regimes. Structuring situations 
means, for instance, influencing other actors’ beliefs by setting the agenda or framing 
security issues. The exercise of power, when legitimised, is more likely to trigger 
voluntary, and more lasting change –but it is a longer-term strategy. Foreign policy 
actors usually try to combine soft and hard power instruments in ways that are 
mutually reinforcing81. They strive for using instruments in a way that maximises 
what they call “smart power”82.  
 
Foreign policy instruments are generally used in a logic of escalation, i.e. a game of 
competitive risk-taking that renders bargaining very costly83. This logic of escalation 
is not uniform; its shaping also depends on the actors’ capabilities and foreign policy 
objectives84. The logic of escalation does not always guarantee effectiveness, nor does 
it systematically result in compliance. It may conversely spark off aggressive 
reactions, when escalation is reciprocated. Just as soft law may prove more effective 
than hard law in some domains of international law85, soft power instruments may 
prove more effective than hard power instruments in some configurations of 
international relations (although it cannot replace hard power instruments in all 
configurations)86.  
 
1.1.2.5. Outputs in Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
                                                 
79 Tetlock, P. E. 1985. ‘Accountability: A Social Check on the Fundamental Attribution Error.’ Social 
Psychology Quaterly vol.48 (3); Tetlock, P. E. and McGuire, C. J. 1986. ‘Cognitive Perspectives on 
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80 Nye, J. S. 1990. ‘Soft Power.’ Foreign Policy vol.80. p. 168. 
81 Brighi, E. and Hill, C. 2008. ‘Implementation and Behaviour.’ In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, 
Cases, eds. Smith, S., et al. p. 127 ff; Hill, C. 2003. The Politics of Foreign Policy. 
82 Wilson, E. J. 2008. ‘Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power.’ The ANNALS of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science vol.616. 
83 Carlson, L. J. 1995. ‘A Theory of Escalation and International Conflict.’ The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution vol.39 (3). 
84 Geller, D. S. 1990. ‘Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation.’ The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution vol.34 (2). 
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Evaluating the success or failure of foreign policy actions is an essential step in FPA, 
not least because it helps understanding the historical and normative contexts 
underpinning the shaping of new foreign policy objectives. Failures, for instance, are 
likely to induce negative experiential learning. This dimension of FPA, however, has 
been widely neglected in the literature, so that there is today “not even a common 
understanding of what is meant by success” in foreign policy87. The existing studies 
usually concentrate on only evaluating the effectiveness of three types of instruments. 
First, it is commonly contended that military instruments prove overwhelmingly 
effective –i.e. they are “the only effective means for achieving ambitious foreign 
policy goals like taking or defending territory, altering a state’s military behaviour, 
and changing a state’s regime or internal political structure” 88 . Second, the 
scholarship admits that economic sanctions do not prove very successful on target 
states 89 , although chances for success are improved when democracies are the 
initiators90, and actors interact in contexts where international economic cooperation 
prevails91. Third, a growing interest is devoted to the potential of public diplomacy, 
which arguably starts to “make a difference”, thanks to the use of new technologies in 
world politics92.  
 
The broader literature distinguishes three dimensions in its assessment of 
failure/success. The first one is effectiveness. It denotes “the degree to which a rule 
induces changes in behavior that further the goals; improves the state of the 
underlying problem; or achieves its policy objectives”93. Effectiveness is conceptually 
distinct from implementation, which is the process of putting policy objectives into 
practice; and it also differs from compliance, which is a “state of conformity or 
identity between an actor’s behavior and a specified rule [or policy objective]”94. The 
second dimension that should be taken into account in the evaluation of foreign policy 
outputs is the cost-efficiency of the instruments chosen by policy-actors, i.e. policy 
efficiency. This dimension is not included in the assessment of policy effectiveness, 
and is often neglected by foreign policy analysts95. Policies that are considerably 
costly (e.g. military action) may prove effective, but policies fostering less costly 
instruments and eventually prove equally effective, should be granted a higher degree 
of success. Effectiveness and efficiency, however, may be at odd with a third 
dimension, i.e. legitimacy. In order to be fully successful, foreign policy actions shall 
serve the ends of the people, both internally and externally 96 . This legitimacy 
dimension is most salient in democracies, where foreign policy-makers are 
increasingly expected to exhibit some level of accountability. 
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1.1.2.6. Analysing European Foreign Policy through Foreign Policy Analysis? 
 
Sceptical observers may criticise the attempt at applying FPA to EFP. Two arguments 
may be advanced. First, FPA is not an outcome-oriented approach, and it is thus of 
little help in explaining and assessing EFP –a domain that is often approached through 
its outputs. EFP studies often rely on perspective underlining the “actorness” of the 
EU, conceived as “international actor”97, “collective presence”98, “civilian power”99, 
“ethical power”100, or “normative power”101. Their object of research is rarely 
located in the “inside” process of EFP-making. EFP studies are more interested in 
researching the external impact of the EFP, for instance, in terms of level of 
recognition, cohesion, authority and autonomy 102 . Using FPA, a process-oriented 
approach, to scrutinise EFP may be unconventional in this respect, but it is not ill-
fitted. Indeed, the argument stating that FPA, unlike EFP actorness-perspectives, fails 
to evaluate policy outcomes is flawed, since FPA does include an evaluative analysis 
of foreign policy outputs, for instance in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and 
legitimacy. In fact, one may argue that FPA covers a broader analytical scope than 
EFP actorness-based approaches: it is both actor-oriented, actor-specific, whilst 
refuting the presumed EU unitariness. This approach better responds, arguably, to the 
“multiple realities” of the EFP103.  
 
The second argument questioning the applicability of FPA contends that the EU is a 
sui generis foreign policy actor, since traditional FPA presupposes ontological 
statehood 104 . This “poses significant conceptual and theoretical challenges to 
conventional conceptions of agency and power”105, and arguably requires a “radically 
new reconceptualisation of [the EFP] subject-matter”106. This scepticism rests on a 
traditional state-centric understanding of FPA, which posits the existence of clear 
boundaries between the realms of domestic and foreign policy as prerequisite for 
analysis. This assumption, however, is not central to FPA. There is room in FPA for 
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multi-level analysis and integrative, multifactoral approaches 107 . FPA proponents 
argue indeed that “explanatory variables from all levels of analysis, from the most 
micro to the most macro, are of interest to the analyst to the extent that they affect 
decision-making”108. Drawing forcibly analytical boundaries on a territorial basis in 
order to disentangle processes that have a weak or non-territorial basis can only result 
in flawed analysis. More importantly, “taking the state as the sole reference point for 
foreign policy is no longer tenable”109. A wide range of “new security” actors has 
emerged at the subnational and transnational level (e.g. religious groups, criminal 
organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGO), international NGOs and 
multinational enterprises). Scholars who consider that the EFP is a sui generis 
phenomenon should then acknowledge that a “transformational FPA” has emerged, 
which relaxes the state-centric assumptions of classical FPA110. This transformational 
FPA allows the analysis of the foreign policy of sui generis actors like the EU, whilst 
avoiding the classical conclusion that the EU is “an incompetent state”111. It can best 
deal with the multiple “sources of (in)coherence” characterising EFP 112 , both 
horizontally (in a new security perspective) and vertically (in a MLG perspective). 
 
1.2. Reviewing the literature on Europeanisation 
 
These last two decades have seen a remarkable growth in Europeanisation studies. 
This growth is remarkable, indeed. It contrasts with the development of the research 
in other fields of comparative politics and international relations, and it rightly 
denotes an “emergent field of inquiry” 113  that has become highly attractive to 
researchers indulging in cross-level and divide-transcendent thinking. Unfortunately, 
this growth has been mostly quantitative. It has been motivated by the sectoral and 
geographical expansion of the scope of Europeanisation studies, rather than driven by 
the conceptual and theoretical efforts needed to consolidate the burgeoning “set of 
puzzles”114. Once concentrated on member states’ domestic politics and institutions, 
the Europeanisation research agenda has now grown so far as to encompass conflict 
resolution in Moldova and Abkhazia115. Threatened by conceptual overstretching, this 
inflationary growth has failed to develop shared definitions and compelling models.  
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Europeanisation research, to date, remains an unconsolidated, poorly differentiated 
field of inquiry, approached by a variety of conceptual definitions and various 
research strategies, each shedding light on a particular conception of the phenomenon. 
Some studies understand Europeanisation formally and a minima, as a process of 
national adaptation through legal compliance 116 . They investigate “the growing 
influence of European treaties, directives and case law on the substance of domestic 
legal systems”117. Other studies encompass a wider ontology, and therewith examine 
all kinds of “pressures emanating […] indirectly from EU membership”118, including 
“the impact of the development of transnational society […] and supranational 
governance […] on national process and outcomes”119.  
 
The major problem with Europeanisation research is not that it produced a great 
variety of studies premised on different conceptual choices. Some argue indeed that 
Europeanisation is an essentially contested concept, “no one use of which can be set 
up as its generally accepted and therefore correct or standard use”120. And as such, it 
is the promise of vivid debates within the European scholarship, and beyond. The 
major problem with Europeanisation research is rather that “the majority of its work 
not been reflexive about the concepts it is employing” 121 . Some scholars 
conceptualised Europeanisation with great depth but atrophied the concept’s 
theoretical and field utility. By choosing a definitional (as opposed to denotational) 
approach to concept formation, they constructed a concept with “high discriminatory 
power”122, but too little utility with regards to the major developments that European 
member states and the European Union undergo. Other scholars, whishing to have a 
broader definiendum, magnified the concept’s expected utility. But as they had to 
define its attributes (definiens), they realised that they had been considerably 
undermining their concept’s boundedness123.  
 
In writing their papers, Europeanisation researchers usually do devote some 
preliminary thoughts to defining their concept. Such academic cautiousness is indeed 
anything but superfluous, considering the “many faces of Europeanisation”124, or the 
concept’s alleged “essential contestability”125. Amidst the semantic and conceptual 
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confusion, bones of contention between conceptual families have become better 
organising principles than family resemblances. They divide scholars both on the 
theoretical role of Europeanisation (the vertical debate), and its epistemology (the 
horizontal debate).  
 
1.2.1. The vertical debate on the theoretical role of Europeanisation 
 
The first conceptual debate divides scholars on the theoretical role that is assigned to 
Europeanisation vis-à-vis European integration 126 . Therein, Europeanisation is 
conceived of as a unidirectional process of linear change, possibly admitting 
epiphenomenal feedback effects. It operates vertically (mostly authoritatively) 
between domestic structures of governance and an emerging European institutional 
centre. Where scholars disagree boils down to whether Europeanisation should be 
conceptualised as an independent variable with an explanandum posited at the 
European level, or whether it is conceptualised as dependent variable with an 
explanandum posited at the domestic level. The logical separateness of the dependent 
and independent variables are therein assumed, and a rationalist approach to causation 
is prescribed.  
 
1.2.1.1. Bottom-up conceptions 
 
Bottom-up conceptual approaches identify Europeanisation as an explanans that 
accounts for the dynamics of European integration and the epigenesis of the European 
polity127. Europeanisation is for instance defined as the “emergence and development 
at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, 
and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that formalize 
interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of 
authoritative rules” 128 . This definition stresses that Europeanisation produces 
institutional change at the supranational level. Europeanisation studies accordingly 
focus on the mechanisms that a range of actors uses to project, or upload, their policy 
preferences and approaches onto the European level129. These actors negotiate shifts 
of competence from the state to the European-level130. They may be governmental 
representatives, who engage in intergovernmental bargaining with instrumental or 
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functional purposes131, or networks, which intervene at various levels of European 
governance in order to promote the unification of Europe132. Europeanisation, in this 
sense, refers to “simultaneous processes of change and a pattern of mutual adaptation 
among co-evolving institutions” resulting in functionally differentiated integration133. 
Europeanisation may finally be driven by “legal activists”, who push for the 
constitutionalisation of the European polity134. Europeanisation then refers to those 
forces that drive this fundamental shift from an intergovernmental organisation 
governed by international law to a “system of governance founded on higher law 
constitutionalism”135. 
 
The main concern with bottom-up conceptions of Europeanisation appears when 
researchers examine the top-down impact of Europeanisation on domestic 
structures136. In so doing, they attempt to extend their concept’s definiendum by 
packing-in domestic change in the explanandum, whilst not reducing the scope of the 
definiens to the degree necessary to fit the new concept. They then fail to climb the 
ladder of generality, and consequently, run the risk of conceptual stretching137. If 
Europeanisation denotes change at the European level, why should Europeanisation 
researchers primarily seek to investigate change at the domestic level? Besides, 
bottom-up conceptions often fail to “demarcate the specific territory of 
Europeanisation” vis-à-vis neighbouring concepts’, such as European integration, to 
which they can easily be substituted138. Bottom-up definitions of Europeanisation are 
for instance almost fully interchangeable with the early Haasian definition of 
European integration, i.e. the process in which “political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalty, expectations and political 
activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction 
over the pre-existing national states” 139 . This confusion renders the conceptual 
domain of Europeanisation vague, “poorly bounded”, i.e. with “definitional borders 
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which overlap neighbouring concepts”140. Despite their flaws, bottom-up conceptions 
of Europeanisation are often used in research designs aiming at the study of 
institutional change in core European member states and in policy fields that fall 
beyond the competency of the Communities (e.g. foreign and security policy). 
 
1.2.1.2. Top-down conceptions 
 
Top-down conceptions of Europeanisation account for the bulk of Europeanisation 
studies produced in the 2000s. They identify Europeanisation as a dependent variable, 
and search for explanatory factors, mostly at the supranational level, that account for 
changes in domestic structures of governance. The explanandum, then, is located at 
the domestic level, where “changes in national political systems [occur], that can be 
attributed to the development of European regional integration”141. Europeanisation, 
in other words, is “change in the core domestic institutions of governance as a 
consequence of the development of European-level institutions, identities and 
policies”142.  
 
This conception of Europeanisation builds on the European Union as being a 
référentiel for domestic actors, i.e. a normative and cognitive template to which 
national-policy makers seek to adjust themselves143. Actors accordingly download 
European ideas, norms, acquis communautaire and acquis politique144. In applicant 
states, Europeanisation likewise refers to “the impact of the EU accession process on 
national patterns of governance” 145 . Europeanisation usually implies that actors 
accommodate European demands, e.g. because these demands happily “fit” their own 
structures or because they are ready to transform their domestic structures. But 
Europeanisation researchers usually also enquire into alternative responses such as 
inertia and retrenchment146: 
 
The top-down conception of Europeanisation is premised on the post-ontological 
existence of an EU référentiel (existing prior to Europeanisation). This entails several 
flaws. First, this assumption understands very restrictively Europeanisation as EU-
isation. It reifies the EU into a unitary référentiel with clearly demarcated boundaries. 
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This reification is highly questionable, since European norms, often, are not reducible 
to EU norms147. Second, it runs the risk of prejudging the role of the EU in producing 
domestic change vis-à-vis other variables such as globalisation, democratisation, 
regionalism and neo-liberalism, which themselves may have a constitutive impact on 
so called “EU norms”148. The EU, after all, is also “a zone of intensive discursive 
practice about globalization”149.Third, it rules out the possibility that Europeanisation 
may also occur where no EU référentiel has emerged150. Héritier & Knill showed 
indeed in the French case of road haulage that Europeanisation can occur “in the 
absence of European adaptation pressure”, and that the latter “does not necessarily 
constitute a condition for domestic change” 151 . Top-down conceptions of 
Europeanisation have nonetheless become prevalent in many fields of 
Europeanisation research (especially research on institutional change in candidate 
states and in policy fields where the EU holds substantive competences). Often, they 
have been supportive of progressive efforts made in model-building, most notably 
through the development of the goodness of fit model (see section 1.2.3). Top-down 
conceptions of Europeanisation, finally, offer a non-deterministic approach to 
transformation, since they do not suggest that Europeanisation shall end up with the 
unification of the EU (unlike bottom up conceptions). The outcome of 
Europeanisation is not specified, and should first and foremost be determined 
empirically152.  
 
1.2.2. The epistemological debate on Europeanisation  
 
The second conceptual debate that divides the scholarship concerns the epistemology 
underpinning Europeanisation research, and the ontology that is ascribed to the 
European Union in its relation with the Europeanisation concept. Vertical conceptions 
of Europeanisation tend to consider Europeanisation as a process linking identifiable 
causes to distinct and separate consequences –one of them being the EU référentiel or 
the institutional centre created by European integration. Horizontal conceptions, by 
contrast, tend to consider Europeanisation as a reflexive process, in which causation 
cannot be fully established between the different variables, since structures in Europe’ 
s system of multi-level of governance are co-constitutive. Instead of viewing the EU 
as a causative point of reference, they consider it as an arena having a constitutive 
rather than a causal effect on foreign policy. 
 
1.2.2.1. Vertical conceptions 
                                                 
147 Barbé, E., et al. 2009a. ‘Drawing the Neighbours Closer... To What?: Explaining Emerging Patterns 
of Policy Convergence between the EU and Its Neighbours.’ Cooperation and Conflict vol.44 (4). 
148 Haverland, M. 2007. ‘Methodology.’ In Europeanization: New Research Agendas, eds. Graziano, P. 
and Vink, M. P; Radaelli, C. M. and Pasquier, R. 2006. ‘Encounters with Europe: Concepts, 
Definitions and Research Design.’ POLITIK 2006. 
149 Rosamond, B. 2000a. ‘Review Article: Globalization and Europeanization.’ Yearbook of European 
Studies vol.14. p. 271. 
150 see Héritier, A. and Knill, C. 2001. ‘Differential Responses to European Policies: A Comparison.’ 
In Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policymaking, ed. Héritier, A; 
Irondelle, B. 2003. ‘Europeanization without the European Union? French Military Reforms 1991–96.’ 
Journal of European Public Policy vol.10 (2). 
151 Héritier, A. and Knill, C. 2001. ‘Differential Responses to European Policies: A Comparison.’ In 
Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policymaking, ed. Héritier, A. p. 288-
290. 
152 Jachtenfuchs, M. and Kohler-Koch, B. 2004. ‘Governance and Institutional Development.’ In 
European Integration Theory, eds. Wiener, A. and Diez, T. 
 24
 
Vertical conceptions of Europeanisation emerged as a rationalist synthesis of the 
bottom-up and top-down conceptual debate. While bottom-up conceptions view 
Europeanisation as an uploading process, top-down one defines it as a downloading 
process. The weakness of the former is to ignore the consequences of the uploading, 
while the shortcoming of the latter is to overlook the genesis of the material to be 
downloaded. Complementarities are obvious, and attempts have been made to bridge 
the conceptual gap between the two approaches. Some researchers, thus, have 
integrated (or more precisely subsumed) the two conceptual strands to a higher-order 
approach, whereby Europeanisation shall both encompass bottom-up and top-down 
changes 153 . They conceive of Europeanisation as “the extent to which EC/EU 
requirements and policies have affected the determination of member states’ policy 
agendas and goals” and “the extent to which EU practices, operating procedures and 
administrative values have impinged on, and become embedded in, the administrative 
practices of member states”154 . It is a process mediated by domestic institutions 
through which actors attempt to project their preferences on the EU level, while they 
downloading into their domestic structures existing EU norms, which they in turn 
attempt to influence (feedback loops). In this two-way process, member states may 
adopt three different strategies155:: Pace-setting, i.e. “actively pushing policies at the 
European level, which reflect a member state’s policy preference and allow to 
minimize implementation costs; foot-dragging, i.e. blocking or delaying costly 
policies in order to prevent them altogether or achieve at least some compensation for 
implementation costs; and fence-sitting, i.e. neither systematically pushing policies 
nor trying to block them at the European level but building tactical coalitions with 
pace-setters and foot-draggers”. The theoretical underpinnings of this process have 
been developed in the goodness of fit model156.  
 
Two criticisms can be made here. First, this conceptualisation cannot apply to 
applicant and non EU member states, as these are usually presumed to only recipients 
of European policy, and not contributors. Unlike the member states, they cannot 
“Europeanise” (in a bottom-up understanding) their domestic preferences by 
projecting them at the European level157. Second, the articulation of the two dynamics 
(bottom-up and top-down) remains weakly conceptualised. Stone Sweet refers to 
Europeanisation as the “complex, multidimensional impact of the development of 
European law on national legal systems”, and as “the impact of the development of 
transnational society […] and supranational governance […] on national process and 
outcomes”158. While “impact […] on national legal systems” suggests a top-down 
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conception, the conditional prerequisite of “development of European law” in fact 
denotes a bottom-up conception. The same ambiguity is observed in Smits’ definition 
of Europeanisation, i.e. “the growing influence of European treaties, directives and 
case law on the substance of [their] domestic legal systems”159. In order to deal with 
this conceptual ambiguity, some researchers introduced the notion of feedback 
loops160. Their claim is therewith that they can segment the bottom-up/top-down 
relationship and explore Europeanisation as a linear series of successive causalities. 
But this practical approach does not solve the conceptual challenge, which is to 
connect bottom-up and top-down conceptions of Europeanisation within a single 
conceptual roof. It is a theoretical rather than a conceptual solution.  
 
1.2.2.2. Horizontal conceptions 
 
Horizontal conceptions of Europeanisation do not rely on an exclusively rationalistic 
logic of causality premised on the separateness of the dependent and independent 
variables; they conceive of Europeanisation as a “matter of reciprocity between 
moving features”161. Europeanisation is accordingly conceptualised as a reflexive 
process through which actors interact across levels of governance structure, so that 
their interactions have a constitutive effect on both domestic and European structures. 
This approach implies understanding the interactive, non-linear and multi-directional 
interplay between structure and agency through a broader epistemology, and 
accepting that constitutive claims shall at least complement causal thinking. This 
epistemological position towards causality has ontological implications too. By giving 
more weight to the reflexive qualities of the process, horizontal conceptions of 
Europeanisation shift the transformational focus from a rationalistic, objectivist 
ontology of being onto an ontology of becoming influenced by social-constructivism 
and thick-thinking162. It moves away from the belief that material and ideational 
structures impact upon actors’ consciousness and behaviour in a deductive manner by 
responding to authoritative claims, and draws closer to conceptualising change 
inductively as an actor’s participation in the social structures it contributes to 
constructing163.  
Horizontal conceptualisation of Europeanisation refers, for instance, to the 
“construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and 
norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and 
then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and 
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public policies”164. It is, in the same vein, defined as the “construction of a new 
collective identity –or rather a new understanding of identity- and its dissociation 
from the ethnically dominated territory of the nation-state”, and its valuing of the 
“political rather than the cultural aspects of belonging”165 . Europeanisation, as a 
“macro-process”166, is more than policy adjustment: it has a constitutive impact on 
actors’ multiple identities and preference formation. It is, in that sense, dialectically 
reflexive. Europeanisation may also ensue through the plural constitutionalisation of 
the European polity, whereby it “creates the structural premises for a decentralised 
integration of society by supporting integrative mechanisms within autonomous social 
subsystems”167. It then rests on a reflexive conception of law. 
 
Europeanisation does not imply the pre-existence or construction of a centralised 
référentiel hierarchically posited and reified as the EU. The EU, certainly, is an 
important object in the study of Europeanisation. But it is not the only one. It is one 
arena among others –an arena fostering the international diffusion of norms, or, in 
different words, a non-exhaustive “transfer platform”168 fostering hierarchical and 
heterarchical interactions between national, subnational, supranational and 
transnational actors. In this transactionalist perspective, the role of the EU is 
nonetheless important. The EU, indeed is an “institutional arena [that] steadily 
became the prime arena for […] political transaction” among member states169. This 
makes the EU special in Europeanisation studies, but it does not make it ontologically 
unique. Besides, this EU arena is not fixed; it is constituted through the interactions it 
fosters across the different levels of structure. Preferences are neither uploaded, nor 
downloaded, but socially and discursively reframed and cross-loaded170. Change then 
can be viewed as one of collective identity (trans)formation, whereby socially 
constructed identities diffuse intersubjective expectations among actors (and thereby 
co-determine their behaviour). Their institutionalisation may indeed entail that norms 
become internalised in a top-down manner, and may become a point of reference in a 
bottom-up manner. But this institutionalisation does not constitute the end-product of 
Europeanisation. To be maintained, the construct needs being reproduced, or it will be 
transformed. Horizontal conceptions of Europeanisation, thus, do not only encompass 
the emergence of a European référentiel in their explanandum –they also include the 
diffusion, maintaining and transformation thereof.  
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This horizontal approach has been criticised for being too general, as it could imply 
that any interaction at the European level has a Europeanisation dimension171. This 
critique is well-grounded, given the measure of interpretivism with which one should 
theoretically assess whether an interaction has been carried out on the European arena 
or not. In addition to that, one might blame horizontal conceptions for not delineating 
what the European arena is –beyond the EU platform. In order to make a progressive 
contribution to the conceptual debate, would-be horizontalists should therefore clarify 
the conceptual domain they assign to their conception of Europeanisation in their 
research design. They should also delineate the conceptual boundaries that distinguish 
their conception of Europeanisation from conceptual neighbours such as convergence, 
harmonisation, and political integration172. And they should finally explain how they 
consider isolating the horizontal effect of Europeanisation vis-à-vis the many other 
phenomena at play (e.g. globalisation, democratisation). In a word, much remains to 
be done before a truly reflexive understanding of Europeanisation prevails in the 
scholarship. 
 
1.2.3. Theorising Europeanisation 
 
Europeanisation research is still at the early phase of its theoretical development. As 
noted in the literature, Europeanisation “remains a relatively new theoretical interest 
and has produced more questions than answers”173. And in a similar vein, Bulmer 
notes that Europeanisation is not per se a theory, but the “phenomenon which a range 
of theoretical approaches have sought to explain”174. Despite these considerations, 
some attempts have been made to theorise Europeanisation as middle-range theory. 
Inspired by new institutionalism, they have resulted in series of rationalistic 
approaches labelled as “goodness of fit” model175.  
 
The goodness of fit model is premised on a vertical conception of Europeanisation. It 
theorises adaptational change in domestic structures of governance as a consequence 
of EU integration, and sheds light on the causal underpinnings thereof. In this model, 
the key determinant of change is the exercise of adaptational pressures on domestic 
structures of governance, stemming from a “mismatch” between EU and domestic 
structures. These pressures are mediated by domestic institutions that constrain or 
facilitate change. Europeanisation, accordingly, is issue-, institution- and sector-
specific176. These adaptational pressures do not apply to states’ structures as a whole, 
but specifically affect policy-sectors and particular sets of institutions. And mediating 
factors vary among policy-sectors and sets of institutions as well as among states. 
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That is why Europeanisation is often referred to as the differential impact of European 
integration on domestic structures. As summarised by Caporaso, “outcomes are not 
expected to be identical, except in the improbable case where adaptative pressures and 
mediating institutions are identical”177. 
 
In order to better understand this model, it is necessary to examine the theoretical 
basis it is built on. New institutionalism provides in this respect the well-needed 
“catalogue of research hypotheses” on the impact of institutions upon political actors, 
behaviour and outcomes178. It provides a theoretical framework to understand policy 
choices within a “political system”, where power is shared among various actors179. 
Institutionalism is not a unified theory. It consists of (at least) three different 
approaches: rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalism.  
 
1.2.3.1. Rational Choice Institutionalism 
 
Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) views institutions as “formal legalistic entities 
and sets of decisions and rules that impose obligations upon self-interested political 
actors”180. In this “thin” conception of institutions, institutions matter as contexts for 
strategic interactions: they “limit and/or facilitate the pursuit of [the actors’] strategies 
and establish a systematic connection between domestic political conditions and 
incentives to comply with European policy demands”181. Institutions do not alter 
actors’ preferences, since interest formation is considered by RCI scholars as 
exogenous to institutional settings. Preferences are fixed, and rational actors 
determine their behaviour instrumentally so as to maximise their attainment. The 
purpose of institutions is then, as any international regime, to reduce transaction costs 
and facilitate collective action among utility-maximisers. Politics is seen by RCI 
scholars as a “series of collective action dilemmas” whereby actors interact in mixed-
motive games 182 . Stressing a “calculus approach”, RCI scholars consider that 
institutions “structure interactions by affecting the range and sequence of alternatives 
on the choice-agenda or by providing information and enforcement mechanisms that 
reduce uncertainty about the corresponding behaviour of others, and allow gains from 
exchange”183. In that sense, the role of institutions goes beyond that of a neutral arena 
for political interactions.  
 
The EU, in RCI, is accordingly viewed as an “emerging political opportunity 
structure” favouring “differential empowerment” among the member states 184 . 
European integration, RCI scholars argue, implies the emergence of new opportunities 
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and constraints, and a redistribution of resources. In order to maximise their utility, 
rational actors seek to minimise the institutional misfit caused by integration. They 
therefore seek to upload their own preferences in shaping the EU institutional settings, 
so as to lower the costs incurring to them through subsequent adaptation. The 
adaptation process, however, is not straightforward: mediating factors at the domestic 
level “filter the domestic impact of Europe”185. In line with their ontological premises, 
RCI scholars acknowledge two kind of mediating factors: first, veto players, i.e. 
“individual or collective actors whose agreement […] is required for a change of the 
status quo”186; they can thereby inhibit materially and effectively domestic adaptation. 
Second, facilitating formal institutions, which use material and ideational resources to 
support domestic change. 
 
1.2.3.2. Historical Institutionalism 
 
Historical institutionalism (HI) adopts an epistemology of “thicker” rationalism to 
explain institutional change, but only in the long-run187. On short-run issues, HI does 
not really offer an alternative approach to RCI instrumental “calculus approach”. HI 
and RCI share several premises on the role of institutions in the political process188. 
But when considered in a historical perspective, institutions acquire the characteristics 
of normative social order, and may accordingly leave their own imprint on political 
outcomes. HI stresses the need to analyse policy-setting in a structuralist perspective 
following a “cultural approach”189. Actors, according to HI, are not perfectly rational 
utility-maximisers, their understanding of mixed-motive games is rationally bounded 
by normative commitments, cognitive ability and social control 190 . Actors, for 
instance, may pursue multiple inconsistent purposes, and only have a limited 
understanding of the consequences of their own strategy. They may also develop 
misrepresentations of the others’ strategies191. HI scholars, therefore, prefer to view 
actors as utility-satisficers, whereby behaviour is determined by contextual 
perceptions rather than sheer instrumentality. HI adds that the cognitive and 
normative filters for interpretation and perception that are used by actors in 
determining their strategy and interest are embedded in institutions, which makes 
institutions and interests mutually constituted.  
 
At the core of HI lies also an “image of social causation that is ‘path dependent’”192. 
This means that there is no straightforward institutional adaptation –adjustments are 
made incrementally, “building upon traditions and arrangements that were already in 
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place”193. And these adjustments have to fit into the former institutional setting, which 
“reflect[s] the historical experience of a community”194. Path dependency then implies 
that institutions are neither completely malleable, nor perfectly rigid. They result from 
an “historical process of sedimentation” 195 , whereby old and new institutional 
elements coexist. This historical inefficiency translates into institutional inertia, which 
makes it very difficult for change to “lock in” institutionally. It is also a source of 
unintended consequence that contrasts with the RCI instrumental effectiveness. Path-
dependency does not necessarily mean historical determinism though. Thelen, for 
instance, acknowledges that under certain historical circumstances, “critical 
junctures” can be operated, through which key actors renegotiate the configuration 
and purpose of institutions196. These exceptional (historical) momentums produce a 
“branching point” deviating institutions onto another dependency-path197.  
 
1.2.3.3. Sociological Institutionalism 
 
The third approach frequently identified in the new institutionalism literature draws 
from social constructivism. It stresses the normative and cognitive dimensions of 
institutions, and the mutual constitutiveness of institutions and interests. In this 
“thick” conception of institutionalism, known as sociological institutionalism (SI), 
actors are expected to fulfil social expectations. They do not conform to institutions, 
broadly defined as “frames of meaning”198 or “relatively enduring collection[s] of 
rules and organised practices derived from collective identities and belongings and 
embedded in structures of meaning and resources”199. They internalise institutions, 
which implies that they are ready to change their interests and preferences, not only 
their strategies to attain pre-defined objectives. The role of socialisation herein is 
underlined by the sociological institutionalist literature200. But mediating factors also 
intervene at the domestic level to constrain or facilitate this process of internalisation. 
Norm entrepreneurs can for instance “mobilise […] to persuade actors to redefine 
their interest and identities”201. Epistemic communities and advocacy coalitions may 
also use persuasion and framing to influence positively of negatively internalisation. 
And cooperative informal institutions, which are embedded in the domestic 
institutions of the state, may also act as mediating factors –supporting for instance 
consensus-building or burden sharing202. But in the SI logic of change, actors do not 
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maximise utility or satisfy self-interest, but mainly strive for acting in an appropriate 
way, i.e. in line with the shared understandings embedded in their institutional 
identity-construct. Their behaviour has to reflect the norms that are attached to their 
role and identities by the institution. In so doing, actors reproduce the institution, and 
in turn, have a constitutive effect on them.  
 
Though relying on a broader ontology than RCI and HI, SI nevertheless adopts a 
rationalistic epistemology in explaining adaptational change. The EU is indeed 
conceived of as a normative construct with its own strategic identity and security 
doctrine. These EU norms create normative mismatches with national structures, 
prompting adaptational change –through internalisation. Though conceiving of the EU 
as an ontologically thick institution capable of transforming member states’ 
preferences, SI therefore relies on an epistemologically thin conception of social 
constructivism, as it neglects the reflexivity underpinning social change. 
 
1.2.3.4. The limitations of the goodness of fit model and the way forwards 
 
The goodness of fit model provides a simple, relatively intuitive and parsimonious 
explanation of top-down institutional change in structures of domestic governance. 
European integration, by generating structural misfits, exerts adaptational pressures 
on domestic actors. These pressures are mediated by a range of intervening variables, 
which contribute, together with the degree of misfit, to determine the extent to which 
domestic structures are “europeanised”. This rationalistic model seems to work for 
material misfits (RCI) as well as ideational ones (SI). In the first case, actors seek for 
differential empowerment, whereas in SI, domestic adapt because they internalise 
norms. In HI, the model gains additional features enabling to explain institutional 
inertia and resilience to change.  
 
Attractive though it looks, this model suffers from several pitfalls. First, and most 
critically, it rests on a very rationalistic epistemology. Europeanisation is 
conceptualised as a vertical process of adjustment. Even in the sociological version of 
the model, actors are assumed to be able to perceive a normative misfit between 
domestic norms and European norms, considered exogenous. The model thus applies 
a logic of consequentialism to preferences formation; and it does not explain why 
actors (at the domestic and European levels) hold these preferences, and it assumes 
that EU preferences do not change through interaction (only domestic actors’ do). 
Beside this epistemological critique, another assumption can be questioned. The 
goodness of fit model suggests indeed that Europeanisation requires the building of, 
or the adaptation to, material and ideational (policy or institutional) templates (or 
référentiels) at the European level. However, it has been argued that Europeanisation 
can occur “in the absence of European adaptation pressure”203. And that the degree of 
misfit is not always correlated with the degree of adaptation204. The model, finally, 
gives a decisive role to intervening variables, e.g. level of economic development205, 
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attitude towards globalisation 206 , selective use of the EU as an argument for 
reforms207. Their significance in terms of phenomenal outcome sometimes proves 
higher than that of adaptational pressures208. This is problematic, as the model claims 
to explain Europeanisation through adaptational pressures, not through intervening 
variables. All in all, the goodness of fit model does provide relevant explanations of 
institutional change in many fields, but it may be “a special case rather than a general 
explanation”209 –a special case, whereby Europe is reducible to the EU and the EU 
can be reified as a référentiel.  
 
What is needed to complement the picture is a theoretical framework building on a 
broader epistemology –i.e. on the horizontal conception of Europeanisation. This 
framework will surely integrate important elements of the goodness of fit model, as 
adaptational change does belong to the conceptual domain of Europeanisation. But 
Europeanisation, arguably, is not limited to adaptational change. It extends beyond the 
former’s epistemological boundaries, towards instances of institutional change that 
are not solely propelled by the existence of a misfit but more generally rendered 
possible by cross-level interactions. 
 
1.3.  Reviewing the literature on the Europeanisation of foreign 
policy 
 
Once considered as a classical international organisation, the EU has now become an 
international actor, capable of agency of its own, including in foreign policy matters. 
This development often constitutes an “empirical embarrassment” to International 
Relations (IR) scientists, who find it hard to envision that international organisations 
may acquire some the agency that used to be reserved to their principals210. Many 
scientists in the IR scholarship and in the governments were accustomed to consider 
foreign policy with “great sensitivity […] as a ‘special domain’ in which national 
concerns dominated international (or European) interests211. Political cooperation in 
this area was believed to “rarely if ever explicitly require such changes on the part of 
EU states”212. After all, foreign policy was amongst “the last great bastion of state 
sovereignty, […] the reserved domain of the European nation-states” 213 , i.e. 
something preserved from exogenous interferences. In a world dominated by statal 
conceptions of inter-national politics, foreign policy, in a word, was presumed 
immune to Europeanisation.  
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And yet, a number of studies show that Europeanisation is a pregnant reality in 
Europe; that European and national structures are interrelated; that ideas are diffused 
across levels of governance; and that changes ensue through various mechanisms, e.g. 
compliance, learning, or obedience. Does this astonishing development constitute a 
“new stage in the history of Western European states”214? Does it sound the knell of 
the Westphalian political order in Europe? Or is it a regional adaptation to meta-
structural changes in world politics aimed at rescuing Westphalia and strengthening 
an increasingly weakened state215? The truth probably lies in-between, i.e. in the 
transformation of the relationship between sovereignty and territoriality –a domain on 
which Europeanisation research can definitely shed some insightful light. 
 
1.3.1. Conceptual approaches 
 
In comparison with other policy fields (e.g. environmental policy, competition policy, 
communications and media), the Europeanisation of national foreign policy remains 
an under-researched field of inquiry216. It started to attract scholars’ attention only by 
the very end of the 1990s. This burgeoning interest originated in the growing corpus 
of studies devoted to the EFP. It was motivated by the introduction of the CFSP in the 
Maastricht treaties (in replacement of the EPC), the transfer in the CFSP of important 
assets from the Western European Union (WEU) in the Amsterdam Treaty (e.g. 
Petersberg tasks), as well as the wars in Yugoslavia, which pointed out the 
weaknesses of the EFP.  
 
The literature, more specifically, is dominated by two conceptual approaches, both of 
them related to vertical conceptions of Europeanisation. On the one hand, an 
integrationist approach to Europeanisation conceptualises Europeanisation as a 
bottom-up process of foreign policy change leading to the emergence of European 
structures of foreign policy governance. On the other hand, a top-down approach 
conceptualises Europeanisation as the impact of the CFSP on domestic structures of 
foreign policy governance. These approaches are premised on “a clear distinction 
between state actors and structures, in which European integration is treated as an 
exogenous force”217. Both approaches thus adopt a rationalistic epistemology. The 
researchers who adopt them usually strive for unveiling the causality links that run 
between the European and national levels of foreign policy-making. The horizontal 
approach, which “integrates European governance as an endogenous process in 
foreign policy” is still very much underrepresented218.  
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1.3.1.1. Bottom-up approaches 
 
The bottom-up definitions of Europeanisation in the field of foreign policy allude to 
the growing importance of the EPC process (until the Treaty of Maastricht), and to the 
subsequent development of the CFSP. In this understanding, Europeanisation refers to 
the elevation of foreign policy-making onto the European level. It has to do with 
“aspects of foreign policy being ‘taken out’ of the exclusively national conduct of 
foreign policy and elevated to EU policy-making”219. This process is also seen as one 
“of integrating policies and actions of the member states” 220 . The key logic 
underpinning this integrative dynamics is not straightforwardly unique. Most of 
“bottom-uppers” identify Europeanisation as the “national projection of domestic 
foreign policy objectives and approaches onto the EU level”221. National foreign 
policy executives are believed to remain the primary actors driving the strategic 
Europeanisation of their domestic interests.  
 
Bottom-up Europeanisation mainly operates from the domestic to the EU level, but 
not only. At the EU level, it also ensues through the “communautarisation” of foreign 
policy, i.e. its departure from intergovernmentalism. Europeanisation then refers to 
“the process by which EPC (and later CFSP) moved closer to EC norms, policies and 
habits, without itself becoming supranationalized” 222 . It should be noted that 
communautarisation here does not necessarily refer to the “1st-pillarisation” of CFSP. 
It denotes a gradual process of change, not a sense of attainment. For instance, the 
communautarisation of foreign policy was used in the 1990s to designate the 
commitment of member states to institutionalise the EPC within a newly formed 
Common Foreign and Security Policy223, without though, their being in favour of the 
supranationalisation of an area “so sensitive in terms of national sovereignty”224. 
National foreign policies then became europeanised as “EPC habits and procedures of 
political cooperation became institutionalised into a corporate body of European 
values and norms, [which] eventually caused member states to change their attitude 
and preferences”225. Europeanisation had an ideational dimension, since it “changed 
the way individual states determined and pursued their interests”226.  
 
A more radical integrationist approach, though, refers to the Europeanisation of 
national foreign policy as the development of EC competences in high politics, in 
particular through the cross-pillarisation of the CFSP227. Here, communautarisation is 
understood in the sense of 1st-pillarisation indeed (although again, not in a sense of 
attainment). Another definition includes the “strengthening of the European pillar” in 
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Nato228 or the prevalence of European continentalist views, initiatives and common 
actions in the field of security policy (as opposed to the divisive effect of Euro-
Atlanticism in Europe) 229 . Europeanisation then refers to the development of 
distinctly European activities in world security, and the growing external involvement 
of the EU in remote conflicts230.  
 
1.3.1.2. Top-down definitions  
 
A top-down conceptualisation of Europeanisation in the field of foreign policy 
produces a different set of definitions. These refer to Europeanisation as a process of 
domestic adaptation to EU policies, implying changes in national foreign policy, 
decision-making mechanisms, values and identity 231 . Domestic adaptation is 
understood as “a move by national actors towards a greater consistency with the EU 
foreign and security policy”232. This adaptational move is operated as a response to 
pressures exerted on “all national policymakers concerned with EU affairs to follow 
centrally determined norms, rules and deadlines” 233 . Top-down definitions of 
Europeanisation are accordingly premised on the existence of a European référentiel, 
e.g. “a distinctive (West) European position in international affairs”234. 
 
This is not to say that this référentiel is the only driving force involved in 
Europeanisation. Domestic factors do matter. In certain cases, Europeanisation may 
only act as a catalyst for domestic change235, while in others, it may even only be an 
alibi, a justification for reforms236. Nor does it imply that this référentiel necessarily 
exists en l’état, prior to the occurrence of Europeanisation (post-ontological 
argument), or that “Europeanisation would not exist without European integration”237. 
Indeed, policy-adaptation only refers in this case to “a change of an existing position 
or the creation of a new position on an unsettled policy problem thanks to a state’s 
participation in the EPC/CFSP system”238. When a European template for policy 
action exists, adaptational change is straightforward; but even when no such template 
pre-exists, Europeanisation is possible, if national policy-makers, turning to the 
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existing CFSP framework, are subsequently subject to adaptational pressures. In a 
word, change may not only be caused by discrepancies with an established 
institutional order at the European level, but also by the discrepancies that emerge as 
this institutional order is being established. In praxis, this means that 
“Europeanization intervenes not only after the process of integration, when common 
institutions and policies exist, but also during and even before the process”239. This 
allows to study top-down Europeanisation in policy fields that have not been 
thouroughly integrated (yet) (e.g. defence policy), and in states that are not EU 
member (yet) (e.g. candidate states).  
 
Another definition of Europeanisation, which is closely related to the latter, precisely 
conceive of Europeanisation as outwards process, whereby the EU exports “its 
structures and values beyond its territory and embed[s] third countries within these”240. 
Here, the emphasis is laid on third countries downloading European norms. This 
conceptualisation is especially relevant for the study of Europeanisation in the EU’s 
neighbourhood or in enlargement countries241, i.e. in countries that arguably tend to 
“simplistically” download European ways of doing as a “means of attaining economic 
and institutional modernisation” 242 . It is finally also relevant in the study of 
“europeanised” conflicts, well beyond European borders. In this case, Europeanisation 
is defined as “EU’s growing ‘presence’ in the wider region” (not in terms of 
capabilities, but in terms of significance for the downloading parties)243. As explained 
in a book dedicated to this approach, it is “a process which is activated and 
encouraged by European institutions, primarily the European Union, by linking the 
final outcome of the conflict to a certain degree of integration of the parties involved 
in it into European structures”244. Europeanisation, in this understanding, is a “method 
of conflict settlement and conflict resolution”245. It provokes “conflict with conflict” 
by creating “perturbations” in the context within which conflicts erupt, e.g. by 
introducing conditionality instruments, socialising actors, and issuing reports246.  
 
1.3.1.3. Vertical definitions 
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Combining the bottom-up and top-down approaches, some definitions refer to 
Europeanisation as a “two-way process” of preference shaping at the European level 
through the projection of national foreign policy objectives (uploading) and 
preference accommodation at the domestic level (downloading)247. More precisely, 
Europeanisation then refers to “the process of change at the domestic level (be it of 
policies, preferences or institutions) originated by the adaptation pressures generated 
by the European integration process; a process of change whose intensity and 
character depend on the ‘goodness of fit’ of domestic institutions and adaptation 
pressures”248. Alas, the conceptualisation of the connection between the uploading 
and downloading dimensions of Europeanisation remains weak. If the goodness of fit 
model yields good result in snapshot analysis, it does not satisfactorily explain the 
reciprocities underlying the dual process of EFP formation and domestic change (see 
section 1.2.3.4).  
 
Proponents of the goodness of fit model explain that the degree of adaptational 
pressures determines the intensity and character of the behavioural response. Börzel & 
Risse identify three responses249: absorption takes place when domestic change is of 
low intensity, accommodation when it is moderate, and transformation when it is 
subject to intense pressures. Miskimmon notes however that “EU Member States are 
affected in an asymmetric fashion through their involvement in CFSP”250. This is 
logical, since Europeanisation is aimed at their differential empowerment251. In praxis, 
this means that smaller states, through Europeanisation, may have enhanced access to 
information and to major decision-makers252. And it is clear that Europeanisation does 
not affect member states and non member states in a similar way253. Yet, conceptually, 
in non-EU Europe, vertical Europeanisation fails to differentiate itself from top-down 
approaches. This is because non-member states (and candidate states) have almost no 
possibility to upload their preferences onto the European level254. Being part of the 
external policy-environment of the Union, they are the recipients or EFP, and only 
become contributors as they enter the Union 255 . Vertical conceptions of 
Europeanisation in non-EU Europe thus often boils down to top-down conceptions.  
 
1.3.1.4. Horizontal definitions  
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The last set of definitions advanced in the literature views domestic and European 
foreign policy structures as becoming mutually constitutive. Defining Europeanisation, 
thus, is extremely problematic if one introduces implicit or explicit references to 
causality as an attribute that connotes the process. Europeanisation is for instance 
defined as an “interactive, ongoing and mutually constitutive process of 
‘Europeanising’ and ‘Europeanised’ countries, linking national and European 
levels”256. More specifically, it is the “transformation in the ways in which national 
foreign policy are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and 
pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from 
a complex system of collective European policy making”257.  
 
Throughout the study of this transformation, horizontalists claim the need to take into 
account the “subjective dimension of foreign policy and the self-understanding of the 
actors involved” 258 . This brings horizontalists close to adopting an interpretivist 
epistemology, although positivist approaches (when not taken as ontological position) 
are not barred, in theory. The crux of horizontal approaches is to understand the 
decentralised formation of European collective identities and foreign policy 
cultures259. It is also to uncover the “reasons”260 that have allowed national foreign 
policies to be increasingly pursued on the EU level261. This development was labelled 
by Allen under the label of “Brusselisation”262–it is the idea (not to be conflated with 
communautarisation) that foreign policy is made by national representatives, but 
increasingly in Brussels –in ways that significantly differ from foreign policy making 
in European capitals263. It contends that “public officials are no longer just agents of 
the [state]; they are participants in an evolving polity which provides opportunities for 
political action but also imposes constraints on their freedom of action”264. This 
Brusselisation of national foreign policy has a constitutive effect on foreign policy-
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makers’ identities, and may imply the re-organisation of state-centric policy-making 
structures through the reinforcement policy-networks265.  
 
1.3.2. The phenomenon of Europeanisation 
 
It has been seen that Europeanisation, in itself, is a “phenomenon which a range of 
theoretical approaches have sought to explain”266. Identifying and delineating the 
phenomenon in question should thus be a research priority. This phenomenal 
approach (what does Europeanisation entails?), however, is often neglected in favour 
of processual research (how does Europeansation works?). This is disappointing, 
since as Rosenau rightly put it, “to think theoretically one must be predisposed to ask 
about every event, every situation, or every observed phenomenon: ‘of what is it an 
instance?’” 267 . The following sections therefore aim at shedding light on the 
phenomenon of Europeanisation, based on other researchers’ findings. This 
examination cannot not conclusively help determine what the phenomenon of 
Europeanisation entails (since this has to be explored in relation with the definition of 
Europeanisation), but it nonetheless paves the way for further phenomenal research, 
by presenting an overview of its possible manifestations. 
 
1.3.2.1. Substantive and geographical scope covered by Europeanisation studies 
 
The geographical scope of Europeanisation studies in the foreign policy literature 
mainly covers EU member states. This “EU domination of Europeanization 
research” 268  falsely tends to conflate Europeanisation with EU-isation 269  or 
“unionisation”270 . As remarked by Wallace, it is necessary to “avoid eliding the 
definition of Europeanisation with membership of the EU”271. This EU-isation trap 
has been acknowledged in the wider Europeanisation literature, and prominent 
scholars called for widening the geographical scope of Europeanisation research 
beyond the boundaries of the EU, i.e. amidst candidate states and beyond272.  
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Currently, Europeanisation studies in the field of foreign policy have been carried out 
through single case studies for the following countries: France 273 ; Germany 274 ; 
Spain 275 ; Poland 276 ; Britain 277 ; Greece 278 ; Ireland 279 ; Portugal 280 ; the Czech 
Republic 281 , Romania 282  and Estonia 283 . Small-n case studies with comparative 
insights have been carried out for the following countries: Ireland an Austria284; 
France, Germany, Britain285; Hungary, Romania, Slovakia286; Netherlands, Denmark, 
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Ireland287 and the Nordic states288. Some studies compare current member states with 
prospective ones, e.g. Romania and FYROM289; Greece and Turkey290; Ukraine, 
Moldova and Romania291; and the Mediterranean states292. Some edited books with 
country-specific chapters have been published, which do address the topic of 
Europeanisation empirically, although they do not specifically deal with the concept 
of Europeanisation (but rather with EFP)293. In the Balkans, little research has been 
made on the Europeanisation of national foreign policy per se. Domestic change as a 
result of a unified European Justice and Home Affairs policy294 or EFP towards 
Kosovo 295  are remarkable exceptions, but they do not engage with the 
Europeanisation literature. Europeanisation in the Balkans has been researched by 
other scholars, but not in the field of foreign policy296. Some interesting studies have 
been carried out elsewhere in non-EU Europe (see the literature review in section 1.4).  
 
Few studies take a cross-country look at substantive foreign policy issues. There are 
studies that explore how the EU has “europeanised” (i.e. pacified) the confrontational 
relations between unfriendly neighbours297. Others examine how the foreign policy of 
some member states has changed vis-à-vis the Middle East, South Africa298, Africa299, 
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ex-Yugoslavia300 and Asia301. Others take a more transversal look and scrutinise a 
policy field (nuclear non-proliferation)302 or relations with Nato303. And some focus 
specifically on the domestic impact of the CFSP304 or the European Neighbourhood 
Policy305. Some studies finally explore the transformation of role conceptions306 or the 
reorganisation of member states’ MFAs307.  
 
1.3.2.2. Foreign policy actors 
 
In a bottom-up perspective, Europeanisation manifests itself through “a greater 
consolidation of authority at the EU level”308. This implies the empowerment of EFP 
Community actors, and especially of the Commission309, which arguably benefits 
most from the expansion of the EFP agenda. These institutional developments pave 
the way for a “decentralized but highly institutionalized framework for policy 
coordination”310. The emergence of this institutionalised framework, which precludes 
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cooperation “à la carte” in foreign policy, has led to profound changes in the 
distribution of roles among national actors. With the CFSP becoming “less like a 
series of periodic meetings”, the monopoly held by high-level government officials 
over foreign policy has significantly eroded –though not uniformly311. On the one 
hand, pressures exerted on national bureaucracies to implement EU foreign policy 
decisions within narrow time constraints have resulted in the centralisation of foreign 
policy executive power, generally in the hands of the Prime Minister or the Head of 
State312. This change in the balance of executive power in foreign policy, also referred 
to as “prime-ministerialisation of foreign policy” has been well documented313. On the 
other hand, however, the executive power in foreign policy is subject to pressures for 
decentralisation 314 , which participate in decentralising the EFP-making at the 
intergovernmental level. The growth in the EFP agenda implies that national political 
representatives in Brussels are increasingly “forced to act more independently of the 
centre and on mandates defined in advance”315 . This “Brusselisation” of foreign 
policy leaves less time for anchoring foreign policy decisions at home. It translates 
into an increasing informalisation of national foreign policy, when it is conducted on 
the European plane.  
 
National foreign policy executives (i.e. individuals) are not the only actors affected by 
Europeanisation vertical pressures. Adaptational changes also concern bureaucratic 
structures, which see their organisational pattern profoundly transformed 316 . 
Organisational changes first ensue through the expansion of the network of diplomatic 
services, in size, staff, resources, and number of missions317. This expansion echoes 
the growth of the national foreign policy agenda. New national officials are appointed 
to serve national interests within (or through) the CFSP, and ensure a certain 
continuity in the pursuit of national foreign policy in Brussels 318 . These are for 
instance the CFSP counsellors attached to the Permanent Representatives Committee 
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(COREPER), the COREPER II, and the European Correspondents in European 
capitals. Bureaucratic reorganisation also implies the re-orientation of national foreign 
Ministries towards Europe. The status of the foreign Ministry, which is to handle 
European affairs, is usually enhanced relative to the other ministries, and the linkages 
between political and economic departments are strengthened319. More resources are 
for instance given to diplomatic services for their handling of commercial work320. 
This effect echoes the cross-pillarisation of the EFP321 and the blurring of the divide 
between low and high politics in EFP, which spills over the organisation of national 
bureaucratic structures.  
 
1.3.2.3. Foreign policy contexts 
 
Europeanisation “hits” foreign policy contexts through the emergence of the EU as an 
incontrovertible opportunity structure, which empowers and constrains foreign policy 
actors in their relationship with domestic structures of governance. Foreign policy 
coordination, to start with, means that national actors loose not only parts of their 
control over the agenda-setting, but also over the foreign policy-process as a whole. 
Scholars have documented that Europeanisation affects the context of foreign policy-
making by increasing the number of actors involved in the determination of national 
foreign policy, and by fragmenting the handling of foreign policy situations322. The 
increasing number of references to EU activities that are made by national actors in 
the conduct of national foreign policy shows the incontrovertibility of the European 
context, even in those fields that should lie beyond the reach of the EFP 323 . 
Legislative adaptation (or constitutional change) certainly participates in binding 
national executives to act in accordance with European norms324. This adaptation 
needs not being expressly required by the European Treaties, or the EPC/CFSP. The 
reorientation of domestic legal structures can also be triggered internally by the 
intervention of mediating factors. The German Supreme Court, for instance, had to 
reinterpret some key provisions of Germany’s Grundgestezt in order to justify the 
country’s military participation in the Balkans325. In a similar vein, the compatibility 
of the neutrality doctrine of some member states had to be vetted in the light of the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in order to allow institutional 
developments at the EU level326.  
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In most of the cases, however, the incontrovertibility of the European context did not 
emerge through the sole reorientation of national legal structures. Ideational change in 
national role conceptions, foreign policy identities and security cultures have affected 
foreign policy contexts in a very remarkable way, i.e. through the subjective 
perception by foreign policy actors of a European collective identity, towards which 
national role conceptions have started to converge 327 . Scholars have accordingly 
documented the emergence of a European civil-military culture328, or more generally, 
of a European strategic culture329. They have documented the emergence of shared 
norms among policy-making elites in relation to international politics and of shared 
definitions of European and national interests330. Changes in small states’ diplomatic 
culture have also been documented331. Collective identity formation arguably also 
involves external differentiation, or “othering”, in which case the Europeanisation 
national foreign policy identities manifests themselves through the expression of Anti-
American, or anti-Atlanticist sentiments332. Europeanisation, in any event, seems to 
entail changes in national foreign policy actors’ views and identities.  
 
The incontrovertibility of the European context finally affects the pursuit of national 
foreign policy in a very profound manner. Although national and European foreign 
policies remain analytically separable, they “are no longer separate” 333 . First, 
Europeanisation affects national foreign policy contexts through the introduction of 
Multi-Level Governance (MLG) in the field of foreign policy. Smith has identified 
the key factors fostering or undermining MLG in the pursuit of foreign policy334: the 
inherent characteristics of the policy problem (e.g. time frame, violence); the actors 
involved in, and the stage of, the policy-making sequence; the novelty of the policy 
decision; and country specific and situation-specific characteristics. MLG in foreign 
policy, however, does not necessarily entail “supranational” decision-making335. It 
solely means that the conduct of national foreign policy is located in a more 
fragmented, multi-layered context of decision-making. It also implies, at the 
ideational level, a differential treatment of EU and non-EU affairs by foreign policy 
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actors, the former being less considered as high politics than the latter336. Second, 
through Europeanisation, non-governmental actors have been given more access to 
foreign-policy making. They form a participative context, which influences decision-
making. National foreign policy is accordingly also europeanised through the 
Europeanisation of political parties, parliaments, pressure groups, the media and 
public opinions337. An interesting case here is presented by Perget338 for the military-
industrial complex, the Europeanisation of which was fostered by “negative 
integration”339. Another interesting case concerns the international NGOs, for which 
Europeanisation meant transnationalisation 340 . Now active at the European level, 
international NGOs participate in the EFP-making process, especially (but not only) 
through the Commission’s EC Humanitarian Office341. Finally, the Europeanisation of 
foreign policy has manifested itself through changes in public opinion. Public support, 
or at least “passive approval”, is indeed required for further transfers of competence342. 
In Germany, public opinions have played a important role in supporting the 
development of the EU’s as an international actor, but also in constrained the scope of 
the country’s involvement in the CFSP343. Changes in public support, thus, may also 
be indicative of Europeanisation344.  
 
1.3.2.4. Foreign policy process and instruments 
 
With regards to foreign policy processes, Europeanisation manifests itself most 
visibly through the rise of foreign policy coordination on the European plane345. 
Coordination takes place in a weakly institutionalized context through the réflexe 
communautaire, which, increasingly, has become the norm rather than the exception. 
There is, arguably, in the EFP matters an “institutionalised imperative of 
concertation”346 imposing regular communication and consultation among member 
states on any substantive field covered by the Treaties347.  
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Procedurally, this commitment to coordination has translated into the prevalence of 
decision-making by consensus in the Council of Ministers and the European Council. 
But where Europeanisation has had a distinctive effect on voting behaviour and 
rationality is in the growing inclination of foreign policy decision-makers to adopt a 
problem-solving attitude348. This empirical observation contrasts with the view of 
liberal intergovernmentalists, who argue that collective decision-making shall 
converge towards lowest-common-denominator decisions349.  
 
The inclination towards problem-solving has entailed the shrinking of the range of 
domaines réservés in national foreign policy 350 , and the expansion of collective 
actions351. The increase in the overall number of “foreign policy actions” remains 
insufficiently documented. Smith noted that this number rose from two between 1957 
and 1971 to 20 in the 1970s, 50 in the 1980s and over 100 in the 1990s352. The 
number of European Correspondence telex (COREU) similarly rose from 480/year in 
1970s to 1300/year in 1990s. The Europeanisation of national foreign policy 
processes has furthermore resulted in enhanced access to information, especially for 
small states with limited networks, although the provision of information is not 
discretionary (which thus induces more dependence)353. Similarly, small states have 
gained an improved access to key international decision-makers through the 
Presidency354. This twofold access improvement has led to reduced fears of being 
entrapped in great power politics355  and is supportive of the “voice opportunity” 
hypothesis356. 
 
Europeanisation finally has had a transformative effect on national foreign policy 
instruments. The institutionalisation of the EFP has had a twofold effect on the 
agenda-setting capacity of national foreign policy actors. On the one hand, their 
commitment to foreign policy coordination means that they have, at least partly, lost 
control over it 357 . But on the other hand, foreign policy actors have gained the 
possibility to project their own interests on the European plane –thus conserving an 
important access to agenda-setting358. The European institutional context has also 
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offered new opportunities to national foreign policy actors in terms of budgetary, 
diplomatic and economic resources359. Through bottom-up Europeanisation they can 
now exert some influence over their counterparts, e.g. by defining “external goals in 
terms of shared European, rather than specifically national interest” 360 . This 
manifestation of Europeanisation is often referred to as “multilateralisation” –and it 
takes place not only within the EFP, but also in other international fora, such as Nato, 
the United Nations (UN) or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE)361. It can be considered as a novel instrument of foreign policy. For instance, 
in the 1990s, the Council endorsed some aspects of the Belgian Afrikapolitik in its 
EFP362. Similarly, Greece frequently turns to the EU as a “protector power” or a 
“security provider” in its relationship with Turkey or the Balkans363. France, likewise, 
multilateralised its approach to the first Gulf War conflict364 at the EU level, and 
Germany did the same with regards to the fusion of the WEU into the EU and the 
development of the CFSP365.  
 
1.3.2.5. Foreign policy outputs 
 
The manifestations of Europeanisation in terms of foreign policy outputs are most 
visible through the attainment of some form of policy-convergence over time366. 
Member states usually witness an extension of the geographical and issue-area 
coverage of their foreign policy367. Becoming a member state of the EU, indeed, 
imposes “the burden of having to have an opinion on matters in which they previously 
had not the slightest interest”368. Small states have thus been drawn to contribute to 
foreign policy situations, in which they would not have been involved, had their 
foreign policy not been europeanised369. For instance, Luxembourg sent EC monitors 
to Croatia and Slovenia, and assigned a contingent of peace-keepers in Slavonia370. 
Sometimes, EU member states participate in EU activities, although they perceive no 
direct interest in so doing371.  
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In terms of effectiveness, it has been argued that the impact of small member states’ 
foreign policy is greater when it is expressed through the CFSP than as go-alone372. 
But assessing the actual changes in the effectiveness of foreign policy in the light of 
Europeanisation remains difficult. Laatikainen found for instance that the evolution of 
the CFSP has “eclipsed the unique Nordic [group’s] role” in the United Nations373. It 
has eroded its authority, its autonomy and external recognition, i.e. its capacity to act 
as a foreign policy actor. Europeanisation, in this sense may sometimes have a 
disruptive effect on sub-regional integration374. Laatikainen, however, has conceded 
that even though the role of the Nordic bloc may now be less visible, it may have 
gained in effectiveness, by gaining resonance through the EU375.  
 
Europeanisation does not always mean effective success. Scholars have showed how 
conditionality and socialisation that are aimed at conflict settlement may in reality 
undermine the process of peace-building376. It can induce superficial changes377, or 
fail to anchor changes in domestic structures of external governance378. It can even 
create further tensions, as national roles are not simply replaced by European ones. 
For instance, tensions remain between the ESDP and the Irish and Austrian neutrality 
doctrines 379 . In fact, Europeanisation affects national foreign policy in a very 
differential manner. Differences in policy outcomes remain among member states 
owing to their respective history, traditions and bureaucratic politics 380 . And 
convergence does not garantee cross-sectoral uniformity. For instance, 
Europeanisation has proved less salient in military policy outputs, where structural 
limitations to Europeanisation persist. As argued by Miskimmon, “until the EU/Nato 
relationship is resolved, the EU will remain limited in defence policy and thus fail to 
exert significant Europeanisation pressure on Germany and the other EU Member 
States381 . Europeanisation, by contrast, has proved more effective in commercial 
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foreign policy382 and in the framework of the pre-accession process383. Whereas the 
literature readily addresses the issue of effectiveness, it remains silent about the 
consequences of Europeanisation for national foreign policies in terms of efficiency 
and legitimacy.  
 
1.3.3.  Mechanisms of Europeanisation 
 
The Europeanisation of national foreign policy cannot be explained through a single 
mechanism, or a single logic384. The literature suggests that it is most often driven by 
a plurality of mechanisms, with some of them being more salient in some foreign 
policy activities than in others. This plurality of mechanisms is reinforced by the 
multifaceted nature of EFP integration, that is driven by intergovernmentalism, 
transgovernmentalism and supranationalism385. The first logic of EFP integration, 
based on grand bargains, fosters the Europeanisation patterns based on power and 
interest; the second logic, based on decentralised, albeit authoritative “networks of 
deliberative forums”, fosters the knowledge and identity-based development of a 
European “culture of cooperation involving standards of behavior, shared 
understandings and a common language” 386 ; as for the third logic, it has a 
transcendent effect on interests and social identities, by reference to the organisational 
memory that develops at the EU level.  
 
Europeanisation scholars, however, have not extensively researched in greater details 
the mechanisms involved. Their explanatory picture mostly remains incomplete. For 
instance, Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier identify three mechanisms of 
Europeanisation vis-à-vis the candidate states: political conditionality (or 
“reinforcement by reward”); socialisation (social learning) and lesson-drawing387 . 
Likewise, Diez, et al. identify four “path to EU perturbation” in border conflict 
management, which echo the top-down conception of external Europeanisation: the 
“carrot and the stick” (conditionality), the enabling impact of the EU, the connective 
impact (e.g. when the EU finances activities associating the belligerents), and a 
constructive impact (which induces identity change)388. 
 
All in all, the variety of mechanisms at play and the differences in the analytical and 
theoretical frameworks used by Europeanisation scholars render any attempt at 
consolidating and generalising these findings very difficult. The following part, 
consequently, will limit itself to emphasising some interesting points. The first point 
is that socialisation among foreign policy actors should not be neglected. Even though 
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some EFP sectors, as the military, remain principally the field of grand bargains389, 
studies show that “élite socialisation and learning were more decisive” in the French 
defence policy than interest-based mechanisms390. In a similar vein, Europeanisation 
in CFSP has been found to be “much more [driven by] a process of socialization than 
forced, formal adaptation”391. The argument was also brought by Wong392. This is 
understandable, since no clear vertical chain of command has been established in EFP, 
which would facilitate the enforcement of mechanisms of legal and political 
compliance. Miskimmon has also showed that domestic changes in Germany in CFSP 
matters were mainly driven by socialisation393. The superiority of socialisation as a 
mechanism of Europeanisation in foreign policy meets some resistance though. 
Keukeleire & MacNaughtan have argued that the significance of socialisation is 
exaggerated for three reasons: first, the CFSP now includes a growing number of 
actors in comparison to the EPC club; second, socialisation is weaker in bigger states; 
third, it is much weaker among foreign policy actors that are not directly involved in 
foreign policy decision-making (e.g. bureaucracies)394.  
 
The second point concerns Europeanisation through conditionality. Conditionality 
entails the manipulation of states utility calculations with the purpose of inducing 
change (e.g. EU membership in exchange of domestic reforms). The literature on 
conditionality is voluminous. It indicates that conditions, to be effective, must be 
“clear, determinate and consistent across target states and international 
organisations”395, that is, they must be credible in order to lock in transformations into 
a predictable course 396 . And the anticipated reward should be higher than the 
anticipated cost of domestic adaptation397. Accession negotiations are typical positive 
bargaining games with conditional rewards398. Even in the earlier phase of the pre-
accession strategy, positive conditionality plays an important role. Positive 
conditionality may be expressed ex post, i.e. the reward is granted as an inducement 
for forthcoming adjustments but may be withdrawn if the obligations are violated399. 
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Or it can be expressed ex ante, i.e. the reward is granted only after the conditions are 
fulfilled (e.g. accession conditionality). Because it is more sophisticated and proved 
more effective, the EU traditionally prefers ex ante to ex post conditionality400. Ex 
post conditionality, indeed, tends to be “static rather than dynamic and symbolic 
rather than substantial”401. Conditionality is an instrument widely used by the EU in 
its relations with non-EU states. “Democratic conditionality”, on the one side, refers 
to the normative, little quantifiable pre-conditions that applicants must fulfil in 
political (i.e. liberal democracy) and economic terms (e.g. functioning market-
economy) in order to “minimise the risk of new entrants becoming politically unstable 
and economically burdensome to the existing EU”402. “Acquis conditionality”, on the 
other side, refers to the the “rights and obligations, actual and potential, of the 
Community system and its institutional framework”403, including the ECJ case law 
and the EU legislative measures taken under the three pillars, which prospective EU 
member states are expected to adopt404. “Acquis conditionality” pre-conditions are not 
fixed, they grow in accordance to the acquis communautaire, which means that 
membership conditionality regimes are evolutive. They are a “dynamic concept” 
designed specifically for each applicant405. In their empirical studies, several scholars 
have pointed out the effectiveness of conditionality in the Western Balkans and 
beyond, as compared to other mechanisms of Europeanisation406. The Ohrid process 
in FYROM and the reorganization of external border control in the region should 
exemplify this success 407 , and allegedly provide the strongest explanation for 
adaptational change in European non-member states 408 . Conditionality has also 
proved to be very effective when it targets policy changes rather (rather than being 
part of the accession process). By relaxing its visa regime with the Balkans countries, 
the EU could arguably counterbalance the shortcomings of the pre-accession strategy, 
increased its external leverage and ensure more effectiveness409. Policy-conditionality 
in the Balkans, for some, may even be a more important driving force than 
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membership conditionality. No research, however, has been carried out to assess the 
impact of conditionality on Balkan states’ foreign policies in comparison to the other 
mechanisms of Europeanisation.  
 
Emulation, finally, seems of little relevance to foreign policy scholars. Denca argues 
that some emulative behaviour can be evidenced, as candidate states reorganise their 
former missions to the EU as permanent representations “mirroring the internal 
structure of the Council’s working group, and emulating the existing models in other 
member states”410. But these observations are relatively rare, as most of the research 
designs do not take seriously the possibility that Europeanisation, in foreign policy 
matters, ensues through learning. Persuasion, likewise, is little mentioned in the 
literature. Only Nasra alludes to the importance of this mechanism for small states in 
order to project their preferences on the European plane411.  
 
1.4. The Europeanisation of foreign policy in non-EU Europe  
 
1.4.1. The many spaces of non-EU Europe 
 
The concept of non-EU Europe stems from political geography412. It denotes a space 
created from the incongruence of EU and European borders, the former being most 
prominently defined in organisational-institutional terms by EU membership, while 
the latter is usually defined in cultural, historical or geographical terms. Since the EU 
is “currently the core political project in Europe”413, most of Europeanisation studies 
tend to conflate the two notions and readily use EU and Europe indiscriminately, as 
synonyms. This conflation of spaces fuels what Vink and Graziano labelled the “EU 
domination of Europeanization research”414. It is problematic, since it takes for 
granted the EU-ness of the space located outside the EU but inside Europe. 
At best, it prejudges the role of the EU in non-EU Europe; at worst, it discards 
the role of other regional forces.  
 
To understand the concept of non-EU Europe, it is necessary to start with the 
commonsensical observation that Europe (and thus, non-EU Europe) is “a space of 
ambiguity”, with no established consensus as for where it “begins” and where it 
“ends”415. It is composed of a variety of images and narratives, which acquire their 
                                                 
410 Denca, S. S. 2009. ‘Assessing the Impact of European Integration on the Foreign Policy-Making in 
Central and Eastern Europe: The Cases of Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia.’ Conference paper. p. 16. 
411 Nasra, S. 2009. ‘The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Bilateral Relations Revisited?’ 
Conference paper. 
412 e.g. Scott, J. W. 2005. ‘The EU and 'Wider Europe': Toward an Alternative Geopolitics of Regional 
Cooperation?’ Geopolitics vol.10 (3). p. 447; Scott, J. and van Houtum, H. 2009. ‘Reflections on EU 
Territoriality and the 'Bordering of Europe'.’ Political Geography vol.28. p. 271. 
413 Olsen, J. P. 2002. ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization.’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol.40 
(5). p. 927. 
414 Vink, M. P. and Graziano, P. 2007. ‘Challenges of a New Research Agenda.’ In 
Europeanization: New Research Agendas, eds. Graziano, P. and Vink, M. P. 
415 Scott, J. and van Houtum, H. 2009. ‘Reflections on EU Territoriality and the 'Bordering of Europe'.’ 
Political Geography vol.28. p. 273. 
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meaning through discourse and practises in a social process that is complex and 
contested416. Depending on the image or narrative that underpins the construct of 
“Europe”, non-EU Europe may be conceptualised in (at least) three different manners, 
Westphalian non-EU Europe, neo-Westphalian non-EU Europe and post-Westphalian 
non-EU Europe417.  
 
Westphalian non-EU Europe consists of those states which do not participate in the 
EU’s “advanced instance of regional cooperation”418, whilst being located on 
the European continent. It is the uni-dimensional negative of the EU space in 
Europe, the external borders of which are physically determined by individual 
states’ territorial boundaries.  
 
Neo-Westphalian conceptions of non-EU Europe, by contrast, are 
characterised by a pluridimensional space into which the EU, conceptualised as 
an international actor, exports its normative preferences 419 . This space is 
pluridimensional because it is constituted by several “concentric circles” 420 , all 
centred on an EU core. This conception of non-EU Europe is close to the notion of 
periphery within an empire. The diameter of the circles is determined by the type of 
institutional link that binds non-EU states to the EU centre, i.e. the institutional 
distance from the EU core. Neo-Westphalian Europe shares its commitment to hard 
territoriality with Westphalian non-EU Europe, though at another scale. Close 
association countries (e.g. Switzerland, Norway) constitute the nearest circle; 
accession association countries (e.g. Croatia) partake in the second circle; pre-
accession association countries (e.g. Albania) in the third circle; the neighbourhood 
association countries (e.g. Ukraine) in the farthest circle. 
 
This commitment to concentric circles is relaxed in post-Westphalian conceptions of 
non-EU Europe in favour of a more polycentric space with porous borders. In post-
Westphalian Europe, “non-EU” and “EU” Europe are not mutually exclusive. For 
instance, not all EU member states are part of the Schengen area (e.g. the United 
Kingdom (UK)) or the Euro-zone (e.g. Denmark); some member states have 
negotiated transitory arrangements (e.g. Austria regarding the freedom of movement 
of the Bulgarians), which others have lifted them (e.g. Sweden); and, some member 
states have negotiated opt-out clauses (e.g. Poland), whereas others have few or no 
opt-outs on their record (e.g. Spain). This illustrates the fact that EU membership is 
not premised on perfect homogeneity. On some specific issues, non-EU Europe may 
then rightly include (temporarily or not) the UK, Denmark, Austria and Poland. To 
                                                 
416 Paasi, A. 2001. ‘Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and 
Identity.’ European Urban and Regional Studies vol.8 (1). 
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Conceptions of Europeanisation.’ Journal of Contemporary European Research vol.8 (1). 
418 Moravcsik, A. 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht. p. 4-5. 
419 Olsen, J. P. 2002. ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization.’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol.40 
(5). p. 937ff. 
420 Lavenex, S. and Ucarer, E. M. 2004. ‘The External Dimension of Europeanization -the Case of 
Immigration Policies.’ Cooperation and Conflict vol.39 (4). p. 423. 
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make the matter more complex, some European states use the Euro as official 
currency (e.g. Montenegro) or are part of the Schengen area (e.g. Switzerland), 
although they are no EU member-states. And some European non-EU member states, 
like Norway or Turkey, share important features with EU member states by 
participating in the European Economic Area (for the former) and in the European 
customs union (for the latter). In matters of trade policy, it is then questionable that 
these countries actually belong to non-EU Europe.  
 
Understandingly, these institutional overlaps considerably blur the dichotomy 
between EU-Europe and non-EU Europe in post-Westphalian conceptions of Europe. 
Institutional overlaps also concern international organisations, such as the Council of 
Europe, the OSCE, Nato or the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). These organisations participate in the weaving of European 
rules and norms to a considerable extent, just as the EU. Since European states 
multiply cross-memberships, their adherence to European norms shall not necessarily 
mean that the EU is the sole (and not even mightiest) norm-maker. In scrutinising 
policy convergence in the European Neighbourhood Policy countries (ENP), for 
instance, other international, regional and mini-lateral organisations are believed to 
play an essential role421. Sometimes, it may even be impossible to identify ideational 
lineages or normative property, and to discriminate between EU and non-EU 
European norms in Europe.  
 
Europe, or as Ruggie puts in a postmodernist manner “EUrope”422, is in fact best 
conceptualised as a heterarchical political space admitting “varying degrees of EU-
Europeanness”423 and variable institutional densities424. Non-EU Europe, thus, in a 
post-Westphalian understanding, is neither the mere negative of the EU in 
(Westphalian) Europe, nor the multilayered circles revolving around the EU core 
institution in (neo-Westphalian) Europe. It is the post-territorial space transcending 
EU institutional boundaries, which is delineated, to a large extent, by researchers’ 
interpretivist claims as for what the notion of belonging to the EU and to Europe 
entails. As noted by an ENP scholar, the EU has “no copyright on the definition of 
European identity or of European values […After all,] non-candidate countries can 
claim to have a European vocation even if the EU thinks otherwise”425. To sum up, 
what matters most in post-Westphalian conceptions of non-EU Europe, is not a 
territorial delineation, placing one state in and one state out of this intermediary space; 
it is the normative (self-) identification of the people, which depending on its 
aspirations, bestows a sense of belonging to non-EU Europe. 
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Non-EU Europe, to conclude with, is not a static concept. It evolves over time, 
including in Westphalian and neo-Westphalian conceptions of Europe. Austria, 
Finland and Sweden, for instance used to be part of non-EU Europe before their 
accession in 1995. And Greenland used to be part of the EU-Europe before its 
withdrawal from the EU in 1985. Changes in the space of non-EU Europe may have a 
temporal dimension, but also a sectoral one, especially in the neo-Westphalian and 
post-Westphalian conceptions of Europe. They follow up the transfer of competences, 
which gradually empowers EU Community. For instance, France and Germany could 
be considered as being part on non-EU Europe in military matters in the period 
spanning from the failure of the European Defence Community in the 1960s to the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in the early 1990s. Until the WEU was merged in the EU, 
indeed, the EU did not hold substantive competences in military matters.  
 
1.4.2. The empirical scope of the literature 
 
Although the conceptual scope of the literature on non-EU Europe now seems wider 
than at first sight, the number of studies devoted to europeanised foreign policy in this 
space is rather limited. The literature is unambiguously dominated by studies on 
Turkey, where a large debate has been flourishing over the past five years on the 
domestic impact of European integration in foreign policy matters. There is, more 
specifically, a literature examining changes in Turkey’s strategic foreign policy 
priorities426; changes and resistance to change regarding specific foreign 
policy issues in Turkey427, but also in the Czech Republic428 and in Bulgaria429; 
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changes in security discourse in Turkey430, but also Estonia431; changes in 
military policy and institutions in contemporary Turkey432 but also in France in 
the early 1990s433; change in the role of foreign policy actors in Romania and 
Bulgaria 434  and in Poland 435 ; changes in organisational structures and 
procedural norms in Romania, Slovakia and Hungary436, and in Poland437; and 
changes in the process and outcomes of military procurement in the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Slovakia438. Only a few studies scrutinise changes at 
prior-accession stages. Most of them, indeed, focus on changes in Central 
and Eastern European states shortly after their accession in the EU439. Only a 
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few contributions examine changes in the earliest stages of accession440. This 
lack of early research is understandable, since Europeanisation research only 
emerged as a research focus in the late 1990s.  
 
Another strand of the literature examines changes in national foreign policy or 
security doctrine in Norway 441 , Latvia 442  and Finland 443  including in pre-
accession period for today-members. But they do not focus specifically on 
attributing this change to Europeanisation, and often treat the EU and Nato as 
belonging to a single institutional package444. At the limits of the non-EU 
space in post-Westphalian European, some studies finally focus on the 
Europeanisation of interstate and secessionist conflicts in Cyprus, Turkey, 
Serbia-Montenegro, Israel-Palestine and Georgia445 , in Transnistria446 , in 
Cyprus, Transnistria, Serbia-Montenegro and Abkhazia 447 ; policy 
convergences between the EU on the one hand and Morocco, Ukraine, 
Georgia and Russia on the other hand 448 ; and uploading process in 
Romania449. 
                                                 
440 e.g. Kramer, H. and Pelinka, A. eds. 1994. L'autriche Et L'intégration Européenne; and 
especially Luif, P. 1994. ‘La Neutralité De L'autriche Et L'europe De 1992.’ In L'autriche Et 
L'intégration Européenne, eds. Kramer, H. and Pelinka, A. 
441 Moses, J. W. and Knutsen, T. 2001. ‘Out: Globalization and the Reorganization of Foreign 
Affairs Ministries.’ Cooperation and Conflict vol.36 (4); Græger, N. and Leira, H. 2005. 
‘Norwegian Strategic Culture after World War Ii: From a Local to a Global Perspective.’ 
Cooperation and Conflict vol.40 (1). 
442 Galbreath, D. J. 2006. ‘Latvian Foreign Policy after Enlargement: Continuity and Change.’ 
Cooperation and Conflict vol.41 (4). 
443 Heikka, H. 2005. ‘Republican Realism: Finnish Strategic Culture in Historical Perspective.’ 
Cooperation and Conflict vol.40 (1). 
444 e.g. Rasmussen, M. V. 2005. ‘'What's the Use of It?': Danish Strategic Culture and the 
Utility of Armed Force.’ Cooperation and Conflict vol.40 (1). p. 78. 
445 e.g. Tocci, N. 2007. The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard. 
446 Vahl, M. 2005. ‘The Europeanisation of the Transnistrian Conflict.’ CEPS Policy Brief (73). 
447 Coppieters, B., et al. eds. 2004. Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies 
from the European Periphery. 
448 Barbé, E., et al. 2009b. ‘Which Rules Shape EU External Governance? Patterns of Rule Selection in 
Foreign and Security Policies.’ Journal of European Public Policy vol.16 (6). 
449 Popescu, L. 2010. ‘Europeanization of Romanian Foreign Policy.’ Romanian Journal of European 
Affairs vol.10 (4). 
 59
 
Only a few contributions dealing with Europeanisation issues in the Western Balkans 
have been published, some very recently450. But these, usually, do not deal with 
foreign policy specifically. 
 
1.4.3. Definitions and research variables 
 
The literature in the area usually defines Europeanisation as a process of “domestic 
adaptation in the conduct of foreign policy, as a result of current or prospective EU 
membership”451. It has also been sometimes defined as “a process which is activated 
and encouraged by European institutions, primarily by the European Union, by 
linking the final outcome of a conflict, to a certain degree of integration of the parties 
involved into it into European structures”452. In both case, the explanandum is posited 
at the domestic level, and the explanans lies in the dynamic relationship between 
national and European authorities. Most of the conceptions of Europeanisation are 
thus related to top-down approaches.  
 
A number of factors can be identified in the specific literature, which play the role of 
intervening variables or (less frequently) rival hypothesis. First, there are other 
international organisations, e.g. Nato, UN agencies, the OSCE. These may help 
(re)shaping actors’ interests and changing their behaviour, alongside the EU453. The 
EU, in other words, is not the only organisation that matters in non-EU Europe, and 
the transformational impact of other fora should not be overlooked. The relationship 
between European non-EU states and non-European countries, e.g. the United States 
(US), may also play a role that is more significant than the relationship between the 
same countries and the EU, although both relationships converge towards the same 
outcome454. What some analysts may be tempted to designate as Europeanisation may 
in fact rather relate to Americanisation. 
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At the domestic level, a number of factors can be identified, which either have a 
mediating effect or a transformative impact on foreign policy. Where appropriate, 
their interplay with European transformational forces should therefore also be 
scrutinised. These factors include the growing role of NGOs in transnational politics, 
which generates domestic pressures455; the role of partisan politics, which may prove 
decisive, also in foreign policy456; the role of public opinions, which often (though not 
always) guides political actions457; the role of the military458; and the influence of 
economic factors459. In their Europeanisation study, Irondelle460 and Özcan461 finally 
propose a more systematic analysis of mediating institutions likely to play a decisive 
role. Irondelle462 lists the following factors: 1) presence of multiple veto points (i.e. 
are the key foreign policy actors isolated from interest and parliamentary groups and 
societal pressures, groups?); 2) integrated vs. fragmented executive leadership (i.e. is 
foreign policy the preserve of the President?); 3) degree of technocratic capture (is 
foreign policy captured by small technocratic communities?). Özcan463  follows a 
similar pathway, and lists the following factors, which he draws from Manners & 
Whiteman464: constitutional design, role of subnational units, relationship between 
government and parties, role of interest groups and breakdown of domestic-foreign 
distinction. 
 
1.4.4. The phenomenon of Europeanisation 
 
A phenomenal review of the above-mentioned literature shows that Europeanisation 
in non-EU Europe affects most of foreign policy dimensions, i.e. foreign policy actors, 
contexts, processes, instruments and outputs.  
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1.4.4.1. Foreign policy actors 
 
The conduct of political dialogue with the EU and the preparation for candidate states 
to participate in the CFSP require the creation of adequate structures at the domestic 
level465: this includes the appointment in candidate states of Associated European 
Correspondents responsible for coordinating CFSP issues, the nomination and 
empowerment of political directors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the 
selection of foreign policy officials sent to Brussels to participate in various working 
groups. Europeanisation most markedly ensues through the “numerical augmentation 
of personnel, increase in organizational complexity, and functional diversification”466.  
 
Some scholars noted that it also entails the widening of the geographical scope of 
foreign policy coverage, an increase in the number of external representations 
worldwide, as well as changes in terms of wages, number of diplomats, age structure 
and skills 467 . Foreign ministries, it has been found, tend to be rejuvenated and 
professionalised. This phenomenon has been observed as early as in the mid-1980s in 
Austria’s Foreign Ministry 468  and, in the mid 1990s in the French military 469 . 
Paralleling these developments, the installation of the electronic system of Associated 
Countries Network (ACN), which precedes the access to the COREU Terminal 
System, has been identified as empowering younger diplomats. These are usually 
better trained to communication technologies470.  
 
Europeanisation, however, is not always a smooth process of change, as intra- and 
inter-departmental tensions between bureaucracies can emerge with the differential 
empowerment of some actors at the expense of others (an issue already raised in the 
literature on bureaucratic politics). This is particularly the case through the 
Brusselisation of national foreign policy, which candidate states undergo, i.e. the 
empowerment of Permanent Representatives in Brussels relative to high officials in 
the home ministry. Bureaucratic tensions may arise when the most experienced and 
skilled diplomats are sent to Brussels to head the Permanent Mission with a certain 
latitude, and when European affairs became directly reattached to the Office of Prime 
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Minister471. Europeanisation finally has semantic implications since the “permanent 
missions” in Brussels are usually renamed “permanent representations” after 
accession472. 
 
1.4.4.2. Foreign policy contexts 
 
Europeanisation as a phenomenon of change in foreign policy contexts first involves 
the de- (and possibly re-) securitisation of foreign policy discourses, the 
transformation of foreign policy identities, and more questionably, the strategic use of 
Europeanisation to legitimate reforms.  
 
De-securitisation primarily affects the context of Turkish foreign policy towards 
highly sensitive issues such as Cyprus and Israel, most notably through a discursive 
shift “from a hard-line nationalistic stance towards a more balanced and pragmatic 
approach”473. Change, then, aims at making Turkey a security asset for Europe rather 
than a liability474, and it builds on the need to complement the EU acting as global 
player by providing a possible “remedy to the weakness of the EU’s influence in […] 
regions” where Turkey, unlike the EU, is very influential475. Europeanisation then 
ensues through the emergence of alternative discourses on security issues, which 
question the traditionally hard definitions of ‘national security’ in Turkey’s strategic 
culture476. It implies the redefinition of national security in a more inclusive way that 
does not exclude the EU and its member states as “Others”, but includes them at least 
partly in Turkey’s security definition of the “Self”477 . This implies in particular 
“downloading the EU rhetoric of good neighbourly relations and peaceful resolution 
of disputes”478.  
 
Change in discursive contexts, however, need not entail the full-fledged de-
securitisation of foreign policy. Europeanisation may also support a counter-
phenomenon of re-securitisation. For instance, the shift in Estonian security discourse 
has arguably been “not from a dichotomous, exclusive definition of security to a non-
dichotomous, inclusive one, but from dichotomies articulated in terms of military 
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threat to those define in terms of culture and values”479. Europeanisation, in other 
words, seems to transform, rather than terminate, the othering process in candidate 
foreign policy discourse. In other instances, the dominant elites in Ukraine have been 
found to use the proclamation of their ‘European choice’ “as a counterbalance to the 
pull off Russia”480.  
 
The second type of change in foreign policy contexts that parallels the de- and re-
securitisation of security discourses is one involving identity transformation and 
paradigmatic shifts in foreign policy and security doctrines. Europeanisation in the 
French military, for instance, has ensued through the shift from the “national 
sanctuary” narrative based on a conception of security articulated by national 
deterrence and territorial defence through conscription towards a narrative 
highlighting a “European commitment” centred on “multinational action” and the 
principle of cooperation481. The paradigmatic shift in the French military doctrine has 
also affected the traditional security emphasis on nuclear deterrence, which evolved 
into one of “concerted deterrence”482. Similar patterns of paradigmatic change have 
been observed in Bulgaria with respect to Sofia’s foreign policy towards the Balkan 
(and the war in Kosovo in particular ), which involved a shift in decision-making 
context from the self-asserted “Balkanism” narrative to the Europeanisation 
paradigm483. Likewise, in Finland, Europeanisation has found to be ensuing through 
the transformation of the country’s security identity from one supporting “cautious 
neutrality” outside Europe into one enthusiastically integrationist underpinned by 
anti-hegemonic purposes484; In Denmark, identity change has affected the traditional 
normative debate between supporters of “defencism” and “cosmopolitanism” by 
offering an alternative, i.e. “activism” premised on military engagement and military 
diplomacy485. The actual cause of these instances of identity transformation, however, 
remains difficult to isolate, and the EU, often, only acts as one driving force among 
many others. In this respect, the role of other international organisations, e.g. Nato, 
and the influence historical systemic and domestic developments in international 
relations, has been underlined486.  
 
The third type of change in foreign policy contexts involves the possibility of 
domestic actors of using the Europeanisation narrative to legitimate reforms and 
choices in foreign policy structures and actions. Although the Europeanisation 
narrative has been used to determine the appropriate course of action in some 
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instance487, its purely instrumental usage finds little empirical support in the field of 
foreign and defence policy488.  
 
In Turkey and some Central European states, the Europeanisation of foreign policy 
contexts has also ensued through democratisation. The relationship between 
Europeanisation and democratisation remains puzzling for many scholars, who 
investigate the interlocking, mutually reinforcing relationship between the two 
phenomena489 . The debate, generally speaking, revolves around three axes: 1) is 
democratisation a prerequisite for Europeanisation490?; 2) is democratisation induced 
by Europeanisation, i.e. is it one of its most remarkable outcomes491?; 3) is this 
relationship dialectal rather than logical492? In any event, what is remarkable is that 
these studies identify the one specific aim of democratisation, i.e. the durable 
establishment of substantive democracy, as overlapping with the achievements of 
Europeanisation. In the field of foreign policy, contexts are mainly affected by the 
Copenhagen criteria prompting an increased role of NGOs and civil society in 
politics493. In Turkey, this grassroots’ democratisation has induced a public debate on 
the meaning of “national security”, to which pro-EU actors and Eurosceptics actively 
participated494 . Although democratisation is traditionally considered as a primary 
achievement of Europeanisation, some scholars have nevertheless argued that one 
should disentangle democratisation per se (i.e. driven by global and domestic forces) 
and democratisation alongside the EU accession process495. The two processes may 
overlap, but they are not congruent, and may even be contradictory. For instance, in 
the 1990s, Turkey exhibited strong democratisation per se, but growing 
Euroscepticism in the conduct of its foreign policy496. And even today, the democratic 
reforms launched by Turkey under the guidance of the EU contrast with the growing 
disillusionment of Turkish public opinions towards EU accession. The latter 
increasingly constrains the government’s manoeuvring power in foreign policy, and 
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can partly explain Turkey’s disengagement from the West497. In relation to Cyprus 
and to ESDP issues, the democratisation alongside EU accession process has not 
produced foreign policy outcomes that favoured the EU’s objectives498.  
 
1.4.4.3. Foreign policy process 
 
Europeanisation affects foreign policy processes through the growing need, for 
candidate states, to coordinate with the CFSP and the concomitant Brusselisation of 
foreign policy decision-making.  
 
Coordination operates in the accession phase through the ACN in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. It is used by the Council’s Secretariat, which therewith asks whether 
accession states whish to align their position with the position, declaration or action of 
the EU. Responses are not obligatory, and often, provided too late, if not at all, owing 
to the difficulty met in some candidate states to use communication technologies. 
After accession, ACN is replaced by the COREU system, which enables the new 
member states to participate actively in the CFSP. The coordination requirement 
instilled by Europeanisation is not limited to the EU, but can be analysed as wider 
phenomenon of multilateralisation. For instance, in Latvia Europeanisation has been 
found to entail “engaging with other regional and subregional organizations, including 
the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the Council of Baltic Sea States”, or more 
generally, “getting out the bilateral mode of thinking”499.  
 
In candidate states, the epicentre of the foreign policy process is gradually 
complemented by Brussels’ Permanent Missions and Representations, especially in 
matters overlapping with the CFSP and the EU. This decoupling of foreign policy 
(also termed Brusselisation) can be seen partly as a response by Permanent 
Representatives to the lack of reactivity of their home ministry, the diplomatic 
networks of which are overwhelmed by information, and partly as response to 
information asymmetries, which empowers diplomats in Brussels, who conduct 
preparatory meetings (many of them informal) to unveil the position of European 
partners on particular issues and establish like-minded groups500. Candidate or new 
member states’ diplomats in Brussels often receive their instructions from their home 
Ministry too late to be implemented, or they sometimes receive instructions that are 
inapplicable, because these would jeopardise their credibility as consensus-seekers. 
They must therefore adapt to the changing environment by participating more actively 
in the policy process, e.g. by suggesting positions to their Ministry 501 . In those 
countries, Europeanisation can thus be said to entail a certain level of de-
concentration in decision-making.  
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In states where the military plays an important role (e.g. Turkey), Europeanisation 
finally ensues through the “civilianisation” of the policy process, i.e. the development 
of procedures of civilian control in foreign policy-making and withdrawal of the 
military’s veto power502. More generally, it affects procedural norms in candidate 
states’ foreign policy making503. These “norms-to-be-europeanised” include a sense of 
diffuse reciprocity, thick trust, mutual responsiveness and consensus reflex504, as well 
as confidentiality, consultation, respect for other member states’ domaines réservés, 
and rejection of hard bargaining505.  
 
1.4.4.4. Foreign policy instruments 
 
Only a few studies have investigated bottom-up Europeanisation in non-EU Europe, 
or more specifically, whether and how non-EU European states make use of the CFSP 
as a novel instrument to project and magnify own power. This is because candidate 
states (and non-EU state in general) are presumed to have little or no opportunity to 
upload their policy preferences506. Even after accession, uploads and capacity to make 
policy at the EU-level remains weak507. Candidate and new member states remain 
first and foremost norm- and policy-takers, and participation in CFSP remains “to a 
large extent reactive” even after accession508. Some attempts at uploading domestic 
interests have nevertheless been carried out by some Central and Eastern European 
countries (especially Poland), e.g. with regard to “repairing the transatlantic rifts over 
Iraq”, influencing EU-Russia relations and improving the relationship between the EU 
on the one side and Ukraine and the Black Sea region on the other side509. But these 
attempts have yielded very moderate success.  
 
In non-EU Europe, Europeanisation has ensued through the renouncement to use hard 
power instruments. Expectations are formed towards candidate states that they should 
testify of the “full acceptance of democracy, human rights, peaceful resolution of 
conflicts, and support of international humanitarian law” in the conduct of their 
external relations, especially with neighbours510. It has been found, additionally, that 
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non-EU states tend to anticipate their membership by aligning their use of softer 
foreign policy instruments with the EU. Some, for instance have aligned themselves 
with the EU’s Code of Conduct on Arms Exports511. Throughout the pre-accession 
and post-accession period, the level of transparency in the field of arms exports has 
markedly increased in accordance with the requirement of EU soft law, although 
much pressure also emanated from Nato, UN agencies and the US. Foreign policy 
alignment in this area also includes the application of sanctions and restrictive 
measures when and where they are required by the EU512. 
 
1.4.4.5. Foreign policy outputs 
 
Europeanisation, in its most visible manifestation, affects foreign policy outputs by 
inducing a certain level of policy convergence, i.e. the harmonisation or alignment of 
states’ foreign policy positions, declarations and actions with those of the EU513. For 
instance, Turkey eventually accepted an arrangement on EU-Nato military 
cooperation after lengthy negotiations carried out in the EU’s framework. Turkey had 
previously vetoed this arrangement in the framework of Nato, because the ESDP used 
to be perceived “as a challenge that could pose a threat, in case Turkey’s membership 
perspective was not fulfilled”514. In a similar vein, Europeanisation students have 
noted that Poland’s foreign policy attitudes towards the ESDP gradually shifted 
towards greater acceptance515, and likewise, that Turkey’s position towards the Annan 
Plan became “europeanised” over time516. 
 
Policy convergence, however, is neither unconditional nor homogenous. Its 
(differential) impact is contingent on the type of issue that is at stake. As noted by 
Özcan, Turkey does not blindly align its foreign policy with the EU’s, but it acts 
“selectively as many European countries do, like Britain and Greece”517. It only 
supports those EU positions which are not incompatible with its national interests. 
This resilience to change in some issue-areas indicates that “foreign policies have 
been europeanised only to a degree”518. Foreign policy interests may change through 
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Europeanisation, but not in an automatic manner, and they may even evolve in the 
opposite direction, as shown by the on-going shift in Turkey’s foreign policy “from a 
commitment to deep Europeanization to loose Europeanization” and its consequent 
drive towards “Euro-Asianism” or Middle-Easternisation519. In the case of Bulgaria 
and Romania, similarly, “EU membership has not led to a convergence of foreign 
policy outlook where top priority issues un the realm of ‘high politics’ and security 
are at stake”520. In the Czech Republic, convergence is limited, or framed, by the 
country’s historical experience and persisting perception of geopolitical 
vulnerability 521 . When hard security issues are at stake, “Nato and transatlantic 
partnership is seen as vital”522. This perception also prevails in Latvia, which prefers 
“Nato’s hard security guarantees to the EU’s soft security mechanisms”523.  
 
1.4.5. Mechanisms of Europeanisation 
 
There is no systematic study examining the mechanisms of Europeanisation in the 
geographical and sectoral field of research that is here under consideration. A 
transversal reading of the scientific literature makes it nevertheless possible to 
identify three types of mechanisms: political compliance, experiential learning and 
socialisation. While the first two relate to the logic of consequentialism, the latter 
implies normative changes in states’ interests and is driven by the logic of 
appropriateness.  
 
1.4.5.1. Political compliance 
 
Political compliance, i.e. conditionality, is found to play a major role, both in 
candidate states for which there is outspoken prospects of EU accession (e.g. Turkey) 
and in states which consider themselves as European although this perception is not 
shared by the EU (e.g. Georgia)524. Conditionality implies the adoption of the CFSP 
acquis, which is essentially based “either on legally binding international agreements 
or on political agreements to conduct political dialogue in the framework of CFSP, to 
align with EU statements, and to apply sanctions and restrictive measures where 
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required”525. Conditionality may also apply to softer norms such as the Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports526, or to the adoption of procedural norms, e.g. the adoption 
of a “culture of  compromise” in the Council527.  
 
Conditionality also relates to the EU acquis politique. Although it is not found to 
prescribe legally binding changes in national foreign policy regimes, conditionality 
nevertheless plays an important role because it re-orientates the politics of national 
foreign policy. It demands compliance with the fundamental norms the EU seeks to 
diffuse, by promoting externally peace, liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law528. More importantly, the acquis politique prescribes that states shall “refrain 
from irrational foreign policy actions”529 and shall (peacefully) settle their border 
conflicts before entering the EU (though Cyprus, helped by Greece succeeded in 
circumventing this political obligation)530.  
 
1.4.5.2. Experiential learning 
 
Some indications of experiential learning can be found in the Europeanisation 
literature. For instance, some candidate states could draw from benchmarking and 
monitoring mechanisms, from legislative and institutional templates, and from advice 
and twinning from the EU to improve their foreign policy decisions with regard to 
arms exports531 . Likewise, Denca showed that some organisational changes, e.g. 
concerning the adequate number of diplomats, in candidate states’ foreign ministries 
were “inspired by the experience of some other member states”532.  
 
1.4.5.3. Socialisation 
 
Considering the thinness of the CFSP and political acquis, and the sensitive nature of 
foreign policy, conditionality and experiential learning are traditionally considered as 
relatively weak mechanisms of Europeanisation in the field under consideration. 
Some scholars have instead suggested that socialisation, is better equipped to 
designate the reasons of institutional change. Socialisation is indeed perceived as 
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effective in “determining the rhetoric and appropriate behaviour of candidates”533. It 
gathers foreign policy decision-makers “around the concepts of common reflexes and 
norm behaviour and thinking”534, and it may shed light on why procedural norms such 
as consensus-building and coordination-reflex are obediently respected535.  
 
The logic of appropriateness, which underpins socialisation, is premised on the 
formation of a security community, which is “grounded in a feeling of natural 
solidarity between the European partners”, and as such, is capable of transforming 
states’ preferences, including in policy areas as sensitive as high politics 536 . 
Socialisation is most effective among technocrats and professional officials, and it 
starts with the pre-accession process537. The turning point, however, is the moment 
when candidate states are granted the status of “active observer” after signing the 
accession treaties538. Active observers cannot fully participate in the CFSP and ESDP, 
but they can attend to working groups and committees’ meetings in the Council and 
thereby learn the rules and practices operated in the CFSP, ESDP, COREPER II, 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) and General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC), and the collective norms of the EU.  
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2. Research Design 
 
2.1. The conceptual framework 
 
Concepts are the “building-blocks of all inferences”539; they should therefore attract 
researchers’ attention early on, i.e. at the beginning of the elaboration of the research 
design540. This task is here rendered even more important, as the present research 
design proposes an innovative approach to enquire into a conceptual field that lacks 
consensual delimitation.  
 
2.1.1. The definiendum: what Europeanisation denotes? 
 
Concept formation, in this research design, clearly fosters the definiendum over the 
definiens. It is not based on a set of definitional criteria, strictly enabling the observer 
to readily recognise whether a given phenomenon is an instance of Europeanisation or 
not. It will be seen that the definiens (connotations) adopted as definitional attribute of 
Europeanisation are not parsimonious, and might even seem abstruse. This is a major 
weakness –but a necessary evil. There is, indeed, a trade-off between connotations 
and denotations in concept formation541: the longer the list of attributes defining a 
concept, the narrower the concept and the rarer the associated phenomena. Where 
concepts can be formed without much trouble (e.g. because they are intuitively 
“good” or barely contested), prioritising the definiens might be appropriate. But where 
concepts display high levels of essential contestability, tightening the definiendum 
prematurely may only result in even more contestability. For instance, defining 
Europeanisation as the domestic impact of the EU, instead of Europe, adds to the 
clarity of the definitional attributes of Europeanisation (given the relative 
contestability of “Europe”). But it raises new questions since the conflation of Europe 
with the EU shrinks the definiendum of Europeanisation by excluding the domestic 
impact of the European non-EU organisations (e.g. the OSCE, Council of Europe) 
from its conceptual domain. That is why this thesis adopts a strategy of concept 
formation prioritising the definiendum. It will seek to identify a range of empirical 
phenomena in social life, which could be characterised as Europeanisation (based on 
the definition advanced in the research design). This presumes a relatively large 
definiendum. Then, based on a comparative analysis of these empirical observations, 
it will seek to refine the definiens by looking for meaningful commonalities between 
the phenomena. In the absence of consensus in the scholarship, the thesis, in other 
words, will problematise the definition of Europeanisation, rather than positing it right 
at the beginning. This makes the definiendum of Europeanisation closely tied to the 
explanandum.  
 
In the thesis, the Europeanisation explanandum is posited at the domestic level in 
order to differentiate the Europeanisation research domain from neighbouring 
                                                 
539 Gerring, J. 1999. ‘What Makes a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for Understanding Concept 
Formation in the Social Sciences.’ Polity vol.31 (3). 
540 Radaelli, C. M. and Pasquier, R. 2006. ‘Encounters with Europe: Concepts, Definitions and 
Research Design.’ POLITIK 2006. p. 18. 
541 Gerring, J. 1999. ‘What Makes a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for Understanding Concept 
Formation in the Social Sciences.’ Polity vol.31 (3). 
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concepts, such as European integration. This positioning contrasts with bottom-up 
conceptualisations of Europeanisation.  
 
The locus of the explanans, however, is not assumed to reside exclusively in the EU. 
It will be determined empirically, and may be located on the national, supranational, 
subnational or transnational levels. This positioning contrasts with the top-down 
conceptualisation of Europeanisation. Restraining oneself from positing the 
Europeanisation explanans at a given locus also implies that deductive research will 
not be favoured in this thesis. No pre-existing model, or theory, will be tested, which 
allegedly provides a ready-to-use picture of Europeanisation. This positioning also 
contrasts with the vertical conceptualisation of Europeanisation, which is often 
operationalised through the goodness of fit model.  
 
The thesis, instead, will heavily rely on inductive research strategy, and cover a wider 
spectrum of possible sources of change. It does not, however, deny the fact that 
change may originate from the EU, but in conceptualising Europeanisation, it treats 
the EU as a possible but non-unique source of change542. The conceptual framework, 
upon which the research will be conducted, is then closest to horizontal conceptions 
of Europeanisation. It views the EU as an arena, or a “transfer platform”543 rather than 
a référentiel.  
 
2.1.2. The definiens: how Europeanisation is defined 
 
At this point of the research design, it is essential to keep in mind that the conceptual 
framework proposed here is not driven by definiens. The most important elements 
within it are not the selection of connotations per se, but the enunciation of 
epistemological, ontological and theoretical choices, which will guide the research.  
 
Amidst the various definitions of Europeanisation that are of particular interest, four 
quintessential connotational properties can be identified: interactions structure, actors, 
cross-level agency, and institutional change. These connotational properties will help 
drawing some definitional boundaries and delineating the conceptual domain of 
Europeanisation. They are the building blocks of the definition of Europeanisation 
that will be used in this thesis.  
 
Europeanisation will accordingly be defined as a process of institutional change 
induced by a variety of actors interacting across different levels of governance within 
a European interaction structure. 
 
2.1.2.1. Interaction structure 
 
First of all, and most importantly in this research design, Europeanisation is about 
interactions, i.e. reciprocal and mutual actions. This conceptual dimension has been 
underlined by Major 544 , Wagner et al. 545 , and Risse, et al. 546 , for whom 
                                                 
542 see Collier, D. and Mahon, J. E. 1993. ‘Conceptual "Stretching" Revisited: Adapting Categories in 
Comparative Analysis.’ American Political Science Review vol.87 (4). 
543 Bulmer, S. and Radaelli, C. M. 2004. ‘The Europeanisation of National Policy?’ Queen’s Papers on 
Europeanisation vol.2004 (1). 
544 Major, C. 2005. ‘Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy – Undermining or Rescuing the 
Nation State?’ Politics vol.25 (3). 
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Europeanisation referred to the “emergence and development at the European level of 
distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions 
associated with political problem-solving that formalize interactions among the actors, 
and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative rules”547. Although 
their teleological bias equalling Europeanisation with institution-building is not 
accepted in this thesis, their definition rightly emphasises the “continuous interactions 
and linkages between national and European levels”548. No wonder then that Conant, 
in the same book, remarks that variations in the Europeanisation of the judiciary 
reflect the “general pattern of interaction between national Courts and the ECJ”549. In 
another field of research, but similarly, Trenz notes that “Europeanisation is measured 
through the discursive interaction that results in networks of communicative 
interchange”550. All in all, interactions are central to the concept of Europeanisation 
because they delineate, albeit imperfectly, the explanans of Europeanisation. This 
explains why Wagner et al. engaged into developing an interactionist framework of 
analysis, capturing “the interplay between German policy and European governance, 
avoiding the pitfalls of both structural determinism and individual voluntarism”551. In 
this research design, interactions are understood as taking place within interaction 
structures. This premise aims at excluding those coincidental interactions, which are 
not conducted in the framework of patterned relations between foreign policy actors.  
 
2.1.2.2. Actors 
 
The second connotational property completes the first one by bringing agency back in. 
It states that Europeanisation is about interactions between actors. This emphasis may 
seem trivial to researchers committed to methodological individualism, but it is not to 
the wide spectrum of scholars who research interactions between reified levels of 
governance. The best definition stressing the role of actors is perhaps provided by 
Hanf & Soetendorp, who refer to Europeanisation as “a process in which Europe, and 
especially the European Union, become an increasingly more relevant and important 
part of political reference for the actors at the level of the member states” 552 . 
Although this view tends to neglect that Europe (and the EU) is also composed of 
actors, and as such, can hardly be aggregated as a reified référentiel, this definition 
                                                                                                                                            
545 Wagner, W., et al. 2006. ‘German Foreign Policy in Europe: An Interactionist Framework of 
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illustrates very well the importance of actors at the domestic level. This stance has 
also been supported in Miskimmon, who highlighted “a move by national actors 
towards a greater consistency with the EU foreign and security policy”553, and, in 
another field, by Dakowska, who referred to “the way in which the extension of 
European governance to Central and Easter European (CEE) countries affects the 
perceptions and activities of party leaders from candidate countries”554.  
 
Actors are essential to conceptualise Europeanisation, because they are those who 
“adopt working practices, form alliances and networks, make strategic choices, 
allocate resources, and absorb new ideas: in each case willingly reflecting, and 
extending the influence of the European Union within the nation-state”555. Actors, in 
this research design, are thus considered as the basic unit propelling Europeanisation. 
This commitment to actor-oriented perspectives and some form of ontological 
individualism will be completed by a measure of epistemological interpretivism, so as 
to take into account the “subjective dimension of foreign policy and the self-
understanding of the actors involved”556. In this research design, actors are broadly 
understood as individual and collective agents capable of agency on interaction 
structures. It is their agency-ness, rather than the level of analysis, that makes them 
qualify for actor-ness.  
 
2.1.2.3. Cross-level agency 
 
The third connotational property of Europeanisation in this conceptual framework is 
cross-level agency, i.e. the projection of actions across various levels of governance. 
Europeanisation is not a process induced by interactions involving actors all located 
on a single level of governance. It presumes an interaction structure constituted by the 
crossed participation of a series of national, subnational and supranational actors in 
Europe. The concept of Europeanisation, therefore, should be committed, to some 
extent, to MLG theories, and most probably too, to neo-institutionalism. These 
commitments may be relaxed, but only to a limited extent. Regarding the latter, the 
concept of Europeanisation may for instance hold despite the conceptualisation of the 
EU as a negligible institution. Liberal intergovernmentalists, contra neo-
institutionalists, may neglect the role of supranational actors in their understanding of 
Europeanisation, but they cannot deny the “emergence and development at the 
European level of distinct structures of governance”557, which allegedly have the 
capacity to influence national foreign policy making. In other words, supra-
institutional actors may not be significant, but supra-national institutional settings do 
matter to national and subnational actors, because their relationships constitute an 
interaction structure in which cross-level agency is possible.  
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 75
 
The commitment to MLG, however, is less negotiable, since virtually every definition 
of Europeanisation refers to at least two levels of governance. But the demarcation of 
these levels of governance should not be taken for granted. Levels of governance are 
political constructs (and no material objects). This implies that the research should not 
simply rely on pre-existing images, but re-construct the levels across which foreign 
policy actors supposedly interact. It should be noted here that levels of governance are 
not always distinct and separable (a claim that echoes post-modernist critiques).  
 
2.1.2.4. Institutional change 
 
The last connotational property of Europeanisation is one identifying, albeit not 
delineating, the concept’s explanandum. Europeanisation is about institutional change. 
In this conceptual framework, institutions are understood in thick, sociological terms, 
in accordance with Radaelli’s558, Checkel’s559 and Bulmer & Radaelli’s560 reference 
to Europeanisation as the “construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal 
and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of 
EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, 
political structures and public policies”. This view of Europeanisation is advantageous 
because it takes into account a wide spectrum of changes, may they be formal or 
informal, direct or indirect, behavioural or attitudinal.  
 
2.2.  Research questions 
 
In the previous section, the conceptual domain of the research has been delineated. 
What was a vaguely specified research area under the generic term of Europeanisation 
has been narrowed down, and some dimensions of the concept have been prioritised. 
It is within this framework that the research will be pursued. More specifically, it will 
be devoted to answering to the following research questions:  
 
RQ1:  Which changes in the institution of national foreign policy can 
be attributed to those interactions performed on a European 
interaction structure by national, subnational, supranational or 
transnational actors?  
 
RQ1 specifies a dependent variable (“institutional changes”), which it locates at the 
domestic level (locus of the explanandum). RQ1 is interested in changes in the 
institution of foreign policy, not in policy change alone. This implies that the study of 
patterned changes in states’ foreign policy trajectories unfolding over years should be 
given precedence over the exploration of one-off occurrences. RQ1, in addition, 
specifies an independent variable, which it does not locate on one level of governance 
(the locus of the explanans should be researched empirically). The independent 
variable consists of “interactions performed […] by national, subnational, 
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supranational or transnational foreign policy actors”. This wording highlights the 
actor-oriented approach chosen in the research design. To qualify for Europeanisation, 
interactions have to be conducted “on a European interaction structure”. This 
condition does not refer to the existence of a unique objectivised supranational level 
of EU governance. It is more than that. An interaction structure is “European” 
inasmuch as it generates or conforts collective understandings shared by European 
actors in foreign policy matters. There is no European interaction structure in the 
absence of shared understandings. RQ1, finally, calls for researching the causal and 
constitutive connections relating the dependent and independent variable and paying 
attention to the issue of causal attributedness. At stake is the possibility (or not) to 
ascribe a distinctive effect to “European interaction structures”.  
 
RQ2:  What are the prevailing mechanisms of Europeanisation in the 
field of foreign policy? 
 
RQ2 paves the way of the systematic exploration of the connections between the 
variables. It calls for an argumentation shedding light on the “why” of 
Europeanisation. The research will seek to answer RQ2 by relying on a multi-
theoretical framework derived from the work of Walter Carlsnaes (see section 2.4.2).  
 
RQ3: What factors decisively support and constrain Europeanisation? 
 
Having identified the dominating mechanisms of Europeanisation in foreign policy 
(RQ2), the thesis will explore the “mediating factors” that decisively influence the 
prevailing mechanisms of institutional change. RQ3 rightfully reminds the goodness 
of fit approach561, but it is the result of a very different research process.  
 
The focus of RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3 will be placed sectorally on foreign policy and 
geographically on non-EU Europe. The choice of foreign policy as domain of 
empirical research is guided by the complementarities that the chosen approach to 
Europeanisation has developed with the transformative FPA agenda. Since the issue 
of “boundary maintenance and boundary crossing” 562  lies at the core of the 
Europeanisation puzzle, then, the salience of this issue cannot be higher than in a 
domain specifically concerned by boundaries between insiders and aliens, i.e. in 
foreign policy. The choice of European non-EU member states is less obvious. While 
addressing the “no-variation issue”, it aims at challenging the post-ontological claim 
that “Europeanisation would not exist without European integration”563. As noted by 
Irondelle, “Europeanization intervenes not only after the process of integration, when 
common institutions and policies exist, but also during and even before the 
process”564. More specifically, it aims at shedding light on the transformation of 
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Europe’s political order from a perspective that is not limited to EU integration 
studies. 
 
2.3. The research strategy 
 
2.3.1. Bottom-bottom research strategy 
 
In the following part, the structure of inference of the research will be outlined. In 
accordance with the definiendum-oriented conceptual approach of Europeanisation, 
the design will adopt an actor-oriented strategy giving primary weight to outcome-
oriented empirical surveying and inductive research. It will differ from a “baseline 
strategy”, which, starting from the “presence of EU integration, controls the levels of 
fit/misfit of the EU-level policy vis-à-vis the members states and then explains the 
presence or absence of domestic change”565. Baseline strategies (also called top-down 
research design models) imply that the research is conducted recursively after 
presuming the interference of pre-selected intervening variables. They foster 
deductive reasoning and theory-testing, but are not helpful here, given their 
inclination for positivist rationalism. Baseline strategies, indeed, usually give more 
weight to structuralist explanations of Europeanisation. They are thus bound to fail at 
the very margins of the concept’s empirical applicability, i.e. where European 
structures are the weakest. In the absence of clear EFP institutions, the deductive 
fit/misfit approach proposed by baseline strategies will at best prove inconclusive. It 
is, in fact, better suited in order to scrutinise Europeanisation where there is little 
conceptual debate over the sectoral and geographical domains of applicability of the 
concept (e.g. Europeanisation of France’s agricultural policy), rather than 
experimenting at its margins.  
 
The research strategy chosen in this thesis is a bottom-bottom approach, sometimes 
also referred to as bottom-up research design (not to be mistaken with bottom-up 
conceptions)566. The main difference in the bottom-bottom research strategy is that it 
treats the EU (and other European organisations) as exogenous variables567. Instead of 
inferring Europeanisation from deductive conclusions regarding changing levels of 
fit/misfit, the bottom-bottom strategy tries to establish inductively whether “the 
encounter with ‘Europe’ is one of the critical junctures of the policy process under 
examination or a less important encounter”568. To that end, it starts from “the set of 
actors, ideas, problems, rules, styles and outcomes at the domestic level at time zero, 
[…] then process-traces the system over the years, […] identifies the critical junctures 
or turning points –for example when major ideational change takes place, or the 
constellation of dominant actors is altered; […] and for each juncture [finally 
examines whether] the cause of this major change [is] domestic or [whether it] come[s] 
from exogenous variables like the EU-level variables or global-level variables”569. It 
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uses constitutive and causal theorising, but backwards, in order to scrutinise the 
reasons and causes of change in domestic policy and institutions and to generate 
hypotheses.  
 
2.3.2. The praxis of inductive research 
 
In praxis, the operationalisation of such bottom-bottom research strategy runs as 
follows: First, empirical observations are collected to constitute the dependent 
variable. This part is called descriptive analysis. Little attention is paid to explaining 
or attributing a cause to the observation. This stage reflects the choice of the bottom-
bottom research strategy, which “starts from actors, problems, resources, policy style, 
and discourses at the domestic level”570, and does not reason deductively in terms of 
structural or institutional adaptation. The method for data selection will be detailed in 
section 2.5.  
 
Once empirical data have been collected (and changes in the institution of national 
foreign policy have been described and thoroughly analysed in a time-sensitive 
manner), the independent variable (e.g. the EU’s CFSP) is exogenised –as one of the 
possible explanations. The research then specifies the type of inferences that can be 
attributed to the relationship between the variables, on the basis of the conceptual 
framework. For instance, changes in states’ foreign policy behaviour that are found to 
be convergent with the EU are attributed to Europeanisation, because of the existence 
of foreign policy coordination mechanisms. The inference is established by 
demonstrating that the observations can and should be understood as produced in the 
framework of a European interaction structure (in the latter example: EU foreign 
policy coordination mechanisms). The research also examines the type of interaction 
structure (e.g. the role of the EU therein) as well as its non-EU ramifications (e.g. 
with the norms of other European organisations, or international norms).The solidity 
of the inference depends on this work. 
 
Then, the causal and constitutive relationships linking the variables are explored. This 
part is called argumentative analysis. It draws from a multi-theoretical framework 
presented in section 2.4. The objective is to identify the causal, constitutive and 
teleological forces that drove the phenomenon of Europeanisation, as presented in the 
descriptive analysis, evaluate the salience of the mechanisms at play and the factors 
that have facilitated or constrained the process.  
 
Throughout the research, empirical checks will be introduced in the data collection 
procedures so to minimise “the risk of committing the logical fallacy of affirming the 
consequent”571. For instance, domestic convergence in candidate states’ diplomatic 
networks may be indicative of Europeanisation, but it may also be explained by 
globalisation. This risk of pre-judging the role of the EU arena comparatively to rival, 
plausible variables should be taken very seriously572. Haverland has showed that 
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neglecting this over-determination pitfall may considerably undermine the capacity of 
the researcher to establish compelling causality573. This problem is most severe in 
studies using baseline strategies, since these do not treat EU-level variables as 
exogenous (unlike other intervening variables). They thus tend to inflate the relative 
and actual importance of Europeanisation compared to other processes of social 
change. In studies using bottom-bottom research strategies, this risk of over-
determination is intrinsically lower, as EU-level independent variables are treated 
exogenously in the same way as rival (or intervening) variables. But it is not reduced 
to null, as case selection may have a distortive effect on inferences –a methodological 
pitfall known as the “no-variation” issue 574 , and questions in interviews, by 
suggesting that the role of the EU is crucial, may overlook the significance of other 
variables.  
 
2.4. The analytical design 
 
2.4.1. A FPA framework in descriptive research 
 
The descriptive research will identify instances of institutional change with the 
purpose of constituting the dependent variable. It will rest on the FPA framework 
inspired by Hill575 and White576, and presented in the literature review (see section 
1.1.2). This FPA framework, originally conceived with the purpose of analysing 
states’ foreign policy, prescribes the examination of foreign policy through five 
dimensions: foreign policy actors, foreign policy contexts, foreign policy processes, 
foreign policy instruments and foreign policy outputs. Although the first step in the 
research has no explanatory purpose, it can nevertheless use the FPA framework to 
examine systematically whether some institutional changes have taken place in the 
five aforementioned dimensions, within the cases and timeframe under consideration.  
 
Table 1 presents (for each of the five FPA dimensions) a set of observable phenomena, 
which, according to the literature review, may qualify as instances of institutional 
changes possibly attributable to Europeanisation. In this FPA framework, behavioural 
and attitudinal indicators will be used to substantiate the various dimensions of 
change (see section 2.5.3 on the methodology). 
                                                                                                                                            
C. M. and Pasquier, R. 2006. ‘Encounters with Europe: Concepts, Definitions and Research Design.’ 
POLITIK 2006. 
573 Haverland, M. 2003. ‘Methodological Issues in Europeanisation Research: The ‘No Variation’ 
Problem.’ Conference paper; Haverland, M. 2007. ‘Methodology.’ In Europeanization: New Research 
Agendas, eds. Graziano, P. and Vink, M. P; Haverland, M. 2005. ‘Does the EU Cause Domestic 
Developments? The Problem of Case Selection in Europeanization Research.’ European Integration 
online Papers vol.9 (2). 
574 Haverland, M. 2003. ‘Methodological Issues in Europeanisation Research: The ‘No Variation’ 
Problem.’ Conference paper; Haverland, M. 2007. ‘Methodology.’ In Europeanization: New Research 
Agendas, eds. Graziano, P. and Vink, M. P; Haverland, M. 2005. ‘Does the EU Cause Domestic 
Developments? The Problem of Case Selection in Europeanization Research.’ European Integration 
online Papers vol.9 (2). 
575 Hill, C. 2003. The Politics of Foreign Policy. 
576 White, B. 2004. ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe.’ In Contemporary European 
Foreign Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. 
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Table 1: Foreign policy analysis in descriptive research 
 
FPA dimensions Observable phenomena (instances) 
Foreign policy 
actors 
empowerment of EFP Community actors 
prime-ministerialisation of FP 
expansion of diplomatic networks (size, staff, resources, etc…) 
creation of FP structures for conduct of political dialogue with EU 
widening scope of FP coverage 
professionalisation of FP ministries (rejuvenation, technology) 
renaming of ministries, etc… 
Foreign policy 
contexts 
emergence of EU as incontrovertible structure (increase in number of 
reference to EU…) 
collective identity formation 
paradigmatic shift in security doctrine 
de-securitisation, re-securitisation of FP discourse 
reinforcement of democratisation 
introduction of MLG, participation of non-govtl actors 
Foreign policy 
process 
development of réflexe communautaire 
growing FP coordination 
Brusselisation of FP decision-making 
shift towards problem-solving rationality 
increase in QMV in EFP making, shrinking of domaines réservés 
enhanced access to information  
Foreign policy 
instruments 
growing ability to project national preferences on EU level 
renouncement to use hard power 
FP issue multilateralisation 
Foreign policy 
outputs 
FP convergence 
FP alignment 
 
2.4.2. A multidimensional framework of analysis in argumentative research 
 
The second analytical framework proposed in this thesis is an adaptation of 
Carlsnaes’s synthetic meta-theoretical framework for the analysis of foreign policy577. 
It was originally designed as a “metatheoretical framework based on a dynamic 
conception of the interplay over time between interpretative, purposive agents and a 
structural domain defined in terms of both constraining and enabling properties”578.  
 
Its purpose will be to offer a framework in inductive research in order to 1) assess the 
attributability of the data collected by the descriptive research to the phenomenon of 
Europeanisation, and 2) explore the underpinning forces driving the phenomenon. 
That is, in other words, to 1) establish that a logical connection exists between, one 
                                                 
577 Carlsnaes, W. 1992. ‘The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis.’ International 
Studies Quarterly vol.36; Carlsnaes, W. 2002. ‘Foreign Policy.’ In Handbook of International 
Relations, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al; Carlsnaes, W. 2004b. ‘Where Is the Analysis Fo European Foreign 
Policy Going?’ European Union Politics vol.5 (4); Carlsnaes, W. 2008. ‘Actors, Structures, and 
Foreign Policy Analysis.’ In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, eds. Smith, S., et al. 
578 Carlsnaes, W. 1992. ‘The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis.’ International 
Studies Quarterly vol.36. p. 245. 
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the one side, the instances of institutional change observed through FPA at the 
domestic level in descriptive research, and, on the other side, relevant interactions that 
have been performed on a European interaction structure by a variety of foreign 
policy actors; and 2) unveiling the mechanisms of Europeanisation that mattered most 
in the case under consideration and highlighting the facilitating and constraining 
factors, when appropriate.  
 
Although it will here applied to the field of national foreign policy, it is argued that 
this framework could similarly be applied to any other policy field, in which actors 
interact across levels of governance, and could therefore make a valuable contribution 
to Europeanisation research in general. The analytical framework prescribes a three-
step analysis, in order to locate the roots of social action empirically, in both agents 
and structures. It departs from approaches strictly committed to either methodological 
holism or methodological individualism, because it considers, in accordance with 
previous conceptual choices, that both actors and structures matter; and that the forces 
driving Europeanisation are both endogenous and exogenous. The analytical 
framework, thus, is designed for the dual purpose of unveiling both reasons and 
causes of actions. Causes are premised on the ontological existence of (dependent and 
independent) variables, whereas reasons presume that the phenomenon in question is 
an effect of the conditions that make it possible, although it does not exist 
independently of them579. 
 
2.4.2.1. Intentional analysis –looking for teleological motives 
 
The intentional analysis aims at providing teleological explanations in terms of goals 
and individual preferences. Rooted in actor-based, individualistic theories, it seeks to 
understand the relationship between a given phenomenon (e.g. change in foreign 
policy) and the goal that was pursued by actors as the phenomenon ensued580.  
 
Sometimes, social action is a matter of will. Alignment, for instance, often implies 
behavioural change: one actor alters its behaviour in order to get closer to its point of 
reference. This change may be explained by the intention the actor held to indeed get 
closer to its point of reference. This argumentation is less trivial than it seems. 
Sometimes, actors intended to adopt the behaviour that have adopted, but for reasons 
that had been overlooked by researchers. That is why intentional analysis heavily 
relies on interpretative studies581. Sometimes, also, actors held a different intent than 
the one that researchers assigned to them. Their alignment may be unintended, 
unexpected or coincidental. Sometimes, finally, actors did hold the intent at first, but 
they no longer do (and for some reason, may no longer dis-align themselves). These 
considerations are important to detect equifinality issues. Of course, an intentional 
analysis does not elucidate “how a particular intention has come to be a particular 
actor’s intention”582. That is the field of inquiry of the dispositional analysis.  
                                                 
579 Fearon, J. and Wendt, A. 2002. ‘Rationalism V. Constructivism: A Skeptikal View.’ In Handbook of 
International Relations, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 58ff. 
580 Carlsnaes, W. 2008. ‘Actors, Structures, and Foreign Policy Analysis.’ In Foreign Policy: Theories, 
Actors, Cases, eds. Smith, S., et al. p. 97. 
581 Carlsnaes, W. 2002. ‘Foreign Policy.’ In Handbook of International Relations, eds. Carlsnaes, W., 
et al. p. 343. 
582 Carlsnaes, W. 1992. ‘The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis.’ International 
Studies Quarterly vol.36. p. 255. 
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2.4.2.2. Dispositional analysis –looking for normative inclinations 
 
The dispositional analysis aims providing an understanding of social change in terms 
of norms and values. Rooted in normative theories, it does not examine the properties 
of actors that can objectively explain their intentions and their actions, but enquires 
into those “reasons” for action 583  that are vested in actors’ dispositions. The 
dispositional analysis, more specifically, aims at understanding “why certain purposes, 
goals, preferences or choices have been invoked, but not others” at a given moment584.  
 
Social action, in this understanding, is a matter of inclination. Because actors hold 
certain causal and principled beliefs (dispositions) regarding the appropriateness of an 
action (e.g. on the consequences and goodness of alignment), they will develop 
corresponding intentions and seek to act accordingly. It will not be possible to infer 
any causal power from these inclinations, since the dispositions fuelling them do not 
exist independently from the phenomenon. They are held by the same domestic actors, 
who witness and operate the changes in national foreign policy. But this dispositional 
analysis can be of great use to understand the constitutive relationships that nourish 
social action. It will require the examination of the normative constructs that matter in 
foreign policy, their transformation over time and the exploration of the 
intersubjective understandings forming collective identities, which, at a higher-level 
of analysis, sustain dispositions favourable to cooperative behaviours. Discursive and 
cultural strands of constructivism can hereby proved of great utility. 
 
2.4.2.3. Structural analysis –looking for structural forces 
 
The third analytical approach proposed in this multi-dimensional framework is a 
structural analysis. It is based on the assumption that agency is “never pursued outside 
crucible of structural determination”585. Researching key structural constraints and 
enabling factors, and identifying institutional settings are important to identify causal 
powers.  
 
Social action, after all, is also a matter of structural necessity. It is decisively 
determined by both material and ideational properties, which exist independently 
from actors’ will and dispositions, although these properties have an impact on their 
will and dispositions. An EU law obligation to align, for instance, potentially, has a 
causal effect on actor’s behaviour, if the ensuing behaviour is driven by compliance. 
But it also has a constitutive effect on the context in which dispositions take root (by 
providing the raw material for a shift towards obedience) and it is also essential to 
understand why certain intentions are formulated (as structures provide limitations). 
The whole range of causal powers is best studied through rationalist, often holistic, 
theories.  
                                                 
583 Stahl, B. and Harnisch, S. 2009a. ‘Nationale Identitäten Und Aussenpolitiken: Erkenntnisse, 
Desiderate Und Neue Wege in Der Diskursforschung.’ In Vergleichende Aussenpolitikforschung Und 
Nationale Identitäten: Die Europäische Union Im Kosovo-Konflikt 1996-2008, eds. Stahl, B. and 
Harnisch, S. 
584 Carlsnaes, W. 2004b. ‘Where Is the Analysis Fo European Foreign Policy Going?’ European Union 
Politics vol.5 (4). p. 507. 
585 Carlsnaes, W. 2002. ‘Foreign Policy.’ In Handbook of International Relations, eds. Carlsnaes, W., 
et al. p. 343. 
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2.5. Methodological design 
 
2.5.1. Case study 
 
The thesis will follow the methodological design of a cross-national, small-n case 
study. It will examine the Europeanisation phenomenon in two countries “with the 
intention of comparing their manifestations in different socio-cultural settings 
(institutions, customs, traditions, value systems, life styles, language, thought 
patterns), using the same research instruments”586.  
 
The two countries selected for this study are part of the “many spaces of non-EU 
Europe” (see section 1.4.1). Their foreign policy actors interact intensively on 
European interaction structures, but their relationship to the EU differs meaningfully 
from each other. This makes them part of different circles of non-EU Europe –a 
relational property that is all but irrelevant in the study of Europeanisation. Choosing 
two cases instead of a single one can best capture this dimension. A third (and fourth) 
case could have been added (at least theoretically) to underline the heterogeneity of 
non-EU Europe. But it would not have necessarily added much explanatory power. 
Any new case would have increased the number of intrinsic attributes potentially 
linked to foreign policy changes (e.g. economy, political system), made comparison 
more difficult, and blurred the relative significance of the relational properties that 
constitute the many space of non-EU Europe.  
 
2.5.1.1. FRY/Serbia-Montenegro/Serbia and FYROM/RoM/Macedonia 
 
The cases that have been selected in this thesis are Serbia and Macedonia. Serbia only 
became an independent state in 2006, following the dissolution of the state union of 
Serbia and Montenegro587. Before that, Serbia was a constituent republic of the state 
union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006), a loose political union with few 
competences shared. Between 1992 and 2003, it was a constituent republic of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), a tighter federation consisting, again, of 
Serbia and Montenegro588. Since Serbia only became an independent state in 2006, it 
might seem odd to speak of “Serbia’s foreign policy” before 2006. Foreign policy, 
indeed, was a one of the few prerogatives of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro 
between 2003 and 2006 and the FRY between 1992 and 2003. In this thesis, however, 
little attention will be paid to this issue. A heuristical approach will be adopted, which, 
unless otherwise indicated, posits that there is no meaningful difference between 
Serbia-Montenegro, FRY and Serbia’s foreign policies. This heuristic is not an 
optimal solution, but it is an experienced-based technique that enables to study 
Serbia’s foreign policy over a longer period of time, with relative consistency. Serbia, 
after all, is the legal successor of both the FRY and the state union of Serbia and 
                                                 
586 Hantrais cit. in Bryman, A. 2004. Social Research Methods. p. 53. 
587 In May 2006, Montenegro declared by referendum its independence from the state union. Its 
independence entailed the end of the state union, and ipso facto, Serbia’s independence.  
588 Before 1992, Serbia was a constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY), which was dissolved amid the Yugoslav wars. Later, the FRY claimed to be the legal 
successor of the SFRY. See Bühler, K. G. 2001. State Succession and Membership in International 
Organizations. p. 185ff. 
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Montenegro589. This means that Serbia in 2006 took over the international capacity to 
assume the state union’s rights and obligations. Serbia’s post-2006 foreign policy can 
reasonably be considered as a continuity of FRY/Serbia Montenegro’s pre-2006 
foreign policy for another reason: the inherent asymmetry of the FRY/Serbia 
Montenegro, which credited Serbia with more political weight than Montenegro. 
Belgrade, after all, was not only the capital of Serbia; it was also the capital of the 
FRY590, and from 2003, the “administrative centre” of the state union of Serbia and 
Montenegro, as well as the centre of its legislative and executive power591. This 
means that key institutions of foreign policy (e.g. the federal Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the diplomatic academy, the federal Presidency and the Council of Ministers) 
were located in Belgrade. Moreover, in the federal administration, many high-ranking 
positions in foreign affairs were occupied by native Serbs. Between 1992 and 2006, 
none of the six Foreign Ministers of the FRY/Serbia-Montenegro came from 
Montenegro592. The longer diplomatic tradition of Serbia and its larger resources 
certainly reinforced the internal asymmetries of the FRY and state union. That is why 
speaking of Serbia’s foreign policy before 2006 to designate, heuristically, the foreign 
policy of Serbia-Montenegro or FRY, in practical, experience-based terms, is not 
erroneous (although, constitutionally, it is).  
 
The other case that will be studied in this thesis is Macedonia. Macedonia declared its 
independence in September 1991, following a referendum. However, it did not 
receive international recognition right away owing to a dispute with Greece over the 
name of the country593. Greece rejected indeed the name of “Macedonia”, which it 
considered hers, as belonging to the Hellenic heritage of the republic. A solution 
could only be found in 1995, after Athens and Skopje concluded an Interim 
Agreement, stating that Greece would no longer oppose Macedonia in international 
organisations, provided Macedonia is referred to as “former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia” or “FYROM”. Shortly after, in December 1995, the EU accordingly 
established official diplomatic relations with “FYROM”. This agreement, however, 
does not provide that the only valid name of Macedonia is “FYROM”594. Nor does it 
acknowledge Macedonia’s claim to be called “Republic of Macedonia” (RoM). In this 
thesis, therefore, the abbreviated name of “Macedonia” will be used to designate 
(depending on the standpoint) either RoM or FYROM.  
 
The choice of Serbia and Macedonia in this thesis, finally, reflects the need to select 1) 
information-rich (“deep”) cases; 2) most similar cases; 3) most meaningfully 
contrasting cases.  
 
2.5.1.2. Information-rich cases 
 
                                                 
589 Art. 60, Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. 2003. 
590 Art. 5, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. April 1992. 
591 Belgrade harboured the Assembly of Serbia-Montenegro and its Council of Ministers, whereas 
Podgorica only harboured the Court of Serbia-Montenegro. Art. 6, Constitutional Charter of the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro. 2003.  
592 Montenegro, however, was well represented in the Chairmanship of the Council of Ministers of 
Serbia-Montenegro and the Cabinet of FRY.  
593 For a short history, see Mircev, D. 2006. The Macedonian Foreign Policy.  
594 This has point has been raised explicitly in 2011 by the ICJ in its interpretation of the 1995 Interim 
Agreement. See International Court of Justice. 5 December 2011. ‘Judgment of the Court Regarding 
the Objection by Greece to the Admission of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Nato.’ 
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The thesis, conducted under the general auspices of Europeanisation research, has two 
research foci, i.e. a sectoral one (national foreign policy) and a politico-geographical 
one (non-EU Europe). As it is not possible to examine, analyse and compare all 
instances of institutional change throughout non-EU Europe, the geographical scope 
of the research shall be narrowed down by selecting cases that amplify the prospective 
contribution of the research to the Europeanisation scholarship in general, and shed 
light on the phenomenon in non-EU Europe in particular. The difficulty, however, is 
to balance information-richness with relative representativeness. Considering the 
heterogeneity of the non-EU European space, which encompasses states as diverse as 
Moldova, Turkey, Belarus, Switzerland and Norway, priority will be given in this 
thesis to information-richness.  
 
The choice of Serbia and Macedonia is first of all grounded on the fact that the two 
states have been conducting a very dynamic foreign policy over the past 15 years, 
whether on the bilateral, regional, European or international level. This dynamism has 
been amplified by the existence of highly securitised issues in both countries (see 
Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Present and past security issues in Macedonia and Serbia (as of 2013) 
 
Macedonia Serbia 
  
 Highly securitised issues (present)  
Relations with Greece and collaterals 
(Name issue) 
Relations with Pristina and collaterals 
(Kosovo issue) 
  
 (partly) de-securitised issues  
Relations with Kosovo Relation with Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Inter-ethnical relations Relations with Croatia 
 Relations with the Hague Tribunal 
 
The “naming dispute issue” between Skopje and Athens has plagued the foreign 
relations of Macedonia since its declaration of independence in 1991595. Although 
many EU and Nato member states recognise Macedonia under its constitutional name 
(including the United Kingdom, Hungary, Luxembourg or Poland), opposition by 
Greece has translated into repeated (and hitherto rather successful) attempts at barring, 
or at least retarding, Macedonia’s accession to European and Euro-Atlantic 
structures596. Macedonia therefore deploys considerable diplomatic efforts in order to 
obtain the support of third countries, accepting to recognise the country under its 
constitutional name (for instance, Andorra in 2010, Bolivia and Namibia in 2011, 
Hungary in 2012, the Czech Republic in 2013)597. Other security issues in Macedonia 
                                                 
595 for a short overview, see Frčkoski, D. L. 2009. ‘The Character of the Name Dispute between 
Macedonia and Greece.’ 
596 e.g. Embassy of the Hellenic Republic of Greece in Washington 29/08/2008; EurActiv 23/06/2008; 
Grnčarovska 29/10/2010, p. . 
597 Macedonian Information Agency. 6.8.2009. 'Macedonia Establishes Diplomatic Ties with Andorra 
under Its Constitutional Name'. [accessed 05/11/2010]; United Macedonian Diaspora. 8.3.2013. 'Umd 
Thanks the Czech Republic for Recognizing Macedonia '. [accessed 7.6.2013]; United Macedonian 
Diaspora. 18.1.2011. 'Bolivia Becomes 131st Country to Recognize Macedonia's Name'. [accessed 
7.6.2013]. 
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concern a border dispute with Kosovo, which has been settled in 2009598, and the 
question of territorial decentralisation, which is included in the 2001 Ohrid 
Agreement, and “necessarily has an ethnical and political dimension”599.  
 
In Serbia, the foreign policy issue that is most securitised today concerns the Kosovo 
recognition issue 600 . Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence of 17th 
February 2008, Serbia has embarked on a large-scale diplomatic campaign to prevent 
UN member states from recognising Kosovo’s independence. Its campaign has met 
mixed results. Within the EU, five states have not recognised Kosovo as independent 
state as of 2013: Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. To 
support its claim, Serbia has been resorting to a variety of foreign policy actions, e.g. 
expelling ambassadors of countries that recognised Kosovo601. Later, Serbia recently 
moved its dispute on the judicial level by appealing to the International Court of 
Justice, but the Court’s ruling eventually proved more favourable to Kosovo602. Other 
security topics that have been, or are being de-securitarised in Serbia include Serbia’s 
relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina regarding the past (accusation of genocide) and the 
Republika Srpska (territorial integrity issues); Serbia’s relations with Croatia 
regarding the past (mutual accusations of genocide); and Serbia’s relations with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which were 
fraught until the arrest of Mladić in 2011.  
 
2.5.1.3. Cases with meaningful similarities  
 
To be comparable, cases must be selected so as to minimise the number or the 
significance of variables other than the explanans, which could equally explain the 
phenomenon of Europeanisation. In Lijphart’s word, this concern refers to the issue of 
“too many variables, too few cases”603. It is solved by choosing cases displaying 
remarkable similarities –except regarding the independent variable, where differences 
should be most meaningful.  
 
The choice of Serbia and Macedonia is grounded on this logic of meaningful 
similarity. First, both states share important socio-cultural characteristics. Both are 
multi-ethnic states with a Slavic, Eastern Orthodox majority, and both have 
substantial minorities (see Table 3). In Central Serbia, Serbs account for 89.5% of the 
population; in Vojvodina, they represent 65 %; and in Kosovo604, they are a minority 
(around 10% according to the 1991 census, and presumably around 4% today)605. In 
Macedonia, the two thirds of the population are of Slavic ethnicity. Albanians are a 
                                                 
598 EurActiv. 19/10/2009. ‘EU Hails Macedonia and Kosovo for Solving Border Quarrel.’ 
599 Minister Xhaferi cit. in Dnevnik. 06/04/2010. ‘Macédoine: « La Décentralisation Est Un Enjeu Qui 
Aura Toujours Une Dimension Ethnique Et Politique ».’ 
600 for an overview of post-war Kosovo and the status question, see Kramer, H. and Džihić, V. 2006. 
Die Kosovo-Bilanz: Scheitert Die Internationale Gemeinschaft? 
601 Deutsche Welle. 10.10.2008. ‘Serbia Expels Macedonian, Montenegrin Envoys over Kosovo.’ 
602 International Court of Justice. 22 July 2010. ‘Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Indepedence in Respect of Kosovo.’ 
603 cit. in Alecu de Flers, N. 2007. ‘National Adaptation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) of the EU? The Effects of the CFSP on the Foreign Policies of Ireland and Austria.’ Doctoral 
thesis. 
604 Serbia considers Kosovo as part of its territory, despite the declaration of independence of February 
2008. 
605 Republic of Serbia. 2002. ‘Final Results of the Census 2002.’; Republic of Kosovo. 2010. ‘Kosovo 
in Figures 2009.’ 
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majority in some municipalities along the Western border, and they represent 20 to 
50% of the population in North-Western and Central Macedonia (including Skopje). 
In confessional matters, it is worth noting that the Macedonian Orthodox Church 
gained autonomy from the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1959, and declared 
autocephaly in 1967. This has caused recurrent tensions at the highest level between 
the two countries606. Islam, finally, has a long history in Macedonia and Serbia. It was 
brought by the Ottomans in the 14th and 15th century, and it is mostly practiced by the 
Albanians, the Bosniaks, and the Turks. 
 
Table 3: Comparative demographics of Macedonia and Serbia (2002 censuses) 
 
Macedonia Serbia*  
~2 million Total population ~7.5 million 
National or ethnic group 
Macedonians 64.18% Serbs 82.86% 
Albanians 25.17% Hungarians 3.91% 
Turks 3.85% Bosniaks 1.82% 
Roma 2.66% Roma 1.44% 
Serbs 1.78% Yugoslavs 1.08% 
Bosniaks 0.84% Croats 0.94% 
  Montenegrins 0.92% 
  Albanians 0.82% 
  Macedonians 0.35% 
Confessions  
Macedonian Orthodox 64.7% Serbian Orthodox 84.98% 
Islam 33.3% Roman Catholic 5.48% 
  Islam 3.20% 
* The 2002 census of Serbia excludes Kosovo from its statistics 
Sources: Republic of Serbia. ‘Final Results of the Census of 2002.’; Republic of Macedonia. 2005. 
‘Census of population, households and dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002’. 
 
Second, Serbia and Macedonia share a common history: both peoples used to be ruled 
by the Ottomans, which they (sometimes jointly) opposed. Following the Balkan wars 
and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, both belonged in turn to the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918-1929), the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929-1941) 
and of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) (from 1943 till 
Macedonia’s declaration of independence in 1991)607.  
 
Third, both states belong to the same geopolitical space, the Balkans, whether 
naturalistically considered as a geographical reality delineated by the Balkan 
Peninsula, or normatively considered as a reflection of discursive constructions by the 
                                                 
606 Macedonian Information Agency. 2009. 'Ivanov - Tadic: Macedonia and Serbia Make Progress in 
Bilateral Relations'. [accessed 04/11/2010]. 
607 for an history of the Balkans, see Castellan, G. 1992. History of the Balkans: From Mohammed the 
Conqueror to Stalin. 
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West608. Both states crystallise a normative imagery that is “paired in opposition to 
the ‘West’ and ‘Europe’, [as] the dark other of ‘western civilization’” 609 . This 
stereotypical imagery, which Todorova terms “Balkanism”, has been internalised by 
local communities to a surprisingly high degree610. It is still very lively (cf. the 
narrative of Balkanisation), and arguably maintains the ambivalence of the “West” 
towards this “other” Europe. Negative connotations attached to Balkanism are 
addressed to both Serbia and Macedonia. 
 
Fourth, Serbia and Macedonia share important socio-political characteristics. They are 
both parliamentary republics endowing the Head of State with limited powers in 
comparison to the Head of Government, and have unicameral legislatures (see  
Table 4). In Serbia, the political landscape is dominated by three or four political 
parties: the pro-European centre-left Democratic Party (DS), affiliated to the Party of 
European Socialists; the left-wing nationalist Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), founded 
by Slobodan Milošević in 1990; the right-wing ethno-nationalist Serbian Radical 
Party (SRS) and its conservative offspring, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS); and 
the centre-right Euro-sceptical Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), which has lost 
considerable weight in the past few years. In Macedonia, the political landscape is 
dominated by the right-wing moderately nationalist Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity 
(VMRO-DPMNE), affiliated to the European People’s Party; the Centre-left Social 
Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), affiliated to the Party of European 
Socialists; and a few Albanian parties, e.g. the Democratic Union for Integration 
(BDI). 
 
The political system in Serbia and Macedonia has undergone a significant 
democratisation process in the 2000s. As a result, there has been a certain 
improvement of civil liberties and political rights in both countries (see Table 5). But 
the level of democracy in Serbia and Macedonia remains comparable, according to 
the Bertelsmann Foundation. Even corruption, which has been identified as a major 
problem by the EU, is a phenomenon that affects both countries in comparable extents. 
                                                 
608 Todorova, M. 1999. Die Erfindung Des Balkans. 
609 Todorova, M. 1994. ‘The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention.’ Slavic Review vol.53 (2). p. 482. 
610 Todorova, M. 1999. Die Erfindung Des Balkans. 
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Table 4: Political and legal system in Macedonia and Serbia 
 
Macedonia Serbia 
Parliamentary republic Parliamentary republic 
Executive branch 
President  
elected by direct vote, 5-year term 
Gjorge Ivanov 
VMRO-DPMNE, since May 2009 
 
Branko Crvenkovski 
SDSM, May 2004-May 2009 
 
Boris Trajkovski 
VMRO-DPMNE, Nov. 1999-Feb. 2004 
Tomislav Nikolić 
SNS, since May 2012 
 
Boris Tadić 
DS, July 2004-Apr.2012 
 
Milan Milutinović 
SPS, Dec.1997-Dec.2002 
Prime Ministers 
Nikola Gruevski 
VMRO-DPMNE, since Aug. 2006 
 
Vlado Bučkovski 
SDSM, Dec. 2004-Aug. 2006 
 
Hari Kostov 
Indep., June 2004-Nov. 2004 
 
Radmila Šekerinska 
SDSM, May 2004-June 2004 
 
Branko Crvenkovski 
SDSM, Nov. 2002-May 2004 
 
Ljubčo Georgievski 
VMRO-DPMNE, Nov. 1998-Nov. 2002 
Ivica Dačić 
SPS, since July 2012 
 
Mirko Cvetković 
Indep., July 2008-July 2012 
 
Vojslav Koštunica 
DSS, March 2004-July 2008 
 
Zoran Živković 
DS, March 2003-March 2004 
 
Zoran Đinđić 
DS, Jan. 2001-March 2003 
 
Mirko Marjanović 
SPS, March 1994-Oct. 2000 
Legislative branch 
Unicameral Assembly 
120 seats (123 from 2011) 
elected for a 4-year term 
 
 
Parliamentary elections in 
- 2011, won by VMRO-DPMNE –led coalition  
- 2008, won by VMRO-DPMNE –led coalition 
- 2006, won by VMRO-DPMNE –led coalition 
- 2002, won by SDSM –led coalition 
 
Unicameral Assembly 
250 seats 
elected for a 4-year term 
 
Parliamentary elections won by 
- 2012, won by SNS –led coalition  
- 2008, won by DS –led coalition 
- 2007, won by SRS –led coalition 
- 2003, won by SRS –led coalition 
- 2000, won by DS –led coalition 
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Table 5: Democracy in Serbia and Macedonia 
 
Macedonia Serbia 
Democracy indexes 
1997 2010 2003 2010 
Civil liberties 1) 4 3 3 2 
Political rights 1) 3 3 2 2 
Democracy status 2)  7.95  8 
Stateness 2)  8.8.  9.3 
Rule of law 2)  7.3  6.8 
Stability of demo. institu. 2)  8.5  8 
Corruption perception index3)  4.1  3.5 
 
1) higher values indicate lesser liberties and rights; source: Freedom House  
2) source: Bertelsmann Stiftung  
3) higher values indicate lower corruption perception; source Transparency International  
 
Fifth, Serbia and Macedonia have both a population that supports European 
integration (see Figure 1), although this support has been declining in the past few 
years. A meaningful difference between the two countries, however, resides in the 
absolute level of support, which in Macedonia is 15 to 20% higher than in Serbia.  
 
Figure 1: Popular support for EU integration in Serbia and Macedonia  
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Source: SEA and SEIO611. 
 
Sixth, Serbia and Macedonia share important socio-economic characteristics. 
According to the World Bank, they rank respectively 64th and 68th in terms of gross 
                                                 
611 Government of Macedonia. 'Public Opinion Survey Iri'. [accessed 5.3.2013]; Government of the 
Republic of Serbia. July 2011. ‘European Orientation of the Citizens of the Republic of Serbia: 
Trends.’ 
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domestic product (GDP) per capita (PPP) 612 . They have both experienced an 
economic transition, and they are similarly confronted to market-based pressures 
emanating from the globalisation. Both economies trade intensively with the EU, their 
main trading partner 613 . The EU accounts respectively for 60% and 47% of 
Macedonia’s total imports and exports, compared to 54% and 54% of Serbia’s total 
imports and exports. Serbia and Macedonia’s exports mostly consist of price-sensitive 
products (textile and steel for Macedonia, and agricultural products, tires, steel and 
iron for Serbia). None of the countries cover their imports with their exports. The EU 
is also a major investor in both countries: it accounts for 75% of the foreign direct 
investments in both countries. 
 
Seventh, both countries have been recipients of financial assistance provided by the 
EU in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process, through the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) (since 2007), and the Community Assistance for 
Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) (between 2000 and 2006). 
Macedonia also benefited from EU financial assistance prior to 2000614. Between 
2007 and 2010, Serbia has received around €730 million under the IPA scheme, i.e. a 
yearly average of €190 million615. In the same period, Macedonia has benefited from 
€300 million, i.e. a yearly average of 75 million616. These amounts are similar, if one 
takes into account Serbia’s larger GDP and population.  
 
Serbia and Macedonia are finally both very well integrated in the world system, 
although some meaningful differences appear with regards to Nato in particular. Both 
states are members of the United Nations and participate in peace-keeping operations 
worldwide (cf. Serbia’s participation in the MONUC in RDC, UNMIL in Liberia, 
UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire and Macedonia’s participation in the UNIFIL in Libanon). 
Serbia and Macedonia are members of the international organisations, such as the 
Council of Europe or the OSCE, and are also very well integrated in regional 
organisations (e.g. Southeast European Cooperation Process, Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe and Regional Cooperation Council, Central European Initiative, 
CEFTA, BSEC). 
 
In the eight dimensions mentioned here (socio-cultural, historical, geopolitical, socio-
political, EU-related, socio-economic, related to EU financial assistance, and to the 
participation to international organisation), Serbia and Macedonia display striking 
similarities. If cross-national differences are to be found in the explanandum, then, the 
variables underpinning these dimensions will most probably not be the ones that can 
best explain differential change, as little cross-national variation can be evidenced 
between them. Some of these variables (e.g. democratisation, globalisation) can 
nevertheless play a role in co-explaining similarities in the explanandum; their 
relevance will therefore have to be vetted against that of other variables. 
 
2.5.1.4. Cases with meaningful differences 
                                                 
612 World Bank. 'World Development Indicators Database'. [accessed  
613 European Commission. 'EU-Serbia Relations'. [accessed 03/11/2010]; European Commission. 'EU- 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Relations'. [accessed 03/11/2010]. 
614 European Commission. 'Phare'. [accessed 03/11/2010]. 
615 European Commission. 'Serbia - Financial Assistance'. [accessed 03/11/2010]. 
616 European Commission. 'The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - Financial Assistance'. 
[accessed 03/11/2010]. 
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The third concern in case selection is the need to choose cases displaying meaningful 
differences. This concern echoes the “no-variation issue” in Europeanisation 
studies617, i.e. the need to make sure that the independent variable shows cross-
national variations. In the absence of such variations, it is “difficult to confirm the 
‘EU matters’ hypotheses when the hypothesised pattern or outcome is matched by our 
observations, as there is no systematic control for other potential explanations, such as 
globalisation”618. Part of this “no-variation” issue is resolved by the choice of a 
bottom-bottom research design exogenising the independent variable, and the conduct 
of inductive research limiting the risk of over-determination fallacy. The issue can be 
further alleviated by choosing cases that display “variations in the EU variable but 
similarity with regards to other variables”619. The choice of Serbia and Macedonia is 
in this respect quite instructive.  
 
Serbia and Macedonia first exhibit meaningful differences as regards their respective 
relationship with the EU (see Table 6). Both states started their rapprochement with 
the EC/EU in the same time, through the Regional Approach in 1997 and became 
“potential candidates” through their participation in the Stabilisation and Association 
process (SAp) in 2000. But Macedonia progressed towards EU accession at a much 
faster pace than Serbia, at least in the 2000s. It signed its Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) in 2001 and witnessed its entry into force in 2004. Serbia signed it 
in 2008, and had it ratified by all EU member states only in 2013620. Macedonia, 
likewise, was granted the status of EU candidate in 2005, whereas Serbia only 
reached this stage in 2012. The reasons for Serbia’s slower progression towards the 
EU mainly reside in the country’s lack of cooperation with the ICTY (in the mid-
2000s) and its problematic relationship with Kosovo (thereafter). Although 
Macedonia’s integration progress, at first, has been swifter in comparison to Serbia, it 
has been stalled in 2008, mainly because of the “naming issue”. Despite the 
recommendation of the Commission (in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012), the Council has 
not agreed on the opening of accession negotiations with Macedonia. This stalemate 
has allowed Serbia to “catch up” with Macedonia in the 2010s. In spring 2013, both 
countries stood again at the same institutional distance from the EU.  
                                                 
617 Haverland, M. 2003. ‘Methodological Issues in Europeanisation Research: The ‘No Variation’ 
Problem.’ Conference paper; Haverland, M. 2005. ‘Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? The 
Problem of Case Selection in Europeanization Research.’ European Integration online Papers vol.9 (2). 
618 Haverland, M. 2005. ‘Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? The Problem of Case Selection 
in Europeanization Research.’ European Integration online Papers vol.9 (2). p. 2. 
619 Ibid. p. 7. 
620 Belgium, France, Germany and Romania ratified the SAA between the EU and Serbia in 2012. 
Lithuania was the last country of the EU that had not ratified the agreement. The reason invoked for 
this delay was an on-going dispute between Belgrade and Vilnius concerning the cancellation of the 
privatisation of one Serbia’s beer makers, which had previously been purchased by a Lithuanian 
company and the diplomatic race the two countries run for taking over the Presidency of the UNGA. 
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Table 6: A comparative chronology of EU-Macedonian and EU-Serbian relations  
 
 Macedonia Serbia 
Commission recommends opening of accession 
negotiations 14 October 2009 22 April 2013 
European Council posits the resolution of 
naming issue as pre-condition 19-20 June 2008 n.a. 
European Council grants Candidate status 16 December 2005 1 March 2012 
SAA enters into force 1 April 2004 1 September 2013 
Application for EU membership 22 March 2004 22 December 2009 
SAA signature 9 April 2001 29 April 2008 
SAA negotiations resume n.a. 13 June 2007 
SAA negotiations called off  n.a. 2 May 2006 
SAA negotiations start 5 April 2000 10 October 2005 
Thessaloniki European Council confirms the SAp 
and offers “European perspectives” June 2003 June 2003 
Zagreb Summit launches the Stabilisation and 
Association process November 2000 November 2000 
Feira European Council recognises Western 
Balkan countries as “potential candidates” June 2000 June 2000 
Regional Approach launches conditionality 1997 1997 
 
In addition to these cross-national variations in time, timing and tempo regarding the 
EU accession process of the two countries, there are also cross-national variations in 
the type of relationship Serbia and Macedonia have woven with the EU. Macedonia’s 
relationship with the EU (and most of EU member states) is very asymmetrical, 
politically speaking. Macedonia has neither the capabilities, nor the willingness to act 
as a regional power, or to counter-balance its relationship with the EU by intensifying 
its contacts with other entities. Its foreign policy is relatively new –it mostly emerged 
only after independence. It is, in a word, very dependent from the EU and EU member 
states. Serbia’s relationship with the EU, by comparison, is less asymmetrical, at least 
in political terms. Its administration has more expertise in international and European 
affairs, and it has a longer diplomatic tradition within the SFRY. Serbia, furthermore, 
maintains very good relations with Russia. The two countries regularly exchange 
official visits at the highest level, and define their relationship as “strategic”621. Serbia 
traditionally relies on Russia’s support in the UN Security Council regarding Kosovo, 
and occasionally used its “Russian option” to inflect EU positions in its favour. This 
special relationship with Russia attenuates the asymmetry of the relationship with the 
EU. Serbia, finally, is also very active, diplomatically, within the Non-Aligned 
                                                 
621 See Republic of Serbia. October 2009. ‘National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia.’ In 
2013, Serbia and Russia signed a Declaration on Strategic Partnership. See President of Russia. 24 May 
2013. ‘Press Statements Following Russian-Serbian Talks.’ 
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Movement (NAM), an international organisation funded in Belgrade in 1961, and still 
critical of major powers, such as the EU and the US. Serbia has the status of observer 
in the organisation622. 
 
Serbia and Macedonia finally differ in their respective relationship with NATO (see 
Table 7). First, as receiver of security, Macedonia hosted Nato-led military operations 
between 2001 and 2003, as instability surged in North-eastern parts of the country. 
The internal conflict, which opposed state’s security forces to ethnic Albanians 
fighters, was a repercussion of the Kosovo war. It was settled by the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement in 13 August 2001, and Nato accordingly deployed its troops 
to ensure the proper implementation of the Agreement as well as the stabilisation of 
the country623. But Macedonia’s relationship with Nato did not start as receiver of 
security. Since 1995, Macedonia participates in Nato’s Partnership for Peace 
Programme (PfP), and in 1999, it adhered to the Membership Action Plan (MAP) 
with the aim of joining the North Atlantic Organisation. In 2008, Macedonia expected 
to be invited to become a member of Nato, but its expectations were dashed by 
Greece’s opposition owing to the “naming issue”. Despite this setback (repeated in 
2012), Macedonia still hopes to join Nato. Serbia’s relationship with Nato 
considerably differs from Macedonia. As receiver of security, first, Serbia did not 
willingly host Nato’s operation on its territory during the Kosovo war. In 1999, it was 
bombed by Nato624, and forced to accept the deployment of a Nato force (KFOR) in 
Kosovo. These events have fuelled Serbia’s resentment towards Nato in general and 
the US in particular. The country nevertheless joined the PfP in 2006, in order to gain 
assistance in its reform of its security sector and defence systems. But Serbia unlike 
Macedonia, never expressed its intention to join Nato as a member, and therefore does 
not participate to the MAP. Its outspoken reservation is rooted in Serbia’s historical 
participation in the NAM, its relations with Russia and Nato’s role in the Kosovo war. 
In 2007, Serbia’s National Assembly adopted a neutrality doctrine, in order to confirm 
its opposition to join Nato. 
                                                 
622 It hosted in 2011 the 50th NAM summit.  
623 In accordance with the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 13 August 2001. The operation “Essential 
Harvest” in 2001 was intended to disarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy their weapons; the 
operation Amber Fox was intended to assist the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement; and the 
operation Allied Harmony was intended to transfer ownership to Macedonia’s security forces. See 
NATO. 'Nato's Role in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia'. [accessed 12.6.2013]. 
624 Operation Allied Force 
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Table 7: Macedonia and Serbia’s relationship with Nato 
 
Macedonia Serbia 
Intention to join Nato Doctrine of armed neutrality 
Membership Action Plan since April 1999   
Partnership for Peace since Nov. 1995 Partnership for Peace since Dec. 2006 
 
2.5.2. Timeframe: 1997-2013 
 
The empirical research covers a 15-year long period, ideally spanning from 1997 to 
2013. 1997 is a milestone for the Western Balkans. It is the year when the GAERC 
decided to establish a conditionality regime intended to bring the region closer to the 
EU. Although most of its criteria were economic in essence, the “Regional Approach” 
signalled the EU’s readiness to intensify its strategic dialogue with the Western 
Balkans625. This new step occurred a few years after the end of the war, which tore 
apart the region between 1991 and 1995. More generally, 1997 marks the starting 
point of the normalisation of most of Western Balkan states’ international relations. In 
1997, Macedonia had just settled (at least provisionally) its dispute with Greece. The 
trade embargo imposed by Athens because of the naming issue had just been lifted, 
and the 1995 Interim Accord between the Hellenic Republic and the FYROM had just 
been signed. It was, according to Macedonia’s Foreign Minister between 1997 and 
1998, a time of “normalisation and breakthrough”, especially regarding the “highest 
priority of the country”: EU and Nato integration626. For Belgrade, however, this new 
phase only started after the overthrow of Milošević in October 2000. The Kosovo war 
in 1998-1999 considerably undermined the relevance (and effectiveness) of the 1997 
Regional Approach. And it prevented Belgrade from conducting a foreign policy 
comparable with the type of foreign policy pursued in times of peace. That is why this 
period (1997-2000) will not be considered for Serbia/FYR.  
 
2.5.3.  Methods and techniques 
 
2.5.3.1. Descriptive research 
 
The purpose of the descriptive research is to identify a set of changes in the institution 
of national foreign policy. As it does not examine causality relationships, it cannot 
establish that the institutional changes that have been identified are instances of the 
Europeanisation phenomenon. But it can nevertheless orientate the argumentative 
research by providing a set of thickly descriptive observations, whose connection with 
the Europeanisation phenomenon remains to be established. In a word, the purpose of 
the descriptive research is to collect preliminary material in order to explore the 
relationship between the observations and the Europeanisation phenomenon.  
                                                 
625 Council of the European Union. 29 April 1997a. ‘Conclusions of the General Affairs Council.’; 
European Bulletin. 1997. ‘Schlussfolgerungen Des Rates Zur Anwendung Der Konditionalität Bei Der 
Entwicklung Der Beziehungen Zwischen Der Europäischen Union Und Bestimmten Ländern 
Südosteuropas.’ vol.7. 
626 Handziski, B. 2006. ‘Normalisation and Breakthrough.’ In The Macedonian Foreign Policy, ed. 
Mircev, D. p. 42. 
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The descriptive research, to that end, adopts a longitudinal design (see Table 8). It 
prescribes the collection and description of direct and secondary observations 
evidencing instances of institutional change in different foreign policy dimensions 
(actors, contexts, processes, instruments and outputs). As the EU variable is 
exogenised by the bottom-bottom research strategy, the scope covered by the 
descriptive research can be very broad, and even include observations, for which no 
inference of Europeanisation can be drawn. The empirical scope of the descriptive 
research may be subject to some alterations, depending on the availability of the data, 
their relevance for FPA, and the overall amount of description generated by the 
research. For instance, if no data can be found for 2013, or if the data found for Serbia 
in 1999 are of little use owing to the state of war that prevailed at that time, then the 
timeframe of the descriptive research may be changed. Likewise, if the research on 
foreign policy outputs sheds enough light on the process-dimension of foreign policy, 
then the thesis may drop the specific analysis of foreign policy processes.   
 
Table 8: Longitudinal design for descriptive researchl design for descriptive research 
 
 Year  1997 1998 … 2013 
Foreign policy actors 
(FPact) Obs1997,FPact Obs1998,FPact … Obs2013,FPact 
Foreign Policy contexts 
(FPctx) Obs1997,FPctx Obs1998,FPctx … Obs2013,FPctx 
Foreign Policy 
processes (FPpss) Obs1997,FPpss Obs1998,FPpss … Obs2013,FPpss 
Foreign Policy 
instruments (FPinstm) Obs1997,FPinstm Obs1998,FPinstm … Obs2013,FPinstm O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
Foreign Policy outputs 
(FPout) Obs1997,FPout Obs1998,FPout … Obs2013,FPout 
 
NB: Obs1997,FPout. stands for [observation of a phenomenon in 1997 in the field of foreign policy 
outputs]. 
Source: adapted from Bryman 2004627 
 
The methodology for data selection is guided by two principles: it must be 
parsimonious and generate and information-rich observations. Parsimony implies that 
the research should not cover all possible aspects of institutional change in each and 
every dimension of foreign policy identified by the FPA framework. The purpose of 
the descriptive research here is not to give an exhaustive account of all the changes 
that have affected Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy over the past 15 years; it is 
to provide the argumentative research with a source of empirical observations for 
meaningful exploration. Data will therefore be collected gradually until at least one 
sub-set of observations in the relevant FPA categories meets the Europeanisation 
explanans.  
 
The other principle that will guide descriptive research is the need to select data that 
provide information-rich observations. Information-richness is understood as both the 
capacity to generate fruitful argumentation, and to relate to the overall research 
strategy. The first criterion determines the degree of external validity of the research. 
Information-poor observations (e.g. superficial changes the foreign ministry’s name) 
will prove of little interest in generalising the findings. The second criterion, i.e. the 
                                                 
627 Bryman, A. 2004. Social Research Methods. 
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need to select data in accordance with the overall strategy of the research, aims at 
guaranteeing a high degree of internal validity. Collecting information about 
institutional change in the CFSP structures in Brussels, for instance, is not very 
information-rich with regards to the thesis’s research questions.  
 
The instruments used for the descriptive research encompass semi-structured 
interviews as well as content analysis, both qualitative and quantitative. The 
interviews aim at collecting data on facts and attitudes about past changes in Serbia 
and Macedonia’s foreign policy. Qualitative and quantitative content analyses were 
used in order to document similar changes, usually in earlier times or over a longer 
period of time. Quantitative content analysis rather focuses on generating data relative 
to behavioural changes. The sources in descriptive research include: primary sources 
(e.g. interviews), secondary sources (e.g. official documents from Serbia, Macedonia, 
the EU and other international organisations), and secondary literature.  
 
2.5.3.2. Argumentative research 
 
The purpose of the argumentative research is to examine the connection between the 
observations provided by the descriptive research and the independent variable, in 
order to establish an inference and examine the mechanisms underpinning 
Europeanisation. The argumentative analysis, thus, will focus on the exploration of 
the logical connection between the explanans and the explanandum, as well as the 
role of intervening variables.  
 
Concretely, the argumentative research, for the purpose of the analysis, will mainly 
rely on data collected from foreign policy actors directly, in accordance with the 
actor-oriented, inductive research design. The identification of the actors that are 
relevant for drawing the inference and conducting the argumentation will be based on 
purposive sampling. Experts and elites (then considered as experts) will be asked to 
identify powerful actors, who might shed light on a particular change that has been 
observed and described (reputational criterion). Alternatively, they will be identified 
based on their active participation in the decision-making process that led to the 
changes identified in the descriptive research (decisional criterion). Or they will be 
identified in function of their material resources, the formal authority conferred upon 
them by their function, or their belonging to an organisation that is central in the 
foreign policy issue that is considered (positional criterion). As a general rule, 
whenever possible, the data for argumentative research will be extracted from 
interviews with these actors. In the absence of interviews, the data will be extracted 
from the analysis of public declarations, from official documents and other secondary 
sources.  
 
The method used in the argumentative research depends on the type of analysis that 
was performed (i.e. whether applied to intentional, dispositional or structural analysis). 
The data for the intentional analysis will mainly be collected through elite-interviews, 
and researched through qualitative discourse analysis. The purpose of intentional 
analysis will be to assess the extent to which the instances of institutional change 
identified by the descriptive research can be traced back to teleological motives for 
action. The interviews will be semi-structured; they will seek to answer the following 
question: “what did you seek to achieve through this change in your foreign policy”? 
The interviews will rely on purposive sampling (with an emphasis on the reputational 
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and decisional criteria) and they will be conducted under the veil of confidentiality in 
order to obtain thicker data from the interviewees.  
 
The data for the dispositional analysis will be collected through in-depth interviews 
and documentary surveying, and analysed through content analysis. The goal will be 
to apprehend relevant normative changes in Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy 
actors and answer the following question: “what inclinations enabled this particular 
change in foreign policy”? The in-depth interviews will be semi-structured, rely on 
purposive sampling (with an emphasis on reputational and positional criteria), and 
will mostly be conducted under the veil of confidentiality. The documentary 
surveying will above all target Serbia and Macedonia’s official documents and public 
declarations, but it will also include other official sources (e.g. from the EU), as well 
as leaked diplomatic cables (e.g. Wikileak) and non-governmental reports. 
 
The data for the structural analysis will mainly be collected through documentary 
surveying, and analysed through content analysis, congruence techniques and process-
tracing. The congruence techniques will aim at evidencing qualitative covariation 
patterns between the independent and dependent variables, and answering the 
following question: “what structural change may be at the origin of Serbia or 
Macedonia’s foreign policy change”? The data collected from the documentary 
surveying will, above all, encompass political and legal documents. The analysis of 
their content will shed light on the existence of structural causes for action. In 
addition to the congruence techniques, process-tracing will be used with the purpose 
of remedying the limitations of correlational studies as a source of causal inference628. 
As often noted in the literature, “observed correlations do not provide a solid basis for 
inferring underlying causality”629. Process-tracing can therefore be used to “trace the 
operation of the causal mechanism(s) at work in a given situation”630, and thus yield 
more conclusive results. Process-tracing is a time-sensitive technique that allows for 
studying the process underpinning decision-making. It may be used as a full-range 
technique for explaining facts, or as in this thesis, more loosely, as an accompanying 
instrument used to verify a claim, and “exploring the extent to which [the process] 
coincides with prior, theoretically derived expectations about the working of the 
mechanisms”631. Process-tracing will be informed by content analysis, and, when 
possible, by elite interviews.  
 
2.5.3.3. Design of the interviews 
 
Several rounds of interviews have been organised by the researcher in 2011, 2012 and 
2013. Overall, around 60 persons have been interviewed, mainly in Serbia, 
Macedonia and Austria. Some of them were working in Brussels or New York, and a 
few semi-structured interviewees have been conducted by phone. In order to establish 
trust, the interviewer assured the interviewees of the confidentiality of the discussion. 
That is why no information is given about names and the exact functions. In addition 
to these semi-structured interviews, more than 40 short telephone inquiries have been 
made, e.g. to document the year of opening of Serbia and Macedonia’s embassies 
                                                 
628 Bennett, A. and George, A. L. 1997. ‘Process Tracing in Case Study Research.’ Conference paper. 
629 Cf. the equifinality issue. Ibid.Conference paper. p. 2.  
630 Checkel, J. T. 2005. ‘It’s the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of European and 
International Politics.’ ARENA Working Papers vol.26. p. 6. 
631 Ibid. 
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worldwide or gain knowledge of factual data. Nearly all Serbia and Macedonia’s 
embassies worldwide have been contacted in this format. 
 
Obtaining the consent of top executives has not been an easy task. Before the 
interview, for fear of biasing the discussion, the researcher only transmitted little 
information to the potential interviewees (in the form of an interview information 
sheet). In order to facilitate the access to key executives, the researcher engaged in the 
research programme of the OSCE in Prague and got accredited to attend to Permanent 
Council (PC) meetings in Vienna. He also participated, in 2011, in the academic 
sessions of the newly established Belgrade Security Forum. At this occasion, he 
received the support of the organising committee in Belgrade and gained access to top 
decision-makers. The researcher participated in similar conferences in Skopje, 
Sarajevo and Podgorica. The researcher finally capitalised on his personal and 
professional networks, as well as the network of the persons he interviewed 
(especially for data collected on the basis of the reputational criterion). 
 
Most of the interviews were semi-structured. The interview plan had three parts. First, 
the researcher sought to capture the type of representations the interviewee had of 
Europe, the EU and the relationship of his/her country to European foreign policy 
actors (e.g. in terms of hierarchy, European cohesion, level and frequency of 
interactions). The researcher sometimes resorted to pictorial elements in order to fuel 
the discussion. Then the researcher enquired into specific changes that have affected 
the interviewee’s field of competence. He asked them to describe the changes with 
their own words and to assess their opportunity. The researcher finally enquired into 
the causes and reasons that, according to the interviewees, can account for the 
phenomenon. The interviews generally lasted 45 minutes. They were conducted in 
English, German or French. Most of them were recorded, and then manually 
transcribed before being coded and analysed. Some of the interviewees refused to be 
recorded. In that case, the interviewer took hand-written notes.  
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3. Empirical Research 
 
The empirical study presented in this part of the thesis is conducted with the purpose 
of 1) evidencing patterned changes in Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy; 2) 
whenever possible, inferring Europeanisation from these observations; and 3) 
identifying the causal and constitutive forces that underpin the phenomenon.  
 
In order to 1) evidence patterned changes in Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy, 
the author relies on the FPA framework presented in the research design. It 
distinguishes five foreign policy dimensions, the differences between which are more 
analytical than substantive (foreign policy outputs, contexts, actors, instruments and 
processes). In order to 2) infer Europeanisation from these observations, the author, in 
accordance with his definitional framework, will examine, whether these are induced 
by actors interacting across different levels of governance within a European 
interaction structure. Finally, in order to 3) identify the causal and constitutive forces 
that underpin the phenomenon, the author with rely on Carlsnaes’s multi-theoretical 
framework of analysis (following the teleological/dispositional/structural trichotomy).  
 
3.1. Changes in Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy behaviour 
 
This section explores the output and process dimension of Serbia and Macedonia’s 
foreign policy. It assesses the extent to which Serbia and Macedonia’s 1) voting 
behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly and 2) declaratory behaviour in 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have become 
convergent with EU positions over time; it infers Europeanisation foreign policy 
coordination; and it analyses the motives, causes and reasons that best account for the 
phenomenon. Although other international fora could have been considered (e.g. the 
Council of Europe), the research will limit itself to the study of convergence in the 
UNGA and OSCE632. 
 
3.1.1. Convergence towards EU positions in the UNGA 
 
3.1.1.1. Voting in the UNGA 
 
Being “arguably the most important forum for the discussion of global politics”633, the 
United Nations General Assembly is a meaningful source of data for researchers 
willing to investigate states’ foreign policy positions on international issues. Therein, 
all UN member states are able to express their positions on a wide variety of foreign 
policy issues, most notably by voting. Their votes, for or against UNGA resolutions, 
are a good depiction of the expression of their interests and preferences in world 
politics634.  
 
                                                 
632 Both host intense multilateral diplomatic activities with an emphasis on high politics; the former 
covers a wide range of issue-areas at the international level; the latter, being more specialised, focuses 
on security in Europe.  
633 Peterson, M. J. 2006. The UN General Assembly. p. i. 
634 Luif, P. 2003. ‘EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly.’ ESSI Occasional Papers (49). p. 13. 
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The themes covered by UNGA resolutions are delineated by article 13 of the UN 
Charter, and they are reflected by the interests of the six UNGA Main Committees635. 
In practice, however, the themes covered by the UNGA mainly focus on four issue-
areas: political and human rights; decolonisation issues; the Middle East; and 
international security, including international disarmament, small arms and light 
weapons, dual-use goods636. The relative weight of these issue-areas in the overall lot 
of resolutions submitted to the UNGA is not balanced, and it did not remain constant 
overtime. Figure 2 shows that nearly 30% of the resolutions passed on a roll-call basis 
concern international security, and an additional 25% focus on the Middle East alone. 
By the end of the 1990s, resolutions on human rights were proportionally more 
numerous than those on decolonisation. While the latter issue-area has recently been 
loosing its relevance, the former has gained considerable impetus. This change rightly 
reflects paradigmatic developments in contemporary world politics. Of course, the 
themes covered in the UNGA do not always mirror the foreign policy interests of all 
member states in a perfect manner. But overall, it can be argued that the thematic 
coverage of the resolutions passed on the UNGA is broad enough to guarantee a 
satisfying degree of external validity. It can be considered as representative of the 
typical spectrum of foreign policy issues dealt with in world politics by most of UN 
member states, including then Serbia, Macedonia and EU member states. 
 
Figure 2: Thematic categorisation of the resolutions passed in the UNGA between 1992 and 2001 
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Source: own calculations, data from Hosli et al. 2010, p. 41.  
 
Resolutions in the UNGA are passed on a one-country-one-vote basis 637  in 
accordance with the UN “sovereign equality principle”638. The voting rule, defined in 
the UN Charter and in the UNGA Rules of Procedure, is majoritarian. The type of 
majority required (simple or two-thirds) depends on the type of issue brought to the 
                                                 
635 i.e. disarmament and international security issues; political issues and decolonisation; economic and 
financial issues; social, humanitarian and cultural issues; administrative and budgetary issues and legal 
issues. United Nations. 1984. ‘Rules of Procedure of the United Nations General Assembly.’ 
636 Voeten, E. 2000. ‘Clashes in the Assembly.’ International Organization vol.54 (2); Luif, P. 2003. 
‘EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly.’ ESSI Occasional Papers (49); Hosli, M. O., et al. 2010. 
‘Voting Cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly: The Case of the European Union.’ 
Conference paper. 
637 Rule 82, United Nations. 1984. ‘Rules of Procedure of the United Nations General Assembly.’ 
638 Art. 2 (1), United Nations. 1945. ‘Charter of the United Nations.’ 
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vote 639 . In practice, however, most of UNGA draft resolutions are passed by 
consensus, i.e. without a vote. It means that delegates express their position “by show 
of hands or by standing”, and their individual vote is not recorded640. This decision 
mode concerns no less than 70% of UNGA draft resolutions641. Rule 87b of the 
UNGA Rules of Procedure nevertheless foresees that “any representative may request 
a recorded vote”, in which case the roll-call voting procedure applies. In practice, only 
the most controversial and politicised resolutions follow this path642. Recorded votes 
are registered by the UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBIS) and are readily 
available for public consultation643.  
 
Only the member states of the United Nations are entitled to vote in the UNGA. As 
the EU is not granted the status of full member of the UN644, it cannot vote in the 
UNGA645. Most of the positions of the EU can nevertheless be modelled, based on EU 
member states’ voting behaviour and used as pivot (see 3.1.1.2). Changes in the 
distance that separates the EU from Serbia or Macedonia can be measured 
accordingly by comparing Serbia or Macedonia’s positions to EU modelled 
preferences.  
 
3.1.1.2. Measuring voting convergence in the UNGA 
 
The dataset that is used in this part of the study consists of the voting positions 
recorded in the UNGA after roll-call votes. The temporal scope of the research spans 
from the establishment of the EU by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 (52nd Plenary 
Session of the UNGA) to the full entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2010 (65th 
Plenary Session of the UNGA). The geographical scope of the research encompasses 
1) a varying number of EU member states (12, 15, 25 or 27 depending on the 
measurement year); 2) Serbia646  and Macedonia647 ; 3) associated states from the 
                                                 
639 Rules 83-84, United Nations. 1984. ‘Rules of Procedure of the United Nations General Assembly.’ 
640 Ibid. 
641 Peterson, M. J. 2006. The UN General Assembly. p. 74; see also Luif, P. 2003. ‘EU Cohesion in the 
UN General Assembly.’ ESSI Occasional Papers (49). p. 22. 
642 Hosli, M. O., et al. 2010. ‘Voting Cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly: The Case of 
the European Union.’ Conference paper. p. 5. 
643 See United Nations Bibliographic Information System. [accessed 21/12/2010]. 
644 The EU has an observer status in the UNGA. In 2011, it was granted enhanced powers, but still, 
cannot vote. 
645 European Union @ United Nations. 'The EU at the UN - Overview'. [accessed 10/01/2011]; see also 
Eeckhout, P. 2004. External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations. 
p. 200. 
646 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an original member of the United Nations, the 
Charter having been signed on its behalf on 26 June 1945 and ratified 19 October 1945, until its 
dissolution following the establishment and subsequent admission as new members of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was admitted 
as a Member of the United Nations by General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/12 of 1 November 2000. 
On 4 February 2003, following the adoption and promulgation of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia 
and Montenegro by the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the official name of “Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia” was changed to Serbia and Montenegro. Finally, in a letter dated 3 June 2006, 
the President of the Republic of Serbia informed the Secretary-General that the membership of Serbia 
and Montenegro was being continued by the Republic of Serbia, following Montenegro’s declaration of 
independence. See United Nations. 3 July 2006. ‘Press Release Org/1469.’ 
647 By resolution A/RES/47/225 of 8 April 1993, the General Assembly decided to admit as a member 
of the United Nations the state being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United 
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Western Balkans and the Black Sea region (for comparative purposes), and alternative 
major powers (e.g. China, Russia, the United States), to be used as control variables. 
The data are collected from a research database compiling UN records until 2007648, 
and retrieved manually from the UNBIS Website for subsequent years649.  
 
The original data [voting position], recorded by UNBIS, may take five different 
values, depending on the states’ behaviour with regards to voting on specific 
resolutions. These values are [yes] (i.e. vote in favour), [no] (i.e. vote against), 
[abstain] (i.e. no vote although present), [absent] (i.e. no vote because absent) and [not 
a member] (i.e. vote because no voting right). To extract more information from the 
dataset, the data are re-coded. First, [not a member] values are discarded from the 
dataset as they do not carry substantive information of states’ foreign policy choices 
in the UNGA. [Abstain] and [absent], by contrast, are considered just similarly as [yes] 
and [no], i.e. as substantive positions -except when [absence] is systematic, i.e. is 
repeated more than ten times in a raw (e.g. Greece in 1996 owing to a strike of Greek 
diplomats). When [absence] is systematic, then the data are discarded as non-data 
because the repetition of absence supposes an impossibility to express one’s position 
rather than substantive preferences. Otherwise, [absence] is treated as [abstain], since 
leaving the UNGA facilities at the occasion of a vote presumably conveys a 
substantive message on one’s position. This re-coding is consistent with other 
studies 650 . It considers that states may choose to avoid confrontation by being 
selectively absent at the roll-call vote, or by abstaining when the vote takes place. 
Though different in behaviour, both non-voting options may be considered as 
expressing attitudinal preferences. In deciding whether this non-voting option shall be 
given the same substantive weight as [yes] and [no], this study follows Luif (2003)651 
and Hurwitz (1975)652 in the calculation of voting distance indexes (VDI) and Hix, 
Noury and Roland (2005)653 in the calculation of levels of similarity (LoS). In the 
former case, [abstain] and [absent] are treated as “partial agreement”654, i.e. coded 
with a value of 0.5. In the latter case, [abstain] and [absent] are treated nominally as 
full-fledged positions (see Table 9). 
 
The literature on policy convergence underlines the different “directions” of 
convergence655 . Knill, for instance, distinguishes between σ-convergence, i.e. the 
“decrease in variation of policies”, which is operationalised as a measure of regional 
cohesion, and δ-convergence, which is operationalised “by comparing countries’ 
                                                                                                                                            
Nations as “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” pending settlement of the difference that 
had arisen over its name. 
648 Voeten, E. 'Iqss 2008 Dataverse: United Nations General Assembly Voting Data'. [accessed 
20/12/2010]. 
649 United Nations Bibliographic Information System. [accessed 21/12/2010]. 
650 e.g. Luif, P. 2003. ‘EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly.’ ESSI Occasional Papers (49). 
651 Ibid. 
652 Hurwitz, L. 1975. ‘The Eec in the United Nations: The Voting Behavior of Eight Countries, 1948-
1973.’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol.13 (3). 
653 Hix, S., et al. 2005. ‘Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 
1979-2001.’ British Journal of Political Sciences vol.35 (2). 
654 Hurwitz, L. 1975. ‘The Eec in the United Nations: The Voting Behavior of Eight Countries, 1948-
1973.’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol.13 (3). 
655 Holzinger, K. and Knill, C. 2005. ‘Causes and Conditions of Cross-National Policy Convergence.’ 
Journal of European Public Policy vol.12 (5). p. 778. 
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distance changes to an exemplary model” 656 . Whereas σ-convergence informs 
researchers on growing similarities over time among a group of actors, without 
positing a gravity centre towards which actors move, δ-convergence refers to one 
actor changing its behaviour through alignment. In choosing its indicators of 
convergence, this study favours the measurement of δ-convergence over σ-
convergence. It assumes that EU positions are fixed, and act as a pivot against which 
Serbia/Macedonia’s positions can be weighed. It thus presupposes the unilateral 
alignment of Serbia/Macedonia towards EU positions. This assumption finds 
considerable support from empirical observations.  
 
Table 9: Measuring voting δ-convergence 
 
Indicator EU positions modelled 
[not a 
member] [absent] [abstain]  
Level of similarity  
(LoS) 
 
measures the % of positions 
that are identical 
equals [abstain]; 
nominal value, 
treated at equal 
footing with [yes] 
and [no] 
equals [absent]; 
nominal value, 
treated at equal 
footing with [yes] 
and [no] 
Voting distance index  
(VDI)  
 
measures the distance 
between voting positions 
a) by proxy 
(Luxembourg) 
 
b) by consensus 
through 
unanimity 
 
discarded 
equals [abstain]; 
ordinal value 
equating half a 
[yes] 
equals [abstain]; 
ordinal value 
equating half a 
[yes] 
 
The levels of similarity (LoS) index measures the frequency at which two foreign 
policy actors voted identically on a given set of UNGA resolutions. It is calculated by 
aggregating the occurrences of identical voting (coded “TRUE”), such as  
 
n
TRUE
LoS t
bxa
t
∑
=
,
   (1), 
 
whereby ∑
t
bxaTRUE ,  represents the number of identical votes over t, and n represents 
the total number of resolutions for which both parties to the dyad expressed their 
respective position.  
 
Δ-convergence is measured by computing dyadically the voting distance (VDI) that 
separates the position of two foreign policy actors on a given resolution x. As the 
variable takes numerical values, the voting distance (VDIt) between two partners over 
a predefined period of time t can be aggregated arithmetically into:  
 
t
t
txx
t n
BA
VDI
∑ −
=    (2), 
whereby xx BA −  is the voting distance on resolution x between A and B, and n 
represents the total number of resolutions for which both parties to the dyad have 
                                                 
656 Knill, C. 2005. ‘Introduction: Cross-National Policy Convergence: Concepts, Approaches and 
Explanatory Factors.’ Journal of European Public Policy vol.12 (5). p. 6. 
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expressed a position. If for a given resolution x, the voting position of A is strictly 
identical to the voting position of B, then, VDIx is 0; if A and B fully disagree, then it 
is 1; and if A and B partially disagree, then, it is 0.5.  
 
Level of similarity and voting distance indexes are measured in dyads, between an 
actor A (e.g. EU) and an actor B (e.g. Serbia). As the EU cannot express its positions 
by voting in person, these have to be modelled. They are first modelled by proxy, 
using Luxembourg’s voting behaviour as pivotal point of reference. Luxembourg, 
being one of “most Community-minded of all the member states”657, typically votes 
in the UNGA as the majority of the member states, and with minimal voting deviation 
from the EU’s median position (see Table 10). This voting behaviour contrasts for 
instance with the relatively peculiar voting behaviour of France or the United 
Kingdom (UK)658.  
 
Table 10: Selecting the best EU proxy among EU member states 
Total voting distance (VDI) 
from EU median position 1993-2010 
LUX                                                  12 
DEN 15.5
NTH 16.5
ITA 18
BEL 19
GER 21
FIN 21.5
POR 22
SPN 33.5
AUS 40.5
SWD 47.5
GRC 58.5
IRL 56.5
FRN 108.5
UKG 132
Worst proxy 
Best proxy 
 
Source: own calculations  
 
In addition, EU positions will be modelled by identifying those resolutions where the 
member states of the EU (12,15,25,27) voted unanimously659. This represents 74% of 
the resolutions between 1993 and 2010 –a shrinking percentage though (see Figure 3). 
In the absence of unanimous position, no calculation (whether LoS or VDI) can be 
performed, as no EU position is said to have emerged.  
                                                 
657 Foot, R. 1979. ‘The European Community's Voting Behaviour at the United Nations General 
Assembly.’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol.17 (4). p. 357. 
658 The peculiarity of the voting behaviour of France and the UK is sometimes traced back to their 
status of nuclear powers, or former colonisers. See e.g. Beauguitte, L. 2009. ‘Multiscalar Approaches 
of Voting Behaviour of European Countries in the United Nations General Assembly.’ Conference 
paper; Foot, R. 1979. ‘The European Community's Voting Behaviour at the United Nations General 
Assembly.’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol.17 (4). p. 352ff; Luif, P. 2003. ‘EU Cohesion in the 
UN General Assembly.’ ESSI Occasional Papers (49); Lindemann, B. 1976. ‘Europe and the Third 
World: The Nine at the United Nations.’ The World Today vol.32 (7); Winkelmann, I. 2000. 
‘Europäische Und Mitgliedstaatliche Interessenvetretung in Den Vereinten Nationen.’ Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht vol.60 (2). p. 421ff; Hurwitz, L. 1975. ‘The Eec in 
the United Nations: The Voting Behavior of Eight Countries, 1948-1973.’ Journal of Common Market 
Studies vol.13 (3). 
659 see Beauguitte, L. 2009. ‘Multiscalar Approaches of Voting Behaviour of European Countries in the 
United Nations General Assembly.’ Conference paper; Luif, P. 2003. ‘EU Cohesion in the UN General 
Assembly.’ ESSI Occasional Papers (49). 
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Figure 3: Percentage of UN resolutions for which EU member states voted unanimously 
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Source: own calculations 
 
3.1.1.3. Serbia and Macedonia’s voting behaviour in the UNGA 
 
Over the past fifteen years, Macedonia’s level of voting similarity (LoS) with the EU 
in the UNGA has been shifting from very high to quasi-systematic identity (see 
Figure 4). Macedonia’s LoS with the EU was initially low in 1993, but it rapidly grew 
to 80-90% and peaked to 100% in 2008. This means that, in 2008, Macedonia and the 
EU adopted a perfectly identical voting behaviour over the 77 resolutions passed at 
the UNGA during that year, including with regards to “abstention” and “absence” 
(measurement by proxy). More recently, however, Macedonia’s LoS with EU proxy 
positions has been shrinking. In 2010, it reached pre-1999’s levels. This decline, 
however, did not affect Macedonia’s positions on resolutions for which the EU voted 
unanimously. Macedonia’s LoS with EU unanimity has indeed constantly remained 
close to 100% over the past five years. And it is also generally higher than 
Macedonia’s LoS with EU proxy positions. This indicates that voting convergence, in 
the case of Macedonia, is more resilient and is stronger, when the EU adopts 
unanimous positions.  
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Figure 4: Macedonia’s level of voting similarity with EU proxy and unanimity positions 
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Source: own calculations 
 
Macedonia’s LoS with EU proxy is not only high in absolute terms; it is distinctively 
higher. Over the past fifteen years, Macedonia’s votes coincided with the foreign 
policy positions of the United States in only 22 % to 46% of the resolutions passed in 
the UNGA. This LoS is at least twice as low as with the EU proxy. Although 
Macedonia’s foreign policy positions sometimes came closer to China (LoS ranging 
from 47% to 61%) and Russia (LoS ranging from 57% to 70%), none of these levels 
recalls the remarkable convergence that characterises the EU-Macedonia relationship 
(see Figure 5). Besides, the voting behaviours of Macedonia on the one side and the 
US, China and Russia on the other side have not become more similar over time. 
They remained constantly distant, and one can therefore hardly speak of voting 
convergence.  
 
Figure 5: Macedonia’s level of voting similarity with control cases (LoS) 
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Serbia’s voting pattern herein admits several similarities with Macedonia’s, but also 
some notable differences. Between 1997 and 2001, Serbia was not recorded as a 
member of the UN, or it was systematically absent. Data can only be retrieved from 
2001 onwards. And Serbia’s level of voting similarity with EU proxy in the following 
period (2001-2006) immediately rose at Macedonia’s levels, i.e. above 90% (see 
Figure 6). Where Serbia’s voting pattern differs from Macedonia’s is from 2007 
onwards. After reaching levels of voting similarity as high as 95% in 2006, Serbia’s 
voting behaviour started to diverge in 2007. In 2010, Serbia’s LoS fell to 76%, 
amplifying previous decreases in 2007, 2008 and 2009 (measurement by proxy). 
Unlike Macedonia, observable signs of voting divergence also affected Serbia in those 
resolutions for which the EU had reached a unanimous position. After a 20%-fall, its 
LoS stabilised around 80% in 2010. Although unanimity increases Serbia’s propensity 
to vote like the EU, it is not enough to guarantee identical voting.  
 
Figure 6: Serbia’s level of voting similarity with EU proxy and unanimity positions (LoS) 
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Source: own calculations 
 
Still, Serbia’s voting behaviour remains distinctively closer to the EU. Serbia’s LoS is 
the lowest with the USA: it fell from 36% in 2001 to 18% in 2008. And it is the 
highest with Russia. Very interesting, indeed, is Serbia’s concomitant δ-convergence 
with Russia, especially in the past five years, as its positions started to diverge from 
the EU (see Figure 7). This finding suggests that Serbia’s dis-alignment from the EU 
is accompanied by a realignment of its multilateral diplomacy towards Russia. If the 
trend is not reversed, Russia could overstep the EU in the UNGA as Serbia’s closest 
voting partner.  
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Figure 7: Serbia’s level of voting similarity with control cases (LoS) 
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An important result of this research is that Macedonia and Serbia’s LoS tends to peak 
when EU member states express unanimous positions. EU unanimity, in other words, 
often “transpires” into non-EU Europe by capturing the consenting votes of Serbia 
and Macedonia. Their level of voting similarity is by contrast generally lower when 
compared to EU proxy positions (a derivation from EU median positions). Although 
the difference is not considerable, this indicates that, when EU member states 
expressed mixed preferences, Macedonia and Serbia have a slightly higher propensity 
to side with EU dissenters.  
 
In the past few years, Serbia showed a higher propensity to dissent from the EU than 
Macedonia. Between 2002 and 2010, Macedonia has remained perfectly aligned with 
the EU throughout the 428 UNGA resolutions in which the EU voted unanimously. It 
only dissented four times, being absent when the EU voted (see Figure 8). By contrast, 
the number of dissenting positions expressed by Serbia rose from 3 between 2001 and 
2006 to 27 between 2007 and 2010 (see Figure 9).  
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Figure 8: Non-similarities in Macedonia’s voting behaviour 
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Figure 9: Non-similarities in Serbia’s voting behaviour 
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The analysis of Serbia and Macedonia’s Voting Distance Indexes (VDI) provides 
further insights on patterns of voting dissension, by mitigating the impact of non-
substantive positions (i.e. [abstain] and [absent]), and focusing on distance rather than 
similarity. Figure 10 shows that Macedonia’s voting distance to EU unanimous 
positions fell to null in 2002 and remained so thereafter. Interestingly, convergence 
measured by decreasing VDI is generally higher than convergence measured by 
increasing LoS, because Macedonia’s dissenting positions, often, have been non-
substantive, i.e. mildly expressed by abstention or absence (see Table 11). From 1997 
to 2010, Macedonia dissented from EU unanimity in only 25 UNGA resolutions (out 
of 1243 unanimous positions). And it never opposed EU positions in a frontal manner 
(e.g. voting [yes] when the EU unanimous position was [no]). Macedonia, instead, 
preferred to express its dissent mildly, by abstaining from voting in 67% of the cases 
of non-congruent voting, or being absent of the vote in 25% of the cases. These 
dissents mostly concerned human rights questions.  
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Figure 10: Macedonia’s voting distance to EU proxy and unanimity positions 
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Table 11: Resolutions with incongruent voting positions (Macedonia vs. EU unanimity) 
EU* 
unanimity MAC EU RUS TUR CHN USA code* description
11/4/1997 R/52/10      1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 IS CUBA, U.S. EMBARGO
12/6/1997 R/52/133     0.5 1 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 HR HUMAN RIGHTS, TERRORISM
12/6/1997 R/52/139     1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 HR HUMAN RIGHTS, KOSOVO
12/6/1997 R/52/142     1 0.5 0.5 0 n.m. 0.5 0.5 HR HUMAN RIGHTS, IRAN
12/3/1997 R/52/169F    0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 ECOD SUDAN, ASSISTANCE
10/4/1998 R/53/4       1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 IS CUBA, U.S. EMBARGO
12/4/1998 R/53/155     0.5 1 0.5 0 0 0 1 ECOD RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT
12/4/1998 R/53/158     1 0.5 0.5 0.5 n.m. 0.5 0.5 HR HUMAN RIGHTS, IRAN
12/4/1998 R/53/164     1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 HR HUMAN RIGHTS, KOSOVO
12/6/1998 R/53/77U     1 n.m. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A IS NUCLEAR DISARMEMENT
6/3/1999 R/53/227     1 n.m. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A ME LEBANON, INTERM FORCE
11/4/1999 R/54/35      1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A IS SOUTH ATLANTIC, ZONE OF PEACE
12/6/1999 R/54/164     0.5 1 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 HR HUMAN RIGHTS, TERRORISM
12/6/1999 R/54/177     1 0.5 0.5 0 #N/A 0.5 0.5 HR HUMAN RIGHTS, IRAN
12/6/1999 R/54/179     1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A HR HUMAN RIGHTS, DEM. CONGO
12/6/1999 R/54/183     1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 HR HUMAN RIGHTS, KOSOVO
12/3/2000 R/55/114     1 0.5 0.5 0.5 #N/A 0.5 0.5 HR HUMAN RIGHTS, IRAN
6/6/2001 R/55/180B    1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A ME LEBANON, INTERM FORCE
12/5/2001 R/56/146     0 0.5 0.5 0.5 #N/A 0.5 0.5 HR HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
12/5/2001 R/56/165     0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 HR HUMAN RIGHTS, GLOBALIZATION
12/5/2001 R/56/171     1 0.5 0.5 0.5 #N/A 0.5 0.5 HR HUMAN RIGHTS, IRAN
6/18/2004 R/58/307     1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A ME LEBANON, INTERM FORCE
12/8/2003 R/58/35      1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A IS NUCLEAR SECURITY
11/29/2005 R/60/30      1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A ECOD LAW OF THE SEA
21/12/2009 R/64/209 2 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A ECOD GLOBALIZATION, UN
FP position VDx between MAC and
** Foreign policy positions are coded as an ordinal variable: 0 (no); 0.5 (abstain); 1 (yes); n.m. (“not a member”) and abs. (recorded as “absent”) are discarded. 
*** VDx is the Voting Distance between two parties –it takes the following values 0% (identical votes, highlighted in green);
 50% (partial disagreement, highlighted in grey); 100% (frontal dissent, highlighted in red)
issue area
Date Resolution
* EU (15, 25, 27); IS (International Security); HR (Human Rights); ME (Middle-East); ECOD (Economy and Development)
 
Source: own compilation 
 
The situation is different for Serbia. Between 2000 and 2006, Serbia’s voting distance 
index remained quasi null. All but two dissenting positions (in 2001 and 2004) were 
caused by Serbia’s systematic absence from the UNGA. But Serbia’s voting distance 
to EU unanimity positions jumped to 10% in 2009 (see Figure 11). Although such 
levels are not alarmingly high, they nevertheless confirm Serbia’s recent detachment 
from the EU in the UNGA. A more detailed analysis of Serbia’s dissenting positions 
shows that most of them, just as Macedonia’s, are expressed mildly through 
abstention (36%), or through recorded absence (36%) (see Table 12). These 
dissenting positions concern for instance draft resolutions on human rights issues and 
international security. But in 2008, for the first time in a decade, Serbia expressed a 
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position that was antagonistic to the EU’s unanimous preference660. It reiterated its 
frontal opposition to EU unanimity in 2009 661 , and repeatedly thereafter, by 
abstaining as the EU unanimously decided not to abstain. Interestingly, Serbia’s 
dissenting positions systematically matched with the positions of Russia. In other 
terms, when Serbia did not follow the EU, it voted like Russia.  
 
Figure 11: Serbia’s voting distance to EU proxy and unanimity positions 
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Source: own calculations 
 
Table 12: Resolutions with incongruent positions (Serbia vs. EU unanimity) 
EU* 
unanimity SRB EU RUS CHN USA code* description
11/3/2000 R/55/6     
11/5/2000 R/55/115     
6/6/2001 R/55/180B    1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A ME LEBANON, INTERM FORCE
12/7/2001 R/56/179     0.5 1 0.5 0 0 1 ECOD ECONOMIC COERSION
5/6/2004 R/58/292     1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 ME STATUS OCCUPIED TERRITORY
12/18/2007 R/62/142     0.5 1 0.5 0 0 1 HR RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
12/19/2007 R/62/184     0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 ECOD INTERNATIONAL TRADE
12/22/2007 R/62/241     1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A ECOD UN-BUDGET
12/22/2007 R/62/236     1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A ECOD UN-BUDGET
12/2/2008 R/63/47      0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.5 IS NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE
12/2/2008 R/63/75      0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 IS NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE
12/18/2008 R/63/190     1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A HR HUMAN RIGHTS, DPR KOREA
12/18/2008 R/63/182     1 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 HR HUMAN RIGHTS ADVANCEMENT
12/18/2008 R/63/191     1 0 1 0 0 1 HR HUMAN RIGHTS, IRAN
12/18/2008 R/63/162     0.5 1 0.5 0 0 1 HR RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, ELIMINATION
12/24/2008 R/63/245     1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A HR HUMAN RIGHTS, MYANMAR
2/12/2009 R/64/59 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 IS NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE
2/12/2009 R/64/37 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.5 IS NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
18/12/2009 R/64/174 0 1 1 0 0 1 HR HUMAN RIGHTS ADVANCEMENT
18/12/2009 R/64/175 1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A HR HUMAN RIGHTS, DPR KOREA
18/12/2009 R/64/176 1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A HR HUMAN RIGHTS, IRAN
18/12/2009 R/64/147 0.5 1 0.5 0 0 1 HR RACIAL DISCRIMINATION--ELIMINATION
21/12/2009 R/64/188 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 ECOD INTERNATIONAL TRADE
24/12/2009 R/64/238 1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A HR HUMAN RIGHTS, MYANMAR
8/12/2010 R/65/80 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0 IS MULTILATERALISM--DISARMAMENT
8/12/2010 R/65/60 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 IS NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
20/12/2010 R/65/167 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0 ECO GLOBALIZATION--INTERDEPENDENCE
21/12/2010 R/RES/65/226 1 abs, #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A HR HUMAN RIGHTS--REPORTS
21/12/2010 R/65/195 1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A HR UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL--REPORTS
21/12/2010 R/65/202 0.5 1 0.5 1 1 0 HR SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES
24/12/2010 R/65/259 1 abs. #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A misc. UN--BUDGET (2010-2011)
50% (partial disagreement, highlighted in grey); 100% (frontal dissent, highlighted in red)
VDx between SRB and issue area
… abs.
Date Resolution
FP position
* EU (15, 25, 27); IS (International Security); HR (Human Rights); ME (Middle-East); ECOD (Economy and Development)
** Foreign policy positions are coded as an ordinal variable: 0 (no); 0.5 (abstain); 1 (yes); n.m. (“not a member”) and abs. (recorded as “absent”) are discarded. 
*** VDx is the Voting Distance between two parties –it takes the following values 0% (identical votes, highlighted in green); 
 
Source: own compilation 
 
                                                 
660 UNGA Resolution R/63/191 on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
661 UNGA Resolution R/64/174 on human rights, fundamental freedoms and cultural diversity 
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3.1.2. Convergence towards EU positions in the OSCE 
 
3.1.2.1. Declaratory politics in the OSCE 
 
Born in Helsinki as a Conference (in 1973), the OSCE is a regional, Vienna-based 
organisation with 56 participating states and 12 Partners for Cooperation, in which 
intense diplomatic activities are deployed in the pursuit of security-oriented goals in 
Europe. The OSCE aims at promoting, through diplomatic means, a comprehensive 
approach to European security in three dimensions: politico-military, economic and 
environmental, and human. Its activities cover a wide range of issues (from the 
promotion of good governance, fair elections and fundamental freedom to cooperation 
against international terrorism, support for the negotiations on conventional arms 
forces and control of trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW)), and a broad 
geographical area (from North America and Continental Europe to South Caucasus). 
Just as those in the UNGA, the debates in the OSCE lie at the crux of European states’ 
foreign policy interests.  
 
A closer look at the OSCE organisation, however, shows an institution, which, 
comparatively to the UN, is more purposive at the strategic level, more integrated, 
institutionally, and more intertwined with the EU than its larger, New-York-based 
counterpart. Its comprehensive approach to European security, enshrined in landmark 
Summit documents articulates a collective, goal-oriented vision of European 
security662. To implement this vision, the OSCE can rely on resources of its own. Its 
large network of OSCE missions is a guarantee for extracting first-hand information 
and backing the organisation’s activities in the field. The OSCE conducts activities as 
diverse as conflict resolution in South Caucasus, confidence-building in the Balkans 
and monitoring elections in Eastern Europe. The organisation is finally very much 
intertwined with the EU. Through their geographical and functional overlaps, the EU 
and the OSCE share “domain similarities” propitious to inter-organisational 
cooperation663. The EU-OSCE relationship is described as based on “commonalities 
of interests and objectives”664. For that matter, the EU is committed to act externally 
in accordance with the principle of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the 
Charter of Paris665, and it has acknowledged, in its 2003 European Security Strategy, 
its strong interest in enhancing the “strength and effectiveness of the OSCE”666. The 
EU is also intertwined with the OSCE through the extensive development of 
cooperative initiatives in the field. The two organisations meet regularly at the highest 
level667, and have established an inter-organisational framework of cooperation at the 
                                                 
662 See most notably the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1996 Declaration on a Common and 
Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century and the 1999 Charter for 
European Security. 
663 Biermann, R. 2008. ‘Towards a Theory of Inter-Organizational Networking: The Euro-Atlantic 
Security Institutions Interacting.’ The Review of International Organizations vol.3 (2). 
664 Interview with an Official from the Delegation of the European Union to the International 
Organisations in Vienna. Vienna, 01/08/2011 
665 Article 11.1 TEU, Treaty of Maastricht. 7 February 1992. 
666 Council of the European Union. 12 December 2003. ‘European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe 
in a Better World.’ p. 9. 
667 OSCE. 2007. ‘Handbook of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.’ p. 101. 
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political level668. In terms of financial and staffing resources, the EU is the OSCE’s 
primary contributor.  
 
Although decisions taken by the OSCE have no legal power, they are politically 
binding. These decisions are taken in different loci and at different levels, i.e. 
occasionally in OSCE Summits; yearly by the Ministerial Council (MC); and weekly, 
at the ambassadorial level, by the Permanent Council (PC) and the Forum for Security 
Cooperation (FSC). As a rule, they are taken by consensus. As no vote takes place in 
the OSCE, it is not possible to research δ-convergence by scrutinising EU and non-
EU states’ voting behaviour, unlike in the UNGA.  
 
This limitation can be circumvented by the analysis of states’ declaratory behaviour. 
The OSCE, after all, is an organisation, which very much relies on shame and fame 
politics, and the participating states do engage, intensively, in declaratory politics. 
They use their declaratory might as a diplomatic instrument endowed with substantive 
powers. Among them, the growing use of non-EU states’ formal alignment with EU 
statements is of particular interest, not least because of the EU’s activism in 
promoting such alignment. Other alignment groups do exist in the OSCE, which are 
not centred on the EU. Statements are for instance sometimes issued on behalf of the 
GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) or the ‘likeminded’ (i.e. 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Canada, Norway, Iceland), or an ad hoc group of 
countries (e.g. France and the United States). But these configurations have 
considerably shrunk in significance over time, whereas the relative weight of the EU 
in the OSCE’s alignment politics has remained outstandingly high (see Figure 12) 
 
Figure 12: The EU as primary actor in OSCE alignment politics 
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NB: the acronyms under the timeline stand for the countries holding the Presidency of the Council  
Source: own calculations 
 
                                                 
668 Council of the European Union. 17 November 2003. ‘Conclusions on EU-Osce Cooperation in 
Conflict Prevention, Crises Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation.’; Council of the European 
Union. 4 April 2001. ‘Psc Conclusions on EU-Osce Relations in Conflict Prevention and Crisis 
Management.’ 
 115
Δ-convergence, in the form of declaratory alignment, has been extensively supported 
by the EU in its external relations with other OSCE participating states, as part of its 
political dialogue framework. Although the EU cannot personally voice its positions 
in the OSCE (it has not the status of participating state), it is represented by the 
rotating Presidency in all meetings. It is then the Presidency that, speaking on behalf 
of the EU, reads out EU statements. As a rule, these statements are open to alignment, 
and the list of non-EU states that accept alignment is added at the bottom end of EU 
declarations, following a predefined model:  
 
“The Candidate Countries Turkey, Croatia*, the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia*, Montenegro* and Iceland+, the Countries of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and 
Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, the 
Republic of Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia align themselves 
with this declaration.  
 
* Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro 
continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process. 
+ Iceland continues to be a member of the EFTA and of the European 
Economic Area”. 669 
 
The size of the EU-led alignment group in the OSCE has steadily increased since 
2004 (see Figure 13). In 2004, alignment was only offered by the EU to two European 
non-EU states (Croatia and Turkey) besides Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the 
EU in 2007. In 2011, by contrast, the EU offered alignment to up to 17 European non-
EU states (from Ukraine and Azerbaijan to Norway and San Marino). This means that 
on some declarations, the EU speaks on behalf of 44 (out of 56) participating states. 
EU diplomats in Vienna readily concede that they strive for achieving the largest 
possible base of consensus in the OSCE 670 . They therefore usually extend an 
invitation to align to most European non-EU states, i.e. EU candidate states, members 
of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), Western Balkan states (as part of the 
Stabilisation and Association process), and East-European countries (as part of the 
ENP) (see Table 13)671.  
 
                                                 
669 European Commission. 27 January 2011. ‘Internal Note in-01-11-Sv.’ 
670 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Representation of Belgium to the Osce. Vienna, 
26/04/2011; Interview with an Official from the Delegation of the European Union to the International 
Organisations in Vienna. Vienna, 01/08/2011; Interview with a Political Advisor to the Presidencies of 
the Council of the EU at the Osce & the EU Delegation to the Osce in Vienna. Vienna, 11/08/2011 
671 However, the criteria, on which the decision to offer alignment is based, remain fuzzy. For instance, 
the EU does not invite all ENP countries (e.g. Belarus). And it invites, since 2010, two micro-states 
(San Marino and Andorra), despite the fact that the EU has not concluded a framework for political 
dialogue with these two countries on issues relevant to OSCE politics. On the top of it, the EU did not 
accede to the request of Monaco, which in 2011, sought to join the alignees’ group, although it is, in 
many respect, comparable with Andorra or San Marino. Interview with a Political Advisor to the 
Presidencies of the Council of the EU at the Osce & the EU Delegation to the Osce in Vienna. Vienna, 
11/08/2011 
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Figure 13: From EU-29 to EU-44 / the rising size of the EU-led alignment group  
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Source: own calculations 
 
3.1.2.2. Measuring declaratory alignment in the OSCE 
 
How to measure the (changing) frequency at which Serbia and Macedonia have 
aligned themselves with EU statements in the OSCE? The measure is computed from 
a binary variable [aligned; not aligned] for all EU statements, and aggregated on a 
semester basis (per Presidency). A 100%-result means that alignment has been 
systematic with all EU statements with no exception in the period of reference; a 0%-
result means that no occurrence of alignment has been recorded. Data are drawn from 
the statements and declarations made by the EU in the OSCE’s different loci of 
decision-making (mainly PC and FSC). The dataset discards the few statements that 
were closed to any form of alignment 672 . All in all, the research analyses the 
individual positions of Serbia and Macedonia towards 1214 EU statements between 
mid-2005 and mid-2011. It is indeed in 2005 that the EU offered alignment for the 
first time to Serbia and Macedonia (see Table 13). Data collection has been performed 
manually by retrieving data from OSCE documents (e.g. PC and FSC meeting 
journals) and consulting archives at the OSCE documentation repository in Prague673. 
                                                 
672 These statements are usually purely informative. For instance, they inform OSCE participating 
states on a declaration issued by the EU’s High Representative.  
673 Access has been granted through the doctoral candidate’s participation in the 2011 OSCE 
researcher-in-residence programme. 
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Table 13: Chronology of non-EU states’ first alignments 
  
 date declaration 
TUR (Turkey) 13/01/2000 PC.DEL/2/00 
CRO (Croatia) 29/06/2004 PC.DEL/600/04 
ICL (Iceland) 02/06/2005 PC.DEL/442/05 
LICHT (Liechtenstein) 02/06/2005 PC.DEL/442/05 
NRW (Norway) 02/06/2005 PC.DEL/442/05 
UKR (Ukraine) 19/05/2005 PC.DEL/392/05 
MDA (Moldova) 30/06/2005 PC.DEL/699/05 
ALB (Albania) 07/07/2005 PC.DEL/721/05 
BOS (Bosnia-Herzegovina) 07/07/2005 PC.DEL/721/05 
MAC (fYRoM) 14/07/2005 PC.DEL/745/05 
SRB (Serbia) 14/07/2005 PC.DEL/748/05 
MNG (Montenegro) 18/07/2006 PC.DEL/759/06 
AZE (Azerbaijan) 05/07/2007 PC.DEL/698/07 
GEO (Georgia) 14/06/2007 PC.DEL/563/07 
ARM (Armenia) 21/06/2007 PC.DEL/615/07 
ANDO (Andorra) 25/06/2010 PC.DEL/639/10 
SANM (San Marino) 25/06/2010 PC.DEL/639/10 
 
NB: Serbia in 2005 and 2006 refers to the state union of Serbia-Montenegro 
Source: own compilation 
 
3.1.2.3. Serbia and Macedonia’s declaratory behaviour in the OSCE 
 
The comparative analysis of Serbia and Macedonia’s declaratory behaviour in the 
OSCE yields interesting results. It shows first that over the past six years, the two 
countries have aligned themselves with EU statements remarkably often, but not at 
the same level (see Table 14). Macedonia has aligned itself with almost all EU 
statements, and thus behaved just like a member state of the European Union. Its level 
of alignment has oscillated between 91% and 99%, and it culminated most recently in 
2010-2011. Serbia, by contrast, did not reach the 90%-level of alignment, except in 
2006. It started high, at the same level as Macedonia, but it soon decreased, reaching 
60% in 2009 (see Figure 14). During the Czech Presidency, Serbia only aligned itself 
with half of the statements the EU issued in the OSCE. In 20110/2011, Serbia’s level 
of alignment with EU statements rose again and stabilised around 80%.  
 
Serbia and Macedonia’s declaratory behaviour can also be analysed in the light of 
other non-EU states’ propensity to align (see Figure 15). Macedonia’s highly 
convergent behaviour, for instance, echoes that of regional neighbours (Albania, 
Bosnia, Croatia), whereas Serbia’s dis-alignment between 2007 and 2009 recalls 
Turkey’s behaviour.  
 
Table 14: Frequency of Alignment with EU statements (OSCE) 
2005/2-UK 84% 67% 91% 97% 73% 97% 39%
2006/1-AT 97% 91% 94% 95% 99% 78% 95% 62%
2006/2-FIN 94% 88% 97% 94% 99% 72% 91% 70%
2007/1-DE 96% 85% 97% 98% 98% 63% 84% 70%
2007/2-PT 98% 78% 96% 96% 90% 80% 94% 86%
2008/1-SLV 92% 72% 96% 90% 98% 69% 89% 76%
2008/2-FR 92% 68% 86% 91% 98% 48% 85% 91%
2009/1-CZ 96% 56% 96% 99% 97% 77% 82% 92%
2009/2-SUE 96% 72% 99% 99% 97% 62% 69% 91%
2010/1-SP 97% 84% 95% 91% 98% 39% 70% 98%
2010/2-BEL 99% 85% 96% 98% 98% 55% 76% 99%
2011/1-HU 98% 77% 93% 86% 98% 27% 71% 98%
TURK ICLYear/semester/presidency MAC SRB ALB BOS CRO UKR
 
Source: own calculations 
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Figure 14: Frequency of Alignment with EU statements (OSCE, per year) 
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Figure 15: Frequency of Alignment with EU statements (OSCE) 
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Source: own calculations 
 
Over the past six years, Macedonia responded favourably to the EU’s proposal for 
alignment in all but 47 cases (out of 1214). A fourth of these occurrences of non-
alignment concerned EU statements on Macedonia itself (e.g. on elections in 
Macedonia, or on the OSCE mission in Macedonia); a growing third related to soft 
security issues (e.g. migration issues, protection of minorities, freedom of the media); 
and the rest concerned international security issues (e.g. SALW process), Russia and 
Central Asia (e.g. human rights violations and conflict in Transnistria or Georgia), as 
well as EU statements on the Western Balkans (e.g. ICTY, Kosovo, Serbia, Albania). 
Serbia, by contrast, did not respond favourably to the EU’s proposal to align in 227 
cases (out of 1214). Most of them were EU statements targeting Russia or its 
neighbours for their alleged violation of human rights, their failure to provide justice, 
or their implication in some conflict in the region. These issues constitute Serbia’s 
primary source of non-alignment, followed by EU statements on Serbia or Kosovo 
(see Table 15).  
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Table 15: Serbia and Macedonia’s non-alignment with EU statements in the OSCE (2005-2011) 
 
Macedonia
Soft security issues 33% ++
Macedonia 25%
International security 20%
Central Asia and Russia 15% --
Western Balkans 8%
Serbia 227 statements
Central Asia and Russia 56% ++
Serbia and Kosovo 16% --
Soft security issues 14%
Western Balkans 10%
International security 3%
47 statements
 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
3.1.3. Inferring Europeanisation 
 
3.1.3.1. Alignment as a result of foreign policy coordination 
 
Although European integration, in its early ages, did not focus much on foreign policy 
issues per se, its purpose did convey aspirations that pertained to foreign policy 
coordination. Of course, the resources deployed to “strengthen the safeguards of 
peace and liberty” in Europe were at first economic, but the message, “calling upon 
the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts” was in fact 
primarily political 674 . After several failures (in the 1950s and 1960s), a proper 
framework for foreign policy coordination took shape in 1970: the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC). The EPC reflected the member states’ will to “speak with one 
voice”, through the “harmonisation of their views in the field of international 
politics”675. The EPC, however, was due to take place through intergovernmental 
cooperation, in a framework that was institutionally distinct from the European 
Communities. This changed in 1986, when the EPC received a legal basis in the 
Single European Act (SEA) 676 . From then on, the Communities were to foster 
agreement beyond economic matters, in the field of high politics.  
 
In world affairs, the SEA committed the member states to “endeavour to adopt 
common positions […]”677, as well as to “avoid any action or position which impairs 
their effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations or within international 
organizations”678. These steps paved the way for the establishment, in 1993, of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In addition to the institutional changes 
it entailed, the Maastricht Treaty sharpened the legal wording of the SEA, demanding 
that the member states “coordinate their action in international organizations” and 
strive for “concerted and convergent action”679.  
 
                                                 
674 Treaty of Rome. 25 March 1957. Preamble. 
675 Foreign Ministers of the Member States. 27 October 1970. ‘Davignon Report.’ article II.1.b. 
676 Single European Act. 29 June 1987. Title III, article 30. 
677 Ibid. article 30 (7a). 
678 Ibid. article 30 (2d). 
679 Treaty of Maastricht. 7 February 1992. article J.2 (3), emphasis added. 
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Until the 2000s, foreign policy coordination, however, remained a matter that rarely 
involved third states. Although the Treaties do mention the complementarities that 
exist between the EC/EU and some international organisations (most notably the 
United Nations and the OSCE), their relationship was not one stricto sensu defined by 
principles of foreign policy coordination, not least because these international 
organisations had not developed a foreign policy of their own. This concept of 
“European foreign policy”, first introduced by the SEA680, implies that that the EU is 
capable of conducting a foreign policy that is more than the sum of the foreign policy 
of its member states681. And it is precisely this capability, derived from the EU’s 
internal CFSP acquis, that allows the EU today to coordinate its foreign policy 
externally, by extending its “common order” beyond its borders, towards non-EU 
Europe 682 . Once seeking to speak with one voice, the EU, relying on greater 
institutional actorness on the world scene, now strives for speaking on behalf of non-
EU states too683.  
 
The EU extends parts of its CFSP foreign policy coordination acquis in non-EU 
Europe through the so-called “political dialogue” with associated states. Its 
foundations are usually laid in the form of a “joint declaration on political dialogue”, 
and later institutionalised as part of the EU’s numerous Association Agreements with 
non-EU states. The formulation chosen to set up political dialogue is rigorously 
similar to EU member states’ treaty obligations. It provides that the signatories (i.e. 
the EU and its Associate) shall meet occasionally at the ministerial level, and ensure 
an “increasing convergence of positions on international issues”, including “in the 
areas covered by the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union”684. 
In multilateral fora, convergence shall be striven for by “providing mutual 
information on foreign policy decisions, taking full advantage of diplomatic channels, 
including contacts in the bilateral as well as the multilateral field, such as UN, OSCE 
meetings and elsewhere” 685.  
 
In order to achieve these objectives, the EU introduced, in the 2000s, a mechanism of 
alignment, which allows non-EU states to join EU statements in the OSCE and vote 
like the EU in the UNGA. This mechanism, enacted as part of the EU’s political 
dialogue with SAp countries, was introduced by the Thessalonica Agenda for the 
Western Balkans in 2003. The Agenda provides that EU-Western Balkans meetings 
should be held annually at the Political Director level at the margins of the UNGA “to 
discuss international issues, in particular those on the UNGA agenda” 686 . More 
specifically, it foresees that the EU will “invite, as appropriate, the SAp countries to 
                                                 
680 Single European Act. 29 June 1987. article 30. 
681 See White, B. 2001. Understanding European Foreign Policy. 
682 Ekengren, M. and Sundelius, B. 2004. ‘National Foreign Policy Coordination.’ In Contemporary 
European Foreign Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 112. 
683 The EU’s actorness in world politics should not be overestimated, though. The EU failed indeed to 
speak with one voice in a number of occasions, most notably regarding the US-backed intervention in 
Iraqi.  
684 See for instance the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities 
and their Member States of the one part and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of the other 
part. 26 March 2001. articles I4, I6. 
685 See for instance the Ibid. articles I3, I2. 
686 European Council. 16 June 2003. ‘Thessalonica Agenda for the Western Balkans.’ 
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align themselves with EU demarches, declarations and common positions on CFSP 
issues”687. It is based on this provision that the EU shaped its alignment mechanism.  
 
3.1.3.2. The alignment mechanism in practice  
 
The practice of alignment in the OSCE and UNGA rests on a set of informal rules. In 
the UNGA, the procedure for alignment is initiated in New York, generally on 
Tuesdays, after the EU’s internal coordination meetings. These meetings are usually 
reserved for EU member states, and they are held at the ambassadorial level. They 
follow Mondays’ Council’s meetings in Brussels, where sensitive issues can be 
discussed. Their aim is to build consensus among EU member states on specific 
UNGA resolutions. Only after a common position is (provisionally) agreed on in New 
York may Serbia and Macedonia be invited to align themselves with EU positions. 
The voting position of the EU is then communicated 1) to Macedonia during the 
briefing meeting organised by the EU with EU candidate states at the deputy-
ambassadorial level (shortly after the EU’s internal coordination meeting), and 2) to 
Serbia through a communication per email (since the briefing meetings are only open 
to EU candidates). Once the invitation to align is formulated, Serbia and Macedonia’s 
delegates in New York usually consult their home ministry before making a 
decision688. Their decision (not) to align does not need to be transmitted to the EU 
prior to the roll-call vote. It is signalled directly at the occasion of the vote. 
 
The alignment mechanism in the OSCE is operated quite similarly to the UNGA. The 
Permanent Council (PC) is the primary locus of declaratory politics in the OSCE, and 
its regular meetings take place every Thursday morning. Intense consultations precede 
these meetings to coordinate the positions of EU member states internally at first, and 
only then externally, with non-EU states. The process usually starts one week before 
the PC meeting with preliminary consultations among EU member states’ chefs de file. 
The decision, by the EU, to make a declaration at a PC meeting is taken on Mondays, 
around 3 p.m., during the internal coordination meeting of the EU’s member states’ 
permanent representatives. Preliminary consultations give birth to a initial draft 
statement, which is then discussed at the expert-level, on Tuesdays. The draft 
statement is subsequently circulated for approval among EU member states in the 
evening. On Wednesdays, the draft statement is amended by experts in accordance 
with EU member states’ responses. At 3 p.m., a meeting is eventually held at the 
deputy-ambassadorial level, to finalise the negotiations. Depending on the sensitivity 
of the topic, the negotiations can be short, ending around 4 p.m., or lengthy, in which 
case consensus is finalised at the ambassadorial level on Thursdays morning, shortly 
before the PC meeting. Non-EU states do not participate in this process of internal 
coordination. Nor are they allowed to formally participate in the decision-making 
process, e.g. by making suggestions or amendments. Some of them, however, are 
informed of the general topic of the statement the EU plan to make on Tuesdays, at 
the occasion of their weekly briefing meeting (at the ambassadorial level). These are 
the candidate states (e.g. Macedonia) and the so-called likeminded689. These thus 
                                                 
687 Ibid. emphasis in original; See also European Commission. 16 June 2003. ‘The Western Balkans 
and European Integration.’ 
688 Serbia and Macedonia’s delegates in New York may also confer with third partners before making a 
decision. But démarches on specific resolutions are more often conducted in the capital, e.g. by the US 
delegation in Skopje, and Russia’s delegation in Belgrade.  
689 Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Canada, Norway and Iceland 
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receive the information earlier than other non-EU states (e.g. Serbia). The formal 
proposition to align, however, is formulated at the same stage of the process for all, i.e. 
only after consensus has emerged among EU members, i.e. at the earliest on 
Wednesdays afternoon. The draft declaration is then sent by email to Serbia and 
Macedonia’s permanent mission in Vienna, and these are expected to reply before the 
beginning of the PC meeting, by the next morning. In the absence of reply, it is 
assumed that they do not align. Owing to the tight deadline, some non-EU states may 
not succeed in replying on time. The EU, under the Belgian Presidency, has 
accordingly softened its deadline rule, and now accepts belated communications until 
Thursdays afternoon. The names of latecomers are simply added on the alignment list 
before the final text is published.  
 
The practice of alignment in the OSCE also changed in another respect. With the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, a more stringent interpretation of the “speaking 
with one voice principle” was introduced, and replaced by a “speaking with a single 
voice principle”690. Under the Spanish Presidency, an informal email was sent to non-
EU delegations, which formalised a norm that previously existed, but only tacitly. 
This email stated the following:  
 
“Dear Colleagues,  
Please be advised that, except in special circumstances previously agreed 
upon, no alignments to EU statements can be accepted from delegations that 
are going to deliver statements on the same issue on a national basis”. 691 
 
This new rule allows the EU Presidency to remove from the list of alignees the name 
of a country that has notified its willingness to align, if this country, at the OSCE 
meeting, makes a statement in its national capacity. Originally intended to “limit as 
much as possible national statements” that contradict the EU, it is now applied with 
the idea that a plurality of statements, even concordant ones, is detrimental to the 
effectiveness of collective actions in international affairs692.  
 
3.1.3.3. The architects of alignment 
 
The primary architect of alignment, on the EU’s side, is the Presidency of the Council. 
It is responsible for coordinating the EU’s foreign policy, both internally and 
                                                 
690 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the Osce. Vienna, 08/07/2011; 
Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of Macedonia to the Osce. Vienna, 08/07/2011; 
Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Serbia to the Osce in Vienna. 
Vienna, 17/10/2011; Interview with an Official from the Delegation of the European Union to the 
International Organisations in Vienna. Vienna, 01/08/2011; Interview with a Political Advisor to the 
Presidencies of the Council of the EU at the Osce & the EU Delegation to the Osce in Vienna. Vienna, 
11/08/2011; Interview with an Official from Delegation of the European Union to the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. Skopje, 01/11/2011; Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, United Nations Unit Skopje, 07/03/2011; Interview with a 
Member of the Parliament at the National Assembly of Serbia. Belgrade, 14/09/2011; Interview with an 
Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Directorate General for 
Multilateral Cooperation. Belgrade, 13/09/2011; Interview with an Official from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, Directorate for Multilateral Affairs. Skopje, 02/11/2011 
691 Email Communication Forwarded by a Political Advisor to the Presidencies of the Council of the 
EU at the Osce & the EU Delegation to the Osce in Vienna. 16/08/2011 
692 Interview with an Official from the Delegation of the European Union to the International 
Organisations in Vienna. Vienna, 01/08/2011 
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externally, organising meetings, liaising with the Political and Security Committee in 
Brussels, and of course, enacting the alignment mechanism. In comparison, the 
delegation of the European Commission in New York and Vienna only played a 
limited role. Having the status of observer in the UN and OSCE, it could attended 
most of the proceedings in the UNGA and OSCE, and it was “fully associated” with 
the work of the Presidency in accordance with the Treaties, but it was not endowed 
with substantive powers in CFSP693. Its involvement was therefore basically limited to 
being kept informed. Its role, however, is expected to change, following the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. 
 
In New York, the Presidency’s work is assisted by the New York Liaison Office 
(NYLO) of the Secretariat of the Council. But this assistance is first and foremost 
logistical694. The NYLO also provides information, reports and analyses to the EU’s 
High Representative for the CFSP and to General Secretariat of the Council. As its 
activity primarily focus on the internal side of the coordination process, the nature of 
NYLO is closer to an “information bureau rather than as a political institution” 
capable of dealing with external affairs695. Until Lisbon, the NYLO coexisted with the 
Delegation of the European Commission to the United Nations. As a result of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the Delegation of the European Commission and the Council’s 
NYLO were fused into a Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. Its 
mandate is now to “reinforce the coordination of the common European Union (EU) 
policies and approaches at the United Nations, including the drafting of EU 
statements and the adoption of EU positions on Resolutions and other texts”696.  
 
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has resulted in the renegotiation of the 
role of the EU delegations in New York and Vienna. Their involvement in foreign 
policy coordination has been reinforced vis-à-vis the Presidency697. In the OSCE, EU 
statements are now drafted by a joint team composed of the staff of the EU 
Presidency and the newly established EU Delegation. And they are issued by the EU 
delegation –and no longer the permanent representation of the EU member state 
presiding over the Council. In New York, the role of the EU delegation has been 
likewise enhanced (e.g. it organises and chairs coordination meetings). Yet, the EU 
delegations in New York and Vienna have not been able to take on the entirety of the 
workload that was hitherto assumed by the rotating Presidency. Understaffed, 
disorganised, they still rely on the Presidency to operationalise the EU’s political 
dialogue with non-EU states in general, and enact the alignment mechanism in 
particular. The EU delegations and the rotating Presidencies thus cooperate “in a 
pragmatic way, looking at the staff available, on the basis of an ad hoc division of 
                                                 
693 Ibid. 
694 Tuesdays’ briefings were organised in NYLO facilities. Interview with an Official from Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, United Nations Unit Skopje, 07/03/2011 
695 Farrell, M. 2006. ‘EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations.’ GARNET 
Working Paper vol.6 (6). p. 14; Rasch, M. B. 2006. ‘The European Union’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy - Regime Functioning, Evolution and Quality Exemplified by the Eu’s Representation 
in the United Nations.’ Conference paper. p. 11-12. 
696 European Union @ United Nations. 'The EU at the UN - Overview'. [accessed 10/01/2011]. 
697 Interview with an Official from the Delegation of the European Union to the International 
Organisations in Vienna. Vienna, 01/08/2011; Interview with a Political Advisor to the Presidencies of 
the Council of the EU at the Osce & the EU Delegation to the Osce in Vienna. Vienna, 11/08/2011 
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labour”698. Eventually, the EU delegations in New York and Vienna will take over a 
large part of the rotating Presidency’s competences, including those related to the 
alignment mechanism699. 
 
The alignment mechanism also relies on bilateral contacts between Serbia and 
Macedonia on the one side and some EU member states on the other side700. When 
pieces of information are missing, Serbia and Macedonia’s delegates readily contact 
their EU closest partners (e.g. Slovenia) in New York. EU member states may not 
only remedy a lack of information. They also play an inspirational role in the UNGA, 
when the EU has not reached a consensus position. Macedonia’s diplomats are for 
instance well aware that France and the UK often hold positions that are not “typical 
EU positions”, especially on decolonisation issues or Middle East affairs701. In order 
to have a taste of the EU’s position, Macedonia, more often than Serbia, then consults 
with other EU member states (e.g. again Slovenia) to enquire into their national 
position. Its participation, as EU candidate, in EU briefing meetings certainly 
facilitates these informal consultations. Multilateral foreign policy coordination is 
then also conducted at the mini-lateral level, on an ad hoc basis.  
 
On the Serbia/Macedonia’s side, finally, the alignment mechanism is handled at two 
locations: in Vienna and New York first, by the national representatives, who receive 
the invitation to align; and in Belgrade and Skopje too, by state officials in the 
Ministry of Foreign affairs (MFA), who send the instructions (not) to align. 
Interactions with EU actors often imply both actors702. In New York, Serbia and 
Macedonia’s representatives always request instructions from their home Ministry 
before transmitting their decision (not) to align. Decision-making, then, is centralised 
in Belgrade and Skopje, generally in a Unit/Department for UN affairs within the 
MFA. Depending on the sensitivity of the issue at play, the head of this unit usually 
launches a series of consultations within the MFA. On Palestine, for instance, she may 
confer with the department responsible for relations with Middle East countries. In 
some cases, the decision (not) to align is taken at a higher level within the Ministry. 
Once the decision (not) to align is taken, it is communicated back from 
Belgrade/Skopje to Serbia/Macedonia’s permanent mission in New York. Little 
                                                 
698 Interview with an Official from the Delegation of the European Union to the International 
Organisations in Vienna. Vienna, 01/08/2011 
699 Ibid. 
700 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, United 
Nations Unit Skopje, 07/03/2011; Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
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latitude is left to their representatives abroad. Their role is limited to transmitting the 
EU invitation to Skopje/Belgrade in due time, acting in accordance with the capital’s 
instructions in the UNGA, and gathering information on the position of particular 
member states, when the EU has no unanimous position.  
 
In the OSCE, the situation is different. In Vienna, Serbia and Macedonia’s 
representatives can now decide on the spot whether they align or not, without 
systematically involving their home Ministry. This decentralisation of foreign policy 
decisions on alignment has been gained ground gradually, as a response to the time 
constraints under which the alignment mechanism is enacted. Since the EU only 
communicates its statement to non-EU states a few hours before the PC meetings, 
little time is left for consultations with and within the MFA. Serbia and Macedonia’s 
heads of missions have thus been granted by their home Ministry “a margin of 
appreciation”703, according to which they can decide whether instructions from the 
MFA are required or not. On a number of issues, which 1) are not critical to 
Serbia/Macedonia’s interests; 2) are widely accepted by the international community; 
3) have already been discussed within the Ministry, decisions to align are primarily 
taken locally, in Vienna. On more sensitive issues, Serbia and Macedonia’s 
representatives still request instructions, though. But interestingly here, Serbia more 
often than Macedonia: as noted by an EU official, “Macedonia always aligns and says 
it right away, whereas Serbia often seeks for instructions”704. Obviously, Serbia’s 
representatives are keener on viewing European foreign policy as tackling sensitive 
issues. 
 
3.1.4. Argumentative analysis 
 
In accordance with the multi-theoretical framework developed in the research design, 
the following part of the thesis explores the (structural) causes, (dispositional) reasons 
and (teleological) intentions that best account for Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign 
policy convergence towards the EU in the UNGA and OSCE. But it also examines the 
factors that constrained or reversed convergence, and prevented Europeanisation from 
taking root in Serbia after 2006.  
 
3.1.4.1. Structural analysis 
 
More than elsewhere, the EU has woven in the Western Balkans a series of 
contractual relations, which extend the realm of its governance beyond its 
organisational borders. Starting from the 1996 Regional Approach, its conditionality-
based approach has been developed over the years, so as to encompass all of the EU’s 
acquis including CFSP matters. Strategically bound to Western Balkan states’ 
accession perspectives, the existing conditionality regime comprises a plethora of 
rules, some pertaining to foreign policy coordination in multilateral fora. What are, in 
this context, the structural settings that, weighing on Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign 
policy behaviour, purportedly lead to their Europeanisation? And in which respect do 
they differ for Serbia and Macedonia? 
 
                                                 
703 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Directorate for Multilateral Affairs. Skopje, 02/11/2011 
704 Interview with a Political Advisor to the Presidencies of the Council of the EU at the Osce & the EU 
Delegation to the Osce in Vienna. Vienna, 11/08/2011 
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3.1.4.1.1.  Non-concomitant obligations to align 
 
It has been seen that Serbia and Macedonia interact routinely with EU actors in the 
framework of the EU’s political dialogue with non-EU states. This political dialogue 
was established with Macedonia through the signature of a Cooperation Agreement 
on 29 April 1997705. In the annex to this agreement, Macedonia and the EU issued a 
“Joint Declaration on political dialogue”706, which introduced two soft obligations: an 
obligation de moyen regarding foreign policy coordination, and an obligation de 
résultat regarding foreign policy convergence. The obligation de moyen pertained to 
the need to coordinate one’s foreign policy by 
 
“providing mutual information on foreign policy decisions, taking full 
advantage of diplomatic channels, including contacts in the bilateral as well 
as the multilateral field, such as UN, OSCE meetings and elsewhere”.707  
 
As for the obligation de résultat, it states that actors should act with the purpose of  
 
“bringing about mutual understanding and increasing convergence of 
positions on international issues, and in particular on those matters likely to 
have substantial effects on one or the other Party”.708 
 
This contractual framework was consolidated in March 2001 with the signature of a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between Macedonia and the EU709. 
Title II of this Agreement specifies that political dialogue between the Macedonia and 
the EU “shall be further developed and intensified”, with the intent of establishing 
“close links of solidarity” and “common views on security and stability in Europe, 
including in the areas covered by the Common Foreign Security Policy of the 
European Union”710. It reiterates the obligation to strive for “increasing convergence 
of positions” 711, and strengthens the obligation de moyen, adding that foreign policy 
coordination should take “full advantage of all diplomatic channels”712. The wording 
of the SAA logically echoes the Treaties713, since its aim is to prepare the signatory to 
EU accession. With the introduction, for Western Balkan states, of the alignment 
mechanism in 2003, the EU eventually routinised foreign policy coordination. In its 
conclusions at the Thessaloniki Summit, the Presidency stated that the EU would 
hitherto invite SAp countries to “align themselves with EU demarches, declarations 
and common positions on CFSP issues”, and “as appropriate”, allow them to 
participate in co-ordination and briefing meetings714.  
                                                 
705 Council of the European Union. 29 April 1997b. ‘Council's Decision on the Cooperation Agreement 
between the European Community and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.’ 
706 Council of the European Union. 29 April 1997c. ‘Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue between 
the EU and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.’ 
707 Ibid. 
708 Ibid. 
709 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States of the one part and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of the other part. 26 March 
2001. 
710 Ibid. article 7. 
711 Ibid. 
712 Ibid. article 9.2, emphasis added.  
713 e.g. art. 11 TEU, Treaty of Maastricht. 7 February 1992. 
714 Presidency of the European Council. 21 June 2003. ‘Thessaloniki EU-Western Balkans Summit 
Declaration.’ p. Annex 1. 
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Although this possibility was offered to Serbia and Macedonia indiscriminately, the 
process that framed Serbia’s foreign policy coordination with the EU only started 
several years after Macedonia (see Table 16). It started in 2001 with the establishment 
of an EU/FRY Consultative Task Force (CTF) composed of senior officials, entrusted 
with the duty to prepare Serbia to SAA negotiations715. But the CFT did not engage in 
foreign policy matters, and mostly focussed on legal and judicial reforms and 
economic matters. In 2003, the CTF evolved into an Enhanced Permanent Dialogue 
(EPD)716, as the European Council decided to extend its “bilateral political dialogue at 
the ministerial level […] to Serbia and Montenegro”717. In September 2003, Serbia 
and the EU accordingly issued a Joint Declaration on political dialogue 718 , the 
wording of which echoes Macedonia’s joint declaration of 1997. It formulates both 
types of obligations (de moyen and de résultat), though five years later. These 
obligations were later enshrined in Serbia’s SAA719, in January 2008, in a wording 
that, again, perfectly matches with Macedonia’s SAA, although Macedonia had 
signed it seven years before. One of the few differences concerned the future of 
political dialogue, which, in Macedonia’s SAA, shall be “developed and 
intensified” 720  (art. 7), whereas in Serbia’s SAA, it simply “shall be further 
developed”.721  
 
Table 16: Serbia & Macedonia’s obligations towards the EU in multilateral diplomacy: different 
timeframes 
 
 Obligation to 
communicate 
Obligation to 
converge Legal basis 
Macedonia 1997 / 2001 1997/ 2001 
Joint declaration on political dialogue (OJ C 
240 29 April 1997) 
SAA (doc. 6726/01 26 March 2001) 
Serbia 2003/ 2008 2003/ 2008 
Joint declaration on political dialogue (doc. 
12616/03 17 September 2003) 
SAA (doc. 16005/07 22 January 2008) 
  
 
 
The key difference between Serbia and Macedonia’s obligations, then, is not 
substantive: it is a difference in time and timing. In time first, because Macedonia had 
to coordinate its foreign policy with the EU five years before Serbia; and in timing 
then, because Macedonia first engaged in political dialogue, and then was offered 
alignment, whereas Serbia’s political dialogue postdates the introduction of the EU’s 
alignment mechanism (2003). Whereas the alignment mechanism logically emerged 
                                                 
715 Council of the European Union. 10 July 2001. ‘EU/Former Republic of Yugoslavia Consultative 
Task Force: Terms of Reference.’ p. 1. 
716 Presidency of the European Council. 14 April 2003. ‘Draft Conclusions on the Western Balkans.’ 
717 European Council. 16 June 2003. ‘Thessalonica Agenda for the Western Balkans.’ 
718 Council of the European Union. 17 September 2003. ‘Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue 
between the EU and Serbia and Montenegro.’ 
719 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States of the one part and the Republic of Serbia of the other part. 22 January 2008. 
720 Article 7 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and 
their Member States of the one part and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of the other part. 
26 March 2001. 
721 Article 10.1. of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities 
and their Member States of the one part and the Republic of Serbia of the other part. 22 January 2008. 
 128
as an instrument to reach the objectives stated in the political dialogue framework 
(regarding both key obligations), for Serbia, it was introduced as a novelty with no 
referent agreed upon as to its purpose. Making use of it, thus, had the benefit of being 
totally cost-free for Serbia: it was a right without duty. This imbalance may have 
facilitated Serbia’s sudden alignment with EU positions from 2003 to 2006.  
 
3.1.4.1.2. Political compliance 
 
Following the conclusion of this framework for political dialogue, the EU has 
regularly controlled that Serbia and Macedonia fully comply with their obligations in 
the UNGA and OSCE. But the careful examination Serbia/Macedonia’s conditionality 
dialogue with the EU shows that this follow-up has been more thorough for 
Macedonia than for Serbia. It started as early as 2004 through encouragements 
addressed to Macedonia by the SAA Council, stating that “as it moves closer to the 
European Union, [Macedonia] is encouraged to continue to align itself with 
established EU positions, also on international issues”722. As Macedonia’s alignment 
became systematic, the EU, between 2005 and 2011, repeatedly acknowledged and 
welcomed the fact that Macedonia “has continued to align itself with a number of EU 
common positions and statements”723.  
 
Serbia’s follow-up on alignment, by contrast, only started later, in 2010, through the 
Commission’s progress report724. In 2011, the Commission enquired more specifically 
into the question, asking in its Questionnaire: “How many measures (declarations, 
demarches, common positions) have you aligned with since July 2008?” 725 . 
Considering Serbia’s lesser propensity to align, the assessment was of course not as 
congratulatory as Macedonia’s. The analytical report accompanying the 
Commission’s Opinion thus stated that the country “needs to align further with EU 
statements and Council decisions”726.  
 
3.1.4.1.3. The compellingness of EU obligations 
 
                                                 
722 Council of the European Union. 14 September 2004. ‘Joint Press Release -EU-Former Yugoslav 
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Serbia and Macedonia responded to the EU’s conditionality regime by enshrining in 
key documents the obligation to align their foreign policy behaviour with the EU’s. 
Macedonia acknowledged the compellingness of EU obligations in this respect as 
early as 2001, in its national plan for the implementation of the SAA727. Serbia, 
having not signed a SAA by that time, waited until 2005 to acknowledge in its 
National Strategy document the compellingness of EU obligations728. Differences 
between Serbia and Macedonia do not only concern these timeframes. They also 
relate to the legal understanding the two countries had of their respective obligation to 
align. Whereas Macedonia committed itself repeatedly to “adhere to EU common 
positions, declarations and statements, whether they are based upon EU invitation or 
on a unilateral basis”729, Serbia rather only stressed that it would “work carefully 
towards aligning its positions with the EU statements, bearing in mind its national 
interests and the EU accession as its priority objective”730. The difference in tone 
barely conceals different perceptions regarding the compellingness of EU obligations. 
Whereas Macedonia understands political compliance with the CFSP acquis as 
unconditional, Serbia cautiously qualifies its position with a safeguard clause. It 
declares its will to comply with the CFSP acquis, provided EU positions do not 
conflict with its national interest.  
 
At the individual level, political compliance ensues in the UNGA and OSCE through 
the diffuse pressures exerted by the EU on Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy 
actors. These pressures are diffuse because they are rarely exerted directly (e.g. 
through diplomatic démarches). EU diplomats indeed usually resent presenting 
alignment as a formal imperative derived from contractual obligations, as such an 
approach carry the risk of antagonising EU partners731. Diffuse though they are, these 
pressures for alignment are nonetheless felt by Serbia and Macedonia’s 
representatives. In interviews, these often bluntly recognise that one of the reasons of 
their alignment is that they “have to”–although sheer compliance is not what primarily 
drives their behaviour732.  
 
This perception is vivified when these do not to align with EU positions. EU 
diplomats may then enquire into the reasons that prevented alignment, though gently, 
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Cooperation. Belgrade, 13/09/2011 
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“out of political curiosity”733. As their country comes closer to the EU, these pressures 
for alignment purportedly heighten734. As a Serbian diplomat stated:  
 
“the closer we are in the EU integration process, the more compelled we are 
to harmonise our position with the EU”.735  
 
But Serbia and Macedonia responds differently to these pressures. Whereas 
Macedonia generally accepts compliance as a “rule of the European integration game”, 
on the ground that it increases its chances to join the EU736, Serbia, reacts to these 
pressures more critically737. As a diplomat argued,  
 
“Look at Macedonia: it is a candidate country but has not received the 
possibility to open negotiations for accession in the EU. And it aligns 
systematically with EU positions. On the other side, look at Turkey: it has 
been a candidate for a long time, and it started to negotiate its accession in 
the EU. But it does not align itself with the EU as often as Macedonia. So, I 
do not think more alignment necessarily has an impact on whether you are go 
faster or not towards the EU.”738 
 
If sheer compliance, according to the Serbian diplomat, does not speed up the EU 
integration process, then, the leverage of the EU in matters of alignment cannot work 
as effectively on Serbia as it does on Macedonia. Both might acknowledge the 
compellingness of EU obligations in this respect, but the gain expected by Macedonia 
(rightly or not) in terms of European integration exceeds by far Serbia’s most 
optimistic anticipations. In short, Macedonia views alignments as a duty with 
prospective rewards. It is then encouraged to sustain a high level of alignment with 
the EU. Serbia, by contrast, first considered alignment as a right without duty 
(between 2003 and 2006), and later as a duty with uncertain reward. After aligning 
itself intensively, Serbia therefore started to question its dedication to alignment.  
 
3.1.4.2. Dispositional analysis 
 
3.1.4.2.1. Alignment as a signal, not as a goal 
 
EU actors do not demand alignment for its own sake. They conceive of it as part of 
the EU’s political dialogue with non-EU countries, and as a means to “bring 
agreement on different issues”739. In aligning themselves with EU positions, non-EU 
                                                 
733 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, United 
Nations Unit Skopje, 07/03/2011 
734 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Representation of Belgium to the Osce. Vienna, 
26/04/2011; Interview with an Official from the Delegation of the European Union to the International 
Organisations in Vienna. Vienna, 01/08/2011 
735 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 
Directorate General for Multilateral Cooperation. Belgrade, 13/09/2011 
736 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, United 
Nations Unit Skopje, 07/03/2011 
737 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 
Directorate General for Multilateral Cooperation. Belgrade, 13/09/2011 
738 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Serbia to the Osce in 
Vienna. Vienna, 17/10/2011 
739 Interview with an Official from the Delegation of the European Union to the International 
Organisations in Vienna. Vienna, 01/08/2011 
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states are well aware of the ideational underpinnings of alignment. What is expected 
from them is not only behavioural compliance. It is their involvement and their active 
and unreserved participation in the EU’s CFSP740. As an EU diplomat from the EU 
delegation to the OSCE in Vienna argued,  
 
“Alignment is a signal. It is not so much a goal, unlike political dialogue 
which is pursued per se, or on which the EU focuses. Alignment means that 
states share EU statements, but there is so much more than an EU 
statement”.741  
 
Instead of striving for political compliance only, EU actors look for Serbia and 
Macedonia’s adherence with EU norms and values, i.e. they appeal to soul-deep 
agreement rather than (or in addition to) symbolic gestures.  
 
Alignment, then, cannot be merely caused by EU conditionality (although obligations 
do matter). It is underpinned by shared understandings, guiding non-EU diplomacies 
into collective action in multilateral fora. These shared understandings cannot be 
imposed through legal obligations. They emerge from the internalisation of EU norms, 
i.e. the inclusion of EU approaches into non-EU normative and cognitive templates. It 
supposes, in a nutshell, that the will to align, having first been formulated by the EU, 
now emerges from non-EU state actors’ endogenous dispositions towards the EU. 
Although Serbia and Macedonia’s diplomatic actors all share such dispositions, the 
analysis shows that EU norms, in matter of alignment, have not been internalised in 
Serbia as deeply as they have in Macedonia.  
 
3.1.4.2.2. Alignment as a response to foreign policy objectives 
 
In the OSCE and UNGA, Serbia and Macedonia both pursue several objectives. Some 
are defined in collective terms, others in individualistic terms. Macedonia, for 
instance, characteristically defines its priorities in the OSCE and UNGA in collective 
terms, and these are consubstantially linked to EU and Euro-Atlantic integration 
processes742. These objectives are 
 
“First, the EU and its integration. This objective has been stated as early as 
1992 by the National Assembly. The second objective is Euro-atlantic 
integration, i.e. Nato. In more general terms, Macedonia pursues in 
international organisations the objective of becoming a provider of security 
after having been a security consumer”.743 
 
                                                 
740 This expectation resonates with article 11(2) of the TEU, which provides that EU member states 
“shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty 
and mutual solidarity”. Treaty of Maastricht. 7 February 1992. 
741 Interview with an Official from the Delegation of the European Union to the International 
Organisations in Vienna. Vienna, 01/08/2011 
742 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of Macedonia to the Osce. Vienna, 
08/07/2011; Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Macedonia, Directorate for Multilateral Affairs. Skopje, 02/11/2011; Interview with an Official from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, Directorate for Bilateral Relations with 
Non European Countries. Skopje, 03/11/2011 
743 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of Macedonia to the Osce. Vienna, 
08/07/2011 
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Macedonia’s objectives are thus primarily defined by the prospect of joining a 
community (hence the notion of collective). This is not to say that individualistic 
interests have fully disappeared from Macedonia’s foreign policy spectrum. In the 
OSCE, Macedonia, for instance, also aims at preparing the closing of the OSCE 
mission in Skopje. But it is not an objective that foreign policy actors can actively 
pursue, since the reforms needed (e.g. in democratising the country) exceed their 
scope of action. This objective is therefore secondary in comparison to the EU and 
Euro-atlantic integration objectives, which conversely, can be actively pursued 
through an active participation in the EU’s CFSP and a solid dedication to provide 
security in Europe and beyond.  
 
Serbia shares at the highest level Macedonia’s strategic objective of joining the EU. 
But in the OSCE and UNGA, this goal coexists with another priority, defined in more 
individualistic terms, i.e. by the prospect of maximising one’s individual position 
regardless of community-building. As stated by a Serbian official in charge of 
multilateral affairs in the MFA:  
 
We have two major broad areas of priorities: First our European orientation 
towards EU accession and the fulfilment of all the necessary requirements. 
Second, Kosovo, which is not a surprise, I guess. And there is a third one, to 
engage in all issues that could fall into our foreign policy scope, meaning, 
not to isolate ourselves within the international community as a one-issue 
country, meaning only Kosovo or only Europe; but have a strong outreach in 
foreign policy”.744 
 
Serbia’s “Kosovo objective” has no equivalent in Macedonia’s strategic agenda in the 
OSCE or UNGA. It is very specific to Serbia’s national interests (in the sense that it 
does not echo the EU’s foreign policy) and it focuses on one single issue (though with 
wide repercussions). The third objective is also specific to Serbia’s national interests 
(as it supports the defence of Serbia’s interests beyond EU accession), but it does not 
focus on one issue. These two objectives open avenues for diplomatic activities in the 
OSCE and UNGA, the pursuit of which might conflict with the first priority. For 
instance, Serbia eagerly lobbies in the OSCE and UNGA against Kosovo recognition. 
It develops relations with third countries (e.g. Russia), which do not always share the 
same values as the EU, and sometimes reciprocates their support against Kosovo by 
behaving in a manner that diverges from the EU’s preferences. Likewise, Serbia’s 
third objective (acting against diplomatic isolation) sometimes proves problematic for 
the EU, when it applies through Serbia’s localised support for members of the non-
alignment movement like Iran.  
 
Unlike Macedonia, Serbia seeks to conciliate two types of national priorities: those 
defined in collective terms, pertaining to EU integration, and those defined in 
individualistic terms, pertaining to the defence of Kosovo and a certain autonomy in 
world politics. Macedonia, by contrast, only seems to swear by EU and Euro-Atlantic 
integration. The major difference then resides, for Serbia, in the coexistence of 
potentially conflicting national interests. This coexistence undermines the 
internalisation of EU norms, which cannot be given supremacy, given the other 
                                                 
744 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 
Directorate General for Multilateral Cooperation. Belgrade, 13/09/2011 
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objectives Serbia’s diplomats shall pursue, and it therefore weakens their dispositions 
to align with EU positions. 
 
3.1.4.2.3. Alignment as a means to participate in European foreign policy 
 
Indeed, alignment is not viewed by Macedonia’s representatives as an end in itself. It 
is more of a means, used in the fulfilment of the foreign policy priorities set up at the 
strategic level. Through alignment with EU positions, Macedonia then not only 
expresses its passive adherence to EU norms; it asserts that it shares the EU’s foreign 
policy objectives as well.  
 
The alignment mechanism, at first sight, does not seem to imply the active 
participation of the alignees. Macedonia’s foreign policy actors cannot, indeed, 
participate in the elaboration of EU positions. They may merely attend to EU briefing 
sessions, and therefore remain passive contributors. But the meaning that is attached 
to alignment in Macedonia’s diplomacy is not bound by these formal restrictions. As a 
matter of fact, alignment purportedly signals that Macedonia “participates in 
European foreign policy”, “contributes to European security”, and demonstrates its 
“European way of thinking in the outer world”745. It suggests that despite its non-
involvement in European foreign policy-making, Macedonia supports EU positions in 
international affairs as if it were hers. The very action of alignment, then, is given a 
collective teleology, which thoroughly permeates, if not shapes, Macedonia’s national 
interest.  
 
This coalescence of European and national foreign policy objectives also affects 
Serbia, but to a lesser extent, given the fact that Serbia’s foreign policy agenda 
upholds key priorities defined in individualistic rather than collective terms. The 
difference manifests itself most blatantly in Serbia’s occasional attempts at uploading 
its individualistic, Kosovo-related objective in the UNGA and OSCE fora, e.g. when 
Serbia dissent from the EU on issues related to Russia or Belarus in the hope that its 
support for the latter will help barring Kosovo’s membership in international 
organisations. Pursuing its Kosovo objective, Serbia, then, no longer act in “the sprit 
loyalty and mutual solidarity”746 underpinning an active and unreserved participation 
to the EU’s CFSP. Serbia’s approach critically differs here from Macedonia, which in 
the UNGA and OSCE restrains itself from bringing its individualistic interests to the 
forefront. Macedonia, for instance, does not let its naming issue with Greece interfere 
in its cooperation with the EU on multilateral affairs. As explained by a Macedonia 
diplomat,  
 
“in the OSCE, the naming issue poses a lesser problem, since there is with 
the EU an implicit agreement that we do no speak about that. The naming 
issue is dealt in UN institutions”.747 
 
                                                 
745 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of Macedonia to the Osce. Vienna, 
08/07/2011; Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
United Nations Unit Skopje, 07/03/2011; Interview with an Official from the Delegation of the 
Parliament of Serbia in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Belgrade, 12/09/2011 
746 Article 11(2), Treaty of Maastricht. 7 February 1992. 
747 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of Macedonia to the Osce. Vienna, 
08/07/2011 
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Macedonia thus repeatedly aligned with EU statements in the OSCE, which criticised 
Russia, despite Russia’s threats to shift its support to Greece on the name issue748. At 
the climax of the tensions between the EU and Russia in 2008, during the Georgian 
war, Russia retaliated by addressing Macedonia in official meetings as FYROM. 
Despite this diplomatic blow, Macedonia kept aligning with the EU against Russia 
and accordingly demonstrated its unrestrained commitment to participate in European 
foreign policy. 
 
3.1.4.2.4. Alignment as a norm 
 
Because Serbia and Macedonia’s diplomat pursue different objectives in the OSCE 
and UNGA, their cognitive response to the EU’s invitation for alignment is due to 
differ, regardless of their actual decision to align. How their diplomats read EU 
statements, analyse EU positions, assess their normativity and weigh the 
appropriateness of alignment does not follow the same scheme.  
 
For Macedonia’s diplomats, alignment with EU positions has gradually become a 
norm of its own. Decisions to align are not the result of cost-benefit analyses 
weighing the pros and cons of supporting the EU in the UNGA or OSCE. They are 
not taken after blindly confronting on an equal-footing the prospect of alignment with 
the possibility of not aligning. In the vast majority of the cases, the appropriateness of 
alignment is taken for granted. This assumption –stating that alignment is good- 
considerably simplifies the cognitive process leading to Macedonia’s decisions to 
align with EU statements. When they receive EU statements or EU positions, 
Macedonia’s diplomats proceed to a “bureaucratic analysis”749, which amounts to 
vetting that the EU does not specifically target Macedonia in its position. And as a 
matter of fact, the EU rarely does. Macedonia’s diplomats may then readily apply 
their “policy of alignment by default, including on costly issues”750. After vetting that 
the draft position does not include the keyword “Macedonia”, diplomats cast an eye 
on the substance of the position. But reading, at this stage, is more aimed at getting 
informed than making decisions; indeed, their decision to align is usually taken from 
the outset:  
 
Interviewer: “When do you receive the statement of the EU, you open the 
mail and start reading. What comes to you mind?” 
Interviewee: “that we should align. The EU is now our strategic policy goal. 
So, whatever comes up, I always suggest alignment. I know I had a 
fight with our former Minister, when Macedonia joined the EU's 
position on death penalty and the US. It was a disaster, because the US 
said and pressed us not to do it. So it took all night negotiations to 
finally find a solution”.751 
 
Reasons for questioning the appropriateness EU positions are difficult to imagine. 
Macedonia, as summarised by a diplomat, “has not the ambition to correct the EU in 
                                                 
748 Russia recognises Macedonia with its constitutional name, i.e. Republic of Macedonia.  
749 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of Macedonia to the Osce. Vienna, 
08/07/2011 
750 Ibid. 
751 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Directorate for Multilateral Affairs. Skopje, 02/11/2011 
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its statements”752. Even in issue-areas that are not of direct interest to Macedonia’s 
diplomacy (e.g. human rights in Azerbaijan), or where Macedonia lacks expertise (e.g. 
East Timor), its purported adherence to EU overarching principles and its 
commitment to participate in European foreign policy inclines Macedonia towards 
alignment with the EU753. Even before the alignment mechanism was set up in 2003, 
Macedonia reportedly relied on such dispositions: we were already “closer by default 
to the positions of the EU” 754 . Being in Europe and striving for EU accession 
eventually supersedes on any other consideration. Alignment, in Macedonia’s case, is 
a norm that barely admits any exception. 
 
Serbia also views alignment as a norm. Its diplomats usually start reading EU 
statements with a positive forethought. The idea, however, is not to align by default, 
but to “align as much as possible”755. The nuance is important, as it implies that the 
list of keywords that may trigger non-alignment is longer, and more complex. As 
explained by top officials,  
 
in the UN, “in most case, of course we choose to abide. But then there is 
Kosovo”.756 
 
Alternatively,  
 
in the OSCE, “there are statements about Kosovo, war crimes, Dayton 
Agreement, etc…. These are certain issues, where we do have to have our 
voice”.757 
 
When the EU copes with an issue that lies “East of Vienna” 758 (e.g. Russia) and that is 
important in the pursuit of Serbia’s Kosovo objective, or addresses topics of regional 
relevance (e.g. the Dayton Agreements), then, Serbia’s diplomats, while reading EU 
statements, stop assuming that the EU is right. They conversely start confronting the 
EU’s statement with national approaches, analyse the possible implications of 
alignment, and even consider critically the statement, to identify hidden bones of 
contention or possible improvements. This cognitive approach to EU statements differ 
from Macedonia essentially, for  
 
“Serbia is different from other Western Balkan countries, because they do not 
give a damn about what they align for. They just align hoping that they will 
                                                 
752 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of Macedonia to the Osce. Vienna, 
08/07/2011 
753 Ibid; Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Directorate for Bilateral Relations with Non European Countries. Skopje, 03/11/2011 
754 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, United 
Nations Unit Skopje, 07/03/2011 
755 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 
Directorate General for Multilateral Cooperation. Belgrade, 13/09/2011 
756 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Directorate 
General for the European Union. Belgrade, 12/09/2011 
757 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Serbia to the Osce in 
Vienna. Vienna, 17/10/2011 
758 Ibid. 
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get accession. I do not think they even consider what they vote for in the 
UNGA. Here, we do consider every call the EU addresses to us to join”.759  
 
Alternatively as stated by top official in Serbia’s government:  
 
“You know, the way [other Western Balkan states] read the declaration is 
superficial”.760  
 
This more critical appraisal of EU positions is also advanced by Serbia’s diplomats as 
a means to legitimate the lower levels of alignment their country display in the OSCE 
and UNGA. Being more reflective on EU positions would accordingly contradict with 
aligning automatically. Although the argument certainly finds some theoretical 
grounds, it is undermined in practice by the fact that Serbia fails align with the EU 
because it is committed to support third actors, whose norms and values collide with 
the EU’s (e.g. Russia, Belarus or Iran). This support cannot possibly reflect Serbia’s 
reflective appraisal of EU norms. It rather shows that alignment, in the case of Serbia, 
is a norm that occasionally deserves transgression.  
 
3.1.4.3. Intentional analysis 
 
3.1.4.3.1. Alignment as a demonstration of one’s Europeanness 
 
One of the intentions underpinning alignment is to “demonstrate that we share the 
same values as the EU”761 . This motive builds on the key objective Serbia and 
Macedonia pursue in the UNGA and OSCE with respect to EU integration, and it 
responds to the obligation imposed on them by the EU in the framework of its 
“speaking with one voice” principle. It is yet borne in different manners by Serbia and 
Macedonia’s foreign policy actors, as to whom this demonstration is intended.  
 
In Serbia, showing one’s commitment to EU norms and values is primarily aimed at 
EU institutions, not least 
 
“because there is usually a person in Brussels or in Belgrade that is putting a 
plus and minus, when we align, and when we do not”.762 
 
Alignment, then, is rather intended to confirm that there is an agreement with the EU 
on norm-laden issues. In Macedonia, this demonstration is addressed to Brussels too: 
 
“we want to demonstrate our political commitment to the EU. It's our will 
more than the EU's”.763 
                                                 
759 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Directorate 
General for the European Union. Belgrade, 12/09/2011 
760 Interview with a Top Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. Belgrade, 
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with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, Directorate for 
Multilateral Affairs. Skopje, 02/11/2011 
762 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Serbia to the Osce in 
Vienna. Vienna, 17/10/2011 
 137
 
But alignment, in Macedonia, is also about concurring with the EU in showing to the 
outer world that “this issue matters for Europeans” 764, including on issues barely 
relevant for Macedonia alone.  
 
Honestly, who cares in Macedonia about violations of journalists’ rights in 
Azerbaijan? And still, we’ll align ourselves with the EU on this issue because 
in the end we’re also Europeans”.765 
 
This idea of showing to the outer world that there is a “European way of doing things” 
echoes Macedonia’s commitment to participate in European foreign policy. It is a 
motive that goes beyond the lower-scaled intent, shared by Serbia and Macedonia, of 
proving to the EU one’s Europeanness.  
 
3.1.4.3.2. Alignment as a response to scarce resources and poor visibility 
 
Another motive for alignment is the economy of resources this mechanism allows. 
Macedonia’s diplomats in New York and Vienna easily concede that they have 
“limited resources” at their disposal, that their mission is “small”, and that they cannot 
successfully cover the whole spectrum of multilateral diplomacy in the organisations 
they are accredited to766. In Vienna, Macedonia’s permanent mission to the OSCE is 
indeed also accredited the IAEA, UNIDO, CTBTO, etc… In New York, the 
permanent mission shall (in addition to UNGA diplomacy) cover the six UN Main 
Committees, the Economic and Social Council, etc… The number of meetings 
organised every day in Vienna and New York in those fora then exceeds by far the 
capacity of the Macedonia’s permanent missions, which can neither attend to all of 
them, nor ensure a complete follow-up of all the issues at stake. In New York, for 
instance, Macedonia can only count on 3 diplomats to handle all these issues (see 
Table 17). The alignment mechanism proves in this respect extremely helpful, since 
alignment exempts them from drafting redundant statements; it allows them to react 
effectively under time pressure and to adopt well-informed positions on international 
issues, for which expertise is otherwise lacking, or would have been too difficult to 
gain. As an official in Macedonia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs put it,  
 
“on East-Timor and this kind of issues, where we have no expertise at all, of 
course, we just follow the EU”.767 
 
Since Macedonia’s primary objective resides in joining the EU, and since it does not 
pursue any individualistic interests in the UNGA and OSCE, then decisions to align 
bear no risks.  
                                                                                                                                            
763 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Directorate for Multilateral Affairs. Skopje, 02/11/2011 
764 Ibid. 
765 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of Macedonia to the Osce. Vienna, 
08/07/2011 
766 Ibid; Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
United Nations Unit Skopje, 07/03/2011; Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, Directorate for Bilateral Relations with Non European Countries. 
Skopje, 03/11/2011 
767 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Directorate for Bilateral Relations with Non European Countries. Skopje, 03/11/2011 
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“After all, the EU does not make revolutionary politics: its positions are 
usually balanced”768.  
 
In addition, the alignment mechanism provides smaller countries like Macedonia with 
an opportunity to expand their foreign policy agenda at minimal costs. As expressed 
by a diplomat from Macedonia,  
 
“because the EU has a position on everything and a huge agenda, for smaller 
countries like Macedonia, this the possibility to express a position on issues 
which we would otherwise not have discussed, or not have considered”.769  
 
The benefit of joining the EU, then, is clear:  
 
Because the EU is a big important group, it has more visibility and presence 
than Macedonia. By aligning, everybody hears more about your name and 
knows you're also following on this issue.770 
 
This is a considerable gain, which is yielded without incurring costs, since 
Macedonia’s positions and orientations all concur with the EU’s collective approaches. 
Macedonia can thus seek to boost its international visibility in the OSCE and UNGA, 
only by reaping the benefits of its closure to the EU. 
 
Table 17: Staffing of Serbia/Macedonia’s permanent missions in Vienna and New York 
 
Number of diplomats (2011)  
 Macedonia Serbia 
Vienna 4 6 
New York 3 11 
  
Source: interviews with Serbia and Macedonia’s diplomats in Vienna and New York. 
 
Resource scarcity, however, is not less salient as a motive for alignment for Serbia as 
it is for Macedonia. The reasons for that are numerous. First, Serbia’s diplomats in 
New York and Vienna are more numerous than Macedonia’s (see Table 17). Second, 
they are less autonomous from their well-staffed home ministry, since decisions to 
align are mostly taken, in the case of Serbia, in the capital. Third, as Serbia’s 
dispositions to align are weaker than Macedonia’s, then the prospective costs 
incurring from alignment are higher. On those issues, where alignment with the EU 
(e.g. against Russia) would undermine Serbia’s positions against Kosovo, the 
economy of resources offered by alignment cannot possibly compensate Serbia’s 
failure to pursue its Kosovo objective. Fourth, this economy of resources implies 
greater dependence on EU expertise and access to information. This cannot be 
pursued as a motive for alignment, considering Serbia’s strategic commitment to 
diversifying its foreign policy relations. Serbia’s diplomats are in fact all the more 
reluctant to blindly follow the EU as national expertise on the issue at stake is 
                                                 
768 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Directorate for Multilateral Affairs. Skopje, 02/11/2011 
769 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, United 
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missing 771 . Unlike Macedonia, finally, Serbia occasionally declines alignment 
precisely in order to gain in international visibility: 
 
We sometimes do not align “out of sincerity. […] we want to show our strong 
stance and commitment towards certain issues. To show that we are 
concerned and involved”.772 
 
The limitations faced by Serbia in terms of resources thus impact on Serbia’s 
diplomacy in a manner opposite to Macedonia. Whereas resource scarcity arouses 
motives for alignment in Macedonia, it rather acts as a constraint put on Serbia’s 
willingness to align itself with the EU.  
 
3.1.4.4. Factors constraining Europeanisation 
 
The descriptive analysis of Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy behaviour in the 
UNGA and OSCE pointed at meaningful differences in their respective propensity to 
align themselves with EU positions. Whereas Macedonia only exceptionally failed to 
align itself with the EU, Serbia, in 2007, started to distance itself from the EU. In the 
UNGA and OSCE, Serbia took a divergent course, characterised by an ever higher 
propensity to dissent from the EU in its voting and declaratory positions.  
 
This reversal in Serbia’s foreign policy behaviour cannot be explained by a single 
factor. It emerges from the conjunction of a plurality of factors. Some of them act are 
factors that merely constrain convergence. They weigh on the Europeanisation of 
Serbia’s multilateral diplomacy -as they do on Macedonia’s- without possibly be held 
alone responsible for dissenting behaviours. Others are factors that critically impede 
convergence. Those are obstacles to alignment, which cannot be overcome without 
jeopardising an essential part of states’ national interests.  
 
3.1.4.4.1. Lack of consistency stemming from rotating personnel 
 
The alignment mechanism is operated by a range of actors (see 3.1.3.3), who 
sometimes fail to make a consistent use of the alignment mechanism. The rotation 
system in Serbia and Macedonia’s ministry of foreign affairs provides indeed that 
diplomats only occupy their position for a few years before integrating a new 
structure or returning to the capital (if they were posted abroad). This system may 
entail minor inconsistencies, as does any transition or any replacement. As expressed 
by a diplomat from Macedonia,  
 
“during my absence from here, there were some inconsistencies, which I 
criticised. You know, you always have a human factor”.773  
 
At the EU level, this rotating system is a source of greater instability. As the 
Presidency of the EU is rotating twice a year, the alignment mechanism does not fall 
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under the continuous responsibility of a sole member state. Every 6 months, it has to 
be operated by a different team of delegates, experts and bureaucrats. This impacts, to 
a limited extent, on the efficiency of the alignment mechanism, regardless of non-EU 
states’ readiness to align774. Some Presidencies clearly have fewer diplomats at their 
disposal than others to operate the alignment mechanism. Some are also better 
organised than others. The amount of information that they share with Serbia and/or 
Macedonia may also fluctuate, as does their interest in operating the alignment 
mechanism in an inclusive manner.  
 
“Interviewer: Do you see big differences across the Presidencies regarding 
the way alignment is offered to you? 
Interviewee: Not big, but still. There are differences on how they are 
organised. Because some do it on time, some are more in details, 
during briefings, some share very little information, some more... It 
changes over Presidencies”.775 
 
Similarly, 
 
“We do see variances in the approaches depending on EU Presidencies, in 
levels of consultations. We have seen some Presidencies much more involved 
than others, more briefings, more outreach towards us, more ability to 
interact, etc… Since we are not a decisive factor, some Presidencies have not 
cared that much about us. In general, small countries have tended to be more 
sensitive”.776 
 
Austria, Finland, Slovenia and Sweden are for instance cited as models. Spain, by 
contrast, did not reportedly perform very well. According to a diplomat from 
Macedonia, “Spain was a joke, it was very bad!”.777 Germany, likewise, was reported 
to be inefficient and reluctant to share information with Serbia. Oversized and too 
bureaucratic, its missions experienced difficulties in the timely coordination of 
internal positions, and neglected smaller non-EU countries778. Interestingly enough, 
Spain held the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first semester of 2010, as 
Macedonia recorded in the UNGA some positions that dissented from the EU median 
preference; Germany, likewise, held the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the 
first semester of 2007, as Serbia started to distance itself from EU preferences. 
Attributing Serbia and Macedonia’s dissenting behaviour to Spain and Germany’s 
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alleged mismanagement with respect to the alignment mechanism would certainly be 
exaggerated. First of all, “good” management by Slovenia and France in 2008 or 
Sweden in 2009 did not prevent Serbia’s foreign policy behaviour from diverging 
from the EU. And secondly, it is very doubtful that Spain and Germany’s alleged 
mismanagement affected Serbia and Macedonia’s actual capacity to align. As argued 
by a diplomat from Macedonia:  
 
If you lack information, that's why you're a diplomat, you'll find other ways to 
dig more. It's all about whom you know. Of course, when I come to the 
briefing, and the colleague [from the Presidency] gives me more information, 
or gives me the text of the statement, it's more practical for me, and I loose 
less time, than going back to the mission, trying to locate my colleagues or 
someone I know who can get me the text. When there is a tight deadline 
however, it's more complicated”.779 
 
More than the nationality of the EU member states’ delegates responsible for foreign 
policy coordination, the success of the alignment mechanism depends on the 
personality of diplomats working for the Presidency of the Council. Their diplomatic 
skills are essential in making sure that EU positions circulate without constraints and 
without misunderstandings780. Since the mid-2000s, in Vienna, these are assisted in 
their task by a single, non-rotating political advisor to the Presidencies of the Council, 
who is specifically in charge of the alignment mechanism. This political advisor sees 
to facilitate the transition from one Presidency to another, to maintain personal 
contacts with non-EU states’ delegates and to watch over the smooth enforcement of 
the alignment mechanism.  
 
3.1.4.4.2. Lack of cohesion among EU member states 
 
The EU is usually perceived, from the outside, as a cohesive actor in the UNGA and 
OSCE. On a number of foreign policy issues (around 70% in the UNGA), the EU 
does speak with one voice, as a unitary actor. This perception is based on what the EU 
communicates in those international fora: an end product. From the inside, however, 
i.e. from the point of view of those states participating in the machinery of foreign 
policy coordination, the EU seems much less cohesive781. The interests of the member 
states reportedly compete with each other in order to bend the EU’s consensus 
towards their own preferences782. France, the United Kingdom and Germany are often 
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cited as key players. Their diplomatic weight in the EU enables them to occasionally 
project their policy preferences at the EU level, lure (or “entrap”783) smaller member 
states into agreement, and then use the alignment mechanism to attract non-EU states’ 
support. This perception gives rise to Serbia’s wariness regarding the appropriateness 
of alignment.  
 
“On certain issues, certainly not human rights, it is noticeable that 
sometimes there are frustrations on the part of smaller states not being 
consulted enough. […] See how the Cypriots are frustrated by the general 
trend in the EU with regards to the Cyprus question. […] Why can’t we, 
Serbs, take these frustrations into account”?784 
 
When consensus does not emerge easily through internal coordination, or when it is 
imposed by the mightier states in the EU, then, Serbia’s diplomats may then choose to 
lend an hear to discontented EU member states, especially if those states share critical 
views with Serbia regarding Kosovo. When EU consensus is weak, Serbia’s 
diplomats are usually keen on hearing the non-recognisers’ reservations on the EU’s 
position (i.e. Cyprus, Slovakia, Greece, Romania and Spain), which may soften their 
commitment to alignment. 
 
On some foreign policy issues, however, the EU, rattled by its member states’ 
national interests, does not succeed in reaching a common position. This happened 
repeatedly in the OSCE as the Lisbon Treaty was to enter into force, because EU 
member states disagreed on the new procedures, because the newly established 
European External Action Service (EEAS) was disorganised and because a new 
division of labour had to be put in place785. This happened more recurrently in the 
UNGA, when the EU sought to take a position on internally divisive issues, such as 
the Middle East, decolonisation or UNSC enlargement. Those issues usually bring 
about split votes in the UNGA. Serbia and Macedonia’s diplomats then feel free to 
consult with national diplomacies. On Palestine, for instance, Macedonia usually 
receives communications or delegations from the United States and Israel786, and also 
consults with key EU embassies (France, Germany and the UK)787. On other issues, 
where is it known that France and the UK have peculiar positions (e.g. 
decolonisation), then  
 
“the safest is that we follow whoever is presiding over the Council, because 
usually, it's like that, or we follow the smaller countries, they are closer to 
our foreign policy”.788 
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This tendency to consult with EU member states and look for EU proxy positions 
even though the EU has no common stance on an issue comes close to the 
“community reflex” developed by EU member states over years of foreign policy 
coordination. This community reflex is less developed in the case of Serbia. First, 
Serbia’s diplomats have fewer contacts with EU member states diplomats, as they 
cannot participate in EU candidate states’ briefing meetings789 . Second, Serbia’s 
diplomacy has “a practice” of informing Russia, explaining its alignment positions 
and exchanging views with Russia790. When the EU cannot speak with one voice, this 
practice facilitates Serbia’s realignment with Russia. As argued by an official from 
Serbia’s MFA,  
 
“it all depends on cohesiveness. So, when the EU is cohesive […], it is more 
difficult to go against the trend, especially when for Serbia, as small country. 
Unless it really completely the core of your national interest”.791  
 
In other words, when the EU lacks of cohesion on certain issues, then Serbia may be 
tempted to lend an ear to states in the EU or outside the EU, whose position on other 
issues may be supportive of its national interests.  
 
3.1.4.4.3. Lack of involvement of non-EU states 
 
The alignment mechanism is not designed as an instrument fostering political dia-log 
stricto sensu. It is highly asymmetrical in its conception, and does not put Serbia or 
Macedonia on an equal-footing with EU member states in terms of involvement in 
European foreign policymaking and access to information. To paraphrase a scholar, 
who researched the EU’s diplomacy in the UN Human Rights Council, “what 
dialogue for the EU seems to denote is the EU’s intention to make its common 
position ‘better known’ and ‘better understood’. […] But it is not a two-way exchange 
of arguments”792. This claim finds considerable support amongst many of the EU’s 
associated states, including Serbia and Macedonia793. 
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Serbia and Macedonia do not participate in the meetings, in which the positions with 
which they eventually align, are discussed and elaborated. They are excluded from 
EU internal coordination meetings, including at the expert level, and cannot witness 
the negotiations underpinning EU foreign policymaking. Though limited, candidate 
states, like Macedonia, and members of the EFTA, have nonetheless a relative 
advantage compared to non-candidate countries, e.g. Serbia: they meet with the 
Presidency and the EU delegation every week at the ambassadorial level in Vienna 
and at the deputy-level in New York at so-called political dialogue meetings, where 
they are briefed on the EU’s plans of the week. During these meetings, the EU 
Presidency informs them on its intent to make a statement in the OSCE on a given 
subject, but does not share what the substance of the statement will be. In New York, 
the EU Presidency may communicate the basic orientation of the EU vote, provided a 
consensus is at hand (or nearly so). Since it is not a candidate state, Serbia cannot 
participate in these weekly briefings, unlike Macedonia. It is only involved (and 
informed) after the EU formally sends its invitation to align. This casts serious doubts 
on the EU’s capacity or willingness to conduct a genuine political dia-logue with non-
EU states. As summarised by an EU diplomat,  
 
“our negotiation is within the EU. We have 27 member states, plus the EEAS 
and other EU institutions. So […] we have an EU standard. We would like to 
see that non-EU states share this standard, but we do not want to negotiate 
the EU standard and open the text to a second round of negotiations with 
non-EU states: that is not the point of alignment. The end product must 
reflect: ‘this is the EU speaking’. Non-EU states are welcome to share it, 
which means that they come onboard, but it shall remain an EU position 
reflecting the EU acquis. Plus, in practice, it would be impossible”.794  
 
This very asymmetrical conception of political dia-logue is a stumbling block in 
Macedonia, and above all Serbia’s alignment politics. It creates frustrations in 
Macedonia, for  
 
“there is a general lack of EU interest towards Macedonia’s positions”.795 
 
This frustration is in some way overcome with resignation in the case of Macedonia.  
 
Of course [our relationship with the EU] is asymmetrical. The very fact is 
that Macedonia is not part of the negotiation process. But there are also 
asymmetries within the EU. Compare the Germany and Estonia for instance. 
Within the EU, people say Germany said so and so; nobody says Estonia said 
so and so. Between the EU and Macedonia, […] it is not even equal. I mean, 
in other international organisations, at least there is this illusion of 
equality”.796 
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Serbia’s diplomats make similar comments on the EU’s alleged negligence. They 
regret the lack of involvement of Serbian experts and diplomats, and wish they were 
better informed. As a high diplomat from Serbia’s claimed:  
 
“What I think the EU should do is to inform us every month or every three 
weeks of the general orientations of the EU in the OSCE. We are really 
neglected in this respect”.797 
 
In addition to that, as the EU’s invitations to align are only addressed to Serbia and 
Macedonia after the EU member states have successfully coordinated their position 
internally, what the EU offers actually is “a take-it or leave-it choice”798. Serbia and 
Macedonia’s representatives thus cannot comment on the statement they receive, 
make suggestions or contribute in any way in drafting sessions. This nourishes further 
frustrations:  
 
“We are not on an equal-footing with the EU. Maybe Turkey has that feeling, 
or Russia, or those really big countries. But with respect to Serbia, no. […] 
We are not involved in any discussion about the statement. And when we 
receive it, we decide on the basis of take-it or leave-it”.799 
 
Alignment, as a result, is referred to as “one-sided” rather than negotiated800; as 
“asymmetrical” rather reciprocal801. It places non-EU states in a position of “receivers 
of information” and “good listeners”, rather than active contributors. This puts a strain 
on non-EU states’, and especially Serbia’s, endogenous will to align itself with EU 
positions.  
 
3.1.4.4.4. Time constraints 
 
The alignment mechanism rests on tight deadlines. Decisions to align with EU 
statements must be taken in the OSCE within 24 hours at best, and usually less than 
12 hours. Sometimes, non-EU states’ delegates only receive the proposition to align 
half an hour before the statement is read. They are therefore under time constraints. In 
the UNGA, although the EU’s voting positions are usually known in advance, the six-
hour time difference between New York and Belgrade/Skopje seriously hampers the 
communications between the permanent missions and the home ministry, and they 
may slow down the reactivity required when invitations to align are transmitted on 
short notice. This is especially relevant for Serbia’s delegates, which, as a rule, shall 
request instructions from Belgrade802.  
 
                                                 
797 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Serbia to the Osce in 
Vienna. Vienna, 17/10/2011 
798 Ibid. 
799 Ibid. 
800 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, CFSP 
Unit. Skopje, 07/03/2011 
801 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Serbia to the Osce in 
Vienna. Vienna, 17/10/2011 
802 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 
Directorate General for Multilateral Cooperation. Belgrade, 13/09/2011 
 146
Interestingly, Macedonia’s diplomacy tends to react to this time constraint by 
empowering its heads of mission in Vienna and New York. When the deadline is too 
short, they are entrusted with the decision (not) to alignment: 
 
“we often have problems with the late coordination and deadlines. So we 
have now a kind of framework policy with our colleagues in Vienna, New 
York, Strasbourg and Geneva, so that they only consult us on politically 
sensitive issues”.803 
 
This measure does not alleviate the time constraint, but it makes it less prone to 
induce unwished non-alignments. Serbia, by contrast, has not adapted its more 
centralised decision-making structure, so that tight deadlines occasionally remain a 
source of dissenting behaviour.  
 
“interviewer:  Is the deadline issue a real problem, which prevents you from 
aligning. 
interviewee: There were several cases, where we could not align. There were 
also technical misunderstandings, where the lady who was supposed 
to receive the email, did not”.804 
 
The EU, under the Belgian Presidency, has accordingly softened its deadline rule, and 
now accepts belated communications. This measure, however, has not reportedly been 
used by Serbia as a means to solve its deadline issue, unlike Black Sea countries, 
which benefited from it more regularly.805 
 
3.1.4.4.5. EU restraints on national sensibilities 
 
In the OSCE, the EU applies a more stringent rule of alignment than in the UNGA. If 
they choose to align themselves with an EU statement, non-EU states shall give up 
their right to speak on their national capacity. This so-called “exclusive alignment 
rule” accentuates the asymmetrical design of the alignment mechanism, it stifles 
national sensibilities and it is therefore viewed by most non-EU states with a 
jaundiced eye806.  
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The gradual introduction of this practice of exclusive alignment in the OSCE has not 
been welcomed by Macedonia’s officials. These regret that, on some issues that are of 
particular interests for Macedonia’s diplomacy, the EU does not allow complementary 
statements, event though those would not contradict the EU’s position. The frustration 
is particularly salient on regional issues, where 
 
“in some cases, [one] may require deeper, more in-depth statements, which 
the EU cannot provide, as it is limited by its requirement for preliminary 
consensus. […] Sometimes, it's even a disaster. Last time […] for instance, 
the EU was saying "we provided money for this and that", and that's it. And 
of course I aligned, but the statement was so watered-down”. 807 
 
When consensus in the EU is weak on an issue, then the corresponding statement 
often lacks substance, and Macedonia’s diplomats wish they could reinforce the EU’s 
view. This might lead to moderate deviations. 
 
In other cases, it is not the watered-down substance of EU statements that is criticised, 
but their Manichaeism.  
 
“Here, I can criticize the EU for not being confident enough, because it demands 
exclusivity in its alignment mechanism. It urges us to see regional affairs in black and 
white terms, an approach that is not always very much adapted. The EU is not 
confident enough as it fears that letting states speak may lead to contradictions”. 808  
 
Macedonia’s internal politics, with Slavs and Albanians ruling over the country, and 
its close links to both Serbia and Kosovo often compel Macedonia to find the right 
balance between constructive critique and shame politics. Being less entangled in the 
region’s quagmire, the EU’s diplomacy may occasionally react in ways making 
Macedonia’s diplomats uncomfortable. Frustrations of this kind are also expressed by 
Serbia’s diplomats, who unlike Macedonia’s, may then opt for non-alignment. As 
expressed by a Serbian official from the MFA,  
 
“There are certain issues, where we do have to have our voice. Whatever the 
EU says, whether it is compatible with our position or not, we will have to 
speak, and obviously, we will not align, although we sometimes would like to 
align”.809 
 
The critique against this exclusive alignment rule goes beyond the EU stifling national 
sensibilities. It blames the EU for denaturing the essence of multilateral diplomacy in 
the OSCE. As a Swiss diplomat claimed, OSCE meetings have become “more boring” 
since this rule is in place, and even more so since the Lisbon Treaty810. This has been 
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confirmed by Turkey’s diplomats, both countries being very critical towards the EU’s 
new device.  
 
“Now, there’s only the EU, Russia and the United States speaking in the 
OSCE!”811 
 
This argument is similarly expressed, with moderation though, by Macedonians, 
which regrets that  
 
“we loose the kind of subtle diversity in use in the OSCE. That is good for the 
EU probably, but I do not think it is good for international organisations”.812 
 
And it addressed more bluntly by Serbia’s diplomats and officials, who view the 
practice as “not fair”813 and “little democratic”814. For them, this rule, introduced 
without further explanations815, is inconsistent with the “sovereign equality” principle 
that lies at the core of multilateral diplomacy in the OSCE816.  
 
Because this rule deprives Serbia and Macedonia from their right to speak, it puts 
them in front of severed choices, since alignment shall henceforth imply that their 
individual behaviour is fused into collective action. It also puts an end to the ad hoc 
solution non-EU states used to rely on, especially Serbia, as a response to their lack of 
involvement in EU negotiations. Serbia sometimes used these supplementary 
statements on its national capacity in order to clarify its approach, express nuances, or 
simply gain international visibility, in accordance with its foreign policy objectives. In 
these supplementary statements, it often expressly acknowledged the correctness of 
the EU statement it aligned with. But since the alignment rule now precludes parallel 
statements, non-alignment has become a real, though unfortunate, option. 
 
3.1.4.4.6. Inconvenient necessity to reciprocate diplomatic support 
 
States, like Armenia or Moldova, sometimes hold views that substantially differ from 
those of the EU. Despite their self-declared commitment to sharing EU norms and 
values, their disagreement on specific issues is a source of non-alignment. Armenia’s 
diplomacy, for instance, opposed EU positions in the OSCE, arguing that 
 
“when the EU points at human rights problems in Armenia, they are then 
wrong”.817 
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In a similar vein, Moldova’s diplomats refused to align themselves with EU 
statements on the protection of sexual minorities. They reportedly preferred  
 
“to align ourselves with the Vatican. Because we wonder what kind of 
civilization and values we would promote, if we supported that. LGBT 
parades are full with drugs, they are a blasphemy for our societies. It is 
strange exhibitionism, a pornography, a public degradation”.818  
 
In opposition to Armenia or Moldova, Serbia and Macedonia rarely fail to align 
themselves because they do not agree with the EU. Both countries readily concede 
that non-alignment shall not be interpreted as failures to share EU views or agree with 
the EU on the statement. As a matter of fact, their diplomats find it hard to imagine a 
statement or a position that would completely conflict with their innermost views. 
When it occurs, non-alignment, often, is more tactical than strategic; more 
instrumental than normative; and more driven by rational calculations than ideational 
adherence.  
 
At the crux of non-alignment lies the commonsensical observation that Serbia and 
Macedonia have not the EU as sole partner in international relations. They interact 
with third actors. In so doing, they develop interest-interdependences with non-EU 
actors, which occasionally lead them to support third partners against the EU. Non-
alignment then is the possible outcome. The more dependent one country is on the EU, 
the less political leverage third actors have on it, and, as a consequence, the less likely 
non-alignment is. Macedonia, for instance, rarely supports third countries by not 
aligning with the EU.  
 
“It's very rare that we have dissented from the EU, taken our national interest and 
privileged bilateral relations with third countries, also in the past. I can count these 
occasions on my fingers”.819 
 
At very rare occasions, Macedonia deviated moderately from EU positions in the 
UNGA in order to reciprocate the support conferred by the US with regards to the 
naming issue820. On other occasions, it deviated from EU positions on “bilateral 
issues” with third countries, after an agreement had been negotiated at the highest 
level, e.g. during an official visit (e.g. in the 1990s or early 2000s between Macedonia 
and Iran)821. In such cases, Macedonia’s diplomats in Vienna or New York may not 
even know why their country should not align itself with the EU. Such instances of 
non-alignment, however, remained scarce, not least because the Macedonia has 
become more dependent on the EU diplomatically than it is from others, and because 
its most important policy interests is now EU integration822. Macedonia, as a result, 
has no strategic need to rely on the support of external partners in order to pursue its 
national priorities, and it is therefore less amenable to inconvenient reciprocations.  
                                                 
818 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Moldova to the Osce. 
Vienna, 08/07/2011 
819 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, United 
Nations Unit Skopje, 07/03/2011 
820 For instance, Macedonia abstained when the EU voted in favour of UNGA resolutions on the 
Middle East, while the USA voted against. Ibid. 
821 Ibid.. 
822 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Directorate for Multilateral Affairs. Skopje, 02/11/2011. 
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Serbia, by contrast, is more amenable to support third countries whose approaches 
conflict with EU positions, when their diplomatic support is necessary to pursue its 
national priorities. Its occasional non-alignment follows, according to governmental 
sources, “its well-known position regarding the unilateral declaration of independence 
by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo”823. Serbia, indeed, 
reportedly “relies on others’ support on certain issues that are sill open”.824 In order to 
prevent the declaration of independence of Kosovo before 2008 and undermine its 
recognition after 2008, Serbia has deepened its strategic partnership with Russia and 
improved its relations with countries like Iran, Myanmar and Belarus, considered by 
the EU as most problematic. As expressed by a high official in Serbia’s MFA,  
 
“our relations with a lot of countries are directly linked towards Kosovo. If 
the EU speaks about countries that did not recognise Kosovo, then we are 
very careful. For instance Iran. You know, for us, Iran is not only Iran, it is 
more”. 825  
 
In addition to being opposed to Kosovo recognition, Iran is an important member of 
the non-aligned movement, in which Serbia is increasingly involved. The quality of 
Serbia-Iranian relations contrasts in this respect with the rising tensions that 
developed between the EU and Teheran. In 2008 and 2009 successively, Serbia 
opposed two EU unanimous voting positions in the UNGA blaming Iran for its 
violations of human rights 826 . In the meantime, in March 2009, Serbia’s Prime 
Minister Cvetković received the official visit of Iran’s Foreign Minister Mottaki, and 
in early December 2009, Serbia’s Parliament Speaker Đukić-Dejanović met his 
Iranian counterpart Ali Larijani in Teheran. Serbian officials, at the occasion of these 
high-level visits, publicly thanked the Iranian government for its stand on Kosovo and 
celebrated its engagement within the non-aligned movement827. Serbia’s disapproval 
of the EU’s critique against the Iranian regime in the UNGA should be understood in 
this context, as a reciprocation of Iran’s supports for Serbia’s stance towards Kosovo 
and Serbia’s engagement with the non-aligned movement. The same applies to 
explain Serbia’s reluctance to join forces with the EU and the USA in the Iranian 
nuclear question. A discussion leaked on the Net with Miroslav Šestović, the head of 
the MFA’s Directorate for Africa and the Middle East brought US diplomats to the 
following conclusion:  
 
“Until the International Court of Justice issues its advisory opinion [on the 
legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence], Serbia will use 
its ties with Iran to seek continued support on Kosovo rather than pushing for 
engagement with the P5+1 on nuclear issues or condemning gross violations 
of human rights”.828 
                                                 
823 Answers to the Commission’s Questionnaire, Republic of Serbia. 2011. ‘Answers of the Republic of 
Serbia to the EU Questionnaire Delivered by the European Commission.’ 
824 Interview with an Official from the European Integration Office, Government of the Republic of 
Serbia. Belgrade, 14/09/2011 
825 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Directorate 
General for the European Union. Belgrade, 12/09/2011 
826 UNGA resolutions R/63/191 of 18 December 2008 and R/64/176 of 18 December 2009. 
827 See B92. 3.12.2009. ‘Serbian Parliament Speaker in Tehran.’ 
828 United States Embassy in Belgrade. 24.9.2009. 'Serbia Mfa Sees Iran through Kosovo Prism'. 
[accessed 21.01.2013] 
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Similar observations can be made in order to explain Serbia’s failure to align itself 
with EU positions sanctioning human rights violations in Myanmar829 or Belarus830. 
Serbia’s restraint often stems from the fact that these regimes have not recognised the 
independence of Kosovo. 
 
The key factor that most constrained Serbia’s propensity to align itself with the EU 
certainly is its strategic relationship with Russia. From 2007, Serbia has invested a 
considerable amount of diplomatic capital in this relationship831. This investment 
came at the expense of its EU integration objective.  
 
It is the same for Russia. […] We have to protect our own interests. In this 
case, it may be not to align with the majority of the EU member states, which 
recognised Kosovo. In this case, our interest may collide”.832 
 
The failure of the Belgrade-Pristina negotiation talks on the Kosovo status, led by 
Martti Ahtisaari under the auspices of the United Nations, led Serbia to anticipate 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence by revitalising its relationship with external 
supporters, amongst its influential partner: Russia. In 2007-2008, Serbia and Russia 
exchanged official visits at the highest level up to four times a year, and Serbia and 
Russia’s Foreign Ministers met at least twice a year. Foreign policy coordination was, 
obviously, at the agenda of these meetings. In February 2008, Russia’s President, 
Vladimir Putin, warned that recognition of Kosovo’s independence would open up a 
Pandora’s Box and fan the flames of irredentism833. Russia declared its unconditional 
support for Serbia regarding the Kosovo issue834, and behind closed doors, helped the 
Serbs lobbying against Kosovo recognition, e.g. in the Arab world835. In the same 
time, Serbia increasingly objected to align itself with EU positions criticising 
Russia836, with the expectation that this deviation would eventually pay off. The 
                                                 
829 UNGA resolutions R/63/245 and R64/238. 
830E.g. in the OSCE, from 2008 to 2011: PC.DEL/1059/08, PC.DEL/77/10, PC.DEL/104/10, 
PC.DEL/257/10, PC.DEL/458/10, PC.DEL/796/10, PC.DEL/179/11, PC.DEL/180/11, PC.DEL/616/11, 
PC.DEL/1179/10 
831 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the Osce. 
Vienna, 28/04/2011; Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of Albania to the 
International Organisations in Vienna. Vienna, 29/04/2011; Interview with an Official from the 
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Serbia to the Osce in Vienna. Vienna, 17/10/2011; Interview 
with an Official from the Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia, Political Section. 
Belgrade, 16/09/2011; Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Serbia, Directorate General for the European Union. Belgrade, 12/09/2011; Interview with an Official 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Directorate General for Multilateral 
Cooperation. Belgrade, 13/09/2011; Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of Georgia 
to the Osce in Vienna. Vienna, 19/04/2011 
832 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Directorate 
General for the European Union. Belgrade, 12/09/2011 
833 Russia’s President Putin declared: “The Kosovo precedent is a terrifying precedent. […] And it, 
without a doubt, will bring on itself an entire chain of unforeseen consequences”, Associated Press. 
22.2.2008. ‘Putin Warns West over Kosovo Dispute.’ 
834 See for instance Medvedev’s declaration of 29 May 2009: “we intend to continue to coordinate our 
foreign policy moves in the future [with Serbia], including the ones related to the solving of the issue 
with Kosovo”. Novonite. 29.05.2009. ‘Medvedev: Serbia Is Russia's Key Partner in Southeast Europe.’ 
835 Balkan Insight. 30.11.2010. ‘Wikileaks Show Medvedev Lobbied against Kosovo Recognition.’ 
836 In the UNGA, Serbia joined Russia on an increasing number of resolutions, which the EU opposed 
(e.g. on the use and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons); in the OSCE, Serbia did not join EU 
statements on elections in Russia (PC.DEL/1065/07, PC.DEL/66/08, PC.DEL/181/08), or restrictions 
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occasions for Serbia to support Russia against the EU, and thereby reciprocate 
Russia’s support against Kosovo, became inconveniently numerous in 2008-2009. 
The outbreak of the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, which Moscow contestably 
linked to the “Kosovo precedent”837, became a matter of concern in the OSCE. The 
EU accordingly issued a series of statements (about 30 in 2008-2009) targeting the 
role of Russia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but Serbia, relying on Russia’s support 
over the Kosovo issue, did not align itself with any of these statements838. In a word, 
the congruence of two factors fostered Serbia’s diplomatic distancing from the EU 
between 2007 and 2009: 1) Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008, 
against which Serbia gained diplomatic support from Russia (whereas the EU 
remained divided on the issue); and 2) Russia’s foreign policy in the Caucasus, which 
aroused in the EU an acute ire, which Serbia could not openly share lest it loosed 
Russia’s support on the Kosovo issue.  
 
3.1.4.4.7. Existence of domaines réservés 
 
Foreign policy convergence comes to a halt with states’ domaines réservés. When the 
EU explicitly targets Macedonia, Serbia or Kosovo in its positions, then non-
alignment becomes the rule. This is the case, for instance, when the EU issues a 
statement in the OSCE on the work of the OSCE mission in Skopje839, on elections in 
Macedonia840, or in response to a statement made by a leader from Macedonia in 
OSCE841. This is similarly the case, when the EU issues a statement on the work of 
the OSCE mission in Belgrade 842, on Serbian politics and elections in Serbia843 or in 
response to a statement made by a leader from Serbia in OSCE844. When the EU 
addresses such issues, then it does not always invite Serbia or Macedonia to align 
themselves with its statement, as  
 
“it obvious they will express a national position on the topic.” 845 
 
And indeed, Serbia and Macedonia’s diplomats consider that responding to statements 
targeting their own country is an incontrovertible part of their job –it is a domaine 
                                                                                                                                            
on different kinds of freedom in Russia, including of the press (e.g. PC.DEL/73/07, PC.DEL/915/07, 
PC.DEL/722/08/Rev.1, PC.DEL/1081/08, PC.DEL/722/08/Rev.1, PC.DEL/44/09, PC.DEL/681/09, 
PC.DEL/231/09/Rev.1, PC.DEL/526/09, PC.DEL/848/09, PC.DEL/42/11, PC.DEL/77/11/Rev.1). 
837 The Economist. 28.8.2008. ‘South Ossetia Is Not Kosovo.’ 
838 In 2008 and 2009 alone, PC.DEL/209/08, PC.DEL/324/08, PC.DEL/348/08, FSC-PC.DEL/29/08, 
PC.DEL/605/08; PC.DEL/620/08, PC.DEL/712/08, PC.DEL/605/08, PC.DEL/918/08, 
PC.DEL/1057/08, PC.DEL/15/09, PC.DEL/16/09, PC.DEL/47/09, PC.DEL/80/09, PC.DEL/102/09, 
PC.DEL/91/09, FSC-PC.DEL/16/09, PC.DEL/107/09/Rev.1, PC.DEL/219/09, PC.DEL/260/09, 
FSC.DEL/93/09, PC.DEL/303/09, PC.DEL/345/09, PC.DEL/382/09, FSC-PC.DEL/19/09, 
PC.DEL/533/09, PC.DEL/649/09, PC.DEL/678/09, PC.DEL/1006/09.  
839 E.g. PC.DEL/1056/05, PC.DEL/337/06, PC.DEL/329/07, PC.DEL/298/08, PC.DEL/636/09 
840 E.g. PC.DEL/441/08/Rev.1, PC.DEL/492/08. 
841 E.g. PC.DEL/498/10. 
842 E.g. PC.DEL/166/06, PC.DEL/288/07, PC.DEL/146/08/Rev, PC.DEL/121/09, PC.DEL/130/10, 
PC.DEL/178/11. 
843 E.g. PC.DEL/51/07, PC.DEL/351/08 PC.DEL/148/08/Rev.1, PC.DEL/373/08. 
844 E.g. PC.DEL/839/05, PC.DEL/429/06, PC.DEL/742/07, PC.DEL/140/08, PC.DEL/744/08/Rev.1, 
FSC.DEL/76/11, PC.DEL/595/10. 
845 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Representation of Belgium to the Osce. Vienna, 
26/04/2011 
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réservé, which cannot be substituted by alignment846. Often, non-alignment is not 
used to express dissenting views on the situation. It is rather a matter of national 
sovereignty.  
 
Serbia’s claim for this understandable “right of reply”, however, goes beyond the 
three types of issues listed above (OSCE reports, elections, ministerial address). It 
also applies to ICTY cooperation847, and, above all, to EU statements on Kosovo. 
Serbia’s refusal to align itself with the EU on statements dealing with Kosovo is 
understandable, since Serbia considers Kosovo as part of its territory, and thus as 
belonging to its domaines réservés. Serbia is therefore keen on speaking on its 
national capacity (even though this implies non-alignment) on issues brought in front 
of the OSCE concerning the Kosovo status848, Kosovo politics849, and the work of the 
OSCE mission in Pristina850.  
 
3.1.5. Summary of the findings 
 
What do we learn from this research on Serbia and Macedonia’s multilateral 
diplomacy? In phenomenal terms, first, Europeanisation ensues through convergent 
changes in Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy behaviour. In the UNGA and 
OSCE, its observable manifestation is alignment with EU positions, whether in voting 
or declaration. Alignment occurs as a result of foreign policy coordination. In practice, 
it follows rules that are not identical for Serbia and Macedonia. Serbia, for instance, is 
not invited to EU information meetings, and it does not take decisions on alignment 
locally, in New York or Vienna, unlike Macedonia.  
 
The analysis of Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy behaviour in the UNGA and 
OSCE shows that both countries align themselves with EU positions at a remarkable 
frequency. But the Europeanisation of their multilateral diplomacy is not an 
irreversible phenomenon. After coming very close to the EU in the early 2000s, 
Serbia changed the course of its diplomacy and started around 2007 to distance itself 
from the EU. It aligned itself less frequently with EU voting preferences in the UNGA, 
and failed to join an increasing number of EU statements in the OSCE. Serbia’s dis-
alignment, interestingly, parallelled its rapprochement with Russia’s preferences.  
 
The research does not provide for a single, straightforward explanation for 
Europeanisation and its subtleties. It contends, instead, that the phenomenon is 
multifaceted. To start with, alignment can be understood as an obligation, imposed by 
the EU in the framework of its CFSP conditionality regime, and calling for political 
compliance. Although this facet of Europeanisation concerns both Serbia and 
Macedonia, notable differences have been highlighted, which may explain why Serbia 
and Macedonia’s diplomacy did not follow the same course vis-à-vis the EU. First, 
Macedonia started to coordinate its foreign policy with the EU at least five years 
                                                 
846 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of Macedonia to the International 
Organisations in Vienna. Vienna, 06/03/2012; Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission 
of Serbia to the International Organisations in Vienna. Vienna, 06/03/2012 
847 E.g. PC.DEL/831/06, PC.DEL/477/11. 
848 PC.DEL/300/06, PC.DEL/1081/06, PC.DEL/136/07, MC.DEL/73/07. 
849 PC.DEL/1135/07, PC.DEL/752/10/Rev.1. 
850 PC.DEL/144/07, PC.DEL/796/07, PC.DEL/67/08, PC.DEL/269/08, PC.DEL/721/08, 
PC.DEL/79/09, PC.DEL/706/09, PC.DEL/66/10, PC.DEL/112/11, PC.DEL/866/10. 
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before Serbia. It was first given obligations (to communicate and converge) and then 
rights (to align in multilateral fora). The time and the timing in this process are 
different for Serbia, which first received the right and only then the obligation to align. 
In the early 2000s, Serbia, as a result, was granted a right without duty attached, 
which may have fostered its sudden convergence towards EU preferences. Second, 
the analysis shows that the Commission’s follow-up of Serbia and Macedonia’s 
compliance with their obligation has been more thorough for the latter than the former. 
The Commission only started to vet Serbia’s alignments in the OSCE and UNGA in 
2010, i.e. six years after Macedonia. Third, whereas Macedonia understands political 
compliance with the CFSP acquis as unconditional, Serbia cautiously qualifies its 
position with a safeguard clause. Given the uncertainty of the reward, which 
alignment with the EU offers, Serbia is committed to comply with the CFSP acquis, 
provided EU positions do not conflict with its national interest. These observations 
show that political compliance plays a different role in Serbia and Macedonia’s 
foreign policy convergence towards the EU. Its foundations are deeper in the case of 
Macedonia, and the mechanism is accepted with less restraint.  
 
Then, the analysis showed that alignment should be understood as an appropriate 
behaviour in the light of specific dispositions. First, it is a response to foreign policy 
objectives. Both Serbia and Macedonia share as strategic priority their integration in 
the EU. This predisposes them to alignment with EU positions. But this EU 
integration objective, in Serbia’s case, coexists with potentially conflicting interests 
(e.g. the defence of Kosovo). This coexistence undermines the internalisation of EU 
norms, which cannot be given supremacy, and it therefore weakens Serbia’s 
dispositions to align with EU positions. Alignment, then, is a means to participate in 
European foreign policy. The analysis showed indeed that Macedonia not only 
expresses its passive adherence to EU norms; it asserts that it shares the EU’s foreign 
policy objectives as well. This coalescence of European and national foreign policy 
objectives also affects Serbia, but to a lesser extent, given the fact that Serbia’s 
foreign policy agenda upholds key priorities defined in individualistic rather than 
collective terms. Finally, the analysis showed that alignment, in Macedonia’s case, is 
a norm that barely admits any exception, in the case of Serbia, is also a norm, but one 
which occasionally deserves transgression. The analysis of these dispositions to align 
sheds light on the internalisation of EU norms in Serbia and Macedonia. In the past 
few years, this internalisation has been more thorough in Macedonia than in Serbia, 
which may help understanding why foreign policy convergence has been more 
resilient in the case of Macedonia.  
 
The analysis showed that alignment can also be explained through specific motives. 
Alignment, first, is a means to demonstrate one’s Europeanness. But here again, 
Macedonia goes further than Serbia. Not only do Macedonian foreign policy actors 
believe in the idea of proving to the EU one’s Europeanness through alignment; they 
also strive for showing to the outer world that there is a “European way of doing 
things”, of which they are fully part. Alignment may finally be a response to scarce 
resources and poor international visibility, as it allows Macedonia to expand its 
foreign policy scope at minimal costs. However, the same limitations seem to impact 
on Serbia’s diplomacy in an opposite manner. Whereas resource scarcity arouses 
motives for alignment in Macedonia, it rather acts as a constraint for Serbia. 
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The research finally examined the factors negatively impacting on Europeanisation, 
starting from those merely constraining Europeanisation and ending with those 
radically impeding it. It found that the lack of consistency stemming from rotating 
personnel in Serbia and Macedonia’s MFA and in the EU’s Presidency increases the 
propensity of non-alignment. Second, the lack of cohesion among EU member states 
in the UNGA and OSCE weakens the effectiveness of the EU’s alignment mechanism 
by softening Macedonia and above all Serbia’s commitment to alignment. When the 
EU lacks of cohesion on certain issues, then Serbia is tempted to lend an ear to states 
in the EU or outside the EU, whose position on other issues may be supportive of its 
national interests (e.g. on Kosovo). Macedonia, by contrast, retains a “community 
reflex” urging it to consult with EU member states, even though there is no unanimity 
position. Third, the lack of Serbia and Macedonia’s involvement in the EU’s foreign 
policymaking process puts a strain on Serbia and Macedonia’s endogenous will to 
align with EU statements. Indeed, the alignment mechanism is built on a very 
asymmetrical basis, which creates frustrations, especially on the Serbian side, since 
Serbia is even less involved than Macedonia. Fourth, Serbia and Macedonia face time 
constraints in the operation of the alignment mechanism, EU positions are sometimes 
communicated at the last moment. This is especially relevant for Serbia’s delegates, 
which, as a rule, shall request instructions from Belgrade. Whereas Macedonia’s 
diplomacy has adapted to this constraint by empowering its heads of mission and de-
concentrating its foreign policy decision loci, Serbia’s representatives continue to 
view most of European foreign policy as tackling sensitive issues requiring 
instructions from the capital. Tight deadlines therefore constrain Serbia’s alignment in 
a more potent way. Fifth, the introduction of the practice of exclusive alignment in the 
OSCE has seriously constrained Serbia and Macedonia’s willingness to align 
themselves with EU positions on certain issues, especially with those EU statements 
that have been watered-down by weak consensus or fail to capture the subtleties of 
Western Balkan politics. According to Serbian diplomats, this practice, which has 
been reinforced in the past few years, also harms the sovereign equality principle 
underpinning multilateral diplomacy. Serbia’s rising non-alignment in the OSCE after 
2007 can be understood in this context as a sign of protest. Sixth, Serbia and 
Macedonia’s non-alignment is often rooted in the inconvenient necessity to 
reciprocate diplomatic support. The more dependent one country is on the EU, the 
less political leverage third actors have on it, and, as a consequence, the less likely 
non-alignment is. Macedonia, for instance, rarely supports third countries by not 
aligning with the EU, because Macedonia has no strategic need to rely on the support 
of external partners in order to pursue its national priorities. Serbia, by contrast, is 
more amenable to support third countries whose approaches conflict with EU 
positions, when their diplomatic support is necessary to pursue its national priorities. 
Serbia’s disapproval of the EU’s critique against Iran, Belarus, Myanmar and above 
all Russia should be understood in this context, as a reciprocation of the supports 
conferred by these states upon Serbia with regards to Kosovo and, to a lesser extent, 
cooperation with the Non-Aligned Movement. In particular, the congruence of two 
factors fostered Serbia’s diplomatic distancing from the EU between 2007 and 2009: 
1) Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008, against which Serbia 
gained diplomatic support from Russia (whereas the EU remained divided on the 
issue); and 2) Russia’s foreign policy in the Caucasus, which aroused an acute ire in 
the EU, which Serbia could not openly share lest it loosed Russia’s support on the 
Kosovo issue. Seventh, the existence of domaines réservés occasionally precludes 
alignment. Finally, when the EU explicitly targets Macedonia or Serbia in its 
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positions, then non-alignment becomes the rule. But since Serbia considers Kosovo as 
part of its territory, and thus as belonging to its domaines réservés, it also 
systematically declines alignment when the EU expresses a position on Kosovo.  
 
3.2. Changes in Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy organisation 
 
This section examines some aspects of the actor and process dimensions of Serbia and 
Macedonia’s foreign policy. It explores Serbia and Macedonia’s 1) changing 
administrative capacities for inter-sectoral coordination; 2) changing administrative 
capacities for intra-sectoral coordination; 3) changing administrative capacities for 
outreach coordination; 4) extension of diplomatic networks and 5) changing technical 
capacities. It infers, whenever possible, Europeanisation from an enduring need for 
coordination; finds a deceptive case of pseudo-Europeanisation; and analyses the 
motives, causes and reasons that best account for the phenomena. It should be kept in 
mind, here, that Serbia and Macedonia did not engage in reforming their foreign 
policy organisations with the same heritage. Unlike Macedonia, which had to create 
its foreign policy apparatus from scratch in the 1990s, Serbia could rely on a long 
diplomatic tradition inherited from the SFRY, affording larger resources and expertise. 
The analysis will take into account this important difference. 
 
3.2.1. Building administrative capacities for inter-sectoral coordination 
 
As their cooperation with the EU intensified in a number of policy fields, Serbia and 
Macedonia started to strengthen their administrative capacities in the 2000s with the 
creation of horizontal bodies of inter-sectoral coordination. These were not designed 
to deal substantively with foreign policy (or any other policy-field specifically), but 
rather, to coordinate the work of domestic actors (in particular Ministries), and 
facilitate the adoption of the EU’s acquis. The CFSP being part of this acquis, these 
bodies supported the tightening of cross-level interactions between 
Serbia/Macedonia’s ministries (e.g. MFA) and foreign administrations (e.g. European 
Commission, EU member states’ MFAs).  
 
3.2.1.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
3.2.1.1.1. In Macedonia: the Secretariat for European Affairs 
 
Horizontal coordination, in Macedonia, is assumed by the Secretariat for European 
Affairs (SEA). Established in 2005 as an autonomous service of the Government of 
the Republic of Macedonia, it took over the activities that were previously performed 
by the Sector for European Integration of the General Secretariat of the Government. 
Directed by the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of European Affairs, the SEA is to  
 
“provide professional support and coordination in the work of state 
administration authorities and of other bodies and institutions in the light of 
preparing the Republic of Macedonia for EU membership”.851  
 
More specifically, the SEA monitors the implementation of the agreements concluded 
between Macedonia and the European Communities and their member states852. This 
                                                 
851 Secretariat for European Affairs. 'Organisation'. [accessed 21.03.2012]. 
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includes the parts of Macedonia’s Stabilisation and Association Agreement which 
concern political dialogue (i.e. Title II) 853  and the provisions of Macedonia’s 
European Partnership pertaining to “Regional and international cooperation”854. The 
SEA is furthermore in charge of the preparation of Macedonia’s annual National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), which specifically covers 
foreign policy issues (as part of the EU’s political criteria and as a specific chapter of 
Macedonia’s NPAAs, i.e. “chapter 31: foreign security and defence policy”). It is 
finally responsible for the implementation of the European training strategy for 
Macedonian civil servants, which includes MFA officials both as targeted trainees and 
potential trainers855.  
 
Before the creation of the SEA in 2005, these activities were assumed by the Sector 
for European Integration of the General Secretariat of the Government. Rather than 
being given new functions, the SEA thus emerged as a body entrusted with greater 
administrative (rather than functional) authority. Its creation, and acquisition of legal 
personality, strengthened Macedonia’s capacity to coordinate the efforts of its 
national administrations in fulfilling a shared objective: EU integration856.  
 
3.2.1.1.2. In Serbia: the European Integration Office 
 
In Serbia, the inter-sectoral coordination of European affairs is assumed the Serbian 
European Integration Office (SEIO). Established in March 2004 as an autonomous 
body under the direct authority of the Serbian Government and the responsibility of 
the Deputy Prime Minister, the SEIO took over the activities that were previously 
performed by the Sector for European Integrations in Serbia’s Ministry for 
International Economic Relations857. At the federal level, another body existed yet: 
the European Integration Office of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (EIO-FRY) 
from 2001 to 2003, and of Serbia-Montenegro (EIO-SCG) from 2003 to 2004. 
Established as a body of the federal Council of Ministers in November 2001, the EIO-
FRY/SCG was in fact placed under the authority of the federal Ministry for 
International Economic Relations. It was tasked with the “coordination of SAp-related 
activities, in cooperation with the ministries for international economic relations of 
the two member states [Serbia and Montenegro], and in direct communication with 
the relevant ministries at the level of the state union” 858 . However, with the 
introduction of the EU’s “twin-track” approach towards Serbia-Montenegro, most of 
the competences of the EIO-FRY/SCG pertaining to Serbia were later transferred at 
                                                                                                                                            
852 Secretariat for European Affairs. January 2008. ‘Strategic Plan for the Period 2006-2008.’ 
853 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States of the one part and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of the other part. 26 March 
2001. 
854 European Commission. 3 March 2004. ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the Principles, Priorities, 
and Conditions Contained in the European Partnership with the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.’ 
855 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. 30 May 2000. ‘EU Training Strategy for Macedonian 
Civil Servants.’ 
856 Republic of Macedonia. 2005. ‘Answers of the Republic of Macedonia to the EU Questionnaire 
Delivered by the European Commission.’ 
857 Serbian European Integration Office. 2005. ‘Presentation Booklet.’ 
858 European Integration Office of Serbia and Montenegro. 'Serbia and Montenegro European 
Integration Office'. [accessed 22.3.2011]. 
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the republic’s level, i.e. to Serbia’s SEIO859. Emptied from its competences, the EIO-
FRY/SCG soon became obsolete and was swept under the carpet.  
 
As Serbia developed its relationship with the EU, the SEIO witnessed a considerable 
surge in the number of experts it employed: from 8 employees in 2004 to 80 in 2011, 
and expectedly even more in 2012-2014860. This is because it was given the task to 
monitor the inter-sectoral coordination of the negotiations that led to the conclusion of 
Serbia’s SAA in 2008861; to monitor the implementation of Serbia’s 2004 European 
Partnership, which included provisions on regional cooperation862; and from 2008, to 
coordinate the implementation of the SAA, including with regards to the obligations 
falling under political dialogue (title II)863. The SEIO is now also involved in the 
annual preparation of Serbia’s National Programme for the Integration with the EU 
(NPI), formerly known as Action Plan for the Implementation of the European 
Partnership Priorities, or Action Plan for the fulfilment of priorities under the EC 
progress report (in 2010). These national documents provide a detailed overview of 
the reforms and activities implemented by Serbia’s authorities in order to accelerate 
the integration of the country in the EU. They cover Serbia’s efforts at adopting the 
EU’s acquis, including in foreign policy matters. One chapter is dedicated to the 
adoption of the EU’s political criteria (including regional cooperation and 
international obligations), and another chapter covers CFSP acquis (chapter 31). In 
preparing these chapters, the SEIO (just as the SEA in Macedonia) heavily relies on 
the expertise of its contact points within the relevant ministries, especially the MFA864. 
Finally, the SEIO is actively involved in the provision of in-service training courses 
on European integration 865 . Their target group includes civil servants from the 
MFA866. 
 
3.2.1.1.3. Similarities and differences 
 
All in all, the SEIO’s functions are quite similar with Macedonia’s SEA. Both are 
located at the cross-sectoral interface between the domestic and the European levels. 
Their primary mission is to coordinate the negotiations of their country with respect 
European integration, to monitor the implementation of European agreements, to 
facilitate the adoption of the EU’s acquis, and to organise training courses for civil 
servants. They do not deal substantively with foreign policy issues or foreign policy 
making; but foreign policy being part of the EU’s acquis, they do assume a 
coordinative function in this field.  
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The main difference between the SEA and the SEIO is found in their organisational 
history. Both were created in the mid 2000s, but whereas the SEA emerged as an 
upgraded version of a European unit of the Government’s Secretariat, the SEIO was 
created as an offspring of the MFA, which took over the responsibilities of its awry 
federal peer. Also, the context of their creation differs since the SEA emerged from 
Macedonia’s gaining the status of EU candidate, whereas the SEIO was established as 
it became clear that the EU integration would no longer be treated at the state union’s 
level. 
 
3.2.1.2. Inferring Europeanisation 
 
The establishment of Macedonia’s SEA, and Serbia’s SEIO, both entrusted with the 
mission of coordinating their country’s integration into the EU, casts little doubt on 
the European teleology of such gesture. It also renders the inference of 
Europeanisation all but commonsensical. It was not indeed by chance that the SEA 
was created in 2005, and thereafter strengthened, but in “response to the increased 
needs arising from the intensified integration process of the Republic of Macedonia in 
the EU, for the purpose of the strategic objective for EU membership”867. And the 
emergence of the SEIO in Serbian organisational landscape is no coincidence either: it 
responded to the prioritisation of the EU “on the top the Serbia’ political agenda” 
following the overthrow of Milošević868.  
 
As a matter of fact, the very raison d’être of these two bodies precisely lies in the 
intensification of cross-level interactions between EU and Serbia/Macedonia’s actors, 
including in the field of foreign policy. The SEIO and SEA count among the main 
partners of EU institutions in Serbia/Macedonia, may it be the European Commission 
in Brussels, the delegation of the EU in Belgrade/Skopje or the embassies of EU 
member states in Belgrade/Skopje. And domestically, these have far-reaching 
connections in most of the line Ministries, which usually count an EU Sector or EU 
department in their organisation, including, of course, in the MFA. The inductive 
argument that their capacity-building is a manifestation of Europeanisation is 
therefore most compelling.  
 
3.2.1.3. Argumentative analysis 
 
3.2.1.3.1. Structural analysis  
 
The strengthening of Serbia and Macedonia’s SEIO/SEA administrative capacities 
cannot be convincingly explained by structural factors, located at the EU level, and 
conceived of as pre-conditions for Serbia/Macedonia’s accession in the EU. Although 
these coordinative bodies play a (coordinative, rather than substantive) role vis-à-vis 
the adoption of the CFSP acquis, their functioning is barely monitored by the EU’s 
conditionality regime. The result is a certain latitude left to Serbia and Macedonia’s 
governments as for the way they shall coordinate the European integration process in 
their country. The weakness of structural lineage in this field is confirmed on the 
ground by leading servants in Serbia’s SEIO and Macedonia’s SEA. For their 
                                                 
867 Secretariat for European Affairs. 'Organisation'. [accessed 21.03.2012]. 
868 Interview with an Official from the European Integration Office, Government of the Republic of 
Serbia. Belgrade, 14/09/2011 
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institution, and a fortiori in foreign policy matters, capacity-building is not a matter of 
compliance with EU demands. As reported by an SEA official,  
 
“the EU follows the coordination process, but it is not imposing a model to 
be followed”.869 
 
Or, similarly, as expressed by his counterpart of the SEIO,  
 
“the EU supported our quest, but did not provide the solution per se”.870 
 
When the EU did provide guidelines in this respect (i.e. rarely), those remained 
general. For one, in its 2006 European Partnership, the EU addressed the need for 
Serbia to “strengthen the European integration structures at all levels […] and 
improve cooperation among them” 871 . In the second half of the 2000s, the 
administrative capacities of the SEIO were accordingly strengthened: from 8 
employees in 2004 to 80 in 2011872. In 2008, the EU already acknowledged this 
development, as it did not again insist in its European Partnership on improving inter-
ministerial cooperation873. However, speaking of causality here would be most daring, 
as this re-staffing also took place in a context of EU-Serbia rapprochement. With the 
negotiations on the SAA, which resumed in 2007 after their one-year interruption for 
lack of cooperation with the ICTY, Serbia’s SEIO faced a situation in which  
 
“the relations between Serbia and the EU were intensifying and diversifying, 
in accordance [with Serbia’s strategic objective of joining the EU]”.874 
 
Adapting the SEIO’s capacities to this new reality, then, had little to do with 
complying with intrinsically vague conditions stipulated in the EU’s European 
Partnership. It primarily responded to dispositions that favoured the prioritisation of 
capacity-building with regards to EU integration. 
 
This is not to say that structural factors did not play any role at all in the creation and 
strengthening of horizontal coordinative capacities in CFSP matters. These have 
affected above all Serbia’s SEIO, which was created at the republic level in 2004 and 
considerably strengthened in 2006, following the structural obsolescence of its federal 
counterpart, the EIO-FRY/SCG. With the transformation in 2003 of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia into a state union, a change was introduced in the 
constitutional charter of the new state: the right, upon the expiry of a 3-year period, to 
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break away from the state union875. As it became clear for EIO-FRY/SCG’s leading 
officials that “there was no Serbia and Montenegro” to be negotiated for876, and that 
Serbia-Montenegro was on the brink of dissolution, its director resigned in August 
2004, stressing the need to re-organise, at the republic level, the administrative bodies 
responsible for horizontal coordination. Meanwhile, a group of young officials started 
to pose the building block of the SEIO at the republic level877. They soon received the 
implicit consent of the EU, which first, recognised the “structural weaknesses” of the 
federal EIO-SCG, especially with regards to “its formal status and competences”878, 
and then introduced its twin-track approach in 2004 (dissociating Serbia and 
Macedonia’s integration processes).  
 
As it became clear for nearly all that the dissolution of the state union was a 
countdown, the SEIO started to act as coordinative body, first in parallel with the state 
union’s EIO-SCG, and, from 2006, as sole interface. It is then because of the 
anticipated dissolution of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro that the SEIO 
took over the functions of its federal predecessor. This does constitute a cause of 
organisational change; but not a cause of Europeanisation. At best, the dissolution of 
Serbia-Montenegro acted as an intervening variable, accelerating the strengthening of 
the Serbia’s EIO, by facilitating the effective reallocation of coordinative resources at 
the republic level, where the twin-track process was operative, rather than at the 
federal level, where tensions between Serbia and Montenegro were mounting.  
 
3.2.1.3.2. Dispositional analysis  
 
What primarily mattered in the decision to strengthen these administrative capacities 
were dispositions that guided Serbia and Macedonia’s policy-makers in favour of 
speeding up the EU integration process. There is, indeed, a correspondence between 
the intensification of the relations between the EU and Serbia/Macedonia on the one 
side, and the strengthening of their SEA/SEIO on the other side.  
 
Macedonia’s SEA was created in 2005, upon the European Council’s decision to 
grant the country EU candidate country status. Expectations were, at that time, that 
the country would start negotiating its accession treaty in 2006, and become EU 
member state by 2010 879 . Since it was deprived of legal capacity and lacked 
administrative resources, the Sector for European Integration of the General 
Secretariat of the Government, which was in charge of inter-sectoral coordination 
before the SEA, had to be reformed, in order to meet the challenges posed by the in-
depth 35-chapter long process of negotiation. For comparison, SAA negotiations 
counted only a few chapters (including regional and international cooperation, but 
excluding CFSP). The creation of the SEA responded to this challenge. In its 2004 
National Strategy for European Integration, the Government stressed that  
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“national coordination and cooperation between the line ministries and other 
relevant institutions needs to be ensured”.880  
 
This task was readily assumed by Macedonia’s deputy Prime Minister for European 
integration at that time, Radmila Šekerinska, who also became the SEA’s first 
executive director. Building on resources that already existed in the General 
Secretariat of the Government, the new SEA was established in 2005 as the 
autonomous entity ready to coordinate EU accession talks. Despite the stalling of the 
process ever since, the SEA continued to strengthen its administrative capacities, in 
the (albeit self-grown) hope that the EU would therewith perceive Macedonia’s 
determination to enter the EU. As stated by an SEA official,  
 
“Macedonia’s integration is blocked, but our plan to join the EU is not. We 
need to be ready, to have the infrastructures ready and the staff prepared”.881 
 
Macedonian key actors’ dispositions, interestingly, differ here from the structural 
conditions imposed by the EU. They suggest organisational changes in order to 
increase the preparedness of the country to join the EU, despite the integration 
stalemate. They call for anticipation, and not so much for adaptation.  
 
There is, similarly, a correspondence between the intensification of the relations 
between the EU and Serbia on the one side, and the strengthening of Serbia’s 
administrative capacities for inter-sectoral coordination on the other side. Serbia’s 
SEIO was indeed established in 2004 upon the European Commission’s decision in 
October 2004 to re-launch the SAA Feasibility Report, following the twin-track 
approach882. In 2005, SAA negotiations were launched between Serbia-Montenegro 
and the EU, but most of these were carried out at the republic level, in accordance 
with the twin-track approach. Strengthening the SEIO’s administrative capacities soon 
emerged as a necessity for Serbian policy-makers, should the pace of these 
negotiations be maintained.  
 
“We work and negotiate with the EU, but it is our objective, our strategy to 
join the EU. So, it s up to us to set the pace and be ready”.883 
 
With Serbia’s successful bid for EU candidacy in 2012, and the prospects of starting 
accession talks, this concern became relevant again –hence the current plans for 
increasing the SEIO staff884. Here again, one should rather speak of anticipation, and 
not so much of adaptation. 
 
However, unlike Macedonia’s SEA, which had an organisational predecessor, 
Serbia’s SEIO had to be created from scratch. Before the 2004 twin-track approach, 
the EU did not directly negotiate with Serbia, since European affairs were dealt with 
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at the federal level, and there was therefore no need for developing administrative 
capacities at the republic level in the form of a SEIO. With the establishment of the 
SEIO, resources had then to be created, and the most logical source of expertise in 
European affairs, which Serbia could use without infuriate the federal institutions, 
were thus located in its MFA-like Ministry of foreign economic relations. Part of the 
expertise on EU matters had anyway started to migrate from the federal to the 
republic level, in anticipation of the forthcoming dissolution885. Hence the differences 
in the SEIO and SEA’s organisational history.  
 
Of course, this correspondence between the intensification of EU relations and 
administrative capacity-building in the SEIO/SEA does not amount to causation. But 
establishing causation is not the purpose of dispositional analysis either. What this 
section shows is the constitutive effect the institutional rapprochement between the 
EU and Serbia/Macedonia has had on the two countries’ administrative capacity for 
inter-sectoral coordination, and vice-versa. It is the dispositions of Serbia and 
Macedonia’s policy-makers towards the EU, focusing on speeding up the integration 
process, that nurtured the belief that administrative capacities had to be strengthened. 
Here, the underlying mechanism of Europeanisation is not political compliance; it is 
an anticipatory approach, prioritising EU accession as strategic objective.  
 
In Serbia, the realisation of this objective was facilitated by the result of domestic 
elections. In 2004, Boris Tadić was elected as President of the Republic of Serbia on 
the promise to take his country closer to the EU886. It was at that time, “with the 
newly incoming government” that the decision to establish the SEIO “close to the 
Prime Minister” was taken887. The re-election of Tadić in 2008, against nationalist 
forces, was widely saluted in European circles888. And the victory of his “For a 
European Serbia” coalition in the May 2008 legislative elections eventually released 
the tensions, which had poisoned his governing coalition since 2004. Even though the 
2004 and 2008 electoral campaigns were little, if not at all, concerned by 
administrative capacity-building per se, the victory of political forces that supported 
the speeding up of the accession process certainly strengthened Serbia’s dispositions 
to enhance its administrative capacities in EU affairs.  
 
Another factor that impacted on capacity-building is the question of sheer resources. 
In 2010 and 2011, Macedonia’s SEA, for instance, suspended the publication in 
English of its NPAA documents for budgetary restrictions. As explained by an official 
from the SEA,  
 
“the world financial crisis [has] affected every aspect of financial and 
economic performance and we [SEA] as an institution have to be very careful 
and restrictive with the budget spending. Since the NPAA document absorbs 
significant human capacities and financial means for translation, proof 
reading, editing etc. we were not able this time to provide an English 
version”.889 
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The implications of this suspension were limited, though. NPAAs continued to be 
elaborated in the official language of the country, and could therefore still be 
circulated among Macedonia’s line Ministries following the publication of the EC 
reports890. On the other side, in Serbia, the creation of the SEIO received the financial 
support of the EU, through the European Agency for Reconstruction inter alia. 
Serbia’s could therewith easily materialise its favourable dispositions towards 
European integration:  
 
“there was an instrument of financial support that enabled us to travel 
around and examine the different approaches, to see how things are 
organised in other countries”.891 
 
Both factors (attitude of the governing forces towards European integration and 
availability of financial resources) have affected the process of administrative 
capacity-building. But they did not drive this process, in the extent that 
Serbia/Macedonia’s dispositions towards the intensification of EU relations did. They 
are therefore better seen as intervening variables.  
 
3.2.1.3.3. Intentional analysis 
 
Serbia’s SEIO and Macedonia’s SEA have both been created as governmental 
agencies. But the choice of this institutional design (centrally but autonomously 
situated) was not evident. Foreign policy actors in Serbia and Macedonia solved this 
issue by studying the experiences of their peers. Thus, prior to the establishment of 
the SEIO, an official from Serbia’s SEIO concedes that  
 
“we explored in each of EU candidate countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe what they were doing”.892 
 
The same approach was followed by Macedonia, according to an official of the SEA:  
 
“we made some screening, analyses of the models that were used”.893  
 
This screening primarily occurred at the bilateral level, although the EU, through its 
financial support, facilitated the process. The idea was not to “copy” a model, but 
rather to learn how others did, instead of “reinventing the wheel”.  
 
Serbia and Macedonia proceeded to the identification of different options. Serbian 
actors, for instance, considered entrusting the MFA with the horizontal coordination 
of the European integration process. This seemed logical on the face of it, since most 
of the resources (including expertise) on EU matters at the republic level were 
concentrated in the MFA. But given the cross-sectoral nature of the EU’s acquis, this 
solution would have generated a “vacuum effect”, depriving all the other ministries 
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from their EU-literate personnel 894 . This vacuum effect run against Serbian 
policymakers’ intentions, and the plan was therefore dropped. Macedonia considered 
likewise creating a distinct “Ministry for European integration”, following the 2000-
2005 short-lived Croatian model.895 But the result was expected to be the same as 
internalising European affairs within the MFA, and the plan therefore did not take 
root.  
 
Serbia and Macedonia, interestingly, shared the same intentions with respect to the 
institutional design of their horizontal coordination body, and they both emulated the 
Slovenian experience. According to a Serbian official,  
 
“We came to the conclusion that the best prepared were Slovenia and the 
Baltic states, because they all had a centrally positioned coordination unit 
within the central government”.896 
 
And according to a Macedonian official, 
 
“We decided to use the Slovenian model, after we had some twinning with 
Slovenia in order to build the capacity of the SEA”.897 
 
This Slovenian model was epitomised by the Government Office for European Affairs, 
a centrally positioned agency of Slovenia’s Government created in 1997898. Of course, 
the fact that Macedonia and Slovenia had developed a range of bilateral agreements 
fostering technical cooperation already by the end of the 1990s, the regular exchange 
of experts, and the willingness of Slovenia to “help so that they do not the same 
mistakes as we did” 899 , facilitated this experiential learning process. As did the 
common history shared by Slovenia, Serbia and Macedonia, which “naturally brings 
similarities”900. More recently (in 2011), Serbia’s SEIO also received the assistance of 
Croatia in translation matters. It was offered a (raw) translated version of the EU’s 
acquis (a million euro-worth document)901.  
 
To sum up, in creating their SEIO/SEA, Serbia and Macedonia’s actors intended to 
draw from foreign models’ experiences in that matter. The engagement at the bilateral 
level of EU candidates or EU member states side by side with Serbia/Macedonia 
certainly facilitated the process.  
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3.2.2. Building administrative capacities for intra-sectoral coordination 
 
3.2.2.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
In addition to the inter-sectoral SEA and SEIO, vertical coordination bodies have 
been created within Serbia and Macedonia’s ministries in order to coordinate the 
process of European integration in substantive policy fields. These are the 
SEA/SEIO’s contact points in line ministries, endowed with policy-specific expertise. 
In the MFA and Ministry of Defence (MoD), these bodies deal extensively with 
Serbia/Macedonia’s participation in European foreign policy and adaptation to the 
CFSP acquis. Functionally specialised, they are directly involved in foreign policy 
processes, as technicians operating at the interface between European and domestic 
contexts.  
 
Within Macedonia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a Special Unit in charge of EU 
affairs was first established in 1992. This unit was upgraded in 1995 into Department 
for European integration (directed by a Head for European Affairs), and in 2005 into 
Directorate for European Union, headed by a State Counsellor placed under the direct 
authority of the Foreign Minister. This Directorate serves as contact point for the SEA 
in the MFA. A “key element in the chain of coordination of activities related to 
European integration”, it deals with substantive foreign policy issues 902 . Its 
responsibilities echo those of the SEA in foreign policy903: it coordinates, within the 
MFA, the implementation of the EU’s acquis in CFSP matters, and is involved in the 
training of civil servants from the MFA.  
 
Over the past 10 years, the internal organisation of this body has also been changed. 
As a Department (till 2005), its structure was composed of three units: the Contractual 
relations unit, which took over the monitoring of political dialogue with the EU; the 
European Union integration process unit, which was tasked with drafting national 
strategies to accelerate Macedonia’s accession process; and the European and regional 
cooperation unit, which dealt with the CFSP, the CSDP, the ENP and coordinated 
Macedonia’s participation in the Stability Pact 904 . The present structure of the 
Directorate for European Union differs from its forerunner in at least two respects. 
Instead of the Contractual relations unit, a Sector for political relations with the 
European Union was established in 2005, comprising a unit responsible for contacts 
with EU institutions, and another unit responsible for monitoring the implementation 
of substantive obligations. Likewise, instead of the European and regional cooperation 
unit, a Unit for CFSP was created in January 2006, in order to “enhance the 
coordination and monitoring of the implementation of the acquis in this area”905. In 
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2006, the CFSP Unit was first staffed with 3 officers906, but it grew to 5 in 2009907, 
and expectedly to 6 in 2012908 . The tasks that were previously assumed by the 
Department for European integration with respect to regional cooperation and 
Security and Defence were henceforth transferred to other sectors within the MFA (i.e. 
detached from the European integration Directorate). 
 
In the same period, a Unit for armament control was created in the MFA’s Directorate 
for political security cooperation and multilateral relations. Its purpose is to “monitor 
the implementation of the international regimes for arms control, non-proliferation 
and disarmament”, and a Unit for EU legislation was similarly established in the 
Directorate for international law909. In the MoD, the administrative capacity to deal 
with European affairs was strengthened in 2008 by the creation of an ESDP unit 
within a full-fledged Directorate for international cooperation910. 
 
Finally, by 2007, a Political Director for the EU and a European Correspondent were 
designated in the MFA911, although their formal appointment in this position is still 
expected912. The mission of the political director is to participate in the elaboration of 
foreign policy objectives, make proposals and analyses, and liaise with European 
counterparts in order to grasp and anticipate EU positions concerning sensitive 
foreign policy issues. The political director is assisted in her work by a European 
correspondent, who follows her country’s relations with EU institutions and some 
member states. The European correspondent also follows the internal development in 
European politics in order to assess their impact on her country’s accession prospects. 
 
The result of this 2005 MFA reform was the creation of highly specialised 
coordinative bodies within the MFA responsible for EU affairs, an organisational 
emphasis on CFSP coordination, and an overall emphasis on building administrative 
capacities in the field of foreign policy, in order to back Macedonia’s European 
integration. These changes also affected the MoD, at a relatively high level in the 
organisational hierarchy. These all anchored the EU’s CFSP/ESDP in the 
organisational design of national foreign policy institutions.  
 
Parallel, albeit more limited, developments can be found in the Serbia’s organisational 
structure. These started with the dissolution of the state union of Serbia and 
Montenegro in 2006, and the consequent devolution of foreign policy competences 
from the federal to the republic level. This transfer of competence, however, only 
formalised an état de fait. At the republic level, eponymous institutions were already 
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in place913. With the adoption in 2007 of its Law on Foreign Affairs, Serbia clarified 
the scope of its newly renamed Ministry of Foreign Affairs (formerly Ministry for 
Foreign Economic Relations). This included a “special organizational unit”, the 
Directorate General for the EU, of which the mission was to “intensively monitor the 
EU institution policies and activities, as well as its interconnections with certain 
organizations”914.  
 
This Directorate General for the EU resembles Macedonia’s present-day Directorate 
for European integration915. Headed by an Assistant Minister for European Affairs 
placed under the authority of the Foreign Minister, it consists of three units: one is 
responsible for political dialogue with the EU (unit for EU sectoral policies); one is 
responsible for relations with EU institutions (EU institution department); and one 
deals with Serbia’s involvement in regional initiatives (unit for regional initiatives). 
Serbia’s Directorate General for the EU does not count a dedicated “CFSP unit” 
coordinating the country’s participation in the CFSP. Participation in the CFSP is 
coordinated transversally, within (and across) the MFA’s Directorate General(s), by 
the different units concerned by the CFSP.  
 
As in Macedonia, a Unit for arms control was also created in a Directorate for Nato 
and defence affairs (renamed Directorate for Security policy in 2011). It is not only 
responsible for implementing arm-control obligations, but intervenes more generally 
in the field of defence cooperation. In the same Directorate, a Unit for CSDP was 
introduced in 2011, i.e. in the MFA. Macedonia, by contrast, installed its ESDP Unit 
in its MoD. In Serbia’s MoD, a Unit for European integration and regional initiatives 
was finally established in 2009. But it is placed under the administrative authority of 
the Department for International Military Cooperation, and has not, therefore, the 
status of Directorate, unlike in Macedonia916.  
 
In March 2010, a Political Director for the EU (at the same time Chief of Staff) was 
appointed in the MFA, but without European Correspondent917. Serbia nonetheless 
expects to that the head of the Unit for EU institutions within the Directorate for the 
EU will soon be nominated European Correspondent918.  
 
These organisational changes do mirror Macedonia’s 2005 reform. But they have 
been initiated later in time (from 2008), and are thus at a much lower state of 
progress.919 The absence, in the MFA, of an organisational unit dedicated to the CFSP, 
and the lesser anchoring of the EU’s CFSP/ESDP in Serbia’s MFA/MoD contrast 
with Macedonia’s capacities for CFSP coordination, which have been erected at the 
highest level of the organisational hierarchy. 
                                                 
913 Interview with an Official from the European Integration Office, Government of the Republic of 
Serbia. Belgrade, 14/09/2011 
914 Government of the Republic of Serbia. October 2008. ‘National Programme for Integration with the 
European Union.’ p. 825. 
915 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. 2012e. ‘Organigram.’ 
916 Government of the Republic of Serbia. December 2009. ‘National Programme for Integration with 
the European Union.’ 
917 Republic of Serbia. 2011. ‘Answers of the Republic of Serbia to the EU Questionnaire Delivered by 
the European Commission.’ 
918 Ibid. 
919 Interview with a Senior Researcher from the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Belgrade, 
01/03/2011 
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3.2.2.2. Inferring Europeanisation 
 
The EU has delivered a set of well identifiable expectations regarding prospective 
member states’ organisational capacity to participate in the CFSP. For instance, in 
2001, in the framework of its enlargement strategy, the European Commission issued 
an informal document on administrative reforms, which stated:  
 
“participation in the formulation and implementation of EU’s CFSP requires 
the existence of a functioning MFA, with appropriately trained officials who 
have the necessary technical and language skills to participate in the various 
policy making bodies at different levels, including the posts of “Political 
Director” and “European correspondent”.920.  
 
What a “functioning MFA” means is not specified, though. It is therefore subject to 
the Commission’s evaluation. But this EU requirement paves the way of 
administrative reforms in those states where capacities are deficient. 
 
As a matter of fact, the EU did not pay much attention to Serbia and Macedonia’s 
efforts at building-up their CFSP-related administrative capacity until the mid 2000s. 
No reference to any monitoring by the EU can be found in this respect in EU 
documents until 2004 for Macedonia and 2006 for Serbia. Thereafter, EU-driven 
interactions on this issue intensified at a remarkable pace: through the Commission’s 
questionnaire first, which included questions on the subject; through the 
Commission’s annual progress reports then, which reviewed Serbia/Macedonia’s 
administrative CFSP capacities; and through Serbia and Macedonia’s annual plans 
finally, which, responding to the Commission’s progress report, identified which 
reforms were to be carried out in this field.  
 
3.2.2.3. Argumentative analysis  
 
3.2.2.3.1. Structural analysis  
 
Macedonia’s MFA 2005 administrative reform ensued just after the Commission 
handed over its Questionnaire, which specifically enquired into the country’s capacity 
to carry out its CFSP obligations. The Commission therein asked:  
 
“will your administration, and in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
have the necessary structure and technical equipment to fully take part in the 
Foreign, security and defence policy (CFSP and CSDP) at the time of 
accession”?921  
 
The Questionnaire also requested a detailed reporting of the number of the employees 
in the MFA922. These questions barely concealed the idea that administrative reforms 
were required, should the country strive for becoming a member of the EU.  
 
                                                 
920 European Commission. 13 February 2001. ‘Main Administrative Structures Required for 
Implementation of the Acquis.’ p. 59. 
921 Question 31.A.5, European Commission. 2004. ‘Questionnaire Delivered by the European 
Commission to the Republic of Macedonia.’ 
922 Question 31.A.12, Ibid.. 
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And indeed, in subsequent years, the Commission, in its progress reports, thoroughly 
continued to monitor Macedonia’s efforts at administrative capacity-building. 
Following the 2005 reform, it noted “some progress”, epitomised by the creation of 
the CFSP unit923; in 2007, it reiterated its positive evaluations, acknowledging the 
creation of the ESDP unit in the MoD, but explicitly pointed out that “the CFSP unit 
in the MFA which is responsible for coordination, needs to be strengthened”924. In its 
enlargement strategy, the Commission backed this critique, adding that “the 
institutional and administrative capacity [of Macedonia’s MFA] is not yet sufficient to 
enable the country to participate fully in the EU policies in these areas” 925 . 
Anticipating this critical observation, the Government of Macedonia had previously 
announced that “it is foreseen to strengthen the required functions and mechanisms 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the aim of successful cooperation with the 
EU structures in the area of CFSP”926. And indeed, most of the CFSP-related units in 
the MFA were re-staffed between 2007 and 2009. The Commission’s plea for 
strengthening the CFSP unit was reiterated in the 2008 progress 927 , until 
supplementary posts were created in 2009, fulfilling the EU’s expectations928.  
 
Interactions between EU and Serbian actors on the matter of capacity-building only 
developed in the late 2000s. By then, Serbia had applied for EU candidacy, and the 
Commission had started to monitor Serbia’s progresses chapter by chapter. Before 
2010, there is little sign of EU-Serbia communication in that area. The Commission’s 
progress reports did not for instance evaluate the country’s capacity to take part in the 
CFSP until 2010. In its 2010 Questionnaire, the Commission copy-pasted 
Macedonia’s questions on the need to develop the “necessary structure” in the MFA 
in order to “fully take part in the Foreign, security and defence policy (CFSP and 
CSDP) at the time of accession”, and similarly enquired into Serbia’s MFA staffing929. 
But the Commission additionally underlined the need to set up specific bodies that are 
“responsible for, implement and ensure coordination of foreign policy” in Serbia, and 
to appoint the “necessary ‘Political Director’ and ‘European Correspondent’” 930 . 
Serbia thus faced in 2010 demands by the EU that were more specific than Macedonia 
in 2004. But considering the limited scope of the reforms that have hitherto taken 
place, no wonder that the Analytical report accompanying the Commission’s opinion 
in 2011 noted that  
 
                                                 
923 European Commission. 8 November 2006a. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2006 
Progress Report.’ 
924 European Commission. 6 November 2007b. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2007 
Progress Report.’ 
925 European Commission. 6 November 2007a. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007-
2008.’ 
926 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. April 2007. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of 
the Acquis Communautaire.’ 
927 European Commission. 5 November 2008c. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2008 
Progress Report.’ 
928 European Commission. 14 October 2009b. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2009 
Progress Report.’ 
929 Questions 31.A.5, 12, European Commission. 2010e. ‘Questionnaire Delivered by the European 
Commission to the Republic of Serbia.’ 
930 Questions 31.A.10-11Ibid. 
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“further strengthening will be needed [in the MFA] in order to be fully capable 
of implementing policies and adjusting to the EU legislation”.931  
 
This is a sign, if need be, that the EU still regards Serbia’s administrative reforms 
initiated in the MFA/MoD as incomplete –an assessment shared by independent 
analysts too: 
 
“There has not been major, overall change in the MFA, and those who now 
enter the Ministry are those who were not qualified enough to find another job”. 
932 
 
Alternatively, 
 
“I have not heard from any substantial change in the MFA, especially with 
regards to the internal functioning of the Ministry”.933 
 
Notwithstanding the EU’s conditionality regime, which seems to weigh on 
Serbia/Macedonia’s administrative reforms, MFA officials in both countries do not see 
themselves as complying with EU obligations. As a top official in Macedonia’s MFA 
stated regarding the creation of his CFSP unit:  
 
“we have never had any pressure or even suggestion on the EU side on what 
we should do. It was always our feeling here that we should adapt our 
institutions.”934  
 
Serbian officials made similar statements, underlining the lack of specificity of EU 
requirements in organisational matters. This explains why Serbia did not feel 
committed to create a CFSP unit within its MFA; and why Serbia and Macedonia did 
not experienced the same administrative reforms. In the absence of specific demands, 
Serbia and Macedonia have interpreted the EU requirements of setting up “a 
functioning MFA”935 in their own ways.  
 
All in all, it is mildly convincing to speak of political compliance, except perhaps, 
when the Commission’s reports emit recommendations that are very specific, e.g. on 
increasing the personnel of Macedonia’s CFSP unit in 2007-2009, or when the EU 
demands the nomination in the MFA of a Political Director and a European 
Correspondent. With Serbia and Macedonia’s application for EU membership, the 
Commission started to insist on the need to nominate these two posts in the MFA. In 
Macedonia, there was at the beginning little understanding for the functions these two 
diplomats were supposed to assume, and an analysis of the prospective competences 
and status of the two positions had to be launched, in accordance with the EU’s 
                                                 
931 European Commission. 12 October 2011a. ‘Analytical Report for the Opinion on Serbia's 
Application for Membership of the European Union.’ 
932 Interview with a Senior Researcher from the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Belgrade, 
01/03/2011 
933 Interview with a Director from the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Belgrade, 01/03/2011 
934 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, CFSP 
Unit. Skopje, 07/03/2011 
935 European Commission. 13 February 2001. ‘Main Administrative Structures Required for 
Implementation of the Acquis.’ p. 59. 
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request 936 . The EU’s insistence on appointing these two officials without 
substantiating its expectations eventually led to shallow reforms. Macedonia’s de 
facto European Correspondent’s office readily acknowledges that 
 
“so far, there is no big substance to his post. It is there on the paper, but in 
practice, it changes nothing much”.937 
 
The seat is now occupied because the EU demands it to be, but the occupant has not 
been endowed with a proper mission to match his position. It is for similar reasons 
that the formal appointment of the Political Director has been postponed in 
Macedonia, and that Serbia did not nominate its European Correspondent straight 
away in 2010. In this case, change has been little reflexive. It only has the 
appearances of adaptation.  
 
3.2.2.3.2. Dispositional analysis 
 
It is, here again, the dispositions of Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy actors, 
rather than the obligations deriving from the EU’s conditionality regime, which 
primarily drove the administrative reforms in Serbia and Macedonia’s MFA and MoD. 
These dispositions favoured the endogenous, rather than exogenous intensification of 
the relations between the EU and Serbia/Macedonia and vice-versa. There is indeed a 
correspondence between the stage in the accession process, at which 
Serbia/Macedonia is situated, and the state of advancement of their administrative 
reform in the MFA.  
 
In Macedonia’s MFA, the special unit in charge of EU affairs (established in 1992) 
was first upgraded in 1995, upon the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
Macedonia and the EU, and later in 2005, following Macedonia’s being granted the 
status of EU candidate. This unit then climbed the MFA’s organisational ladder as 
Macedonia came closer to the EU. In 1995, indeed, EU accession was not 
Macedonia’s primary foreign policy objective. Following its political (and even 
physical) blockade by Greece, the country was still prioritising international 
recognition938. By 2005, Macedonia had largely revised its strategic objective, and 
focussed on EU integration. Macedonia’s Foreign Minister at that time asserted 
accordingly that she would “spare no efforts” in bringing her country closer to the EU, 
should this entail soul-deep reforms939. And indeed, as an MFA official stated:  
 
“when we received the status of candidate country in 2005, it was widely 
acknowledged in the MFA and also in the government that we should adapt 
our institutions for the future membership”.940 
 
                                                 
936 Republic of Macedonia. September 2005. ‘Answers of to Additional Questions Referring to the 
Economic Criteria and the Chapters of the Acquis.’ 
937 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, CFSP 
Unit. Skopje, 07/03/2011 
938 Crvenkovski, S. 2006. ‘Interview with Stevo Crvenkovski.’ In The Macedonian Foreign Policy, ed. 
Mircev, D. 
939 Mitreva, I. 2006. ‘The Republic of Macedonia: The Road of Accession to the EU.’ Conference 
paper. 
940 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, CFSP 
Unit. Skopje, 07/03/2011 
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This awareness paved the ground for thicker administrative reforms in the field of 
CFSP coordination in the MFA. It was all about anticipating future needs (and not 
adapting to existing conditions). 
 
In Serbia, by contrast, this disposition to emphasise the MFA’s organic connection with 
European structures has not fostered administrative reforms until very recently. In fact, it 
can even be argued that the  
 
“EU agenda has never taken root in MFA affairs”.941 
 
–for two reasons: first, interactions between EU and Serbia actors on foreign policy 
matters remained limited until 2010, as the country applied for the status of candidate942. 
As an associate state, Serbia had less contact with the diplomacy of the EU than it has as 
candidate state. Second, despite the victory of pro-EU forces in the 2004 and 2008 
elections, Serbia’s MFA remained focussed on the Kosovo issue. In 2008, Tadić 
campaigned with the promise to get his country closer to the EU, but also to defend 
Kosovo as an inalienable part of Serbia and reject any “Kosovo for EU trade”943. 
Interestingly, Serbia had a Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, which could deal with the 
issue of Kosovo. But in practice, it is the MFA that has remained in charge of the most 
sensitive aspects of Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo. As a Serbian analyst explained: 
 
“The only thing we know [the MFA has been] doing is defending Kosovo. 
For like two years, Kosovo was the only policy [of the MFA], and only 
statements [on Kosovo] were giving at the government sessions. They were 
only issuing this guideline”. 944  
 
Or, as extrapolated by another analyst:  
 
“It's like the MFA has been transformed in my opinion into a Ministry of 
Kosovo and Metohija. But we already have a Ministry of Kosovo and 
Metohija, to make the matter more ridiculous!”945 
 
This prioritisation of Kosovo in the agenda of the MFA has monopolised much of the 
MFA’s energy over the past few years, which could not be dedicated to reforming, or 
europeanising, the institution so as to intensify the link between the MFA and European 
affairs. As a result, Serbia did not anticipate its accession by reforming its MFA as 
Macedonia did.  
 
3.2.2.3.3. Intentional analysis 
 
The examination of actors’ intentions brings further light on the causes and reasons 
that underpinned the Europeanisation of Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy 
administration. Re-staffing Macedonia’s CFSP unit, for instance, responded to 
practical, bureaucratic considerations:  
                                                 
941 Interview with a Senior Researcher from the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Belgrade, 
01/03/2011 
942 Interview with an Official from the Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia, 
Political Section. Belgrade, 16/09/2011 
943 B92. 18.10.2007. ‘Tadić Rejects Possibility Of "Kosovo for EU" Trade.’ 
944 Interview with a Director from the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Belgrade, 01/03/2011 
945 Interview with a Senior Researcher from the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Belgrade, 
01/03/2011 
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“it is more a learning by doing approach. We start with a smaller unit and 
then we see what we manage in terms of volume of work. If it’s not enough, 
or if there is an organic growth in the workload, then we respond by hiring 
more”.946  
 
Of course, this learning by doing approach is fostered by the favourable dispositions 
held by foreign policy actors in the MFA, and by the structural context in which 
capacity-building in CFSP coordination takes place.  
 
The intentional analysis helps us also understanding the specific design of Serbia’s 
CSDP unit. This unit is located in the MFA, and is part of the Security Policy Sector, 
whereas, in Macedonia, it is located in the MoD. The intention underpinning the 
creation of this unit in Serbia’s MFA was, according to an official,  
 
“to go further towards the EU, separately from Nato, which we do not intend 
to join in the coming years”.947 
 
The MFA thus makes a clear distinction, at the political, rather than purely technical 
level, between Serbia’s cooperation with Nato and Serbia’s integration in the EU. 
Both are coordinated at the same level in the MFA, but by different units within the 
Security Policy Sector. This intention is supported by Serbia’s specific disposition 
towards military neutrality. Proclaimed in 2007 by the National Assembly in a 
turbulent context (prior to Kosovo’s declaration of independence), the doctrine is 
given little credit among political analysts948, and even within the MFA949. But it has 
contributed to the creation of the ESDP unit in the MFA by revealing the need to 
assert that security policy shall not be the sole concern of the Nato unit in the MFA. In 
fact, Nato approaches should be complemented, if not counterbalanced, by capacity-
building in ESDP coordination. It is interesting here to note how organisational 
reforms, sometimes, are designed with the purpose of sending a message (yes to the 
EU, no to Nato). Though supportive of Europeanisation, the message is not neutral as 
to the type of “Europe” it points to.  
 
3.2.3.  Building administrative capacities for outreach coordination 
 
In addition to intra and inter-sectoral developments in Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign 
policy apparatus, diplomatic missions have been established in Brussels and other 
capitals, and entrusted with outreach activities in the field of CFSP/ESDP 
coordination. Their relationship to their home Ministry changed over time, sometimes 
departing from the sheer dependence that hitherto prevailed. 
 
In October 1992, Macedonia assigned its first representative to the European 
Communities in Brussels. With the establishment of diplomatic relations in December 
                                                 
946 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, CFSP 
Unit. Skopje, 07/03/2011. 
947 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 
Department for Common Foreign and Security Policy and Security Challenges. Belgrade, 13/09/2011 
948 Interview with a Project Coordinator at the Isac Fund. Belgrade, 02/03/2011; Interview with a 
Director from the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Belgrade, 01/03/2011 
949 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 
Partnership for Peace Unit. Belgrade, 12/09/2011 
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1995, Macedonia raised the status of its representation to the ambassadorial level, and 
in February 1996, the first permanent mission of Macedonia to the European 
Communities was created950 . Until 2006, the mission operated with very limited 
resources, though. But after Macedonia became candidate in 2005, its staff rose at a 
remarkable pace: 9 persons were recruited in 2006 (1 diplomat, 5 sectoral experts and 
3 administrative persons)951. 3 were recruited in 2008, including 2 experts from the 
SEA and one diplomat “solely engaged in following CFSP/ESDP activities” in 
Brussels952. Today, Macedonia’s permanent mission in Brussels counts 14 persons (6 
diplomats, 5 experts, 3 administrative staff) 953 . Macedonia also strengthened its 
mission in Vienna, and it relies since 1996 on a permanent missions to Nato in 
Brussels (dealing in particular with the military dimension of the ESDP), to the 
Council of Europe (in Strasbourg), to the UN (in Geneva and New York), to the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO, in Rome) and to the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO, in Paris). These missions are an 
“important segment of the institutional framework” of Macedonia’s approach to 
European foreign policy, since they are “involved in the process of joining the 
common positions, statements and declarations of the European Union”954 . They 
directly participate in coordinating the country’s participation in the EU’s CFSP.  
 
Serbia did not open a permanent representation to the European Communities, but 
inherited the mission opened in Brussels by the SFRY in 1968. Following the 
signature of Serbia’s SAA in 2008, the administrative and technical capacities of the 
mission was strengthened. Four experts (in the fields of trade, customs, agriculture 
and energy) were engaged in 2008955. Although no post has been created to deal 
specifically with the CFSP, the mission actively participates in the different 
dimensions of foreign policy coordination. It operates, for instance, the mechanism of 
alignment with EU statements. Serbia also opened in 2010 a permanent mission to 
Nato in Brussels (preceded by a liaison office since 2004, headed by a special envoy 
with the rank of Ambassador). The liaison office had thenceforth been involved in 
coordinating Serbia’s participation in Nato’s PfP. Serbia has also a permanent mission 
to the Council of Europe (in Strasbourg), to the UN (in Geneva and New York), to the 
OSCE (together with other international organisations, in Vienna), to the FAO (in 
Rome) and to the UNESCO (in Paris). 
 
An important task of Serbia and Macedonia’s permanent missions is to handle the 
invitations for alignment handed over by the EU in Brussels, Strasbourg, Geneva, 
New York, Vienna, etc… In so doing, the permanent missions work hand in hand 
                                                 
950 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia. 'About the Mission'. [accessed 
27.03.2012]. 
951 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. April 2007. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of 
the Acquis Communautaire.’ 
952 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. March 2008. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of 
the Acquis Communautaire.’; Government of the Republic of Macedonia. 29 May 2009. ‘National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis Communautaire.’; Secretariat for European Affairs. January 
2008. ‘Strategic Plan for the Period 2006-2008.’ 
953 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of Macedonia to the European Union. 
Brussels, 30/03/2012 
954 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. 2012. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of the 
Acquis Communautaire.’ 
955 Government of the Republic of Serbia. October 2008. ‘National Programme for Integration with the 
European Union.’ 
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with their home ministry956. But this relation, in some fora, has undergone notable 
changes. Herein, the general rule is: “the capital decides, the mission abides”. In 
UNGA affairs, for instance, Serbia and Macedonia’s national representatives in New 
York always request instructions from their home Ministry before transmitting their 
decision (not) to align with EU statements. Decision-making, then, is centralised in 
Belgrade and Skopje, generally in a Unit for UN affairs within the MFA. Depending 
on the sensitivity of the issue at play, the head of this unit usually launches a series of 
consultations within the MFA. Once the decision (not) to align is taken, it is 
communicated back from Belgrade/Skopje to Serbia/Macedonia’s permanent mission 
in New York. Little latitude is left to national representatives in the UNGA. Their role 
is limited to transmitting the EU invitation to Skopje/Belgrade in due time, acting in 
accordance with the capital’s instructions in the UNGA, making reports on their 
actual (non) alignment, and on the MFA’s request, gathering information on the 
position of particular member states, when the EU has no unanimous position.  
 
This general rule admits exceptions, though. In some fora, it has become: “the capital 
decides on sensitive issues, the mission on others”. In the OSCE, for instance, Serbia 
and Macedonia’s representatives regularly decide on the spot whether they shall align 
with EU statements, without involving their home Ministry. These have often been 
granted by their home Ministry “a margin of appreciation”957, according to which they 
can decide whether instructions from the MFA are required or not. On a number of 
issues, which 1) are not critical to Serbia/Macedonia’s interests; 2) are widely 
accepted by the international community; 3) or have already been discussed within the 
Ministry, decisions to align are now primarily taken locally. This does not concern 
“sensitive” issues, though, for which Serbia and Macedonia’s representatives still 
request instructions. But interestingly here, Serbia more often than Macedonia. As 
noted by an EU official,  
 
“Macedonia always aligns and says it right away, whereas Serbia often seeks 
for instructions”.958  
 
As regards Serbia and Macedonia’s outreach coordination, here again, the imprint of 
the European interaction structure leaves little doubt on its European lineage. The 
creation and building up of Serbia and Macedonia’s permanent missions to the 
European Communities went obviously hand in hand with the intensification of the 
relations between Serbia/Macedonia and European actors involved in foreign and 
security affairs. Thus, inferring Europeanisation from their extension is barely 
questionable. 
                                                 
956 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Serbia to the Osce in 
Vienna. Vienna, 17/10/2011; Interview with a Political Advisor to the Presidencies of the Council of 
the EU at the Osce & the EU Delegation to the Osce in Vienna. Vienna, 11/08/2011; Interview with an 
Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, United Nations Unit Skopje, 
07/03/2011; Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 
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from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, Directorate for Bilateral Relations 
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957 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Directorate for Multilateral Affairs. Skopje, 02/11/2011 
958 Interview with a Political Advisor to the Presidencies of the Council of the EU at the Osce & the EU 
Delegation to the Osce in Vienna. Vienna, 11/08/2011 
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Following the establishment of diplomatic relations with the European Communities 
(EC) in 1995, Macedonia opened its permanent mission to the European Communities 
in 1996, and a permanent mission to Nato in 1996. Until 2006, the EU mission 
operated with very limited resources, though. But after Macedonia became an EU 
candidate in 2005, its staff rose at a considerable pace. Likewise, following the 
signature of its SAA in 2008, the administrative and technical capacities of Serbia’s 
mission to the EU were strengthened. Serbia also opened a liaison office to Nato in 
2004 after submitting its application for its PfP. These congruent developments do not 
imply that Serbia and Macedonia opened their mission because of specific obligations 
(which did not exist for that matter). They show that their opening was part of a larger 
process of institutional rapprochement, which fostered actors’ disposition to intensify 
outreach coordination in CFSP/ESDP matters. They also correspond, as explained by 
an official from Macedonia, to  
 
“a system that has been put in place in the EU by other candidate 
countries”.959 
 
The fact that Romania and Bulgaria, and before them Slovenia, opened such missions 
before joining the EU certainly supports the idea that these outreach coordination 
bodies were necessary. Their experience in that matter was later taken into account 
and emulated in Serbia and Macedonia.  
 
Finally, as the EU improved its status of participant in world politics, Serbia and 
Macedonia were urged to adapt. In order to keep with the pace of the EU’s diplomacy, 
e.g. through alignment in international fora on an ever widening scope of foreign 
policy issues, Serbia and Macedonia were induced to either increase their staff in 
relevant outreach coordination bodies, or/and to decentralise their foreign policy, by 
allowing their permanent representatives to take speedier decisions without requesting 
instructions from the MFA. This decentralisation of foreign policy decisions on 
alignment has been developed gradually, as a response to the time constraints under 
which the alignment mechanism is enacted. Since the EU only communicates its 
statement to non-EU states a few hours before OSCE meetings, little time is left for 
consultations within the MFA. 
 
3.2.4. Extension of diplomatic networks: a deceptive case of pseudo-
Europeanisation 
 
3.2.4.1. The deceiving power of deductive research 
 
With the EU’s intent to become an international actor in world politics, the need to 
develop an adequate diplomatic network has risen for EU candidate states. Until the 
Lisbon Treaty, the EU was represented through its network of EC delegations, but 
these were only capable of handling issues within the scope of the Communities –
which excluded the CFSP. The diplomatic representations of EU member states were 
therefore very important, especially those of the member states holding the rotating 
Presidency of the Council. Now, despite its newly created diplomatic service, the EU 
                                                 
959 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, CFSP 
Unit. Skopje, 07/03/2011 
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still heavily relies on its member states’ representations abroad. Hence the 
Commission’s interest for the diplomatic network of would-be candidates.  
 
In its Questionnaire to Serbia (2010) and Macedonia (2004), the Commission 
accordingly raised the following question:  
 
“Will your administration, and in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
have the necessary structure […]to fully take part in the Foreign, security 
and defence policy (CFSP and CSDP) at the time of accession”?960 
 
Although the scope of this question is not delineated, one may argue that the 
“necessary structure” mentioned above shall include adequate diplomatic capacities. 
As a matter of fact, in its Questionnaire to Serbia, the Commission specifically 
requested the following: 
 
“Please provide us with basic information on the structure, disposition, and 
numbers of your diplomatic service (embassies, missions, consulates general 
and consulates)”?961 
 
These questions do not explicitly convey any obligation, at least with regards to the 
opening of new embassies. And there is, actually, no formal requirement in that sense. 
But since Serbia and Macedonia are expected to “fully take part” in an ever growing 
CFSP; since this implies covering issue-areas as broad as Kosovo, East Timor or 
Somalia; since their participation in the CFSP would be undermined, should they lack 
diplomatic capacities, one could rightly expect that the geographical coverage of 
Serbia and Macedonia’s diplomatic network should undergo adaptational changes as 
they move closer to the EU. One could even argue that this would imply a possible 
extension of their diplomatic network. 
 
Seducing though it is, this inference would build on a deceit. By reifying the EU as 
sole point of reference, bracketing other determinants, and implicitly positing EU 
integration as primary source of change, deductive approaches tend to overestimate 
the salience of the EU independent variable in the analysis of social changes. The 
following section will illustrate this major flaw, by showing that inferring 
Europeanisation from the extension of Serbia and Macedonia’s diplomatic networks 
would fail to present the actual reasons for this phenomenon. The following section 
will thus show that Serbia and Macedonia’s diplomatic networks have grown in a 
significant manner over time. But it will not take the plunge and conclude on 
Europeanisation. It will show that, despite the appearances, the opening of new 
embassies abroad has little, if anything, to do with interactions with the EU. What 
matters here, is first and foremost the political and economic relations countries 
intend to develop with one another, at the bilateral level.  
 
3.2.4.2. Documenting the extension of diplomatic networks 
 
                                                 
960 Question 31.A.5, European Commission. 2004. ‘Questionnaire Delivered by the European 
Commission to the Republic of Macedonia.’ Questions 31.A.5, 12, European Commission. 2010e. 
‘Questionnaire Delivered by the European Commission to the Republic of Serbia.’ 
961 Question 31.A.12., European Commission. 2010e. ‘Questionnaire Delivered by the European 
Commission to the Republic of Serbia.’ 
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This research is based on a series of personal communications (by email and by phone) 
with Serbia and Macedonia’s embassies worldwide; on personal communications (by 
email) with Serbia and Macedonia’s MFA civil servants from the department for 
bilateral relations962; on personal communications (by phone) with the personnel of 
foreign embassies in Skopje and Belgrade; on internet researches on Serbia and 
Macedonia’s MFA website and the website of the MFA of the host country in which 
an embassy of Serbia/Macedonia is installed. These communications, transmitted 
between February and May 2012, have enabled the collection of primary data on the 
date of opening, and possibly closing, of Serbia and Macedonia’s embassies 
worldwide, as well as the motives underpinning their opening or closing.  
 
Only embassies (not missions) led by an Ambassador (not a chargé de mission) are 
considered in this analysis, as these embody the establishment of bilateral relations at 
the highest level. Serbia, being considered as the legal successor of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-2003) and later Serbia-Montenegro state union (2003-
2006), no nominal distinction is made between the different entities in the graphic. 
The research also neglects the temporary closing of Serbia/FRY’s embassies for 
military-related reasons963.  
 
The results of the research indicate a clear tendency: Serbia and Macedonia’s 
diplomatic networks have been extending gradually over time (see Figure 16). Of 
course the extension is most impressive for Macedonia, since the newly independent 
state started from scratch in the mid 1990s, in terms of bilateral representations. In 
1997, it counted only 25 embassies worldwide, and most of them (22) were harboured 
in Europe (see Figure 16) In 2012, this number rose to 38. During this period, seven 
new embassies have opened in Europe, three in Asia, two in the Arab Peninsula, and 
one in Africa. Although Macedonia’s bilateral representations are still predominantly 
located in Europe, one-fourth of them now extend Macedonia’s bilateral outreach 
beyond the Old Continent.  
 
Serbia’s diplomatic network underwent similar changes, but under different 
circumstances. A successor of a diplomatically very active state (cofounder of the 
non-aligned movement), Serbia/FRY inherited in the 1990s a very broad diplomatic 
network. After the overthrow of Milosevic, Serbia/FRY reformed this network, 
closing 17 embassies (out of 74), mostly in Africa, where it was very present, and 
some in Asia. Since its neighbours had gained independence, it nonetheless opened 
new embassies in the region (in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia). After this initial 
restructuring in 2001, Serbia/FRY gradually re-extended the geographical coverage of 
its diplomatic network, especially from 2008 onwards (see Table 18). For instance, it 
re-opened four embassies in Africa and opened 3 embassies in Central Asia and the 
Arab Peninsula. Today, almost half of the embassies of Serbia (i.e. 28 out of 63) are 
located outside Europe –a much higher percentage than in Macedonia. Despite the 
financial crisis, Serbia will sustain its efforts at internationalising its diplomatic 
network: further openings are planned. 
 
                                                 
962 Personal Communication from Official from Macedonia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department 
for Africa and the Middle East. Skopje, 12/03/2012 
963 e.g. Serbia/FRY’s embassy in New York and Paris closed in 1999 following Nato bombings in 
Belgrade; Serbia/FRY’s embassy in Bagdad closed in 2003 following the Iraqi Freedom Operation; 
Serbia/FRY’s embassy in Tirana closed between 1999 and 2001 following the war in Kosovo 
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Figure 16: Size of Serbia and Macedonia’s diplomatic network 
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Source: compilation of data communicated personally from Serbia and Macedonia’s officials964 
 
Table 18: Geographical coverage of Serbia and Macedonia’s diplomatic network 
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3.2.4.3. Argumentative analysis 
 
3.2.4.3.1. Beyond the sheer appearances of Europeanisation 
 
Macedonia and Serbia often refer to the relations with their EU on their embassies’ 
websites, despite the fact that these are only involved in bilateral relations. 
Macedonia’s embassies, for instance, all dedicate a significant (and standardised) part 
of their website to Euro-Atlantic integration. They present the country not only as 
Macedonia, but as prospective EU and Nato member state, and accordingly identify 
the European integration of Macedonia as an object of interest for their host country. 
                                                 
964 Telephone Enquiries with the Staff of Two Dozens of Embassies Worlwide. Luxembourg, 
February-May 2012 
965 Ibid. 
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This could (falsely) lead to the conclusion that European integration matters in 
Macedonia’s decision to open new embassies.  
 
The opening of at least seven embassies (out of thirteen) is of particular interest here, 
because their website establishes a link between the opening of the embassy (mostly 
in Europe) and Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The idea suggested here is that 
the strengthening of bilateral relations with European member states shall accelerate 
Macedonia’s integration into the EU and Nato. At the occasion of the opening of 
Macedonia’s embassy to the Holy Sea, Prime Minister Georgievski, for instead, 
praised in 2002 the  
 
“continued support from the Holy See, particularly in relation to the efforts 
of Macedonia for membership in the European Union, which on several 
occasions clearly expressed in the speeches of the current Roman pontiff”.966  
 
Likewise, the opening of the Embassy of the Republic of Macedonia in Prague 
reportedly  
 
“came as a result of the efforts of the Government of the Republic of 
Macedonia to intensify comprehensive relations with the countries of the 
European Union”.967 
 
And it responded, more specifically to the  
 
“constant and continuous support [the Czech Republic] has demonstrated for 
the integration of Macedonia in NATO and the EU”.968  
 
Very similar arguments have been made by Macedonia’s chargé d’affaires in Estonia, 
“one of the staunchest supporters of the EU and NATO open-door policies”969; in 
Montenegro, which shares with Macedonia the “common strategic objectives of EU 
and NATO integration”970; in Spain, where Macedonia’s ambassador praised the 
“support by a country member of the European Union and NATO”971; and in Norway, 
for the country “strongly supports Macedonia's aspirations towards NATO”972.  
 
Beyond Europe, these dispositions take another form. They do not emerge from the 
expectation that bilateral cooperation with the host country shall contribute to 
Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. They instead result from third countries’ 
growing interest for Macedonia. As an official in Macedonia’s MFA explained:  
 
“Being a candidate is perceived as a good thing abroad, an asset in our 
relations. Many countries want to cooperate with us all the more since we are 
                                                 
966 AlfaTV. 14.1.2010. ‘Ѓорѓевски: Стогодишнината Од Раѓањето На Мајка Тереза Добар Повод 
Папата Да Ја Посети Македонија.’ 
967 Embassy of Macedonia in Prague. 'За Амбасадата'. [accessed 27.03.2012]. 
968 Embassy of Macedonia in Prague. 'Билатерални Односи'. [accessed 27.03.2012]. 
969 Kolev, N. 2012. ‘Macedonia in Estonia -a Case of True Partnership.’; Embassy of Macedonia in 
Talin. 'Билатерални Односи'. [accessed 27.03.2012]. 
970 Embassy of Macedonia in Podgorica. 'Билатерални Односи'. [accessed 27.03.2012]. 
971 Embassy of Macedonia in Madrid. 'The Ambassador'. [accessed 27.03.2012]. 
972 Macedonian Information Agency. 25.11.2008. ‘Macedonia to Open Embassy in Norway.’ 
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candidate. They open more embassies here [in Skopje], in a residential basis, 
and it pushes us to do the same, indirectly, as an act of reciprocity”.973 
 
Against all appearances, these dispositions, however, do not enter the scope of 
Europeanisation. They are at best factors that have facilitated the decision to extend 
Macedonia’s diplomatic network. As the same official put it,  
 
“interviewer: Has your diplomatic network extended through EU integration? 
“interviewee: Not because of the EU. This extension is not imported from the 
EU, it is […] coherent with our history”.974 
 
Deprived of diplomatic services before its independence, Macedonia first engaged in 
building one as a means of promoting statehood975. In the 2000s, this objective was 
complemented with integrating the country into Euro-Atlantic structures. With 
growing dedication, Macedonia therefore sought to strengthen its bilateral relations 
with the countries that were members of these structures, in the hope that these would 
accelerate the integration of Macedonia in Euro-Atlantic structures. This cognition 
nurtured dispositions that drove in part the extension of Macedonia’s diplomatic 
network. But these dispositions did not sustain decisive actions, since bilateral 
relations, in practice, are dealt separately from multilateral affairs. 
 
“When it comes to the EU, as State counsellor for cooperation with non-
European countries, I try not to take too much into consideration the position 
of the EU, because I know that others in the MFA will present the position of 
the EU. So, it is not up to me to accommodate EU views”.976 
 
What matters most, then, in the decision to open an embassy, is not Macedonia’s 
quest for European integration; it is the bilateral relations with EU and non-EU 
countries alike, or, as stated by an official from the MFA responsible for bilateral 
affairs:  
 
“I don’t care if I’m speaking with an EU country or not. I have to deal with 
all of them in the same way, at the bilateral level. There is no difference in 
the approach of establishing relations”.977  
 
Serbia’s embassies also identify the EU as object of interest on their website, but to a 
much lesser extent than Macedonia, and with few references to Nato integration (see 
Table 19). In London, for instance, Serbian Ambassador Dejan Popović underlined in 
2012 
 
“the support [Serbia] enjoys by friendly nations on the path of its Euro-
integration. One of the biggest privileges I have […] is to cooperate with the 
people sincerely committed to the EU enlargement – the Government, Her 
                                                 
973 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Directorate for Bilateral Relations with Non European Countries. Skopje, 03/11/2011 
974 Ibid. 
975 Ibid. 
976 Ibid. 
977 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Directorate for Bilateral Relations with European Countries. Skopje, 04/11/2011 
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Majesty’s Opposition, civil servants, academics, business circles, local 
communities”.978 
 
This support, acknowledged by most of Serbia’s ambassadors to EU countries, 
certainly fits Serbia’s strategic interests, but it cannot convincingly explain the 
opening of Serbia’s embassies. At best, Serbia’s new embassy in Ljubljana (opened in 
2001) was to  
 
“devote special attention to its relations with the Republic of Slovenia as a 
former Yugoslav Republic and a Member State of the EU and NATO”.979  
 
Serbia expressed similar expectations for its Embassy to Macedonia and Croatia, but 
not at the moment of their opening (respectively in 1996 and 1997).  
 
Table 19: Themes addressed by Serbia and Macedonia’s embassies on their webpage as categories 
EU and Nato 100%
no webpage 39%
the EU only 3%
the EU and Kosovo 9%
Kosovo only 26%
neither the EU nor Kosovo 23%
Embassies of Serbia
Embassies of Macedonia
 
Source: websites of Serbia and Macedonia’s embassies worldwide, 2012 
 
In fact, Serbia often overlooks its relations with the EU when it handles bilateral 
affairs with third countries. These relations are not, for instance, mentioned in the 
brief overview presenting Serbia’s history from the medieval time to the dissolution 
of the state union980. And they are not used as publicity in Serbia’s bilateral relations. 
Kosovo, by contrast, is often given a proper webpage, for instance under the banner 
“Kosovo’s disastrous precedent”981. It is presented extensively as an object of interest 
(or a concern) for the host country. European affairs, to sum up, are barely a theme 
that impregnates Serbia’s bilateral relations, unlike the Kosovo issue. The extension 
of Serbia’s diplomatic network, then, rather seems related to the intensification of 
Serbia’s diplomacy vis-à-vis the Kosovo independence issue.  
 
3.2.4.3.2. Actual reasons for the extension of diplomatic networks 
 
Inferring Europeanisation from the extension of Serbia and Macedonia’s diplomatic 
networks would be misleading, at best. There is indeed no direct requirement in the 
EU’s conditionality regime, which pertains to the opening of new embassies, and 
bilateral affairs, in practice, often remain separate from, if not insensitive to, EU 
multilateralism. Although some embassies do advertise European integration in their 
host country, their interest for European affairs is primarily rhetorical. It is not a 
determinant that decisively matters in the decision to open a new embassy –it is at 
best a facilitating factor. 
                                                 
978 Embassy of Serbia in London. 'Speech on the Occasion of the National Day of Serbia and the Day 
of the Army of Serbia (2012)'. [accessed 27.11.2012]. 
979 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. 'Bilaterala'. [accessed 27.03.2012]. 
980 See for instance, Embassy of Serbia in London. 'History of Serbia'. [accessed 27.11.2012]. 
981 Embassy of Serbia in London. 'Kosovo's Disastrous Precedent '. [accessed 27.11.2012]. 
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Reasons for opening embassies are in fact much more diverse than those hypothesised 
by deductive approaches to Europeanisation. As a matter of fact, they often have 
nothing to do with the EU. The first and most important reason is certainly to support 
investments through economic diplomacy. In Canberra, the embassy of Macedonia 
primarily opened in order to back the Diaspora and foster Australian investments in 
Macedonia –unsurprisingly, official declarations do not evoke Macedonia’s Euro-
Atlantic bid for accession982. In Qatar, New Delhi and Tel Aviv, Macedonia mostly 
referred to economic prospects for cooperation as key justification for opening the 
embassies983. As explained by an official from the MFA,  
 
“the main driving force for […] future openings will be economic, not 
political”. 984 
 
Only then comes politics. Macedonia did open embassies for political grounds, for 
instance in Cairo, in order to capitalise on the  
 
“influential role that this country has the international political scene as a 
country with an exceptional role in the Middle East, Arab world and 
Africa”.985  
 
Or in the Rome and New Deli, where it evoked the political support its received from 
the Holy See and India with regards to the name issue dispute with Greece 986 . 
Macedonia finally opened embassies in its neighbourhood, for obvious reasons. In 
Pristina, Macedonia’s first ambassador substantiated Skopje’s decision to open an 
embassy through the commitment to “strengthening peace and stability in the 
region”987. Of course, this general commitment echoes the EU’s key objective in the 
region –establishing “good neighbourly relations”988. But it is above all Macedonia’s 
“endogenous will”.989 
 
The reasons underpinning the opening (or closing) of Serbian embassies abroad are 
not different in substance, even though politics is sometimes given priority over 
economy. In the early 2000s, Serbia opened an embassy in Sarajevo and Ljubljana in 
order to promote good neighbourly relations990. But from 2008, the main rationale for 
opening embassies became the intensification of bilateral relations with non-European 
states opposed to Kosovo’s declaration of independence. In Buenos Aires, Serbia 
opened an embassy after “the Government of Argentine brought the decision not to 
                                                 
982 Macedonian Information Agency. 9.5.2005. ‘Fm Mitreva Visits Australia.’ 
983 SETimes. 21.10.2011. ‘Macedonia, Qatar Ties Open up Investment Opportunities.’; Macedonian 
Information Agency. 20.1.2009. ‘Macedonia Opens Embassy in India, Two Countries Boost 
Cooperation.’; Embassy of Macedonia in Tel Aviv. 'Билатерални Односи'. [accessed 27.03.2012]. 
984 Tanjug. 13.3.2011. ‘Serbia to Re-Open Embassy in Congo.’ 
985 Embassy of Macedonia in Cairo. 'Билатерални Односи'. [accessed 27.03.2012]. 
986 AlfaTV. 14.1.2010. ‘Ѓорѓевски: Стогодишнината Од Раѓањето На Мајка Тереза Добар Повод 
Папата Да Ја Посети Македонија.’ 
987 Embassy of Macedonia in Pristina. 'Амбасадор'. [accessed 27.03.2012]; Macedonian Information 
Agency. 20.1.2009. ‘Macedonia Opens Embassy in India, Two Countries Boost Cooperation.’; Balkan 
Insight. 6.11.2009. ‘Macedonia, Kosovo Open Embassies.’ 
988 Balkan Insight. 15.3.2010. ‘Macedonia Opens First Embassy in Kosovo.’ 
989 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Directorate for Bilateral Relations with Non European Countries. Skopje, 03/11/2011 
990 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. 'Bilaterala'. [accessed 27.03.2012]. 
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recognize the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) of Kosovo and Metohija”, 
and expressed its concern that recognition would cause a “domino effect and the 
demise of the UN system” 991 ; in Baku, Serbia’s Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić, 
similarly underlined  
 
“the principled position of the two countries on the supremacy of 
international law standards of territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
states”.992 
 
In Kinshasa, Vuk Jeremić welcomed  
 
“Congo’s principled support for Serbia in favour of the principle of 
territorial integrity, despite the pressures that aimed at changing the 
Congolese position”.993  
 
And although the prospects for economic cooperation played a central role in the 
opening of Serbia’s embassy to Ghana and Kazakhstan, so did the idea that enhancing 
bilateral relations with those states would help “lobbying against the recognition of 
independent Kosovo”994. Political concerns over Kosovo recognition did not only 
justify the opening of new embassies. They also pressed Serbia to close some of its 
representations, as retaliation for the host country’s recognition of Kosovo 
independence. Serbia’s embassy in Peru was accordingly closed in 2009 after the 
“Government of the Republic of Peru decided on 21 February 2008 to recognize the 
unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo and Metohija” 995 . In Ghana, 
Serbia’s embassy, which had just reopened in 2011, recently viewed its activities 
suspended owing to the country’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence996. And in 
2008, Serbia declared for a short time the Montenegrin ambassador in Belgrade 
persona non grata on the same ground997.  
 
Decisions to open new embassies are constrained, if not blocked, by financial 
considerations. Macedonia, for instance, postponed sine die the opening of its 
embassy in Buenos Aires for financial reasons, and also rescheduled that in Tokyo, 
originally planned for 2010/2011. As an official argued,  
 
“because of the economic crisis, the budget of my directorate was cut by one-
third. Now, we see if we can still open Tokyo in 2012. But ultimately, I think 
that there is room for 5-6 more embassies, not more. More embassies may be 
opened, but then, others will have to be closed”.998 
 
This constraint should not be underestimated. Financial considerations were also 
pivotal in many of the decisions that led to the closing of Serbia embassies in the early 
                                                 
991 Ibid. 
992 Embassy of Serbia in Baku. 'Mutual Relations'. [accessed 27.03.2012]. 
993 Tanjug. 13.3.2011. ‘Serbia to Re-Open Embassy in Congo.’ 
994 Novositi. 5.11.2010. ‘Besplatna Ambasada U Kazahstanu.’ 
995 Tanjug. 27.2.2008. ‘Serbia Ambassadors Withdrawn from Belgium and Peru.’; Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Peru. 'Relaciones Bilaterales'. [accessed 27.03.2012]. 
996 B92. 1.3.2012. ‘Ghana to Shut Down Belgrade Embassy.’ 
997 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Montenegro. 'Bilateral Relations'. [accessed 
20.3.2012]. 
998 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Directorate for Bilateral Relations with Non European Countries. Skopje, 03/11/2011 
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2000s. With the overthrow of Milosevic’s regime, many African countries, 
participating in the non-aligned movement, lapsed out of Serbia’s key interests999. 
Maintaining the embassies in those countries despite the lack of political and 
economic interest would have been too costly. Therefore, much of the 2001 
restructuring of Serbia’s diplomatic network ensued “for financial reasons”1000. Funds 
were reallocated within the MFA, and 17 embassies were accordingly closed.  
 
3.2.5. Building up technical capacities 
 
Over the past five to fifteen years, the technical capacities of Serbia and Macedonia’s 
foreign policy institutions have been strengthened. Diplomats and civil servants have 
been enrolled in a large number of training programmes with the purpose of making 
them EU-literate in CFSP/ESDP matters. And communication networks have been 
modernised in the MFA and MoD, in order to increase the level of protection of 
confidential data and secure the exchange of sensitive information with foreign 
partners. These technical capacities have been strengthened through demand-driven 
interactions with European actors for the former (diplomatic training) and through 
supply-driven interactions for the latter (communication networks). Although the EU 
played an important role in supporting and framing the building up of these technical 
capacities, it has not been the sole actor, and sometimes not even the primary one. 
Europeanisation, in this field, was highly dependent on Serbia and Macedonia’s 
engagement with EU member states and Nato. 
 
3.2.5.1. Enhancing diplomatic training capacities on EU affairs 
 
3.2.5.1.1. Descriptive analysis: domestic and foreign sources of expertise 
 
With the acceleration in the 2000s of their EU integration process, Serbia and 
Macedonia have soon been confronted with a compelling need to rely on competent 
professionals, capable of negotiating with European actors on sometimes very 
technical issues 1001 . Efforts were therefore devoted at training new experts, 
rejuvenating the staff, improving its technical skills, and developing its proficiency in 
foreign languages. The phenomenon has concerned both Serbia and Macedonia –with 
significant differences though.  
 
Owing to the lack of domestic capacities for the provision of training courses in 
CFSP/ESDP affairs, Macedonia swiftly demonstrated a strong interest in being 
included “in all forms of training” organised in this field by European actors1002. 
Many of these training courses were staged by EU member states directly1003. Austria, 
Slovenia, Germany and Hungary initiated for instance ESDP training programmes for 
SAA countries in 2006/2007 and 2008/2009, in which Macedonia participated1004. 
                                                 
999 Interview with a Senior Researcher from the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Belgrade, 
01/03/2011 
1000 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. 'Bilaterala'. [accessed 27.03.2012]. 
1001 Interview with an Official from the European Integration Office, Government of the Republic of 
Serbia. Belgrade, 14/09/2011 
1002 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. April 2007. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of 
the Acquis Communautaire.’ 
1003 Interview with an Official from the Austrian Embassy in Macedonia. Skopje, 08/03/2011 
1004 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. March 2008. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of 
the Acquis Communautaire.’ 
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And Norway financed in 2009 a 10.000€ training project on the “introduction the 
gender concept in the area of security and defence” in Macedonia1005. Other courses 
were organised by the European Security and Defence College (a network of EU 
member states educational institutions), or the Secretariat General of the EU 
Council1006. Some courses were finally organised by the Commission itself, under the 
scheme of Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) 1007 . These 
courses mainly featured European experts or civil servants, often in post, sharing their 
experience with Macedonian counterparts. They were often organised at the request of 
Macedonia (or other SAA countries) and addressed various aspects of Macedonia’s 
participation in the EU’s CFSP/ESDP, namely crisis management, civilian-military 
coordination, fight against terrorism, reforms in the security sector, classification of 
information, implementation of international restrictive measures and industrial 
security1008. The participation of Macedonia’s civil servants to demand-driven training 
programmes was coordinated by the SEA.  
 
For the past fifteen years, Macedonia has imported most of its expertise on 
CSFP/ESDP affairs by participating in such programmes organised by a multitude of 
European actors. Although these have responded effectively to the MFA’s needs in 
this matter, the idea of strengthening Macedonia’s domestic capacities for diplomatic 
training has recently arisen. In 2007, the MFA therefore launched a plan to create a 
full-fledged Diplomatic Academy. Its purpose was to go beyond the provision of 
tailor-made, issue-specific courses; to train a new generation of diplomats directly in 
Macedonia, in cooperation with foreign institutes, rather than having them sent in 
foreign diplomatic academies (e.g. in Vienna, Rome or Malta). Although the project 
remains stalled for financial reasons, it arguably “represents a step forward in the 
sphere of diplomatic education”1009.  
 
In Serbia, these domestic capacities for professional training have already been in 
place for more than a decade. They have been inherited from the longer diplomatic 
tradition of the country, and they make the MFA today less dependent on foreign 
expertise. The Diplomatic Academy “Koča Popović”, created in 1998, is an active 
contributor in this field. Its programmes are “designed to enhance the specific 
                                                 
1005 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. 29 May 2009. ‘National Programme for the Adoption 
of the Acquis Communautaire.’ 
1006 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. April 2010. ‘Monthly Progress Brief on the European 
Integration of the Republic of Macedonia for April 2010.’; Government of the Republic of Macedonia. 
2012. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis Communautaire.’ 
1007 MPB, Government of the Republic of Macedonia. February 2010. ‘Monthly Progress Brief on the 
European Integration of the Republic of Macedonia for January 2010.’; NPAA, Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia. 2012. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis Communautaire.’ 
1008 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. April 2007. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of 
the Acquis Communautaire.’; Government of the Republic of Macedonia. March 2008. ‘National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis Communautaire.’; Government of the Republic of 
Macedonia. 29 May 2009. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis Communautaire.’; 
Government of the Republic of Macedonia. 1 February 2010. ‘Monthly Progress Brief on the European 
Integration of the Republic of Macedonia for January 2010.’; Government of the Republic of 
Macedonia. April 2010. ‘Monthly Progress Brief on the European Integration of the Republic of 
Macedonia for April 2010.’; Government of the Republic of Macedonia. June 2010. ‘Monthly Progress 
Brief on the European Integration of the Republic of Macedonia for June 2010.’; Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia. September 2010. ‘Monthly Progress Brief on the European Integration of the 
Republic of Macedonia for September 2010.’ 
1009 Mitevska-Avramova, L. January 2007. ‘Diplomatic Academy – Step Forward in Diplomatic 
Education.’ Macedonian Diplomatic Bulletin, vol.12. p. 8. 
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knowledge and skills of diplomats and civil servants and become the stronghold of 
their professional career development”1010. The Diplomatic Academy underwent a 
profound reform in 2001, following the overthrow of Milosevic. Its recruitment 
procedure was depoliticised1011. For the younger recruits willing to prepare the MFA 
entrance examination, it now requires a university degree and a good command of 
English, posits a 35-year old age limit and conditions entrance on an examination1012. 
Changes not only affected the selection process. The academic programme was also 
modernised with a new emphasis on European integration1013. Courses on EU law and 
EU institutions are today compulsory: they form one pillar in the academic 
programme. Additional courses on EU/Nato approach to human rights or EU/Nato 
multilateral diplomacy or military diplomacy are also compulsory. The Academy also 
offers non-compulsory electives on the EU’s CFSP (e.g. “the EU as an actor in 
international relations”), as well as courses addressing topical questions (e.g. in 2005, 
the “CFSP in the draft treaty establishing a constitution for Europe”). Although most 
of the lectures are given by Serbian experts, foreign scholars are occasionally invited. 
The Academy entered in cooperation with a wide range of foreign partners, i.e. more 
than twenty diplomatic academies worldwide (e.g. Vienna, Croatia, Egypt, Spain, the 
US, Turkey) and around fifteen academic institutions, including the John F. Kennedy 
School of Government (Harvard University), the Centre for Political and Diplomatic 
Studies (Oxford University), the French National School of Administration (ENA) 
and the College of Europe in Bruges1014. These improvements increased the reputation 
of the Academy in the region, which now attracts an increasing number of diplomats 
from neighbouring countries and even beyond (e.g. Iraqi diplomats in 2011)1015. They 
contribute to strengthening the already positive image of Serbian diplomats in foreign 
circles –that of “excellent and very well educated” professionals, who usually 
demonstrate a very good command of several languages, including French, English 
and German1016.  
 
Beside the activities of the Diplomatic Academy, the civil servants of Serbia’s MFA 
have participated in a number of external training courses, organised by a variety of 
European actors between 2001 and 20101017. Between 2006 and 2008, the SEIO 
coordinated the organisation of more than 50 courses1018. Some of them directly 
focussed on CFSP/ESDP affairs. EU member states largely contributed to delivering 
such expertise. In the framework of the Szeged Process, the modalities of which were 
previously agreed upon through the signature of a Memorandum on cooperation in the 
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field of EU integration, Hungary remains a key provider of technical assistance since 
2005. Also active in this field, Norway organised a seminar on CFSP coordination in 
2009. And France and Slovenia organised twining projects from 2006, which dealt 
with some aspects of the CFSP too (e.g. “Capacity Building regarding the European 
integration process). These training programmes, intended for lower- and medium-
ranked diplomats, mostly focussed on “issues related to the CFSP, upgrading 
negotiation and lobbing skills”1019.  
 
3.2.5.1.2. Inference and argumentative analysis 
 
Europeanisation may be inferred from Serbia and Macedonia’s capacity-building 
efforts in the field of diplomatic training, inasmuch as these are pursued in the 
framework of European integration. And indeed, the involvement of the EU and its 
member states in the delivery of the expertise and the training courses casts little 
doubt on the inference. It is Serbia and Macedonia’s prospect for EU integration 
which shaped this quest for foreign and domestic expertise on EU affairs generally 
and the CFSP more specifically.  
 
The need to build up these capacities has even been addressed explicitly by the 
Commission, which in its proceedings states the following:  
 
“Participation in the formulation and implementation of EU’s CFSP and 
CSDP requires the existence of a functioning MFA and possibly other line 
ministries, with appropriately trained officials who have the necessary 
technical and language skills to participate in the various policy making 
bodies and Council working groups at different levels”.1020  
 
Clear though it is, the Commission’s guideline remains vague as for the means to 
achieve this goal and the extent of the reform that is expected. That may explain why 
Serbia and Macedonia, having inherited different capacities, chose different paths to 
improve the diplomatic training of their civil servants. The former, which already had 
an established diplomatic academy at its disposal, strengthened its domestic capacities 
in addition to appealing to foreign programmes. The latter, by contrast, since it lacked 
domestic structures, first looked for foreign expertise, and eventually considered 
opening a diplomatic academy. 
 
In both, the EU and its member states have played a crucial role. The EU financed 
some training courses under its TAIEX and Twinning programmes (although the 
emphasis here was not put directly on the CFSP/ESDP). At the intergovernmental 
level, Serbia and Macedonia also resorted to cooperation schemes serving the same 
purpose. But the development of such programmes of technical assistance was 
operated on “voluntary basis” 1021 . Diplomatic training was then more driven by 
demand than imposed by conditionality. And it actually responded to changes in 
Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy environment. With their gradual integration 
                                                 
1019 Government of the Republic of Serbia. October 2008. ‘National Programme for Integration with 
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1020 European Commission. 7 June 2004. ‘Main Administrative Structures Required for Implementation 
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1021 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 
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into European structure, Serbia and Macedonia’s diplomats were offered (at different 
time though) the possibility to participate (albeit restrictively) in the EU’s CFSP and 
Nato’s PfP. In order to keep up with the level of the member states’ diplomacy, 
training naturally emerged as a panacea. These institutional frameworks, in which 
Serbia and Macedonia’s professionals growingly interact with their European peers, 
provided the background stimulus, or disposition, to build domestic capacities in this 
field, and “avoid looking ridiculously unskilled”1022. In Serbia, it was also pursued 
with the intent to toughen the country’s capacity to “stand firm” in multilateral 
negotiations, whether with or through the EU1023.  
 
3.2.5.2. Enhancing the protection of diplomatic communications 
 
3.2.5.2.1. Descriptive analysis: adopting new standards for more security 
 
In the past few years, Serbia and Macedonia have taken the necessary steps for 
coming closer to the EU and Nato in the field of diplomatic communications. Both 
have accordingly enhanced the level of security of their diplomatic communications, 
and they have built the legal and technical capacities to securely exchange classified 
information.  
 
These changes have affected Macedonia already in the 1990s, as the country came 
closer to Nato. Driven by the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which Macedonia joined in 
1995, the modernisation of Macedonia’s diplomatic communications started with the 
signature of a Nato Security Agreement in 1996. An Office for reciprocal security was 
created in the MoD, which hosted a central registry of classified information. Sub-
registries were likewise created in the MFA. Following Nato recommendations, the 
Office was reformed in 2002 and 2004 so as to become increasingly independent1024. 
In 2004, the Law on Classified Information enabled it to grow into a standalone 
administrative body, the Directorate for Security of Classified Information (DSCI)1025. 
Its task now is to guarantee the security of classified information in all its 
dimensions1026: personnel (e.g. through security vetting or the issuance of security 
clearance), administrative (e.g. through the installation of central and sub-registries), 
physical (e.g. through the technical definition of security areas) and information (e.g. 
through cryptographic protection). It is also to ensure “the continuous application of 
the international standards and norms” in the field of security policy, while taking on 
the measures and activities securing the exchange of classified information “with 
foreign states and international organizations” 1027 . In order to further enhance 
Macedonia’s communication security policy, the 2004 law on classified information 
was amended in 2007, and the capacities of the Directorate centrally responsible for 
the protection of classified information in the MFA were accordingly strengthened, 
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e.g. through the procurement of security equipment and training sessions1028. Between 
2007 and 2012, around twenty seminars and training sessions were organised, 
including some TAIEX courses, in order to improve the level of expertise of DSCI 
and MFA employees in matters of diplomatic communications1029.  
 
Macedonia’s communications in the framework of Nato’s PfP were not the only 
concerned by these improvements. As of 2007, the security of Macedonia’s 
diplomatic communications was enhanced internally, with the installation of a virtual 
private network (VPN), securely connecting the MFA with its diplomatic and 
consular missions abroad1030. Communications via VPN is commonly used to connect 
an organisation to its offices by creating a “fully encrypted ‘virtual tunnel’ over the 
public internet”, which prevents eavesdropping and interceptions, and authenticates 
the communications1031.  
 
More importantly, with the modernisation of Macedonia’s communication structures, 
new opportunities for cooperation were created. In 2005, Macedonia received the 
status of EU candidate, and took the necessary steps for its full participation in the 
CFSP. It concluded in 2005 a bilateral agreement on the exchange and protection of 
classified information with the European Union, which was a prerequisite for building 
further capacities in the CFSP area. The procurement (from the EU) of a Certified 
Computer Unit, installed both in the MFA and in Macedonia’s mission to the EU in 
Brussels, soon allowed Macedonia to gain access to the EU’s Network for Electronic 
Exchange of Classified CFSP information with the Candidate Countries (ACN). 
Intended for candidate countries, this ACN network connects the associated states 
directly to the Secretariat General of the EU Council. It notably facilities the process 
of alignment with EU démarches, positions, declarations and joint actions, but also 
allows the associated countries to transmit information to the other countries in the 
network on foreign policy activities. First foreseen by the end of 2006 1032 , the 
installation of the equipment required for participating in the ACN was repeatedly 
delayed 1033 , and eventually completed in 2009 1034 . It henceforth “continue[d] to 
operate without problems”1035. Although the ACN network is designed to allow the 
exchange of various forms of information, including consultations, Macedonia today 
uses it “only for the process of alignment”1036.  
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Following (and in addition to) the agreements concluded with Nato in 1996 and the 
EU in 2005, Macedonia has concluded bilateral agreements on exchange and 
protection of classified information with an ever growing group of European 
countries1037: Bulgaria (2006) Albania (2006), the Czech Republic (2009), Slovakia 
(2009), Croatia (2009), Estonia (2009), Ukraine (2009), Poland (2010), Slovenia 
(2011), France (2011), and negotiations are going on with Germany 1038 . These 
agreements complement the EU/Nato framework and offer to Macedonia the 
possibility to intensify its exchange of classified information on issues that go beyond 
alignment1039.  
 
Unlike Macedonia, Serbia just entered the early phase of adaptation of its diplomatic 
communications network. Following its entrance in Nato’s PfP in December 2006, it 
adopted in 2007 a Law on the Fundamentals for the Regulation of Safety Services1040 
establishing the Office of the National Safety Council. With the adoption in 2009 of 
the Data Secrecy Law1041, the Office grew into the present Office of the Council for 
National Safety and Protection of Secret Data (hereafter: Council Office). Just as 
Macedonia’s DSCI, Serbia’ Council Office is an autonomous Government agency 
entrusted with legal capacity. It hosts the central registry of foreign classified 
information and documents, and it is responsible for “the implementation of assumed 
international obligations and international agreements concluded between the 
Republic of Serbia and other states or international agencies and organisations in the 
field of secret data protection”1042. The extent to which the capacities of the Council 
Office have been built since 2007 remains obscure for little information is available 
on this organisation1043.  
 
Having strengthened its organisational capacities in the field of data protection, Serbia 
engaged in exchanging classified information with Nato. It concluded in October 
2008 the necessary Security Agreement, creating thereby the “conditions for a more 
active role in the PfP programme”1044. But Serbia has not signed such an agreement 
with the EU yet, although negotiations are ongoing1045. It passed, in December 2009, 
a Law on Confidentiality, which fulfils the EU’s conditions for applying for such an 
agreement with EU 1046 . But the technical framework for exchanging classified 
information with the EU is not operational yet. Serbia has not signed similar 
agreements at the bilateral level with individual states either.  
 
In short, Macedonia and Serbia are both involved in enhancing their technical 
capacities in the field of diplomatic communications. But Macedonia started this 
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process already in the 1990s, through its participation in the PfP programme, 
modernised its internal communication network, and in the 2000s, set up the legal and 
technical foundations that allow the MFA to securely exchange classified information 
with the EU and its member states in the field of the CFSP/ESDP. Less connected to 
European structures, Serbia only started to adapt its communications system in 
2007/2009, through the PfP programme. Its participation in the EU’s diplomatic 
communication network remains very limited.  
 
3.2.5.2.2. From adaptation to Nato to alignment with the EU 
 
In security and defence Western Balkan states often speak of “Euro-Atlantic 
integration” rather than (or in addition to) European or EU integration. For them, both 
processes are part of a “return-to-Europe” narrative1047. Conditions to work with, or 
accede to, both organisations are to a large extent “very similar” 1048  and 
“interconnected” 1049 , although the EU “does not formally encourage prospective 
member states to join NATO”1050. At the technical level, the EU conveys NATO 
standards in its conditionality dialogue with Serbia and Macedonia1051. In particular, it 
has adopted technical and security standards for the transmission of classified 
information, which are very close to Nato standards. These standards have become 
part of the CFSP acquis, and compliance with them is now controlled by the 
Commission prior to accession1052. In its proceedings, the Commission also already 
stated that:  
 
“each member state must have a functioning cipher system fully compatible 
with established EU technical and security standards for the transmission of 
classified information, in order to participate in the exchange of encrypted 
electronic CFSP and ESDP information as of the moment of accession”.1053 
 
The technical and security standards mentioned in the Commission’s document are 
provided in a Council’s decision on security regulations 1054  and a Commission’s 
decision 1055 . These landmark documents expressly codify the management and 
exchange of classified information within the EU, and secure the use of the two 
communication networks the EU and its member states use in foreign policy matters: 
the CORTESY system for CFSP questions (the COREU Terminal Equipment System) 
and the ESDP-NET for ESDP questions (inherited from the Western European 
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Union’s WEU-NET in 2001)1056. These systems secure the exchange of classified 
information between the Council’s General Secretariat, the national capitals, the 
Commission and other organisations1057.  
 
Of course, as Serbia and Macedonia are not EU member states, they cannot fully take 
part in the CORTESY/ESDP-NET networks. Most notably, they cannot use the 
networks to participate in the preparation/elaboration of EU decisions and statements 
on CFSP/ESDP issues1058. But Serbia and Macedonia are nonetheless expected to take 
part in the ACN system, a system allowing them to receive a certain type of classified 
information from the EU (e.g. invitations to vote as the EU; invitations to align with a 
given statement, etc…). Participation in this ACN network is even part of their 
conditionality regime, but it implies that some adaptational changes in accordingly 
securing the installations, and meeting EU standards in terms of personnel, 
administrative, physical and information security. Serbia having been granted the 
status of candidate only in 2012, it could not interact on the same platform as 
Macedonia before, and it was therefore not held to adopt these standards beforehand.  
 
3.2.5.2.3. Adaptational change as requirement for CFSP participation 
 
The political dialogue on diplomatic communications started for both countries with 
the Commission’s questionnaire addressed to EU applicants, and it has been closely 
monitored by the Commission’s progress reports ever since. In 2005, the Commission 
enquired into Macedonia’s “capacity to participate in secure communications 
networks” 1059 . Throughout its progress reports, its attention then focussed on 
Macedonia’s law on Classified information 1060 , on the installation of the ACN 
network1061, on the signature of bilateral agreements on diplomatic communications 
security with EU member states1062, and more generally on security measures in the 
field1063. Communications between Macedonia and the Commission thus revolved 
precisely around security-related issues in diplomatic communications. Throughout its 
conditionality dialogue with Macedonia, the Commission has evaluated the reform 
process, including through relevant inspections. In 2008, it thus noted that in the field 
of diplomatic communications, 
 
“there is a lack of human and budgetary support”.1064  
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Macedonia responded by strengthening its technical capacities in secured 
communication systems and invited experts to train DSCI civil servants 1065. In 2009, 
the EU inspection team accordingly “presented a positive evaluation of the progress 
made since the previous inspection conducted in May 2006” 1066 . It validated the 
effective alignment of Macedonia’s communication security policy with the EU.  
 
Serbia’s interactions with the EU on that matter also started upon the Commission’s 
delivery of its questionnaire (though later, in 2010). They conveyed, however, 
obligations that were right off more specific than in Macedonia’s questionnaire. 
Instead of merely enquiring into the “capacity to participate in secure communications 
networks”1067, the Commission addressed to Serbia the following set of questions:  
 
“Is the legal framework on security procedures for the exchange of classified 
information which enables secure communication between Member States' 
Foreign Ministries in place? 
 
Does your country comply with the EU security policy requirements? 
Does your country have an agreement with the EU on security procedures for 
the exchange of classified information and has it been ratified?  
 
Does your country comply with the Council Decision of 19 March 2001 
adopting the Council’s security measures (2001/264/EC) as amended by the 
Council”.1068  
 
From its answers to this questionnaire, it is quite clear that political compliance is 
what drove the on-going reform of Serbia communication security policy. In 
drawing up the 2009 Data Secrecy Law, Serbia’s Government reportedly “took 
into account the EU standards and requirements in the field of the system of 
classified information”, in particular the Council Decision 2001/264/EC1069. It also 
acknowledged that the country “has yet to harmonise its legislation in this field 
with the EU regulations”, especially by signing and ratifying the Agreement 
between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on security procedures 
for exchanging and protecting classified information1070. A first agreement with 
the EU was signed in May 2011.1071  
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3.2.5.2.4. EU vs. Nato: Janus-faced Europeanisation 
 
Asserting that Serbia and Macedonia have adapted their organisational settings 
through political compliance with EU standards may be misleading. Indeed, these 
“EU standards” are not genuinely “EU” standards; they have been taken over from 
NATO’s toolbox1072. One should not, therefore, put the EU on a pedestal, whilst 
inferring Europeanisation. It is not responsible for the alpha and omega of Serbia and 
Macedonia’s adaptational changes in this specific field of diplomatic communication 
policy. And one should acknowledge the decisive role of Nato vis-à-vis the EU. 
 
The adoption of European security standards in the field of diplomatic 
communications is rooted in Nato’s Partnership for Peace programme (PfP), which 
Macedonia joined in 1995, and Serbia in 2006. It was brought a step further as 
Macedonia deepened its cooperation with Nato in the framework of the individual 
partnership programmes (IPP) and MAP (Membership Action Plan) processes. And it 
was monitored by Nato throughout the process, e.g. through regular PfP inspections. 
By joining the PfP programme, Serbia and Macedonia committed themselves to 
professionalise their crypto-communication systems according to Nato security 
standards. These standards were stipulated in Serbia and Macedonia’s respective 
bilateral Security Agreement with Nato, which predate those concluded with the EU. 
They pertain to personnel security (e.g. issuance of security certificates according to 
the “need to know” principle)1073; administrative security (with the creation of a 
central registry and several sub-registries)1074; physical security (with construction 
and surveillance norms) 1075 , and also address the issue of exchanging classified 
information through Nato’s secure communication and information networks 
(CIS)1076. These Nato standards only entered the EU’s CFSP acquis more recently, as 
the EU developed its activities in domains overlapping Nato’s scope of action1077. In 
communication security matters, then, it can be observed that Nato preceded the EU 
in building the interaction structure on which Serbia and Macedonia now operate.  
 
But in a context marked by the tightening of EU-Nato relations, disentangling Nato 
from EU standards is risky, at best. EU norms are indeed in all respects very close to 
Nato standards. They even “travelled” from one institution (Nato) to another (the EU), 
resulting in their inter-institutional harmonisation. In 2000, Javier Solana, who just 
ended his mandate as Nato’s Secretary General, introduced, as EU High 
Representative, the proposal to reform the protection of classified information 
applicable to the EU. This proposal ensued through an exchange of letters between the 
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Secretaries-General of Nato and the Council Secretariat on 26 July 2000 1078 . It 
tightened the EU’s security standards, put them in line with Nato, and paved the 
ground of the more comprehensive security agreement the two organisations signed in 
20031079. Considering the inter-institutional context, in which Serbia and Macedonia 
professionalised their diplomatic communications networks, speaking of European 
structures rather than EU or Nato structures is more appropriate than ever. This 
broader understanding of Europeanisation contrast with a conception of EU-isation 
that would overestimate the transformative power of the EU in foreign policy. 
 
3.2.6. Summary of the findings 
 
Over the past 15 years, Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy actors have undergone 
critical changes in the organisational design of their foreign policy institution, in at 
least three respects: administrative capacity-building, extension of the geographical 
coverage of their diplomatic network and technical capacity-building. These changes 
have affected both administrations differentially, and have placed Serbia and 
Macedonia’s foreign policy actors at a ringside seat of the blurring distinction 
between the domestic and the foreign in Europe. Most of them can hardly be 
understood in isolation of the European context in which they took place. Of course, 
one should not fail to emphasise that Serbia and Macedonia did not engage in 
reforming their foreign policy organisations with the same heritage. Unlike 
Macedonia, which had to create its foreign policy apparatus from scratch in the 1990s, 
Serbia could rely on a long diplomatic tradition affording larger resources and 
expertise.  
 
Many of the observations described in the previous section barely conceal a European 
lineage. For instance, shortly after gaining its status of EU candidate in 2005, 
Macedonia established its SEA, initiated EU-related reforms in the MFA, created a 
Unit for CFSP, increased the staffing and training of its EU/Nato-related units, 
assigned a diplomat in Brussels to deal specifically with the CFSP, speeded up its 
training process in EU and CFSP matters, and brought its diplomatic communications 
structure in line with EU standards. The same is true of Serbia, although its 
organisational reforms started later in the 2000s, as did its institutional rapprochement 
with the EU. A deeper examination of the underpinnings of these organisational 
changes confirms that these are no coincidence. They were entailed by cross-level 
interactions on European structures, which gained impetus as the two countries came 
closer to the EU.  
 
First, at the interface between the domestic and the European levels, inter-sectoral 
bodies have been established as autonomous agencies of the Government (SEA/SEIO), 
in order to monitor the horizontal coordination of the European integration process, 
the implementation of European agreements and to facilitate the adoption of the EU’s 
acquis, including in CFSP matters. The main difference between Macedonia’s SEA 
and Serbia’s SEIO is found in their organisational history. Whereas the SEA emerged 
in 2005 as a response to Macedonia’s being granted the status of EU candidate, the 
SEIO was established in 2004 as it became clear that the EU integration would no 
                                                 
1078 Duke, S. 2006. ‘Intelligence, Security and Information Flows in CFSP.’ Intelligence and National 
Security vol.21 (4). 
1079 Council of the European Union. 3 June 2003. ‘Security Standards for the Protection of Classified 
Information Exchanged between Nato and the EU.’ 
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longer be treated in Belgrade at the state union’s level. If the stimulus is different, the 
rationale for building up inter-sectoral capacities is similar. For both, the process was 
not driven by political compliance; it was all about the anticipation of future needs 
(and not so much about adaptation to existing conditions), in a context prioritising EU 
accession as primary objective. In creating their SEIO/SEA, Serbia and Macedonia’s 
actors drew lessons from foreign models’ experiences. And the engagement at the 
bilateral level (and with the support of the EU) of EU candidate or EU member states 
side by side with Serbia/Macedonia certainly facilitated the latter’s experiential 
learning. Some of these models (especially Slovenia’s) were emulated. Domestic 
politics (in Serbia) and access to financial resources (both in Serbia and Macedonia) 
did play a role in this process, but not in a decisive manner; they were intervening 
variables.  
 
Second, within the ministries, intra-sectoral bodies have been established for the 
vertical coordination of Serbia/Macedonia’s participation in the CFSP. Macedonia 
underwent its MFA reform in 2005, just after obtaining its status of EU candidate, 
which resulted in the creation of highly specialised, intra-sectoral coordination bodies 
responsible for EU affairs, an organisational emphasis on CFSP coordination, and an 
overall emphasis on building administrative capacities in the field of foreign policy. 
Serbia’s foreign policy administration underwent similar changes, but they started 
later in time (from 2008), and are thus at a much lower state of progress. The absence, 
in the MFA, of an organisational unit dedicated to the CFSP, and the lesser anchoring 
of the EU’s CFSP/ESDP in Serbia’s MFA/MoD contrast with Macedonia’s capacities 
for CFSP coordination, which have been erected at the highest level of the 
organisational hierarchy. All in all, it is mildly convincing to speak of political 
compliance here, except perhaps, when the Commission’s reports emit 
recommendations that are very specific or when its demands the nomination in the 
MFA of specific positions (Political Director and European Correspondent). In the 
absence of thorough understanding of what these posts stand for, the EU’s insistence 
on appointing them eventually led to shallow reforms. At the crux of the 2005 MFA 
reform in Macedonia was a “learning by doing approach”, fostered by the favourable 
dispositions held by foreign policy actors in the MFA with regards to establishing an 
organic link between Skopje’s MFA and European affairs. In Serbia, the process of 
reform has not advanced at the same pace, because the Kosovo issue continues to 
monopolise much of the organisational energy of the MFA. More limited in scope, MFA 
reforms in Serbia nonetheless signalled Serbia’s wish to treat distinctly EU and Nato 
integration processes. So, they were also designed to send a message.  
 
Third, the capacities of Serbia and Macedonia’s permanent missions for outreach 
coordination have increased over the past 15 years. After obtaining its candidate 
status, Macedonia’s mission to the EU viewed its staff considerably growing, and now 
even counts a CFSP diplomat in Brussels. Serbia’s mission to the EU had to wait till 
the signature of its SAA in 2008 to see comparable, albeit more modest, changes. 
Likewise, Macedonia’s efforts to increase its capacities for outreach coordination with 
Nato have been intensified well before Serbia’s. Although Serbia and Macedonia’s 
permanent missions to the UNGA and international organisations in Vienna 
(including OSCE) have a comparable role vis-à-vis their respective home ministries, 
in the OSCE, Macedonia’s permanent mission tends to demonstrate more autonomy 
than Serbia’s. This de-concentration of foreign policy decisions on alignment has 
been developed gradually, as a response to the time constraints under which the 
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alignment mechanism is enacted. Since the EU only communicates its statement to 
non-EU states a few hours before OSCE meetings, little time is left for consultations 
within the MFA. Serbia and Macedonia did not develop their capacities for outreach 
coordination because of specific obligations; they draw lessons from previous 
candidate states, and emulated their experience in that matter.  
 
Fourth, changes have affected the geographical coverage of Serbia and Macedonia’s 
diplomatic networks. These have been extending gradually over time. The extension 
is most impressive in the case of Macedonia, since the newly independent state, in the 
mid 1990s, started from scratch in terms of bilateral representations. After an initial 
restructuration, Serbia gradually re-extended the geographical coverage of its 
diplomatic network, especially from 2008 onwards. But this dual extension of Serbia 
and Macedonia’s diplomatic networks should not be seen as a manifestation of 
Europeanisation. By reifying the EU as sole point of reference, bracketing other 
determinants, and implicitly positing EU integration as primary source of change, 
deductive approaches tend to overestimate the salience of the EU independent 
variable in the analysis of social changes. The idea that opening new embassies shall 
accelerate Serbia or Macedonia’s European integration is not convincing. There is no 
direct requirement in the EU’s conditionality regime, which pertains to the opening of 
new embassies, and bilateral affairs, in practice, often remain separate from, if not 
insensitive to, EU multilateralism. Although some embassies do advertise European 
integration in their host country, their interest for European affairs is primarily 
rhetorical. It is not a determinant that decisively matters in the decision to open a new 
embassy –it is at best a facilitating factor. The reasons that actually matters here are 
primarily economic, i.e. in order to support investments. They are sometimes political 
too, especially in the case of Serbia, which fosters countries that have not recognised 
the independence of Kosovo. This deceptive case of pseudo-Europeanisation is very 
interesting because it demonstrates the flaws of deductive research: all the changes 
that affect Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy cannot be traced back to 
interactions on European structures.  
 
Fifth, Serbia and Macedonia have witnessed changes related to the professionalisation 
of their foreign policy actors. They both put a growing emphasis on diplomatic 
training. Owing to the lack of domestic capacities for the provision of diplomatic 
training, Macedonia swiftly demonstrated a strong interest in being included in all 
forms of CFSP/ESDP training organised by European actors. It only recently planed 
to open a Diplomatic Academy (project stalled since 2007). By contrast, domestic 
structures for diplomatic training have been established in Serbia well before 
Macedonia, and the country can moreover rely on a long diplomatic tradition. This 
makes Serbia’s MFA less dependent on foreign expertise. Serbia’s diplomacy can 
most notably rely on its Diplomatic Academy, reformed after the regime change in 
2000. The Academy has even become attractive to foreign diplomats (above all from 
the region). In Serbia and Macedonia, diplomatic training ensued through a demand-
driven process. The programmes were developed on a voluntary basis with the 
involvement of EU member states. Serbia and Macedonia’s participation in EU and 
Nato integration programmes provided the background stimulus for enhancing 
diplomatic training. The aim was to respond to the EU’s requirement regarding MFA 
competence and avoid looking unskilled before EU and Nato peers. For Serbia, it was 
also to improve the negotiating position of its diplomats in a CFSP context.  
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Sixth, Serbia and Macedonia have reformed and modernised their diplomatic 
communication networks. But Macedonia started this process already in the 1990s, 
through its participation in the PfP programme, modernised its internal 
communication network, and in the 2000s, set up the legal and technical foundations 
that allow the MFA to securely exchange classified information with the EU and its 
member states in the field of the CFSP/ESDP. Less connected to European structures, 
Serbia only started to adapt its communications system in 2007/2009, through the PfP 
programme. Its participation in the EU’s diplomatic communication network remains 
very limited. This capacity building process was first initiated in a context of Euro-
Atlantic integration, with Nato in the forefront, and only then taken over by the EU. 
Although it is now closely monitored by the Commission, one should nonetheless 
acknowledge the decisive role Nato continues to play in the creation and diffusion of 
security norms. Europeanisation here, more than elsewhere, differs from EU-isation. 
Considering the inter-organisational context, in which Serbia and Macedonia 
professionalise their diplomatic communications networks, speaking of European 
structures rather than EU or Nato structures is more appropriate than ever.  
 
3.3.  Changes in Serbia and Macedonia’s border regimes 
 
This section examines some aspects of Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy 
contexts. It explores Serbia and Macedonia’s changing attitudes towards border 
dispute settlement; infers Europeanisation from a European approach to good 
neighbourliness; and analyses the uneven achievements in this area, as well as their 
underpinnings. 
 
3.3.1.  Descriptive analysis: Serbia and Macedonia’s border disputes 
 
3.3.1.1. The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the uti possidetis principle 
 
The dissolution of the SFRY did not ensue peacefully, by means of a treaty concluded 
by the constituent republics. It resulted from a series of secessions that led to the 
constitutional collapse of the federation. In 1990, for the first time since 1945, multi-
party elections took place in the different republics of the SFRY. In Slovenia, Croatia, 
Macedonia and Bosnia, the nationalist parties, campaigning against Milošević, 
heavily defeated the Communists1080. Their victory not only signalled the initiation of 
democratisation in the SFRY. Because their demands regarding the transformation of 
the SFRY into a confederation of sovereign independent states were antagonistic to 
the position held by the Communist party led by Milošević, the SFRY suffered 
internal tensions, which culminated with the unilateral secession of Slovenia and 
Croatia (on 25 June 1991) and Macedonia (on 8 September 1991).  
 
In an attempt at appeasing the mounting tensions in the region, the European 
Community convened a Peace Conference on Yugoslavia and set up an arbitration 
commission under the chairmanship of Robert Badinter 1081 . The commission 
consisted of the presidents of five Constitutional Courts in Europe. It was to provide 
legal advice on sensitive issues related to the on-going dissolution of the SFRY, 
                                                 
1080 See Glaurdic, J. 2011. The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia. p. 81-
117. 
1081 Bühler, K. G. 2001. State Succession and Membership in International Organizations. p. 180-185. 
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amongst which the question of international borders. In its Opinion No. 3 of 20 
November 1991, the Badinter Commission suggested that “former boundaries”, i.e. 
boundary arrangements previously existing between the constituent republics, should 
“become frontiers protected under international law” 1082 . This recommendation, 
amounting to upgrading the status of internal borders in the eyes of international law, 
was based on the uti possidetis principle, which had formerly been applied to settle 
decolonisation issues and had become customary law1083. Opposed to the use of force, 
the Badinter Commission added that “the Republics’ territories and boundaries could 
not be altered without their consent” 1084. Disputes should instead be resolved through 
peaceful negotiations.  
 
The recommendations of the Badinter Commission paved the ground of the 
international recognition of the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia, and concluded on the legal extinction of the SFRY, 
contra Belgrade, which claimed that the FRY continued the international personality 
of the SFRY1085. Though contested, the Badinter Commission’s decision to apply the 
uti possidetis principle to the SFRY dissolution was grounded on “historically well-
established boundaries”, for which no reasonable alternative could have been found in 
the absence of consensus among the Republics1086.  
 
The application of this principle was no panacea. It did not avert the violence that 
broke out throughout Yugoslavia, and it did not ward off disputes on border 
delineation, which erupted after the constituent republics became independent 
sovereign states. Indeed, boundaries between the constituent republics of Yugoslavia 
were not always demarcated, and not even precisely delineated. Governments, after 
all, “establish interstate boundaries to separate states and peoples, while they establish 
or recognize internal boundaries to unify and effectively govern a polity” 1087 . 
Upgrading these internal boundaries into international borders then created a new set 
of territorial issues, which had so far been overlooked. Many of the territorial areas, 
for which no precise borderline had been agreed on before the dissolution of the 
SFRY, suddenly, gained the status of dispute over international borders. They became 
a challenge to regional stability and a plague for good neighbourly relations.  
 
3.3.1.2. Macedonia’s border disputes 
 
Before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Macedonia had no territorial contention with its 
neighbours. Its borders had been delineated under international law by the SFRY in 
                                                 
1082 Pellet, A. 1990. ‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the 
Self-Determination of Peoples.’ European Journal of International Law vol.3 (1). p. 185. 
1083 The uti possidetis principle provides that international borders shall not be changed by force. After 
a war, the belligerents shall accordingly either recover their territory, or agree, by treaty, to change 
borders. In the aftermath of the war in Yugoslavia, the uti possidetis principle was applied to the 
constituent republics of the SFRY (an not to the autonomous provinces such as Kosovo).  
1084 Pellet, A. 1990. ‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the 
Self-Determination of Peoples.’ European Journal of International Law vol.3 (1). p. 185. 
1085 The UNSCR 777, adopted on 19 September 1992, considered that the SFRY had ceased to exist, 
and that its membership in the UN had extinguished. Refuting the FRY’s claim for SFRY succession, it 
recommended to the UNGA that the FRY should apply for membership as a distinct object. 
1086 Vidmar, J. 2010. ‘Confining New International Borders in the Practice of Post-1990 State 
Creations.’ Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht vol.70. p. 346-351. 
1087 S. Ratner cit. in Ibid. p. 327. 
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concert with Greece, Albania and Bulgaria. Serbia and Macedonia were both 
constituent republics of the SFRY, and Kosovo was an autonomous province within 
Serbia. So, little attention had been paid to precisely documenting the boundary, 
which runs on the Northern part of Macedonia for about 300km, mostly along Kosovo. 
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, however, the existence of grey areas in about 5% 
of this 300km-long border became the subject of a bilateral dispute1088.  
 
The dispute first opposed Skopje to Belgrade. On 8 April 1996, Macedonia and the 
FRY established diplomatic relations and engaged in solving their bilateral issues. A 
joint diplomatic commission was established in order to “prepare a draft for an 
international agreement” delineating the joint state border 1089 . The two parties, 
however, disagreed on different aspects of border delineation. Whereas Skopje 
demanded the strict application of the uti possidetis principle, Belgrade’s claim 
extended to parts of Macedonia’s territory, which Milošević had deemed of strategic 
importance1090. Where the uti possidetis principle could not be invoked (for internal 
boundaries between the two SFRY constituent republics had not been precisely 
delineated), the two parties also disagreed on the guiding criterion to use. Ethnicity 
and geography could both be invoked, with different implications. Belgrade and 
Skopje finally diverged with respect to specific issues. Macedonia, for instance, was 
concerned about its access to the Prohor Pčinski monastery. Located on the Serbian 
side of the border, along the river Pčinja, it was important to the historiography of 
Macedonia’s nation. Between 1996 and 2001, the joint commission held 14 working 
sessions in order to find a common ground1091. Its work paved the ground of the 
“Agreement for determining the extension and delineation of the state border”, signed 
by the Presidents of the two states on 22 February 2001 and ratified by their 
assemblies shortly after.  
 
This agreement could have sounded the death knell of Macedonia’s only border 
dispute, had it not concerned Kosovo. The first attacks against the agreement were 
launched shortly after its signature by radical groups of Albanians, who disputed the 
uti possidetis principle, arguing instead, contra Skopje, that borders should be 
delineated along ethnic lines1092. The Kosovo war (1998-1999) had just ended, and 
encouraged by their victory over Belgrade, some paramilitary fractions of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army strived for uniting Macedonia’s ethnic Albanians with those in 
Kosovo. The signature and ratification of the 2001 Agreement between the FRY and 
Macedonia then sounded as a provocation, which some analysts argued, “was one of 
the triggers for the [2001] conflict in Northern and Western Macedonia”1093. Incidents 
at the border with Kosovo soon erupted, with several casualties, and military and 
paramilitary operations broke out in neighbouring villages (e.g. Tanuševci) 1094 . 
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Despite the 2001 agreement, the FRY-Macedonian border, therefore, could not be 
physically demarcated. 
 
Albanian leaders in Kosovo soon also questioned the validity of the bilateral 
agreement between Macedonia and the FRY. They argued that the 2001 border had 
been delineated “without the presence of Kosovo’s team”1095, and announced their 
will to revise the agreement1096, stirring up Belgrade’s ire. At stake was a border area 
in Macedonia populated by ethnic Albanians, which had witnessed violent protests in 
2001 (e.g. Tanuševci, Kodra Fura), and overall, 2500 hectares of land claimed by both 
sides1097. The declaration of independence of Kosovo on 17 February 2008 brought 
Macedonia back to negotiations. A joint technical commission was set up in 18 April 
2008, under the “mediation and chairmanship of the International Civilian Office” of 
Kosovo1098, in order to find a solution to the dispute “within one year”1099. Its work 
led to the conclusion on 16 October 2009 of a bilateral agreement between Macedonia 
and Kosovo, amending the 2001 agreement between the FRY and Macedonia1100. 
Following the agreement, Macedonia and Kosovo officially established diplomatic 
relations, on 17 October 2009. 
 
3.3.1.3. Serbia’s border disputes 
 
Serbia has border disputes with all its ex-SFRY neighbours, and none of them has 
been solved. With Montenegro, first, it has a territorial dispute over a 50km-long 
segment of land and forests, between Bijelo Polje (Montenegro) and Prijepolje 
(Serbia). The dispute erupted in 2006, following the independence of Montenegro, 
and has since then affected the local life in this area1101. Belgrade and Podgorica 
initially considered looking for a solution to the issue, but the recognition by 
Montenegro of the independence of Kosovo in 2008 had a negative impact on Serbo-
Montenegrin relations, and the process of border demarcation was accordingly stalled. 
After three years of stalemate, the dialogue between Belgrade and Podgorica 
eventually made some progress, when an interstate diplomatic border commission 
convened for the first time on 7 March 2011. Its role is to “regulate the delimitation of 
the border, local border traffic and the opening of border crossings”1102. 
 
Serbia also has several border disputes with Bosnia-Herzegovina. One concerns the 
river Lim, a tributary of the Drina, and Sastavci, a small village on its Southern bank. 
Located in Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the cadastre, it is surrounded by Serbian 
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territory and cut off the rest of Bosnia by the river Lim. It is a Bosnian enclave in 
Serbia, well connected to the Serbian municipality of Priboj, and well integrated in 
the local economy1103 . Serbia and Bosnia have different positions regarding this 
territorial issue. The former would like to peg the border to the course of the Lim 
River, and thereby acquire the village in exchange of a piece of territory of the same 
size. The latter, by contrast, advocates the creation of a territorial corridor, under 
Bosnian control, linking the enclave to Bosnia. The other disputes concern the few 
kilometres of Bosnian territory (around Štrpci) travelled across by the Belgrade-Bar 
railway. The line was constructed at the time of the SFRY, as there was no border 
regime. And there is also the Bajina Basta – Zvornik section of the Drina, which 
harbours a hydroelectric power station, which Serbia revitalises on the Bosnian side 
of the river1104. These border disputes are still open. Despite the establishment in 2005 
of an interstate cooperation council, which has not convened, and its reactivation in 
2010, no progress has been made in resolving these issues1105. 
 
With Croatia, the border dispute concerns a segment of the Danube River, from the 
Hungarian border in the North to the village of Ilok in Slavonia. This segment 
contains two disputed islets (Vukovarska ada and Šarengradska ada), and involves a 
substantial number of security forces. In the cadastres, the course of the Danube used 
to mark the border between Serbia and Croatia on this segment. But centuries of land 
erosion and sedimentation have changed the course of the once meandering Danube. 
It now flows relatively straight, and its gravity centre shifted to the West, in the 
direction of Zagreb. The result of this geological process is 11000 hectares of 
contested land in Vojvodina and Baranija, and divergent positions regarding 
navigation rights on the present-day Danube (with incurring economic benefits)1106. 
Referring itself to the Austro-Hungarian cadastres, Croatia defends the idea that its 
border still lies where the cadastral record put it 200 years ago, and claims the strict 
de juris respect of the uti possidentis principle formulated by the Badinter 
Commission.1107 Serbia, by contrast, calls for pegging the borderline to the thalweg of 
the Danube, in accordance with international practices and puts forwards its de facto 
understanding of the uti possidentis principle1108. In order to look for a common 
ground, an interstate diplomatic border commission was set up in 20011109. But it did 
not convene until April 2010, as Serbo-Croatian relations gained a fresh impetus1110. 
A second meeting of the Commission took place in November 2010, but the issue, to 
date, remains open.  
 
Serbia now also considers that it has a territorial dispute with Macedonia over the 
portion of land renegotiated by Skopje with Pristina in 2009. Belgrade, indeed, does 
not recognise the independence of Kosovo, and therefore argues that  
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“by signing and ratifying the Agreement on physical demarcation of the 
border between Macedonia and Kosovo in October 2009, the Macedonian 
party […]  violated the 2001 Agreement on demarcation and definition of the 
State border with Serbia (FRY)”.1111 
 
By resolving its dispute with Kosovo at the bilateral level, Macedonia inevitably 
reopened a contentious issue with Serbia. Another bilateral dispute, of course, 
concerns the delineation of the Southern border of Serbia, which is a very sensitive 
bone of contention between Belgrade and Pristina. The issue is very complex, since 
Belgrade fiercely opposes the independence of Kosovo. At stake is not only the 
international status of the separation line between Serbia and Kosovo or a quarrel over 
borderlands. It is a matter of contested sovereignty with far-reaching implications in 
terms of regional instability, and it will therefore be analysed in a dedicated section. 
 
3.3.2.  Inferring Europeanisation from European good neighbourliness 
 
Despite the landmark recommendations of Badinter Commission regarding the 
application of the uti possidetis principle in the Western Balkans, Serbia and 
Macedonia have both experienced border disputes with their ex-Yugoslav neighbours. 
The magnitude of these disputes has been variable. Some concerned relatively 
unpopulated areas of little strategic interest (e.g. the Serbo-Montenegrin border), 
whereas others proved more sensitive, because of their economic spinoffs (e.g. 
navigation rights on the Danube) or their ethnic background (Macedonia-Kosovo 
border). Some disputes even claimed their lot of casualties (FRY/Kosovo-Macedonia 
border).  
 
Although these border disputes are typically bilateral in nature, their resolution takes 
place in a wider environment, impregnated by international norms. These norms, of 
course, do not determine the course or the terms of the negotiations. They have no 
agency of their own. But they frame the negotiations, by designating what the 
collective understanding of good-neighbourly relations is, and what an appropriate 
behaviour means. That is why even utterly bilateral issues have an international (and 
in this case European) dimension. And that is why one may conceive of 
Europeanisation in the field of border regime. The EU is, as a matter of fact, a key 
diffuser of international norms in the Western Balkans. But it is not, as such, a norm-
maker. Before (and in addition to) being an EU principle, good-neighbourliness is, 
first and foremost, a general principle of international law. What the EU, however, 
achieves in this international context is (with uneven results) to introduce its own 
practice of this general principle of international law. 
 
3.3.2.1. Good neighbourliness as general principle of international law 
 
The good neighbourliness principle is not an EU principle per se. It is a general 
principle of international law, derived from the purposes and principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations1112. Already in 1957, the United Nations General Assembly 
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(UNGA) called upon neighbouring states to “develop friendly and cooperative 
relations and settle disputes by peaceful means”1113. It substantiated its understanding 
of the good-neighbourliness principle in different resolutions, e.g. in 19791114 and 
19811115 , and called for its more specific application in Europe during the Cold 
War1116, and in South-Eastern Europe after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In 2002, 
2004 and 2006, the UNGA, reviewing the key issues in Western Balkans, accordingly 
stressed  
 
“the importance of good-neighbourliness and the development of friendly 
relations among States, and call[ed] upon all States to resolve their disputes 
with other States by peaceful means, in accordance with the Charter”.1117 
 
The UNGA accordingly expressed, in the same set of resolutions1118, its support for 
the 2001 border delineation agreement between Macedonia and FRY, which it 
deemed valid (at least until 2006), despite the opposition of Kosovo leaders on the 
ground. These resolutions, passed without a vote in the UNGA, received the support 
of Serbia and Macedonia1119. 
 
The good-neighbourliness principle did not remain the preserve of the United 
Nations’ normative system. In the 1970s, the principle travelled into the normative 
setting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe1120, and became one 
of the pillars of the OSCE’s work in Eastern and South Eastern Europe. In 1990, its 
participating states celebrated good-neighbourliness by declaring: 
                                                                                                                                            
to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”. United Nations. 1945. ‘Charter of 
the United Nations.’ 
1113 United Nations General Assembly. 14 December 1957. ‘Resolution on Peaceful and Neighbourly 
Relations among States ’. 
1114 United Nations General Assembly. 14 December 1979. ‘ Resolution on the Development and 
Strengthening of Good Neighbourliness between States.’ 
1115 United Nations General Assembly. 9 December 1981. ‘Resolution on the Development and 
Strengthening of Good Neighbourliness between States.’ 
1116 . In 1965, the UNGA requested the “governments of European states to intensify their efforts to 
improve reciprocal relations, with a view to creating an atmosphere of confidence”. United Nations 
General Assembly. 21 December 1965. ‘Actions on the Regional Level with a View to Improving 
Good Neighbourly Relations among European States Having Different Social and Political Systems.’ 
1117 Point 8, United Nations General Assembly. 30 December 2002b. ‘Resolution on the Maintenance 
of International Security – Goodneighbourliness, Stability and Development in South- Eastern Europe.’; 
Point 8, United Nations General Assembly. 16 December 2004. ‘Resolution on the Maintenance of 
International Security – Goodneighbourliness, Stability and Development in South- Eastern Europe.’; 
Point 7, United Nations General Assembly. 19 December 2006. ‘Resolution on the Maintenance of 
International Security – Goodneighbourliness, Stability and Development in South- Eastern Europe.’ 
1118 Point 8, United Nations General Assembly. 30 December 2002b. ‘Resolution on the Maintenance 
of International Security – Goodneighbourliness, Stability and Development in South- Eastern Europe.’; 
Point 8, United Nations General Assembly. 16 December 2004. ‘Resolution on the Maintenance of 
International Security – Goodneighbourliness, Stability and Development in South- Eastern Europe.’; 
Point 7, United Nations General Assembly. 19 December 2006. ‘Resolution on the Maintenance of 
International Security – Goodneighbourliness, Stability and Development in South- Eastern Europe.’ 
1119 Without membership, Kosovo was not given the possibility to express its position regarding the 
UNGA resolutions.  
1120 The Article IX of the Helsinki Final Act provides that the participating states “will endeavour, in 
developing their co-operation as equals, to promote mutual understanding and confidence, friendly and 
good-neighbourly relations among themselves. The Helsinki Final Act also prescribes the peaceful 
settlement of disputes. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 1 August 1975. ‘Helsinki 
Final Act.’ 
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“we reaffirm our commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means. [And we] 
pledge to co-operate in strengthening confidence and security among us”.1121 
 
At that time, the SFRY was signatory to the Charter of Paris, but the admission of 
Macedonia in 1995 and the readmission of Serbia (as FRY) in 20001122 signalled their 
adherence to this principle.  
 
The OSCE’s engagement in promoting good neighbourly relations in the Western 
Balkans has been acknowledged by the United Nations ever since. The 2002, 2004 
and 2006 UNGA resolutions on good-neighbourliness in South-Eastern Europe all 
welcomed the supportive role the OSCE played in this respect. But they put a higher 
emphasis on the role of the EU in the region, which it praised for its contribution to 
good-neighbourliness. The UNGA thus insisted that  
 
“the rapprochement of the South-Eastern European States with the European 
Union will favourably influence the security, political and economic situation 
in the region, as well as good-neighbourly relations among the States”.1123 
 
And it therefore encouraged Western Balkan states to “pursue […] integration into 
European structures”1124, ensure their active participation in the Stability Pact for 
South-Eastern Europe and engage in the stabilisation and association process 
launched by the EU. 
 
3.3.2.2. Good-neighbourliness according to the EU 
 
The good-neighbourliness principle entered the EU’s normative system relatively late, 
in the beginning of the 1990s and at the policy level first, e.g. regarding the EU’s 
emergent migration policy1125, or its relations with the Middle East1126. It was for the 
first time placed at the core of an EU policy in 1994, when the Council, acting on the 
basis of a joint action, set up a Pact on Stability in Europe, also called “Balladur Plan” 
for Central and Eastern Europe. The Plan aimed at “promoting good neighbourly 
relations, including questions related to frontiers and minorities”1127. It was designed 
to avert tensions by consolidating the borders of Central and Eastern European states 
and to 
 
“encourage countries which have not yet concluded cooperation and good 
neighbourliness agreements and arrangements, including minority and 
                                                 
1121 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. 1990. ‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe.’. 
See also the Point 18 of the Warsaw Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. 8 July 1997. 
1122 The OSCE membership of the FRY had been suspended between July 1992 and November 2000. 
1123 Point 12, United Nations General Assembly. 30 December 2002b. ‘Resolution on the Maintenance 
of International Security – Goodneighbourliness, Stability and Development in South- Eastern Europe.’ 
1124 Point 4, United Nations General Assembly. 16 December 2004. ‘Resolution on the Maintenance of 
International Security – Goodneighbourliness, Stability and Development in South- Eastern Europe.’ 
1125 Annex 5A, point 6., European Council. 11/12 December 1992. ‘Conclusions of the Presidency ’.  
1126 Point 29, European Council. 26/27 December 1992. ‘Conclusions of the Presidency ’. 
1127 Point 1.5, Council of the European Union. 14 June 1994. ‘Council's Decision on the Continuation 
of the Joint Action Adopted by the Council on the Basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union 
on the Inaugural Conference on the Stability Pact.’ 
 208
border issues, to do so, through a process of bilateral negotiations and 
regional tables”.1128 
 
While defining the role of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) as being responsible for monitoring the implementation of such agreements, 
the EU, which initiated the Pact, expressed its “readiness to play the role of moderator 
in the bilateral talks”1129. In 1997, at the occasion of the European Conference, the 
good neighbourliness principle was introduced as a component of the accession 
process towards CEE countries. CEE states aspiring to join the EU had to engage in 
resolving their bilateral disputes at first, or, as European Council put it, they  
 
“must share a common commitment to peace, security and good 
neighbourliness […] and a commitment to the settlement of territorial 
disputes by peaceful means, in particular through the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice”.1130 
 
The introduction by the EU of its own practice of international law in that field soon 
also became a corner stone of the EU’s policy towards the war-torn Western Balkans. 
On 13 December 1995, at the suggestion of the EU, the five successor states of the 
SFRY, together with the EU and other partners (e.g. the OSCE), adopted a 
Declaration on the Process of Stability and Good Neighbourliness1131. Inspired by the 
Pact on Stability in Europe, the EU, under French Presidency, launched the 
Royaumont Process one year later, in order to build in the Balkans a “new Europe, a 
Europe of democracy, peace, unity, stability and good neighbourliness”1132 . The 
Council backed this initiative by appointing a Process Coordinator, calling the FRY to 
fully participate in the process, and 
 
“encourag[ing] the normalisation of relations and the restoration and 
development of dialogue and confidence between the countries 
concerned”.1133  
 
Because it did not offer accession perspectives, lacked substance on key issues (e.g. 
border dispute resolution) and did not succeed in relieving the tensions at the brink of 
the Kosovo war, the process of Royaumont “never took off the ground”1134. It was, 
however, succeeded by a more institutionalised forum: the Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe (SPSEE). The SPSEE was launched as an initiative of the EU under 
German Presidency in June 1999. Its purpose was to foster cooperation among 
Western Balkan states, “preventing and putting an end to tensions and crises as a 
prerequisite for lasting stability” and “creating peaceful and good-neighbourly 
                                                 
1128 Point 1.7, Ibid. 
1129 Point 2.4, Ibid. 
1130 Point 5, European Council. 12/13 December 1997. ‘Conclusions of the Presidency ’. 
1131 Ehrhart, H.-G. 1998. ‘ Prevention and Regional Security: The Royaumont Process and the 
Stabilization of South-Eastern Europe.’ In OSCE Yearbook. p. 331. 
1132 Declaration on the Process of Stability and Good Neighbourliness, Royaumont, 13 December 1995, 
cit. in Ibid. 
1133 Article 1, Council of the European Union. 9 November 1998. ‘Common Position Concerning the 
Process on Stability and Good-Neighbourliness in Southeast Europe.’ 
1134 Missiroli, A. 2004. ‘The EU and Its Changing Neighbourhood: Stabilization, Integration and 
Partnership.’ In European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, ed. 
Dannreuther, R. p. 14. 
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relations in the region”1135. In addition to initiating the project, the EU played a 
leading role in the Pact, in particular by offering European perspectives to its 
participants. Although the FRY was excluded from the SPSEE at the time of its 
foundation, it joined the structure in October 2000, and was henceforth bound to its 
good neighbourliness principle.  
 
Just as it did through the “Balladur Plan”, the EU gradually linked the accession 
perspectives of Western Balkan states to their compliance with the good-
neighbourliness principle. Following the Zagreb and Thessaloniki Summits in 2000 
and 2003, the Council stated that  
 
“cooperation and good-neighbourly relations form an essential part of the 
process of moving towards the EU”.1136 
 
Then, in 2005, the European Council made the link between good-neighbourliness 
and EU accession more explicit. It explained, in two sentences placed side by side, 
that  
 
“each country's progress towards European integration […] depends on its 
efforts to comply with the Copenhagen criteria and the conditionality of the 
stabilisation and association process. In this process, regional cooperation 
and good neighbourly relations will remain essential elements of EU 
policy”.1137 
 
In 2009, the link between good-neighbourliness and accession perspectives became 
perfectly clear. Because they may jeopardise the enlargement process, bilateral 
disputes should be resolved. As explained by the Council:  
 
“While stressing the importance of good neighbourly relations and the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, the Council underlines that bilateral issues 
should not hold up the enlargement process. Bilateral disputes need to be 
resolved by the parties concerned, who have the responsibility to find 
solutions in a spirit of good neighbourliness, bearing in mind the overall EU 
interests”.1138 
 
Over the past 10 years, the EU’s engagement in promoting good-neighbourliness in 
the Western Balkans has gradually gained in stringency. First formulated as a vague 
recommendation, the principle was later associated with increasingly specific 
applications, regardless of the substantive competences of the EU in that matter. In 
2011, it was even given a temporal determinant. The Council declared indeed:  
 
“[we] encourages all parties concerned to address bilateral issues, falling 
outside areas of EU competence and/or contractual obligations towards the 
                                                 
1135 Point 5, European Council. 10 June 1999. ‘Cologne Declaration on the Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe.’ 
1136 Council of the European Union. 13 October 2003. ‘Council Conclusions on the Western Balkans ’ 
p. 3. 
1137 Point 41, European Council. 16/17 June 2005. ‘Conclusions of the Presidency ’. 
1138 Point 4, Council of the European Union. 7 December 2009. ‘Draft Council Conclusions on the 
Enlargement, Stabilisation and Association Process.’ 
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EU, in a constructive spirit, as early as possible, taking into account overall 
EU interests and values”.1139 
 
Slowly but surely, the good-neighbourliness principle has entered the grey area of the 
EU’s political criteria. It is now projected in the Western Balkans through 
conditionality-based measures, and the Commission’s progress reports now include a 
section on compliance with this principle. The Commission, for instance, requested in 
its Questionnaire that Serbia and Macedonia provide an overview of their relations 
with neighbouring countries, including “outstanding bilateral issues” 1140 , “border 
issues and prospects for solutions”1141 In 2007, the good neighbourliness principle 
even entered the European Treaties (through in the framework of the ENP)1142.  
 
Over the past 15 years, the EU has played a leading role in the promotion of good 
neighbourly relations in the Western Balkans. Through the initiatives it initiated, the 
European perspectives it offered and the conditionality approach it adopted, the EU 
has transformed the good-neighbourliness general principle of international law into a 
guiding principle of European law, and has set up a new frame for the conduct of 
neighbourly relations in the Western Balkans. In so doing the EU has increased the 
normative compellingness and the stringency underlying the general principle of 
good-neighbourliness. It is by the yardstick of this EU-impregnated general principle 
of good neighbourliness that the Europeanisation of Serbia and Macedonia’s 
neighbourly relations can be assessed.  
 
3.3.2.3. Good-neighbourliness according to the EU and through regional initiatives 
 
In addition to initiating and guiding this development directly from Brussels, the EU 
also backed regionally-owned initiatives aiming at improving good neighbourly 
relations. In 1996, the Foreign Ministers of South-Eastern European states convened 
at Bulgaria’s instigation in order to launch the Southeast European Cooperation 
Process (SEECP). The SEECP, also called “Sofia Process”, was to provide a forum 
fostering political dialogue in the region. One of its priorities lay in the enhancement 
of stability, security and good-neighbourliness. Though locally-owned, the SEECP 
expressed from the beginning on its willingness to receive the EU’s support. In their 
founding statement, the members of the SEECP thus declared themselves  
 
“convinced that they are in consonance with […] the Royaumont process and 
accordingly expect that they will be fully supported by the European 
Union”.1143 
 
                                                 
1139 Point 7, Council of the European Union. 5 December 2011. ‘Council Conclusions on Enlargement 
and Stabilisation and Association Process.’ 
1140 Question I.148, European Commission. 2004. ‘Questionnaire Delivered by the European 
Commission to the Republic of Macedonia.’; Question I.151, European Commission. 12 October 
2011b. ‘Commission Opinion on Serbia's Application for Membership of the European Union.’ 
1141 Question I.151, European Commission. 12 October 2011b. ‘Commission Opinion on Serbia's 
Application for Membership of the European Union.’ 
1142 The new article 8 of the Treaty of Lisbon. 13 December 2007. provides that “the Union shall 
develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity 
and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful 
relations based on cooperation”.  
1143 Sofia Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations Stability Security and Cooperation in the 
Balkans. 7 July 1996. 
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The role the SEECP expected the EU would play in the organisation was not to get 
directly involved in the Sofia Process. It was more inspirational than operative, more 
participative than leading. Being “consonant” with the EU in its support for good-
neighbourliness, the SEECP was to use the impetus of European integration to 
promote political dialogue in its own regional format. It would, occasionally, involve 
the EU in “concrete fields and projects of common interests”, while remaining distinct 
from EU frameworks 1144 . In 2000, the SEECP, “welcoming the adoption of the 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe”, expressly called for  
 
“creating peaceful and good-neighbourly relations in the region through 
reconciliation, recognition of the inviolability of the existing borders and the 
peaceful resolution of disputes, on the basis of international law”.1145 
 
It furthermore clarified its relationship with the EU, “emphasizing the European 
orientation” of SEECP countries, and “expressing [its] strong belief that European and 
Euro-Atlantic integration is essential in promoting countries’ common objectives”1146.  
 
The EU, unsurprisingly, reciprocated its support to the SEECP. Its action was deemed 
“mutually reinforcing”1147. No efforts were spared in linking the SPSEE to the SEECP 
in order to reinforce the former’s local ownership. For instance, the EU proposed to 
involve the SEECP in the nomination of a representative from South-east Europe 
(SEE) in order to take part in the coordination of EU-led SPSEE and SAp 
activities1148. It also drew lessons from the SEECP’s experience, when it decided in 
2008, to transform the internationally-led Stability Pact into a locally-owned 
organisation, the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC)1149.  
 
The road followed by the good-neighbourliness general principle of international law 
has been long and curvy. Through its enlargement policy towards Western Balkan 
states, the EU has played the role of key stakeholder in the promotion good-
neighbourliness. But it also acted indirectly, supporting rather than initiating, 
regionally-owned approaches. It is in this context –a context in which the importance 
of good-neighbourliness is magnified as European integration proceeds- that Serbia 
and Macedonia pursue their national approach to border dispute settlement.  
 
3.3.3.  Argumentative analysis 
 
The following section examines the structural causes, dispositional reasons and 
intentional motivations underpinning the practice of the EU’s good neighbourliness 
principle in the field of border dispute resolution. For each of the border disputes 
described in the first section, it emphasises the role of the EU and its member states, 
                                                 
1144 Thessaloniki Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations Stability Security and Cooperation in the 
Balkans. 10 June 1997. 
1145 South-East European Cooperation Council. 12 February 2000. ‘Charter on Good-Neighbourly 
Relations Stability Security and Cooperation in Southeastern Europe.’ 
1146 Ibid. 
1147 Point 35 and 38, Council of the European Union. 11 May 1999. ‘Western Balkans Working 
Group's Draft Text Serving as Position to Be Taken by the EU in Preparatory Meetings 
with Other Participating States and Organisations.’ 
1148 Council of the European Union. 1 July 2002. ‘Draft Minutes of the 2416th Meeting of the Council 
(General Affairs).’ p. 13. 
1149 European Council. 19/20 June 2008. ‘Conclusions of the Presidency ’. 
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unveils the mechanisms of Europeanisation that might have been at work, whilst 
recognising that other factors (domestic and international) have often been more 
decisive. 
 
3.3.3.1. The role of the EU in the 2001 FRY-Macedonia border dispute settlement 
 
From their initiation in April 1996 to their successful conclusion in 2001, the EU has 
followed with great attention the negotiations surrounding the FRY-Macedonian 
border dispute. But overrun by the deterioration of the situation, first in Kosovo 
(1998-1999) and then in Macedonia (2000-2001), the EU did not really manage to 
make its voice heard. The pre-eminence of the United States in the region as 
guarantor of material security, the credible involvement of international organisations 
in securing legal and political orders, and the prioritisation of other sensitive issues 
more important to the EU and its member states, all contributed to lighten the EU’s 
perceived engagement in matters of border dispute resolution. Despite its many efforts, 
namely deployed trough its conditionality dialogue with the FRY and Macedonia, the 
EU therefore failed to play a decisive role in bringing about the 2001 border 
agreement.  
 
Aware of its potentially disruptive effect on regional stability, the Commission 
already noted in 1997 that the  
 
“unresolved question of borders [between FRY and Macedonia] remained 
the major obstacle to the development of co-operation”.1150 
 
But the Commission had few instruments at its disposal to promote border dispute 
resolution. The 1996 Royaumont Process lacked substance in this issue-area, and the 
Regional Approach, which allowed the exercise of hard conditionality, did not really 
cover good-neighbourliness. The EU rather pinned its hopes on regional, locally-
owned initiatives. In November 1997, in the framework of the Sofia Process, the 
heads of state and government of SEE convened in Crete the first Inter-Balkan 
summit. The border dispute between FRY and Macedonia was on the agenda. But 
despite bilateral consultations between Milošević and Gligorov (and a previous 
meeting between the foreign ministers in August), the Commission noted in 1998 that 
“no statement of an agreement” could be made 1151 . Although the tone of the 
Commission in these reports seems informative at first, it in fact conceals sheer 
disappointment. In the absence of a more stringent framework tying the FRY and 
Macedonia to the EU, the EU’s margin of manoeuvre remained very limited. 
 
With the war raging in Kosovo, the EU’s conditionality dialogue with the FRY 
understandably came under increasing strain. The relations between the FRY and the 
EU decayed, as did those between the FRY and Macedonia. In its 1999 report, the 
Commission took note of the “severe deterioration in relations” between the two, “due 
to the conflict in Kosovo and the destabilising effect of the influx of large numbers of 
                                                 
1150 European Commission. 19 October 1998. ‘Regional Approach Conditionality Report: Compliance 
with the Conditions Set out in the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997.’; European Commission. 30 
March 1998. ‘Regional Approach Conditionality Report: Compliance with the Conditions Set out in 
the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997.’ 
1151 European Commission. 19 October 1998. ‘Regional Approach Conditionality Report: Compliance 
with the Conditions Set out in the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997.’ 
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refugees”1152. The stationing of Nato troops in Macedonia infuriated Belgrade, and 
trade relations between the two countries broke off1153. These developments made the 
perspective of settling the border dispute even more unrealistic.  
 
But the EU did not blame the FRY and Macedonia indiscriminately for the decay of 
their good neighbourly relations. It took a differentiated approach, exercising blame 
and shame conditionality against the FRY, whilst intensifying its support for 
Macedonia and rewarding it with new incentives. This differentiated approach was 
essential in the EU’s exercise of conditionality at the turn of the century. Milošević’s 
regime, for good reasons, received the blame for the failed attempts at settling the 
FRY-Macedonian border dispute, and, more generally, for the deterioration of 
regional security. The border dispute with Macedonia was last in a series of problems 
of higher intensity, which Milošević’s grip on power, once tolerated, had set fire to. 
Cutting the Gordian knot, the Commission noted in 2000 that  
 
 “Serbia’s position hit an all-time low with its exclusion, alone among the 
region, from the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe”1154.  
 
But the EU did not content itself with rejecting the FRY. It posed implicit conditions 
for the FRY to proceed towards the EU in the future. One of them specifically 
pertained to good-neighbourliness. As stated by the Council, only 
 
“a democratic FRY, fulfilling its international obligations and ready for good 
neighbourly relations, will be able to develop its relations with the EU in the 
same conditions as are countries in the region”.1155 
 
This declaration was aimed at increasing the pressure on Belgrade, without actually 
closing the European doors to the Serbs. In November 2000, as Milošević was still in 
power, the European Council reiterated these watermarked conditions: 
 
“a democratic, cooperative FRY living in peace with its neighbours will be a 
welcome member of the European family of democratic nations”.1156 
 
Of course, the scope of these declarations went beyond the specific issue of FRY-
Macedonian border dispute. But the EU’s general expectations were also to be of 
benefit to issues of lesser intensity, such as border disputes. Conditionality, in this 
case, was not issue-specific, but it was firm enough to frame the general orientation 
towards which the FRY was expected to head.  
 
Despite the absence of actual progress in the dispute resolution process, the EU 
considered that Macedonia fulfilled its expectations with regards to good-
neighbourliness. In 1999, the Commission welcomed Macedonia’s efforts at 
                                                 
1152 European Commission. 17 May 1999. ‘Regional Approach Conditionality Report: Compliance with 
the Conditions Set out in the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997.’ 
1153 Ibid. p. 22. 
1154 European Commission. 9 February 2000. ‘Regional Approach Conditionality Report: Compliance 
with the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997 & 21/22 June 1999.’ 
1155 Council of the European Union. 10 November 1999. ‘Council Conclusions on the Western 
Balkans.’ 
1156 European Council. 19/20 June 2008. ‘Conclusions of the Presidency ’. 
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“strengthening good neighbourly relations by solving all pending issues” 1157 , 
including border issues with the FRY. It also welcomed Macedonia’s initiative within 
the UNGA to pass a resolution on the promotion of good-neighbourliness in the 
Western Balkans1158. This congratulatory attitude strongly contrasted with the severe 
critique against Belgrade’s regime1159. It was backed in deeds by important progress 
in the EU-Macedonia relationship. At the midst of the Kosovo crisis, three weeks 
before the beginning of Nato activities in Kosovo, the Government of Macedonia 
submitted its first formal request for EU membership. The Foreign Minister of 
Macedonia at that time, Aleksandar Dimitrov estimated then that 
 
“it is of vital importance to raise the relations between Macedonia and the 
EU to the next level”.1160 
 
One year later, SAA negotiations started. They were completed by the end of 2000. 
One of the provisions of the SAA was to enshrine the good-neighbourliness principle 
in contractual terms, namely 
 
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia commits itself to enter into 
cooperation and good neighbourly relations with the other countries of the 
region”.1161 
 
Since the negotiations were blocked by Milošević, no progress could be recorded. But 
the EU’s differentiated approach towards the FRY and Macedonia, despite its weak 
leverage on the FRY, aroused key dispositions that were unleashed both in Serbia and 
Macedonia with the overthrow of Milošević’s regime.  
 
The regime change of October 2000 in the FRY opened a new page in FRY-
Macedonian relations. The democratic forces that overthrew Milošević lifted the 
FRY’s reservations against Macedonia’s claim for border demarcation, and were 
eager to initiate the normalisation FRY-Macedonian relations. As stated by Vojislav 
Koštunica, FRY’s new President in 2001, settling the border dispute with Macedonia 
was  
 
“an expression of something deeper than any policy and democracy, such as 
the traditionally good relations between our two nations”.1162 
 
This new disposition severely contrasted with Milošević’s accusation against 
Macedonia’s “stabbing him in the back” in 19921163, as the country declared its 
                                                 
1157 European Commission. 17 May 1999. ‘Regional Approach Conditionality Report: Compliance with 
the Conditions Set out in the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997.’ 
1158 See United Nations General Assembly. 8 January 1998. ‘Resolution on the Development of Good-
Neighbourly Relations among Balkan States.’ 
1159 The EU also praised Macedonia for accepting the deployment of Nato forces on its territory 
1160 Dimitrov, A. 2006. ‘1998-2000: Further Strengthening of the Position and Role of Macedonia.’ In 
The Macedonian Foreign Policy -Interviews of the Foreign Ministers of Macedonia, ed. Mircev, D. p. 
48. 
1161 Art. 4, Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their 
Member States of the one part and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of the other part. 26 
March 2001. 
1162 Cit. in Milenkoski, M. and Talevski, J. 2001. ‘Delineation of the State Border between the Republic 
of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.’ Boundary and Security Bulletin vol.8 (2). p. 95. 
1163 Nikolic, D. 2001. ‘Macedonian Border Dispute Nearing End.’ In Balkan Crisis Report vol.221. 
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independence. It cleared off the political obstacles that punctuated the work of the 
joint diplomatic commission, and enabled the emergence of constructive dialogue 
between Belgrade and Skopje on the issue. Besides, the change in the FRY’s 
dispositions occurred as the EU-Macedonia relationship was gaining momentum. 
Skopje, which had started its SAA negotiations in April 2000, was eager to 
demonstrate its commitment to good neighbourliness. In October 2000, it was about 
to conclude its SAA negotiations, and the regime change in the FRY then was an 
opportunity to materialise this dedication. According to Foreign Minister Dimitrov,  
 
“on our own initiative, we managed to tackle the problem of the disputed 
border, especially after the democratic changes in Yugoslavia and the 
election of the new Government. It finally gave us a chance to resolve this 
issue and to remove it from the agenda”1164 
 
The haste with which Macedonia engaged in settling the border dispute can also be 
explained by domestic conditions. The Kosovo war had armed Albanian militias 
fighting for independence mainly in the FRY, but some had become active in 
Macedonia’s borderlands as well. In the Preševo Valley, across the FRY border, and 
in North-Western Macedonia, guerrillas started to launch attacks against the state 
military and state police. They campaigned for greater autonomy and/or the 
annexation of parts of these territories to Kosovo. The rising instability in 
Macedonia’s borderlands stirred up fears in Skopje that the turmoil could spill over 
the country, should the border with the FRY/Kosovo remain subject to contention. 
This concern certainly brought forwards the border dispute settlement process.  
 
In February 2001, at the margins of a SEECP summit, a border delineation agreement 
was finally concluded between Macedonia and the FRY. It was hailed by 
Macedonia’s new Foreign Minister Srgjan Kerim as a “moment of the new history of 
the Balkans and the South Eastern Europe”1165. The role of the EU was therein 
mentioned as providing an ideal framework facilitating foreign policy convergence on 
such issues, for 
 
“the FRY is our neighbour, we wish to have friendship and cooperation and 
to strive towards European integration together” .1166 
 
Similar declarations were made by Serbian officials regarding the 2001 agreement. 
But since the FRY had not intensified its relationship with the EU yet, they remained 
more elusive. President Koštunica nonetheless remarked that the agreement  
 
“sends a clear message that the Balkans, which has lately been a barrel of 
[gun]powder, will become a part of developed Europe and oasis of 
peace”.1167 
 
In a nutshell, in fostering this process, the EU’s exercise of conditionality has not 
been as effective as regime change in the FRY and rising instability in Macedonia’s 
                                                 
1164 Dimitrov, A. 2006. ‘1998-2000: Further Strengthening of the Position and Role of Macedonia.’ In 
The Macedonian Foreign Policy -Interviews of the Foreign Ministers of Macedonia, ed. Mircev, D. 
1165 Cit. in Milenkoski, M. and Talevski, J. 2001. ‘Delineation of the State Border between the Republic 
of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.’ Boundary and Security Bulletin vol.8 (2). p. 94. 
1166 Cit. in Ibid. 
1167 Cit. in Ibid. p. 95. 
 216
borderlands. The former lifted the stalemate; the latter speeded up its outcome. But 
the EU nonetheless fostered the emergence of dispositions in Belgrade and in Skopje, 
which framed the development of good neighbourly relations after the overthrow of 
Milošević and brought forwards the 2001 border agreement.  
 
3.3.3.2. The role of the EU in the 2009 Kosovo-Macedonia border dispute settlement 
 
Unfortunately, the 2001 border agreement did not stabilise Macedonia’s borderlands. 
On the contrary, it increased the tensions between the Macedonian-Slavs and the 
Albanians and fuelled further incidents at the borders. As the situation clearly became 
unstable in North-Western Macedonia, the physical demarcation of the border, 
provided by the 2001 agreement, could not be carried out. The 2001 insurgency in 
Macedonia re-launched the border dispute, and despite the conclusion of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement in August 2001, the situation in the field remained critical.  
 
Following the signature of its SAA with the EU in 2001, Macedonia nevertheless 
enshrined the EU’s good-neighbourliness principle in its European integration 
priorities1168. The Commission continued to monitor the problems surrounding the 
border demarcation issue, but only through its dialogue with Macedonia and later, 
Kosovo. In the Commission’s eyes, the border demarcation issue no longer opposed 
Macedonia to the FRY1169. It was now a matter of contention between Macedonia and 
Kosovo, where the key obstacles to border demarcation subsisted. Local authorities in 
Kosovo were the most opposed to 2001 demarcation line, so that the Commission in 
2003 noted: 
 
“for the moment, the security situation along the Kosovo part of the border 
remains too fragile for the border demarcation to proceed with the necessary 
co-operation of the authorities in Kosovo”1170 
 
As a result, the Commission conditioned its assistance with the preliminary 
stabilisation of the border, and refused to unblock the 1 million euro it promised for 
the demarcation of the Macedonian border section with Kosovo1171. It called in the 
first place both stakeholders to adopt a “pragmatic approach”, e.g. opening cross-
border points to facilitate local traffic 1172 . But this pragmatic approach was not 
satisfactory, since it did not dissipate the sources of instability which had already set 
Macedonia on fire in 2001. Many of the villages which were close to the disputed 
border harboured prominent insurgents, e.g. Xhezair Shaqiri aka “Hoxha 
Commandant” in Tanuševci. Although these had become too weak to launch new 
                                                 
1168 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. June 2001. ‘Action Plan for the Implementation of the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement.’ 
1169 In its assessments of Serbia’s compliance with the EU’s political criteria, the Commission 
consistently overlooked the fact that the 2001 border agreement had not been fully implemented. 
1170 European Commission. 26 March 2003. ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation 
and Association Report 2003.’ 
1171 Dnevnik. 3.7.2003. ‘EU Not to Finance Macedonian Border Demarcation until Kosovo Section 
Stable.’ 
1172 European Commission. 26 March 2003. ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation 
and Association Report 2003.’ 
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large-scale attacks, they controlled the area and shrugged off the rule of law1173. As 
explained by an OSCE monitor in Skopje,  
 
“Macedonia was a multiethnic state, with lots of internal weaknesses. 
Following the violent crisis in 2001, the international community had 
guaranteed its stability. But the undefined borders with Kosovo remained 
problematic. People there were isolated from the rule of law and nationalists 
from all sides were using the issue to spark off new tensions”.1174 
 
Since Kosovo did not recognise the 2001 border agreement sealed by the FRY, it was 
urgent to reopen the negotiations in order to get rid of this source of instability once 
and for all. But since Kosovo, under international administration, was no sovereign 
state, it could not negotiate and conclude international treaties modifying its borders 
on its behalf. As for the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), its margin of manoeuvre was also limited by its very mandate, and it could 
therefore not go against Serbia on this issue. The solution, then, had to be found in the 
framework of the international negotiations over the status of Kosovo, which started 
in 2005. The EU and the US therefore supported the linkage of this border issue with 
the negotiations taking place under the aegis of the UN. For Kosovo, settling the 
border dispute in this framework was also highly desirable.  
 
In 2005, the Council 1175  and the Commission 1176  warmly supported the 
recommendations of the UN Special Envoy Kai Eide. Reporting on the conditions to 
enter the political process designed to determine the future status of Kosovo, Kai Eide 
prescribed that:  
 
“the demarcation of the border with the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia […] should be resolved before this process ends”.1177 
 
Although these recommendations were firstly addressed to Kosovo, the government 
of Macedonia acknowledged their appropriateness before the EU, in its 2006 
European integration plan1178. The country had just become EU candidate, and it was 
keen on maintaining its European integration momentum.  
 
In order to ease the process, the EU, in its 2006 European Partnership with Macedonia, 
further recommended that the issue be considered as “technical in nature” 1179, and not 
quintessentially as political. This approach, first suggested by the EU-Macedonia joint 
                                                 
1173 Joe Herzbrun. 'Stabiliser La Frontière Entre La Macédoine, Le Kosovo Et La Serbie'. [accessed 
12.3.2013]. 
1174 Interview with a Senior Officer from the Osce Mission in Skopje. Skopje, 12/3/2013 
1175 Council of the European Union. 7 November 2005. ‘Conclusions on the Western Balkans.’ 
1176 European Commission. 15 November 2005. ‘Speech by EU Commissioner Rehn on the 2005 
Enlargement Package.’ 
1177 United Nations. 7 October 2005. ‘Kai Eide Report on a Comprehensive Review of the Situation in 
Kosovo.’ p. 19. 
1178 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. March 2006. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of 
the Acquis Communautaire.’ 
1179 Council of the European Union. 30 January 2006. ‘Council's Decision on the Principles, Priorities 
and Conditions Contained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro Including Kosovo 
as Defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999.’ 
 218
parliamentary committee in December 2005 1180 , aimed at lifting the political 
impediments that weighed on the negotiations. It was agreed upon by the Prime 
Ministers of Macedonia and Kosovo in May 20061181, and its modalities were shortly 
after enshrined in the 2007 “Ahtisaari Plan”: 
 
“Kosovo shall engage with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to 
establish a joint technical commission within 120 days of the entry into force 
of this Settlement to physically demarcate the border and address other 
issues arising from the implementation of the 2001 agreement between the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia”1182 
 
Representatives of the international community were to act as facilitators in the 
discussion process between the two parties. Since the “Ahtisaari Plan” received the 
intelligible endorsement of the Council1183 and the European Parliament1184, and since 
it gave a fresh impetus to the relations between Kosovo and Macedonia and provided 
a clear framework for settling the border dispute, the government of Macedonia 
understandingly welcomed the deal. It declared that it would look for a solution “in 
line with” the Ahtisaari Plan1185, while remaining “committed to aligning with the EU 
position on the Kosovo status process”1186. Both approaches would be bound together 
in a mutually supportive way.  
 
The unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo in February 2008 speeded up 
the border negotiations process in an indirect, albeit decisive way. In July 2008, 
Macedonia’s largest party, the VMRO-DPMNE, formed a ruling coalition with the 
largest Albanian party in Macedonia, the BDI. Founded by Ali Ahmeti, the political 
leader of the Macedonian branch of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK), the BDI 
advocated the recognition of the independence of Kosovo. This was achieved in 
October 2008, as Macedonia established informal relations with Pristina. Its decision 
was received with utter delight. According to Kosovo’s Prime Minister Hashim Taçi:  
 
“this strengthens peace and stability in the region. It further clarifies the 
political reality in the region and it helps the integration of our countries into 
the EU and Nato”.1187 
 
                                                 
1180 In its final statements, the EU-Macedonia joint parliamentary committee repeatedly emphasised 
the” importance of finalising the technical process for the demarcation of the state border between the 
Republic of Macedonia with Serbia and Montenegro” European Union - Republic of Macedonia Joint 
Parliamentary Committee. 6 December 2005. ‘Final Statement.’; European Union - Republic of 
Macedonia Joint Parliamentary Committee. 30 January 2007. ‘Final Statement.’; European Union - 
Republic of Macedonia Joint Parliamentary Committee. 27 November 2007. ‘Final Declaration.’ 
1181 Makfax. 'Macedonia-Kosovo Border Demarcation "Technical, Not Political" Issue'. [accessed 
13.12.2012]. 
1182 Annex VIII., article 3, United Nations. 26 March 2007. ‘Martti Ahtisaari's Comprehensive Proposal 
for the Kosovo Status Settlement.’ 
1183 Council of the European Union. 18 June 2007. ‘Conclusions on the Western Balkans.’ 
1184 European Parliament. 15 March 2007. ‘Report on the Future of Kosovo and the Role of the EU.’ 
1185 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. March 2008. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of 
the Acquis Communautaire.’ 
1186 European Commission. 6 November 2007b. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2007 
Progress Report.’ p. 17. 
1187 Osservatorio balcani e caucaso. 13.10.2008. ‘Macedonia Recognises Kosovo.’ 
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But Skopje informally suggested that it would only establish official relations with 
Kosovo upon completion of the border demarcation negotiations1188. This prerequisite 
may have been the result of a compromise in the ruling coalition between the 
Macedonian Albanian BDI, in favour of recognition and the Macedonian-Slav 
VMRO-DPMNE, which expected the border agreement to be favourable to 
Macedonia1189. And indeed, the border agreement turned in Macedonia’s advantage. 
As Macedonia’s Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski insisted,  
 
“Macedonia will not lose a millimetre of its territory. I would never sign 
anything resulting in losing a millimetre or more of Macedonia's territory”. 
1190 
 
Shortly after, in February 2009, an agreement was concluded between Skopje and 
Pristina, and official relations were established between the two countries.  
 
Throughout the negotiation process, the EU remained very active in Macedonia. Its 
representatives in Skopje discussed the issue informally with the Cabinet of the Prime 
Minister, while the US did the same in Pristina. All in all,  
 
“the role of the EU for Macedonia  and the US for Kosovo was essential. 
Both used their political leverage to press for an agreement. Without them, 
there would not have been any. Political elites in Macedonia and Kosovo 
were more concerned by the short term. They lacked the competence and the 
resources to bring by their own the negotiations to an end”. 1191 
 
In Brussels, the EU also became more vocal in its encouragements, as both countries 
neared an agreement. The European Commission, which monitored the work of the 
joint technical commission on borders, gladly welcomed Macedonia’s “good 
progress” 1192 in 2008 and the end of the demarcation process in 20091193. Following 
the conclusion of the 2009 agreement, the EU also issued a series of laudatory 
statements. The European Parliament, for instance, recommending opening accession 
negotiations, celebrated the 2009 agreement “as a vital contribution to regional 
stability”1194. Both the Presidency of the Council1195 and the High Representative for 
the CFSP1196 welcomed an outstanding “sign of maturity, responsibility and mutual 
                                                 
1188 United States Embassy in Skopje. 7.12.2007. 'Macedonia-Kosovo Border Demarcation - Good 
Fences Make Good Neighbors'. [accessed 17.12.2012] 
1189 Macedonian leaders in the Government supported the idea that the 2001 agreement with the FRY is 
valid. 
1190 Macedonian Information Agency. 17.10.2009b. 'Pm Gruevski: Macedonia Not Losing a Millimeter 
with Kosovo Border Demarcation'. [accessed 13.12.2012]. 
1191 Interview with a Senior Officer from the Osce Mission in Skopje. Skopje, 12/3/2013 
1192 European Commission. 5 November 2008c. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2008 
Progress Report.’ 
1193 European Commission. 9 November 2010b. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2010 
Progress Report.’ p. 25. 
1194 European Parliament. 7 February 2010. ‘European Parliament Resolution on the 2009 Progress 
Report on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.’ See also European Parliament. 12 March 
2009. ‘European Parliament Resolution on the 2008 Progress Report on the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia.’ 
1195 Presidency of the Council of the European Union. 17 October 2009. ‘Presidency Statement on 
Good Neighbourly Relations.’ 
1196 Council of the European Union. 16 October 2009. ‘Javier Solana's Statement Congratulating the 
Fyrom and Kosovo on Their Border Demarcation Agreement.’ 
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respect”. The EU-Macedonia SAA Council, responsible of the supervision of the 
implementation of the SAA, also paid tribute to Macedonia as the “first country of the 
former Yugoslavia to have achieved this with all its neighbours” 1197, while the EU-
Macedonia Joint Parliamentary Committee agreed that Macedonia had become “the 
only country of the region having demarcated borders with its neighbours”1198.  
 
In a similar vein, Prime Minister Gruevski, in a self-congratulatory mood, stated that 
he was 
 
“deeply convinced that the agreement is a great success for Macedonia, 
because we close the border issue, which no one managed to solve for years. 
We are to become the first country in the region, at least from the former 
Yugoslav states, to close all border issues”. 1199 
 
And although the agreement was bilateral in nature, it had, according to Macedonian 
Foreign Minister Milošoski,  
 
“a regional and European context, since the endorsement of this agreement 
means that the Republic of Macedonia will be one of the rare countries in 
Southeast Europe having clearly defined borders with neighbours”.1200 
 
In addition to supporting the completion of the border demarcation process through its 
declarations, the EU tried to increase the weight of its conditionality leverage by 
connecting the issue to the adoption of a part of its acquis communautaire relating to 
integrated border management (IBM). Unlike the settlement of border dispute, the 
IBM falls into the scope of the EU’s acquis. It provides a set of general rules and 
guidelines aiming at enhancing “the coordination and the cooperation of all the 
relevant authorities involved in border security and trade facilitation”1201, including 
through the promotion of international cooperation in border management 
activities1202. Although settling border disputes is not included in the EU’s IBM 
catalogue, the EU nonetheless considers it as a prerequisite to the intensification of 
IBM cooperation. In its IBM Guidelines, it accordingly recognised that adopting the 
EU’s acquis in border-management related activities can hardly set aside the need to 
actually complete border demarcation1203. As stated by a expert on this issue, 
 
                                                 
1197 Stabilisation and Association Council between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the 
EU. 27 July 2010. ‘Joint Press Release of the Seventh Meeting.’ 
1198 European Union - Republic of Macedonia Joint Parliamentary Committee. 30 November 2010. 
‘Final Recommendations.’ 
1199 Macedonian Information Agency. 17.10.2009b. 'Pm Gruevski: Macedonia Not Losing a Millimeter 
with Kosovo Border Demarcation'. [accessed 13.12.2012]. 
1200 Macedonian Information Agency. 17.10.2009a. 'Fm Milososki: Demarcation Agreement Makes 
Macedonia a Country with Clearly Defined Borders '. [accessed 13.12.2012]. 
1201 European Commission. 2007. ‘Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the Western 
Balkans.’ p. 13. 
1202 E.g. harmonisation of security practices at the borders, the establishment of one-stop controls and 
joint contingency plans, the organisation of joint training exercises and joint patrols and the facilitation 
of the exchange of information. 
1203 European Commission. 2007. ‘Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the Western 
Balkans.’ p. 79. 
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“You cannot have an effective IBM without clearly demarcated borders. The 
two go hand in hand”.1204 
 
That is why, from 2008, the Commission also monitored the progress of the joint 
technical commission in the light of the EU’s acquis contained in chapter 24: Justice, 
freedom and security. In so doing, the EU reinforced the contractual framework in 
which border dispute resolution fell. This cross-cutting approach to border dispute 
settlement had a financial component, since the EU under the CARDS scheme, was to 
contribute (as of 2005) to the implementation of the IBM in the Western Balkans.  
 
In a nutshell, although the EU did not take the leading role in setting up the 
framework in which Kosovo and Macedonia authorities were to settle their border 
dispute, it actively supported the efforts deployed in the framework of the UN-backed 
talks. The EU thus contributed to the 2009 settlement by helping framing the border 
issue as technical in nature rather than political, expressing its commitment to the 
Ahtisaari Plan, encouraging the progress realised by the joint technical commission, 
using its political leverage in order to speed up the negotiations, and increasing its 
conditionality leverage by placing the border dispute resolution process close to the 
acquis-laden framework of integrated border management. Of course, other factors 
have also facilitated this achievement (e.g. the 2008 Kosovo declaration of 
independence). But these have mattered in a much lesser extent than in the 2001 
resolution of the FRY-Macedonian border dispute. All in all, it appears that the EU 
did play an essential role in the conclusion of the 2009 border agreement between 
Macedonia and Kosovo. 
 
3.3.3.3. The EU in the settlement of Serbia’s unresolved border disputes 
 
Until 2010, Serbia made little progress in settling its border disputes with its 
neighbours. And yet, it was bound, since 2003, to the “the development of good-
neighbourly relations” by its EU-Serbia joint declaration on political dialogue1205. 
Even its 2005 national strategy paper certifies that Serbia would progress in this area 
using “the existing forums […] especially in the context of European Union 
accession”1206. The formation of joint border commissions with Croatia in 2001 and 
with Bosnia in 2005 responded to this shared commitment, but since these 
commissions failed to convene and remained largely inactive, no progress could be 
observed though. 
 
Throughout its conditionality dialogue, the EU nonetheless endeavoured to bring 
forwards some change. In 2005, the Commission started to monitor Serbia’s 
neighbourly relations, and already pointed out “important issues are still outstanding, 
notably border demarcation with Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina”, but it later 
qualified these “problems that recur” as “sporadic” 1207 . In 2006, the Council 
highlighted these border issues in its European Partnership as a challenge for which a 
                                                 
1204 Interview with a Senior Officer from the Osce Mission in Skopje. Skopje, 12/3/2013 
1205 Council of the European Union. 17 September 2003. ‘Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue 
between the EU and Serbia and Montenegro.’ 
1206 Government of the Republic of Serbia. June 2005. ‘National Strategy of Serbia for the Serbia and 
Montenegro's Accession to the European Union.’ p. 44ff.: 
1207 European Commission. 9 November 2005c. ‘Serbia and Montenegro 2005 Progress Report.’ 
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solution should be found in the “short term”1208. This call was backed in 2007 by the 
European Parliament, which taking a more assertive tone, urged the Government of 
Serbia to 
 
“continue the dialogue with its South-East European neighbours on border 
issues, given that territorial demarcations between Serbia and Croatia and 
between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have yet to be established”.1209 
 
In 2008, the good-neighbourliness principle was enshrined in Serbia’s SAA with the 
EU 1210 , and the need for “resolving outstanding border issues with Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina” was again underlined by the Council1211. The Commission, in 
the meantime, maintained its pressure by reiterating that “no progress” had been made 
since 20071212. In its 2009 enlargement strategy, the Commission clearly stated its 
expectations in this regard:  
 
“further progress is required towards finding definitive solutions to the 
various bilateral issues which remain open, particularly as regards 
borders”.1213  
 
But despite its invocations, the Commission was again forced in 2011 to bemoan that 
border demarcation “remains an outstanding issue” that “has still to be resolved”1214.  
 
The reasons why negotiations between Serbia and its neighbours never took off 
throughout the 2000s are multiple, and they often went beyond the sheer technicalities 
of the border dispute. They were linked to highly sensitive political issues between 
Serbia on the one hand and Montenegro, Bosnia and Croatia on the other hand, which, 
spilling over border disputes, hindered their settlement. With Montenegro, this 
political issue was related to the country’s recognition of Kosovo on 9 October 2008, 
hours after Serbia had referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) the question 
of the legality of the Kosovo declaration of independence. Outraged by the news, 
Serbia received Podgorica’s decision as, according to Serbia’s foreign minister Vuk 
Jeremić, “a stab in the back” 1215 . Belgrade retaliated by freezing its diplomatic 
relations with Montenegro and declaring the Montenegrin Ambassador persona non 
grata. The negotiations on border demarcation logically came to a halt. Although the 
                                                 
1208 Council of the European Union. 30 January 2006. ‘Council's Decision on the Principles, Priorities 
and Conditions Contained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro Including Kosovo 
as Defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999.’ 
1209 European Parliament. 25 October 2007. ‘European Parliament Recommendation to the Council on 
Relations between the European Union and Serbia.’ 
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1212 European Commission. 14 November 2007. ‘Serbia 2007 Progress Report.’; European Commission. 
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1213 European Commission. 14 October 2009a. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-
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1214 European Commission. 12 October 2011a. ‘Analytical Report for the Opinion on Serbia's 
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6.10.2008. ‘Jeremić Voices Optimism, Warns Montenegro.’ 
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relations between Serbia and Montenegro were rapidly normalised1216, Podgorica’s 
efforts to deepen its good-neighbourly relations with Kosovo continued to affect 
Serbo-Montenegrin relations. At stake, for Serbia, was Montenegro’s border dispute 
with Kosovo1217, which Podgorica attempted to solve at the bilateral level, directly 
with Pristina. Serbia opposed Podgorica’s initiative, arguing that “there is no border 
between Montenegro and Kosovo, but only borders between Montenegro and 
Serbia”1218. Because it excluded Belgrade from the talks with Pristina, the initiative of 
Podgorica reportedly represented a direct threat to Serbia’s territorial integrity. In an 
attempt to block this move, Serbia consequently conditioned the settlement of its 
border dispute with its inclusion in the negotiations on the Kosovo-Montenegrin 
border. It thereby linked the two border issues, which resulted in a dual stalemate. 
 
With Bosnia Herzegovina, the standstill is rooted in the institutional complexities of 
the state of Bosnia, inherited from the 1995 Dayton Agreement, and the tumultuous 
relations between Belgrade and Sarajevo following the Bosnian war. Practical 
impediments concerned the border commission, set up in 2005. Unlike Serbia-
Montenegro, Bosnian authorities did not authorise its representatives to negotiate 
territorial swaps –a possible solution for the exclave of Sastavci1219. They were not 
authorised either to negotiate the correction of the border line in the areas claimed by 
Serbia 1220 , and their overall capacity to push the negotiations further was then 
dependent on the tripartite Presidency and Council of Ministers. These central organs, 
however, came under increasing strain after the 2006 general elections in Bosnia. The 
internal divisions in Bosnia continued to rise under the government of Milorad Dodik 
in Republika Srpska, and affected the capacity of the central state to make decisions 
on foreign policy issues. From 2007 to 2010, the post of Bosnian Ambassador to 
Serbia remained vacant1221, and from October 2010 to December 2011, no Council of 
Ministers could be formed. In this state of permanent institutional crisis, issues, like 
border disputes, which required central state’s decisions, could hardly be addressed. 
Besides, the relations between Serbia and Bosnia were durably affected by the ICJ 
ruling of February 2007 regarding the genocide of Srebrenica. These tensions were 
only relieved more recently, in 2010, as Serbia’s Parliament adopted a declaration 
condemning the 1995 Srebrenica massacre and Serbia’s President Tadić attended the 
Srebrenica commemoration. But these improvements have had little impact on Serbia 
and Bosnia’s readiness to address their border issue.  
 
Although no progress has been recorded with Croatia either, Serbia’s approach has 
taken an interesting turn in the past few years, characterised by an increasing number 
of references to the EU and its member states, and a renewed will to address the issue. 
Until recently, the border issue was not of primary (not even secondary) interest to 
Serbian authorities. The bilateral relations between the two countries were dominated 
by concerns over normalisation and reconciliation, and sometimes strained by 
sporadic issues, such as the 2008 genocide lawsuit brought by Croatia before the ICJ, 
                                                 
1216 Serbia accredited a new Montenegrin Ambassador in September 2009. 
1217 Montenegro and Kosovo have not finished the demarcation of their state border, and the existence 
of a 11km-long buffer zone remains problematic. 
1218 B92. 16.06.2010. ‘"Serbia-Montenegro Border Demarcated".’ 
1219 SRNA. 8.12.2004. ‘Bosnia, Serbia-Montenegro Disagree on Demarcation Accord.’ 
1220 Ibid. 
1221 European Commission. 5 November 2008a. ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 Progress Report.’ p. 24. 
 224
or populist declarations1222. The resurgence of Serbia’s interest for its border dispute 
with Croatia came with the 2008-2009 border dispute that opposed Slovenia and 
Croatia. The dispute, which concerned the Bay of Piran, was similarly inherited from 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia. But it was not solved as Slovenia joined the EU in 2004. 
Four years later, the bilateral dispute climaxed, when Slovenia brought the bilateral 
issue at the EU level and exercised its veto right against Zagreb. Croatia was 
negotiating its accession and had purportedly transmitted documents to the EU that 
were prejudging its disputed border in the Bay of Piran. The blockade of Croatia’s 
negotiation process with the EU lasted almost one year and stirred up much 
annoyance in Brussels. Since Croatia joined the EU before Serbia in 2013, it could, in 
the future, theoretically use its asymmetrical bargaining position to tentatively force 
Belgrade into an agreement. This possibility is subject to caution. First, it is not sure 
that the EU (i.e. the other member states) would “tolerate a new Piran dispute” 
between Serbia and Croatia1223. Second, Croatian top-level officials have recently 
indicated that they would not follow Slovenia’s path, which they deemed self-
damaging. As stated by Croatian Foreign Minister Vesna Pusić,  
 
“Our experience with Slovenia over the Bay of Piran dispute teaches us that 
it that is best to resolve problems bilaterally if at all possible, but if not, 
international courts and arbitration are still a viable option”.1224  
 
Whether a “new Piran dispute” is likely or not, the legal possibility for one EU 
member states to block the accession process of an acceding state prompted keen 
concerns in Serbia’s MFA. As argued by a high official in the MFA, the experience 
shows that by multilateralising their bilateral disputes, “some actors may try to use the 
EU on some issues” for their own interest1225. This possibility calls for preventive 
actions, drawing lessons from the negative experience of the Piran dispute. As stated 
by a director in Serbian MFA,  
 
“there is from our side the ambition to gradually eliminate all the open issues 
as we proceed towards EU accession. We already have the Kosovo issue, so 
it is in our interest to have the fewest problems”.1226 
 
If Serbia and Croatia do succeed in solving their bilateral dispute through the 
conclusion of a bilateral agreement, then Serbia is also ready to bring the case in front 
of an arbitration court (e.g. under the aegis of the EU) or before the ICJ, in accordance 
with the EU’s good-neighbourliness principle1227.  
 
In 2008-2009, the member states of the EU also started to matter in a different way to 
Serbia –as a reservoir of ideas and a source of inspiration. In the past few years, 
Serbian experts in the MFA have indeed conducted several studies on the border 
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arrangements existing between the member-states in fluvial areas that used to be 
disputed1228. Officials in the MFA were tasked to  
 
“analyse the manner European countries have settled their border disputes in 
fluvial areas, to consult with experts and institutions from these countries and 
to report on their way of doing”.1229  
 
For instance, there have been studies about the Guadiana River border dispute 
between Spain and Portugal 1230  and the Nagymaros-Gabcikovo barrage dispute 
between Hungary and the Slovak Republic 1231. The peaceful settlement of the dispute 
is cited as an example in Serbia’s answers to the Commission’s 2011 
Questionnaire1232.  
 
In the end, structural forces, like conditionality, did not matter as much as 
motivational forces, like negative lesson-drawing and experiential learning, in 
Serbia’s recent change of attitude. Perhaps, the strengthening of the EU’s 
conditionality regime in 2008-2009 has brought further momentum in this sudden 
interest for border dispute resolution. But conditionality cannot be pointed out as a 
cause for action in this respect. As stated by a top-official in the MFA,  
 
“it has a serious impact, […] but I won't say that this [EU condition] is the 
primary reason [for Serbia’s engagement with its neighbours], because we 
would be obliged to cooperate with or without the EU”.1233  
 
EU conditionality is not a prerequisite for good-neighbourliness, and border disputes 
do not need the structural power of the EU to be resolved. Such allegations would 
misgauge the role of the EU. For most of the countries of the Western Balkan states, 
good-neighbourly relations are inherently important, given their common heritage1234. 
The EU, then, “does not impose”1235 the pursuit of good-neighbourly relations. It 
rather acts as “a facilitator”1236, “leaving to the parties to find a solution”, whilst 
                                                 
1228 Ibid. 
1229 Ibid. 
1230 The dispute revolves around a segment of the Guadiana River between the Olivenza and Táliga, 
with a city (Olivenza) claimed by Portugal but administrated de facto by Spain. The issue lost the little 
relevance it had, after the creation in 2009 of the Euroace euroregion.  
1231 The dispute erupted with the construction of a dam, which changed the course of the Danube River. 
It was solved in 1997 by a decision of the ICJ, upon the recommendation of the European Parliament. 
See Englefield, G. 1993. ‘The International Boundary between Hungary and Slovakia: The 
Nagymaros-Gabcikovo Dispute.’ Boundary and Security Bulletin vol.1 (2). 
1232 Republic of Serbia. 2011. ‘Answers of the Republic of Serbia to the EU Questionnaire Delivered 
by the European Commission.’ p. 522. 
1233 Interview with a Top Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. Belgrade, 
12/09/2011 
1234 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Directorate 
General for the European Union. Belgrade, 12/09/2011; Interview with an Official from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Serbia, Directorate for Neighbouring and South-East European Countries. Belgrade, 
15/09/2011 
1235 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Directorate 
General for the European Union. Belgrade, 12/09/2011 
1236 Interview with a Top Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. Belgrade, 
12/09/2011 
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making the item more important to all. As explained by a MFA official involved in 
border dispute resolution: 
 
“for the EU, it is important that there is an atmosphere of dialogue, that 
there is the ambition to settle the dispute in the course of the accession 
process. This is what the EU expects. The EU does not want the problems to 
be forgotten or frozen”.1237 
 
At play there are dispositions creating a positive issue-linkage, according to which 
“good-neighbourliness is part of European integration”1238. 
 
3.3.4. Summary of the findings 
 
Despite the weakness of its CFSP acquis in that area, the EU actively supported the 
settlement of border disputes in the Western Balkans. But the structural impact of its 
conditionality approach should not be overestimated. In fostering the 2001 border 
agreement between Macedonia and the FRY, the EU’s exercise of conditionality did 
not matter as much as regime change in the FRY and rising instability in Macedonian 
borderlands. In fostering the 2009 border agreement between Macedonia and Kosovo, 
the EU played a greater role, hand in hand with the US, very much involved in 
Kosovo. It helped reframing the border issue as technical in nature rather than 
political, backed its linkage with the Ahtisaari process, encouraged the progress 
realised by the joint technical commission, used its political leverage to speed up the 
negotiations and increased its conditionality leverage by linking the border issues to 
the acquis-laden framework of integrated border management. These contributions 
played an essential role in the settlement of the Kosovo-Macedonian border dispute.  
 
Throughout its conditionality dialogue with Serbia, the EU also endeavoured to bring 
forwards some changes, though with limited success. In the border dispute opposing 
Serbia and Montenegro, the EU did not succeed in lifting the deadlock maintained by 
Serbia’s insistence on linking its Montenegrin border issue with its Kosovo’s non-
recognition policy. With Bosnia-Herzegovina, the standstill is rooted in the 
institutional complexities of the Bosnian state and the tumultuous relations between 
Belgrade and Sarajevo. With Croatia, Serbia only started to look at its border issue 
through a European prism following the Croato-Slovenian border dispute over the 
Piran Bay. Despite their many attempts, the EU and its member states, however, did 
not succeed in bringing about any tangible result so far. The only achievement has 
been a rising interest in Belgrade for EU member states’ experiences in that matter, 
and a nascent willingness to draw lessons from them. 
 
Interestingly, border dispute settlement remains, overall, a field in which the EU has 
little influence. Domestic factors remain prevalent in most of the cases described. 
These factors facilitate or constrain the resolution of border disputes in an essential 
manner. Then come the motivational or dispositional forces radiating towards the EU. 
These mattered because good neighbourly relations came to be considered as a 
principle constitutive of what European integration stands for; because Macedonia, 
and to a lesser extent Serbia, became more inclined to consider that good neighbours 
                                                 
1237 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, Directorate for 
Neighbouring and South-East European Countries. Belgrade, 15/09/2011 
1238 Ibid. 
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having settled all disputes is what will make a peaceful Europe; and because resolving 
dispute settlement was sometimes perceived as an opportunity to demonstrate one’s 
commitment to European integration and capacity to learn. Structural forces, in the 
end, barely mattered, except for Macedonia in 2009. Too weak, too vague and too 
circumvolutory to decisively turn the tide of events, conditionality barely went further 
than encouragement and laudatory politics. Despite the 2009 achievement, the EU’s 
practice of the general principle of good-neighbourliness may, in this respect, appear 
quite disappointing. In most of the cases, EU norms merely echoed UN obligations, 
and left few European imprints that would have magnified the compellingness of the 
general principle of good-neighbourliness.  
 
3.4. Changes in Serbia and Macedonia’s approach to critical foreign 
policy issues 
 
This section explores other aspects of the context and output dimensions of Serbia and 
Macedonia’s foreign policy. It assesses the extent to which Serbia and Macedonia 
have inflected their foreign policy approach towards critical foreign policy issues, i.e. 
regarding Macedonia’s naming issue and the Serbia’s Kosovo issue. It infers 
Europeanisation from the settlement of neighbourly disputes through the use of 
European frameworks and analyses the motives, causes and reasons that best account 
for the phenomenon. It should be kept in mind, here, that Serbia’s Kosovo issue and 
Macedonia’s naming differ in an essential respect: the EU membership of one of the 
parties to the dispute (Greece). The analysis will take into account this important 
difference.  
 
3.4.1.  Descriptive analysis 
 
3.4.1.1. Macedonia’s naming issue with Greece 
 
Despite their flourishing economic relations, Skopje and Athens have remained the 
chief protagonists of a bilateral dispute that has been going on for far too long. The 
bone of contention concerns in its core the name of the state of Macedonia, and in its 
peripherals, the use of cultural, linguistic and historical references to Antique 
Macedonia. Although many view the on-going dispute with a certain amusement, its 
apparent triviality is deceptive. The dispute has had wide-ranging implications over 
the past two decades, and certainly not positive ones. It has affected Macedonia’s 
foreign policy well beyond the scope of its bilateral relations with Greece. As a matter 
of fact, it is responsible for the delayed admission of Macedonia to the United Nations 
in 1993 (under the name of FYROM); for a 20-month economic blockade imposed by 
Greece in 1994-1995; for the belated establishment of full diplomatic relations 
between Macedonia and the European Union in December 1995; and for the 
derailment in 2008 of Macedonia’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes. 
In a country fraught with internal weaknesses, this critical issue adds to the impending 
threats hanging over Macedonia’s stability. But surprisingly, it has attracted little 
scholarly attention so far –notwithstanding (many) conspicuously partial writings1239.  
                                                 
1239 Most of the literature on the subject was produced in the mid 1990s at the occasion of Macedonia’s 
quest for international recognition. Among the few recent academic writings on the naming issue 
specifically, see Ragaru, N. 2011. ‘Macédoine-Grèce: Les Pouvoirs De La Toponymie.’; Mavromatidis, 
F. 2010. ‘The Role of the European Union in the Name Dispute between Greece and Fyr Macedonia.’ 
Journal of Contemporary European Studies vol.18 (1); Shea, J. 2008. Macedonia and Greece: The 
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3.4.1.1.1.  The position of Greece 
 
The naming issue arouse in 1991, as Skopje declared its independence under the name 
of “Republic of Macedonia” (RoM). This name, enshrined in the 1991 Constitution, 
followed the appellation borne by Macedonia in the SFRY between 1963 and 1991. 
The republic was then known as the “Socialist Republic of Macedonia”. Having an 
independent “Republic of Macedonia” bordering the Greek region of Macedonia, 
however, ran into Athens’ most outspoken opposition. The reasons of this opposition 
are multiple.  
 
First, there are Greek objections on historical grounds. Athens considers that the term 
of “Macedonia” evokes the ancient kingdom of Macedon, which reportedly “belongs 
to the Hellenic nation” 1240 and is part of Greek culture1241. Of course, this debate on 
the cultural roots of today’s Greece is highly political. Historiographies that shrug off 
the fact that ancient nations were not built on the same foundations as today’s nations 
certainly fell short of scientific value. But, in Greece, they cement the sense of 
national belonging characterising the “Greekness” of the Greeks. That is why Athens 
constantly objects to Skopje’s insistence on naming the country “RoM”, and 
denounces its pretence at sharing the Hellenic legacy. For Greece, this pretence is 
nothing but “theft of Greece’s historical and cultural heritage” 1242.  
 
The dispute also has a plainly political dimension. Greece accuses Skopje of 
“treacherous […] intentions”, i.e. the “promotion of irredentist and territorial 
ambitions […]” in the Greek region of Macedonia 1243 . This region hosts an 
unrecognised minority of Slavo-Macedonians1244, whose presence is not new, but 
whose number decreased in the past century1245. This minority, according to Athens, 
is prone to convey Skopje’s claim over the Hellenic legacy, and translate it in 
territorial terms, stirring up popular agitation and irredentism. If Slavo-Macedonians 
in Greece, after all, come to identify themselves as the proud descendants of 
Alexander the Great, why should they remain under Athens’ thumb? Skopje’s 
pretence, according to Greece, also, is no fiction; it came close to completion after the 
Second World War, as Tito secretly envisioned the creation of a Greater Macedonia 
that would absorb parts of northern Greece1246.  
                                                                                                                                            
Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation; Messineo, F. 2012. ‘Maps of Ephemeral Empires: The Icj and 
the Macedonian Name Dispute.’ Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law vol.1 (1). 
1240 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic. 'Fyrom Name Issue'. [accessed 10/1/2013]. 
1241 Since nations are imagined communities too, the naming issue cannot be solved by simply asserting 
what seem to be historical facts. The vacuity of the historical debate surrounding the naming issue is 
well exposed in Ragaru, N. 2011. ‘Macédoine-Grèce: Les Pouvoirs De La Toponymie.’  
1242 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic. 'Fyrom Name Issue'. [accessed 10/1/2013].  
1243 Ibid.  
1244 The Government only recognises one minority in Greece (the Muslims), and denies the existence of 
Slavic Macedonian communities in Northern Greece. For many Greeks, those who call themselves 
Macedonians, anyway, are no ethnic Macedonians. They are Bulgarians or Yugoslavs. See McDougall, 
G. 18 February 2009. ‘United Nations Human Rights Council Report of the Independent Expert on 
Minority Issues -Mission to Greece.’ p. 13.  
1245 Vankovska, B. 2010. ‘David Vs. Goliath: The Macedonian Position(S) in the Socalled 'Name 
Dispute' with Greece.’ Südosteuropa: Zeitschrift für Politik und Gesellschaft vol.58 (3). 
1246 According to some authors, the creation of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia would have 
responded to Tito’s plan to gain access to Aegean Sea by claiming Greek territory in Greece’s 
Macedonia, e.g. Thessaloniki. See Mavromatidis, F. 2010. ‘The Role of the European Union in the 
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Greece, finally, articulates its argument in the realm of international law, accusing 
Skopje of  
 
“contravening the fundamental principles of international law and order; 
specifically for good neighbourly relations, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity”.1247  
 
Greece denounces, more specifically, Skopje’s alleged violations of the Interim 
Accord, which was reached in 1995 by the two countries under the aegis of the United 
Nations and the patronage of the US. The 1995 Interim Accord commits both 
countries to abide to a code of conduct in international affairs. The accusations of 
Greece concern a set of specific provisions: those stating that none of the parties shall 
question or undermine the territorial integrity of the other (arts 2-4, 6.2), that the two 
parties shall refrain from provocative actions (art. 7.1), that Macedonia shall 
foreswear controversial symbol (art. 7.2)1248, and that Macedonia shall be referred to 
as FYROM in international settings for Greece not to veto its membership (art. 11)1249. 
According to Greece, Macedonia failed to respect “the letter and the spirit of the 
Accord”1250: it portrayed fallacious maps of Greater Macedonia in history school 
books, supported irredentism in Northern Greece, resorted to provocative actions 
against Greece1251, used prohibited symbols1252, and more questionably, used the 
name of RoM in international organisations1253.  
 
Because Skopje allegedly violates the commitments agreed upon under the auspices 
of the United Nations, Greece considers that the naming issue is not a sheer matter of 
bilateral relations. In the 2000s, it therefore took retaliation measures against Skopje, 
and chose to multilateralise the issue in order to put Skopje under greater pressure. 
This decision followed a series of diplomatic achievements that were believed to 
weaken the position of Greece1254, e.g. the admission of Macedonia in Nato’s pre-
accession Membership Action Plan (MAP) process in 1999, the US recognition of 
                                                                                                                                            
Name Dispute between Greece and Fyr Macedonia.’ Journal of Contemporary European Studies 
vol.18 (1). p. 48. 
1247 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic. 'Fyrom Name Issue'. [accessed 10/1/2013]. 
1248 The Interim Accord foresees that Macedonia shall cease to displayed the Vergina Sun on its 
national flag (which it did between 1992 and 1995). The Vergina Sun was found in 1977 on the 
presumed tomb of Philipp II of Macedon.  
1249 As noted by the ICJ in its 2011 ruling, the Interim Accord, however, does not preclude the use of 
ROM in bilateral relations, including between Skopje and Greece. See footnote 1278 and Messineo, F. 
2012. ‘Maps of Ephemeral Empires: The Icj and the Macedonian Name Dispute.’ Cambridge Journal 
of International and Comparative Law vol.1 (1). p. 183. 
1250 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic. 'Fyrom Name Issue'. [accessed 10/1/2013]. 
1251 For instance, Skopje’s decision in December 2006 to rename its airport “Alexander the Great” 
infuriated Greece. 
1252 See the Interview with Greece’s Foreign Minister Dora Bakogiannis in Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung. 28.3.2008. ‘Skopjes Anachronismus Heizt Spannungen An.’ 
1253 Yet, as noted by the ICJ in its 2011 ruling, the Interim Accord does not prevent Macedonia from 
using the name of ROM in its dealings with international organisations. As a matter of fact, Macedonia 
uses consistently its ROM appellation when it addresses the UN and the EU. Article 11 (1) of the 
Interim Accord rather provides that Greece shall not veto the admission of Macedonia, if Macedonia 
accepts to be referred (by others) as FYROM. See footnote 1278 and Messineo, F. 2012. ‘Maps of 
Ephemeral Empires: The Icj and the Macedonian Name Dispute.’ Cambridge Journal of International 
and Comparative Law vol.1 (1). p. 183. 
1254 Ragaru, N. 2011. ‘Macédoine-Grèce: Les Pouvoirs De La Toponymie.’ 
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Macedonia under its constitutional name in 2004 1255 , and the recognition of 
Macedonia as EU candidate in 20051256. In a landmark decision, Greece decided to 
react in 2008 by preventing Macedonia from being invited to join Nato at the 
Bucharest Summit1257. Threatening to use its veto right, Athens, with the support of 
France1258 and a few others, succeeded to overcome the resistance of the US1259 and to 
condition Macedonia’s membership in Nato to the resolution of the naming issue. The 
decision was ultimately taken that 
 
“an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be 
extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has 
been reached”.1260 
 
Greece applied the same logic of “no solution, no invitation”1261 to Macedonia’s 
integration process in the EU. Since 2008, it keeps blocking the opening of 
Macedonia’s accession negotiations, despite the positive recommendations of the 
Commission and the European Parliament. The decision of the European Council, 
reflecting the Greek position, provides that  
 
“further steps by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in its progress 
towards the EU are possible, […but] maintaining good neighbourly relations, 
including a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution on the name issue, 
remains essential”.1262  
 
This position, first uttered in 2008, has been reiterated ever since on a yearly basis, 
and the stalemate remains effective. 
 
3.4.1.1.2.  The position of Macedonia 
 
                                                 
1255 The US recognition of Macedonia under its constitutional name in November 2004 took place on 
the eve of a referendum on the law on municipality borders, providing more autonomy, at the local 
level, for the Albanians in Macedonia. Some argue that ethnic Macedonians traded their support for the 
referendum in exchange with US recognition. See Vankovska, B. 2010. ‘David Vs. Goliath: The 
Macedonian Position(S) in the Socalled 'Name Dispute' with Greece.’ Südosteuropa: Zeitschrift für 
Politik und Gesellschaft vol.58 (3). 
1256 Interview with an Official from the Permanent Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Osce. 
Skopje, 08/03/2011 
1257 Greece, officially, did acknowledge the use of its veto power in the North Atlantic Council to 
prevent Macedonia from securing its invitation. The Declaration of the Bucharest Summit only evokes 
a lack of consensus among Nato members. And indeed, Greece did not stand alone against Macedonia, 
but received the support of others, e.g. France and Spain. Still, in its 2011 ruling, the ICJ observed that 
the ground for the objection of Greece laid in the naming dispute, not in other factors. The support it 
got from other partners therefore also related to the naming dispute. Although no formal veto was used 
at the Bucharest Summit, the position of Greece, in practice, therefore amounted to the unlawful use of 
veto powers. See Para 71, International Court of Justice. 5 December 2011. ‘Judgment of the Court 
Regarding the Objection by Greece to the Admission of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
to Nato.’ and Messineo, F. 2012. ‘Maps of Ephemeral Empires: The Icj and the Macedonian Name 
Dispute.’ Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law vol.1 (1). p. 182.  
1258 United States Embassy in Athens. 9.6.2008. 'Sarkozy Vows Athens'. [accessed 4.3.2013] 
1259 United States Embassy in Athens. 26.8.2008. 'Scenesetter for Ambassador Lagon's September 1-3 
Visit to Greece'. [accessed 4.3.2013] 
1260 Point 20, North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 3 April 2008. ‘Bucharest Summit Declaration.’ 
1261 GreekNews. 25.2.2008. ‘Karamanlis: No Solution Means No Nato Invitation to Skopje.’ 
1262 Point 56, European Council. 19/20 June 2008. ‘Conclusions of the Presidency ’. 
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The Macedonians, on the other side, view the term of “Macedonia” as part of their 
national identity1263. Already questioned by the Serbs, who oppose the autocephaly of 
the Macedonian Orthodox Church1264 , and by the Bulgarians, who challenge the 
idiosyncrasy of Macedonian language, the Macedonians perceive the objections of the 
Greeks as a threat to their fragile sense of identity 1265  and a denial of their 
fundamental “right to self-identification”1266. They argue, indeed, that every country 
should be allowed to choose its own name; that its constitutional name, “Republic of 
Macedonia”, is already in use for bilateral purposes in most of the UN Security 
Council (e.g. by the United States, the United Kingdom, China and Russia most 
notably), and that it has been recognised by the majority of the UN membership1267. 
For Macedonia, using RoM should be the norm in international affairs, and Skopje 
thus reserves the right to deny the establishment of diplomatic relations with countries 
that fail to use RoM, especially at the bilateral level, such as Cyprus 1268 . In 
multilateral settings, Macedonia takes a more acceptant position, pursuant the 1995 
Interim Accord and the UNSC resolution 817/1993. Therein, it accepts “being 
provisionally referred to” as FYROM1269. But FYROM, then, is not considered as the 
country’s actual name; it is an interim designation, which others may use to label 
Macedonia1270. As stated already in 1993 by Macedonian Prime Minister Crvenkovski,  
 
“the Republic of Macedonia will in no circumstances be prepared to accept 
the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” as the name of the 
country”.1271 
 
Macedonia also systematically rejects the accusations of Greece regarding its alleged 
plans for territorial expansion. It argues that the realisation of such plans would 
                                                 
1263 This claim has been reiterated by leading figures of the government over the past fifteen years, e.g. 
lately, in Kurir. 14.6.2012. ‘Gruevski: Greece Should Realize That Macedonians Live in Macedonia.’ 
1264 The Macedonian Orthodox Church is autonomous from the Serbian Orthodox Church since 1959. 
But in 1967, the Archbishopric of Ohrid in Macedonia declared its full administrative independence. Its 
proclaimed autocephaly implies that the archbishop is not appointed by the patriarch of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church. The autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church is rejected by the Serbian 
Orthodox Church and other national Orthodox Churches.  
1265 The Macedonian identity is even more fragile, as it is split between Slavo- and Albano-
Macedonians. But this difference does not seem to create a cleavage in the position towards 
Macedonia’s name. Despite their electorate, which is often more open to a compromise with Greece, 
Albanian parties tend to align themselves with Slavo-Macedonian parties, when they enter a ruling 
coalition. See Azizi, A. 2012. ‘Euro-Atlantic Integration of Macedonia and the Name Issue: Viewed 
from the Prism of Albanians.’ Mediterranean Journal of Social Science vol.3 (8). 
1266 Republic of Macedonia. 16 November 2012. 'Address by the President H.E.Mr. Gjorgje Ivanov at 
the Congress "90 Years of Paneuropa"'. [accessed 15.2.2013]. 
1267 As of September 2012, 134 countries reportedly recognised Macedonia under its constitutional 
name. Republic of Macedonia. 27 September 2012. 'Address by the President H.E.Mr. Gjorgje Ivanov 
at the 67th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations'. [accessed 15.2.2013]. 
1268 Macedonia has established diplomatic relations with 167 states to date. Not all of them recognise 
Macedonia under its constitutional name though. France, Germany and of course Greece, for instance 
only use FYROM in their official correspondence. Interview with an Official from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, Directorate for Bilateral Relations with Non European 
Countries. Skopje, 03/11/2011  
1269 United Nations Security Council. 7 April 1993. ‘Resolution on the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.’ 
1270 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, United 
Nations Unit Skopje, 07/03/2011 
1271 Republic of Macedonia. 24 March 1993. ‘Letter from Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski 
Addressed to the President of the UN Security Council.’ 
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contravene the domestic and international obligations it freely and bindingly 
subscribed to. Skopje first recalls that its Constitution was amended in January 1992 
in order to explicitly provide that the country has “no territorial claims against 
neighbouring states”, and that it “shall not interfere in the sovereign rights of other 
states and their internal affairs”1272. This commitment is unambiguous, since another 
provision bars all exceptions and asserts the immutable character of Macedonia’s 
obligations in this respect1273. Skopje, second, recalls that the Badinter Arbitration 
Commission, mandated by the European Community, acknowledged this state of 
affairs in 1992, when it recommended the recognition of Macedonia (under the name 
of RoM)1274. And it third recalls its commitment to the 1995 Interim Accord, which 
provides that each Party “undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the territorial integrity 
and the political independence” of the other Party1275, and that “neither of them will 
assert or support claims to any part of the territory of the other Party or claims for a 
change of their existing frontier”1276. Skopje therefore claims that the decision of 
Greece to hamper Macedonia’s integration in the EU and in Nato is neither legitimate, 
nor legal. Dismayed by the conclusions of the Bucharest Summit in 2008, Skopje 
sued Athens before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), with outstanding 
success1277. Greece was found guilty of breaching its obligation under Article 11 of 
the 1995 Interim Accord by objecting to the Nato admission of Macedonia1278. Contra 
Greece, the ICJ noted that in the Interim Accord, Macedonia “had not undertaken any 
obligation to call itself ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’” 1279. Despite 
this ruling, Greece continued to block Macedonia’s integration in transatlantic 
structures, e.g. in the 2012 Chicago Summit1280. 
 
This Greek blockade of Macedonia’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration fuelled 
increasing frustrations in Macedonia, and prompted an escalation of the tensions 
between the two countries. A line was crossed in 2009, when the Macedonian 
government launched a urban project, called Skopje 2014, aiming at revitalising the 
city centre in an overly historicist style recalling the ancient kingdom of Macedon. 
The project foresaw the construction of a large dozen of official buildings, several 
bridges, and a plethora of monuments. The “antiquisation” of the city was intended to 
foster Macedonian “nation-building” and underline the cultural roots of Macedonians 
in history1281. The erection on Skopje’s main square of a 25-meter high statue of a 
“Warrior on a Horse”, which evidently depicts Alexander the Great (in front of 
another giant statue of Philip II of Macedon), unsurprisingly infuriated Athens1282. 
The whole project is primarily supported by the right-wing government led by the 
                                                 
1272 Amendments I and II, Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. 1991. 
1273 See art. 6, Ibid. 
1274 Opinion 6, in Pellet, A. 1990. ‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second 
Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples.’ European Journal of International Law vol.3 (1). 
1275 art. 3, Interim Accord between the Hellenic Republic and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. 13 September 1995. 
1276 art. 4, Ibid. 
1277 Messineo, F. 2012. ‘Maps of Ephemeral Empires: The Icj and the Macedonian Name Dispute.’ 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law vol.1 (1). 
1278 International Court of Justice. 5 December 2011. ‘Judgment of the Court Regarding the Objection 
by Greece to the Admission of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Nato.’ 
1279 Messineo, F. 2012. ‘Maps of Ephemeral Empires: The Icj and the Macedonian Name Dispute.’ 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law vol.1 (1). p. 186. 
1280 The ICJ has no legal capacity to enforce its judgments.  
1281 See MINA. 7.1.2012. ‘Pm Gruevski: Yes, Skopje 2014 Was My Idea.’ 
1282 Ragaru, N. 2011. ‘Macédoine-Grèce: Les Pouvoirs De La Toponymie.’ 
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VMRO-DPMNE since 2006, but it is subject to increasing resistance in the population, 
owing to its nationalist flavour, its extravagant cost and its negligence of Albanian 
historiography in Macedonia1283.  
 
3.4.1.1.3.  The negotiation framework and its outcome 
 
In order to resolve the naming dispute, Macedonia and Greece have conducted 
(fruitless) negotiations in the past 15 years under the auspices of the United 
Nations1284. The EU, interestingly, does not take any active part in this process. Since 
December 1999, the negotiations are chaired by Matthew Nimetz, a Personal Envoy 
of the UN Secretary General. The diplomat brought forth different propositions for 
Macedonia’s name, but to no avail. First opposed to any proposition that would 
include the term of “Macedonia”, Greece gradually revised its position and, in the 
framework of the negotiations, now supports a compound name solution, i.e. a “name 
with a geographical qualifier for use in relation to anyone”  (erga omnes solution)1285. 
Skopje, by contrast, stands for a “dual name” solution, whereby RoM would continue 
to be used by those states that have recognised Macedonia under its constitutional 
name, and FYROM would elsewhere be substituted by a compound name. The latest 
proposal by Matthew Nimetz in October 2008, gave precedence to Greece’s demand 
for a compound name, but watered down its claim for an erga omnes solution. The 
proposal was not accepted by Macedonian leaders1286.  
 
3.4.1.2. Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo 
 
More than ten years after the Kosovo war, the thorny relations between Belgrade and 
Pristina remain an important factor of instability in the Western Balkans. In addition 
to the recurrent outbreak of violent incidents in the borderlands, these tensions in 
Europe’s backyard maintain a climate of defiance and insecurity, with domestic, 
regional and international repercussions1287. The Kosovo issue opposes Belgrade and 
Pristina over an existential question –Kosovo’s claim for statehood. Attempts at 
finding a common ground never ended up in the successful resolution of the issue. 
Following the failure of the Kosovo status process led by UN Special Envoy Martti 
Ahtisaari bewteen 2005 and 2007, and the failure of the Troika’s initiative in 2007, 
Pristina, eventually, unilaterally declared its independence on 17 February 2008 –an 
act, which Serbia continues to consider as sheer “secessionism”1288.  
 
3.4.1.2.1.  Kosovo’s claim for statehood 
                                                 
1283 Beside many Albanians, and a growing number of intellectuals, the opponents to the project count 
the Social Democratic Union party (SDSM, in the opposition, centre-left), the New Social Democratic 
Party (NSDP, centre-left) and New Democracy (Albanian party).  
1284 in accordance with art. 5 of the Interim Accord between the Hellenic Republic and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 13 September 1995.  
1285 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic. 'Fyrom Name Issue'. [accessed 10/1/2013]. 
1286 The proposal provided that Macedonia would bear the name of “Republic of North Macedonia”, 
except in the native language, where Macedonia would have been called “Република Македонија”, i.e. 
Republic of Macedonia.  
1287 The Kosovo issue has domestic repercussions in Serbia, for instance, in the Albanian-populated 
Valley of Preševo, where instability is recurrent. It has implications at the regional level, e.g. regarding 
Serbian irredentism in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at the international level, as shown in the 2008 South 
Ossetia war. 
1288 Republic of Serbia. October 2009. ‘National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia.’ 
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Kosovo’s claim for statehood is rooted in pre-war times1289 . It is legitimated in 
Pristina by a series of historical events that are arguably supportive of the sui generis 
application of the general principle of self-determination: the violent encounter, in the 
1980s, between the political aspirations of Kosovo Albanians and the rise of Serbian 
nationalism; the harsh limitations imposed in 1989 by Milošević’s regime upon the 
autonomy and self-government of the Province; the hardening of Belgrade’s 
repression in Kosovo in the 1990s; and the strengthening of Kosovo autonomous 
institutions, also in the 1990s, created as surrogates of Serbian state1290. When the 
Kosovo war eventually broke out in 1998, Kosovo’s claim for statehood suddenly hit 
the headlines. The armed intervention of Nato against Milošević’s regime in support 
of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) eventually coerced Serbia to sign a peace 
agreement in June 1999. Provisionally placed under the international administration 
of the UNMIK and the physical protection of Nato-led peacekeeping forces (KFOR), 
Kosovo was to retain “substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration”, 
without prejudice to the “sovereignty and territorial integrity” of the FRY1291. But 
considering the terrible events that erupted during the war and the de facto rift that 
had widened between Pristina and Belgrade, Kosovo, in the aftermath of the war, 
“could not accept anything but independence”1292.  
 
Throughout the 2000s, the successive governments in Pristina have struggled to 
establish their sovereign authority over the territory of Kosovo. Internally, they 
claimed supreme and independent authority over the whole territory of Kosovo, 
including the North and the enclaves populated by Kosovo Serbs 1293 . Although 
Pristina primarily used diplomacy to advance its position, it occasionally also resorted 
to force, as in 2010, when the government commanded the Kosovo Police to take over 
border crossings in the North, on which it had no control. Pristina also sought to 
establish its sovereignty externally, by enhancing its international visibility before 
2008 and struggling for international recognition ever since.  
 
3.4.1.2.2.  Serbia’s no-independence position 
 
Following the Kosovo war, Belgrade, by contrast, could envision nearly “anything but 
independence” 1294. This position has been tirelessly advocated ever since, with little 
variations and astonishing unity. Very few politicians have dared to cross the red line 
of acknowledging Pristina’s claim for statehood, regardless of their party affiliation or 
official occupation. Domestic pressure remains very high in Serbia, with public 
                                                 
1289 See Marko, J. 1999. ‘Die Staatsrechtliche Entwicklung Des Kosovo Von 1913-1995.’ In 
Gordischer Knoten Kosovo: Durchschlagen Oder Entwirren? Völkerrechtliche, Rechtsvergleichende 
Und Politikwissenschaftliche Analysen Und Perspektiven Zum Jüngsten Balkankonflikt, ed. Marko, J. 
1290 See Kramer, H. and Džihić, V. 2006. Die Kosovo-Bilanz: Scheitert Die Internationale 
Gemeinschaft? p. 16ff. 
1291 United Nations Security Council. 10 June 1999. ‘Resolution 1244 (1999).’ 
1292 Lehne, S. March 2012. ‘Kosovo and Serbia: Toward a Normal Relationship.’ In Policy Outlook. p. 
4. 
1293 Kosovo counts bewteen 55 and 65 000 Serbs. The two-thirds of them live in the South. 
International Crisis Group. 19.2.2013. ‘Serbia and Kosovo: The Path to Normalisation.’ In Europe 
Report, vol.223. p. 10. 
1294 Lehne, S. March 2012. ‘Kosovo and Serbia: Toward a Normal Relationship.’ In Policy Outlook. p. 
4. 
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opinions overly and emotionally opposed to Kosovo’s independence1295. The no-
independence position was already uttered in 2003, when Serbian Prime Minister 
Đinđić, a reformist assassinated by Serbian nationalists, sent a letter to the UN 
Security Council to draw the attention on the “silent sliding of Kosovo and Methohia 
towards independence” 1296. This course of event, according to Đinđić, contravened 
the UNSC resolution 1244, and would 
 
“not help the position of those responsible democratic and reformist political 
forces in Serbia, who have insisted on full compliance with the international 
obligations and the integration of our country in the international 
community”.1297 
 
Đinđić, who had had Milošević arrested in 2001, believed that Serbia would recover 
its international respectability by respecting its international obligations. But he 
expected the international community to do the same, i.e. respect the commitment the 
UNSC took when it had ascertained the FRY’s “sovereignty and territorial 
integrity”1298.  
 
Failure to do so, according to a 2004 Parliament resolution on Kosovo1299, was the 
reason why anti-Serb violence burst out in Kosovo in March 2004. Concerned by 
these events, the Parliament expressed its no-independence position unambiguously: 
 
“Kosovo and Metohija is an inalienable part of Serbia and the State Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro”.1300 
 
Belgrade’s no-independence position was, according to another Parliament 
resolution1301, not only grounded in UNSC resolution 1244; it also derived from the 
recommendations of the 1992 Badinter Commission and in the 1995 Dayton-Paris 
Peace Agreement. With no delay, this argument was put on the table of the 
negotiations which had just started in the framework of the Ahtisaari process in 2005. 
Any solution imposed to Serbia regarding the status of Kosovo would be seen as 
“illegitimate, illegal and invalid”1302. And any solution that would lead to Kosovo’s 
secession would accordingly not only harm Serbia, but contravene international law, 
and as such be  
 
“a dangerous precedent with unforeseen long term consequences for the 
international order in general”.1303  
                                                 
1295 In 2011, 65% of the Serbs thought that Kosovo “has to be part of Serbia”; 20% even declared that 
secession should be prevented by arms; and only 16% would be ready to recognise Kosovo’s 
independence in exchange of EU membership. See Gallup Balkan Monitor. 'Insights and Perceptions: 
Voices of the Balkans'. [accessed 5.3.2013]. 
1296 Republic of Serbia. 7 February 2003. ‘Letter of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic to the 
Permanent Representatives of the Members of the United Nations Security Council.’ 
1297 Ibid. 
1298 United Nations Security Council. 10 June 1999. ‘Resolution 1244 (1999).’ 
1299 Article 6a., National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. 26 March 2007. ‘Rezolucija O Kosovu I 
Metohiji.’ 
1300 Article 6a., Ibid. 
1301 National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. 21 November 2005. ‘Rezolucija Narodne Skupštine 
Republike Srbije O Mandatu Za Političke Razgovore O Budućem Statusu Kosova I Metohije ’. 
1302 Point 3, Ibid. 
1303 Ibid. 
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The refusal to negotiate Serbia’s no-independence core position in the Ahtisaari 
framework was later reaffirmed by Serbia’s Prime Minister Koštunica: 
 
“Serbia will reject a solution that takes Kosovo away from Serbia and, very 
importantly, will continue to consider Kosovo part of its territory”.1304 
 
It was also presented as the main reason why Serbia rejected the Ahtisaari proposal. 
As stated by the Serbian Parliament, the Ahtisaari proposal could not be accepted 
because it “does not respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of 
Serbia […]”1305.  
 
In order to ascertain the permanence of this commitment and spread the electoral 
burden arising from the expected failure of the Ahtisaari process on the eve of the 
2007 parliamentary elections, the no-independence position was engraved in the new 
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, adopted by referendum in October 2006 and 
proclaimed by the Parliament on 8 November 2006. In its preamble (subject to 
international lawyers’ scepticism1306), the Constitution of Serbia not only reaffirms 
that  
 
“the province of Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of the territory of 
Serbia, that it has the status of a substantial autonomy within the sovereign 
state of Serbia”.1307  
 
It also creates 
 
“constitutional obligations [for] all state bodies to uphold and protect the 
state interests of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija in all internal and foreign 
political relations”.1308 
 
Although the preamble does not specify what the “state interests of Serbia in Kosovo” 
are, and how these shall be “upheld and protected”, the text creates landmark 
obligations in Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo.  
 
With the growing wariness that Pristina might unilaterally declare its independence, 
Serbia rapidly found a field of application for its constitutional innovation: 
obstructing the international recognition of Kosovo’s independence. In July 2007, the 
Serbian Parliament voted another resolution on Kosovo (the fourth in three years). In 
the document, supported by 217 out of 250 members of the parliament (MPs), 
                                                 
1304 SETimes. 1.8.2006. ‘Kostunica Says Kosovo More Important Than EU Membership ’ 
1305 Para. 6, National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. 14 February 2007. ‘Rezolucija Nsrs 
Povodom „Predloga Za Sveobuhvatno Rešenje Statusa Kosova“ Spec. Izaslanika Gs UN Martija 
Ahtisarija ’. 
1306 According to the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, the “Constitution itself does not at 
all guarantee substantial autonomy to Kosovo, for it entirely depends on the willingness of the National 
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia whether self-government will be realised or not”. See Venice 
Commission. 19 March 2007. ‘Opinion No. 405/2006 on the Constitution of Serbia.’ 
1307 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. 2006. 
1308 Ibid. 
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Belgrade first reiterated that “Kosovo is an “inseparable part of the state of Serbia”1309, 
but it then also placed  
 
“the Serbian government and all state organs […] under obligation to react 
vigorously and duly to […] threats and acts of unilateral acknowledgment of 
Kosovo-Metohija's independence”. 1310 
 
While the MPs of the nationalist SRS party, which had won the parliamentary 
elections, voted in favour of the text, its leader (currently officiating as President of 
Serbia) Nikolić reportedly attacked the resolution, arguing that it should have 
specified that Serbia would “defend Kosovo by all means possible”1311. This is what 
international lawyers commonly term “a threat of use of force”. Serbia’s no-
independence position was confirmed in a fifth resolution in 20071312 , and very 
solemnly in front of the UNGA, as pro-EU President Tadić declared “Kosovo’s 
independence is unacceptable for Serbia”1313.  
 
On the eve of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the Serbian government finally 
adopted a top-secret Kosovo Action Plan, aimed at pre-empting Pristina’s attempt to 
secede. It presumably contained a series of “measures against Kosovo or countries 
which recognize Kosovo […], such as economic and trade embargoes or downgrading 
of diplomatic relations” 1314. Unsurprisingly, Serbia condemned Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence immediately after its promulgation. For instance, in his address in 
front of the UNSC, Serbian President Tadić requested that the Security Council take 
 
“effective measure in order to ensure that all the provisions of the Charter of 
the United Nations and UNSC resolution 1244 are fully respected […], react 
urgently and annul the unilateral and illegal act of the secession of 
Kosovo”.1315  
 
Serbia further protested against the declaration of independence by adopting a series 
of retaliatory measures, in accordance with its Kosovo Action Plan. It charged 
Kosovo’s most prominent officials with accusations of high treason1316; it recalled its 
ambassadors posted in countries recognising Kosovo (e.g. from the United States, 
Turkey, Afghanistan, France, the Czech Republic and Australia)1317; declared persona 
non grata some foreign ambassadors in Belgrade (e.g. Macedonia and Montenegro’s 
                                                 
1309 art. 1, National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. 25 July 2007. ‘Rezolucija Nsrs O 
Neophodnosti Pravednog Rešavanja Pitanja Autonomne Pokrajine Kim Zasnovanog Na 
Međunarodnom Pravu ’. 
1310 art. 6, Ibid. 
1311 United States Embassy in Belgrade. 26.7.2007. 'Serbia Adopts New Kosovo Resolution, Pm 
Declares Victory'. [accessed 22.01.2013] 
1312 National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. 26 December 2007. ‘Rezolucija Nsrs O Zaštiti 
Suvereniteta, Teritorijalnog Integriteta I Ustavnog Poretka Republike Srbije.’ 
1313 B92. 27.9.2007. ‘Kosovo Independence Unacceptable, Tadić Tells UN.’ 
1314 United States Embassy in Belgrade. 16.1.2008. 'Serbia Adopts Kosovo Action Plan'. [accessed 
22.01.2013] 
1315 Republic of Serbia. 18 February 2008. ‘Address before the United Nations Security Council by 
H.E.Mr. Boris Tadić.’ 
1316 BBC News. 19.2.2008. ‘Serbia Recalls Ambassador from Us ’ 
1317 B92. 18.2.2008. ‘Belgrade Recalls Ambassador from U.S.’ 
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ambassadors) 1318; even threatened countries willing to recognise Kosovo to engage 
legal actions against them1319; and stopped receiving some ambassadors (e.g. from the 
UK) in the Ministers’ cabinets and put restrictions at lower (working) levels1320. But it 
did not break off relations with any recogniser; soon, sent back its ambassadors1321; 
readmitted the foreign ones it had expelled, and more importantly, eventually 
conceded that “recognition [is] not an unfriendly act”1322. All in all, the retaliatory 
measures heralded by Serbia in its Kosovo Action Plan prior to Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence did not hold water for a very long time.  
 
Rather than opposing Kosovo independence by standing against the recognising states 
and therewith risking its self-ostracisation, Serbia preferred to attack Kosovo in the 
realm of law. Recalling the threat issued by Serbian Parliament in 20071323, Serbian 
President Tadić expressed his intention to challenge the legality of Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence: 
 
“Serbia will never recognize Kosovo's independence and, respecting 
international law, own legitimate interests, her integrity in Kosovo, will 
defend in the legal arena, in front of the International Court of Justice.”1324 
 
The ICJ rendered its opinion on the issue on 22 July 2010, but against Serbia’s 
expectations, it concluded that “the declaration of independence of the 17 February 
2008 did not violate general international law” 1325 . Instead, it remained rather 
ambiguous. Whereas Kosovo officials heartily hailed the judgement of the Court as 
speaking in favour of Kosovo’s right for self-determination and international 
recognition, President Tadić acknowledged Serbia’s bitter disappointment, but 
nuanced its implications. For Serbia, the Court had “applied in its opinion a narrow 
approach as to the scope of the question put to it”1326, and had failed to discuss the 
status of Kosovo. Since the ICJ limited itself to addressing the legality of the 
declaration of independence rather than the independence per se, its opinion, in 
President Tadić’s understanding, did not affect Serbia’s position against Kosovo’s 
independence.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the electoral victory of the nationalists in the 2012 general elections 
did not result in the softening of Serbia’s no-independence position1327. President 
Nikolić is a long-time opponent to Pristina’s claim, and a nationalist figure linked to 
                                                 
1318 B92. 22.5.2008. ‘Serbia Recalls Ambassador from Prague.’; B92. 10.10.2008. ‘Macedonian 
Ambassador Expelled Too.’ 
1319 Xinhua. 27.2.2008. ‘Serbia to Sue Countries Recognizing Kosovo at Icj.’ 
1320 United States Embassy in Belgrade. 20.2.2008. 'Serbia: Government Response to Kosovo 
Independence'. [accessed 30.01.2013] 
1321 B92. 9.10.2008. ‘Govt. Sends Back All Ambassadors.’ 
1322 B92. 20.2.2008. ‘Recognition Not Unfriendly Act, Đelić Told.’ 
1323 Point 7e, National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. 26 December 2007. ‘Rezolucija Nsrs O 
Zaštiti Suvereniteta, Teritorijalnog Integriteta I Ustavnog Poretka Republike Srbije.’. 
1324 B92. 14.2.2009. ‘"It's Clear to All, Kosovo Is No State".’ 
1325 International Court of Justice. 22 July 2010. ‘Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Indepedence in Respect of Kosovo.’ 
1326 Republic of Serbia. July 2010. ‘Position of the Republic of Serbia Concerning the Advisory 
Opinion On "Accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo" Rendered by the International Court of Justice on 22nd July 2010.’ 
1327 B92. 26.10.2012. ‘President: Ready for Talks, Independence Unacceptable.’ 
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Serbian wartime ideologist Vojslav Šešelj1328. President Nikolić reaffirmed in many 
occasions that Kosovo’s independence was unacceptable, as did his Prime Minister 
Dačić, another nationalist figure, coincidentally born in Prizren (Kosovo)1329. For 
instance, most recently, Prime Minister Dačić stated before the UN Security Council 
that  
 
“Serbia will never, under any circumstances, implicitly or explicitly, 
recognize the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo’s ethnic-
Albanian authorities”.1330 
 
President Nikolić likewise reaffirmed that  
 
“Serbia is not ready and cannot nor will it ever under any circumstances 
recognize, either explicitly or implicitly, the unilaterally declared 
independence of its southern province of Kosovo and Metohija”.1331 
 
This position was similarly enshrined in a new Parliament resolution, produced after 
lengthy cross-party negotiations in 2012-2013, in the framework of a new Kosovo 
platform. Adopted by 175 MPs out of 250, the resolution states that  
 
“The Republic of Serbia, in accordance with international law, the 
Constitution and the will of the people, does not recognize and will never 
recognize Kosovo’s unilaterally declared independence”.1332  
 
In order to ascertain that the spirit of the resolution will not be altered, the resolution 
finally created an obligation for the government to “to make future agreements in line 
with the views and fundamental goals of this Resolution”1333. This provision may for 
instance complicate the establishment of treaty relations between Serbia and Kosovo, 
if those imply implicit or de facto recognition. All but a few parties1334 supported the 
Kosovo platform resolution. 
 
3.4.1.2.3.  The negotiation frameworks and their outcome 
 
Belgrade and Pristina initiated active negotiations on Kosovo-related issues in 2005, 
following Kai Eide’s recommendation to the UN Secretary General1335. The UN-
backed negotiations took place in Vienna between November 2005 and March 2007 
                                                 
1328 Until 2008, Nikolić was deputy president and de facto leader of the far-right wing Serbian Radical 
Party (SRS), since the transfer of its official leader, Vojslav Šešelj, in The Hague before the ICTY.  
1329 Dačić acted between 1992 and 2000 as spokesman of Milošević’s party and leads this party (the 
SPS) since 2006. See Dacic, I. 'Биографија'. [accessed 22/1/2013]. 
1330 Republic of Serbia. 21 August 2012. ‘Statement of H.E.Mr. Ivica Dacic before the UN Security 
Council.’ 
1331 Republic of Serbia. 25 September 2012. ‘Address before the United Nations General Assembly by 
H.E.Mr. Tomislav Nikolić’ 
1332 art. 1a, National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. 13 January 2013. ‘Rezolucija O Kosovu I 
Metohiji.’ 
1333 art. 1c, Ibid. 
1334 A few MPs, e.g. from the Liberal Democratic party, opposed the resolution and submitted a counter 
project, more amenable to finding a common ground with Pristina. Most of the opponents, however, 
came from Koštunica’s DSS nationalist party, which rejected the resolution because it was not firm 
enough. 
1335 United Nations. 7 October 2005. ‘Kai Eide Report on a Comprehensive Review of the Situation in 
Kosovo.’ 
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under the leadership of UN Special Envoy Maarti Ahtisaari. The negotiations covered 
a variety of issues, including decentralisation, religious and cultural heritage and 
international presence. They resulted in the elaboration of a draft status settlement 
plan, the essence of which was Kosovo’s de facto supervised independence1336. A UN 
Security Council resolution was accordingly prepared with the support of the USA 
and EU member states in order to endorse the Ahtisaari plan and amend the UNSC 
resolution 1244, but the draft resolution was eventually discarded in July 2007. Unlike 
Pristina, which accepted the plan, Serbia, backed by Russia in the UN Security 
Council, rejected it1337.  
 
After the failure of the Ahtisaari process, the Kosovo status talks continued under the 
aegis of an UN-backed Troika consisting of representatives of the USA, Russia and 
the EU. Face-to-face negotiations between the representatives of Serbia and Kosovo 
were staged in Vienna and a deadline to reach an accord was set by the UN Security 
General. But this new round of negotiations, expectedly, ended up in disappointment. 
By the end of November 2007, the Troika concluded that, notwithstanding their 
acceptance of the fact that peace had to be maintained,  
 
“regrettably, the parties were unable to reach an agreement on Kosovo's 
future status”.1338 
 
A few weeks after, Kosovo declared its independence. Serbia reacted by severing its 
ties with Pristina, cooling its relations with those states that were recognising Kosovo 
and boycotting those events, where Kosovo was given a seat on an equal-footing1339. 
This strategy, however, weakened the position of Belgrade as it pushed Serbia 
towards self-isolationism. In an attempt to regain international legitimacy, Serbia 
brought the case in front of the ICJ. In prevision of an opinion that would expectedly 
support its view, Belgrade, from January 2010, pushed for re-opening the status talks 
under the aegis of the UN1340. It prepared a draft resolution condemning the fact that 
“unilateral secession cannot be an acceptable way for resolving territorial issues”, and 
calling on parties to “find a mutually acceptable solution for all outstanding issues 
through peaceful dialogue” 1341. Wary of the possibility that the status talks could be 
reopened, especially after their recognition of Kosovo’s independence, France, 
Germany, Italy, the UK and the USA expressed their firm opposition to the draft 
resolution. After intense negotiations, Serbia eventually amended its text, and 
presented a new version, co-sponsored by the EU, which was passed on 9 September 
2010. While acknowledging the ICJ advisory opinion, the new resolution dropped its 
reference to secession and its call for settling all outstanding issues. Milder in its tone 
                                                 
1336 United Nations. 26 March 2007. ‘Martti Ahtisaari's Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement.’ 
1337 National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. 14 February 2007. ‘Rezolucija Nsrs Povodom 
„Predloga Za Sveobuhvatno Rešenje Statusa Kosova“ Spec. Izaslanika Gs UN Martija Ahtisarija ’. 
1338 Troika. 28 November 2007. ‘Kosovo Troika Press Communiqué: The Baden Conference.’ 
1339 Serbia, for instance, failed to participate in the Western Balkan conference launching the Brdo 
Process in March 2010.  
1340 Secretary of State of the United States. 30.1.2010. 'Demarche: Serbia's Plans for a New Draft Unga 
Resolution on Kosovo'. [accessed 22.01.2013] 
1341 Permanent Representation of the Republic of Serbia to the United Nations. 28 July 2010. ‘Draft 
Resolution on Agenda Item 77 of the 64th Session of the General Assembly.’ 
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and more general in its wording, it welcomed “the readiness of the European Union to 
facilitate a process of dialogue between the parties”1342.  
 
Dragged into this new round of negotiations, the EU designed a negotiating 
framework, which cautiously avoided a direct confrontation on the question of status. 
Its aim was rather to assist Belgrade and Pristina in finding “practical ways to make 
sure that ordinary life can go on more smoothly” in Kosovo1343. The negotiations, 
launched in March 2011 with the support of the UN General Assembly1344, were to 
focus on three domains: regional cooperation, freedom of movement and rule of law. 
Of course, each of the issues discussed had “status-sensitive aspects”, and the 
negotiations, designed to be technical in nature were in fact highly political1345. In this 
dialogue, the role of the EU went beyond that of mere facilitator, since its 
representatives had competences in agenda-setting, in proposing solutions, and above 
all, in reframing the negotiations through the conditionality regimes the EU 
established with Serbia and Kosovo1346 . First represented by her advisor, Robert 
Cooper, the EU High Representative for CFSP, Catherine Ashton, eventually took the 
lead of the facilitation process in October 2012. The negotiating framework, 
meanwhile, upgraded the level of representation of Serbia and Kosovo up to the Prime 
Minister level1347. Interestingly, the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue does not involve any 
representative of the Kosovo Serbs’ community.  
 
Unlike its forerunners, the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina has 
borne notable fruits. The two parties have to date concluded a series of bilateral 
agreements1348, e.g. on freedom of movement, the mutual recognition of university 
diplomas and the provision of authenticated copies of civil registry documents in July 
2011; customs stamps, cadastral documents in September 2011; integrated border 
management (IBM) in November/December 2011; cooperation and regional 
representation in February 2012; implementation of the 2011 IBM agreement in 
December 2012; customs duties, VAT and levies with a focus on North Kosovo in 
January 2013. More importantly, this dialogue has inflected Serbia’s policy towards 
Kosovo in critical aspects of its no-independence position.  
 
3.4.1.3. Notable changes in Serbia’s approach 
 
                                                 
1342 United Nations General Assembly. 9 September 2010. ‘Resolution on the Request for an Advisory 
Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Whether the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of 
Kosovo Is in Accordance with International Law.’ 
1343 European Union. 8 March 2011. ‘Statement by the Spokesperson of Catherine Ashton, EU High 
Representative on the Start of the Belgrade - Pristina Dialogue.’ 
1344 United Nations General Assembly. 9 September 2010. ‘Resolution on the Request for an Advisory 
Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Whether the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of 
Kosovo Is in Accordance with International Law.’ 
1345 Lehne, S. March 2012. ‘Kosovo and Serbia: Toward a Normal Relationship.’ In Policy Outlook. 
1346 Wary of the diplomatic weight of the EU in this negotiation process, Serbia tried, vainly, to 
associate the UN in the negotiation process, in order to ascertain that any accord concluded under the 
auspices of the EU are conform to the UNSC resolution 1244. 
1347 The Belgrade-Pristina dialogue was suspended between March and October 2012 owing to the 
elections in Serbia. When the dialogue resumed, it ceased to be operated by high-ranking career 
diplomats, and started to involve Serbia and Kosovo’s Prime Ministers directly. 
1348 For a chronology of the negotiation rounds between March 2011 and February 2012, see Malazogu, 
L. and Bieber, F. September 2012. ‘The Future of Interaction between Prishtina and Belgrade.’ In 
Confidence Building Measures in Kosovo, vol.3. p. 9-10. 
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3.4.1.3.1. Deployment of the EULEX throughout Kosovo 
 
In the course of these many rounds of negotiations, Serbia first inflected its policy 
towards Kosovo as regards the deployment of the EULEX, a civil operation launched 
by the EU in 2008-2009 (European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo). Designed 
to assist Pristina’s authorities in the promotion of the rule of law, more specifically in 
the fields of policing, justice and customs, the EULEX assumes activities that are 
usually part of the domestic prerogatives of sovereign states. It can be seen both as 
reinforcing Pristina’s capacities to establish the rule of law throughout Kosovo, and as 
a sign that Kosovo is not a sovereign state as any other. Because of this ambiguity, 
Belgrade has always paid a great attention to the way the mission could or should be 
deployed. Initially hostile to its deployment, Serbia’s position shifted in 2009 to 
negotiated acceptance, and recently, to calculated support.  
 
Serbia has always contemplated the international presence in Kosovo with a tinge of 
mistrust. For instance, it blamed the UNMIK and the KFOR in 2004 for reluctantly 
performing their obligations under Resolution 1244, and accused them of fuelling the 
instability that culminated in March 2004 with the largest outbreak of violence in 
Kosovo since the end of the war. Belgrade linked the attacks against the Serbs to the 
role of the UNMIK in Kosovo, which allegedly encouraged the “transfer of 
responsibilities [to] Kosovo’s provisional institutions”1349. But at least, for Serbia, the 
UNMIK was bound to respect its UN mandate, defined by the UNSC resolution 1244, 
and was therefore by nature “status-neutral”. 
 
As it became clear that the Ahtisaari process in 2005-2007 would be accompanied by 
a reorganisation of the international presence in Kosovo, and that the EU would play a 
more active role in the field, Serbia welcomed the news with outspoken defiance. The 
reason lay in Serbia’s overall rejection of the Ahtisaari plan, against the EU, and in 
the fear that the EU mission in Kosovo would stealthily work at the implementation of 
the contested plan. Serbia had good reasons to believe in the ambiguity of the 
EULEX’s agenda. First, the deployment of the EULEX had been initially planned in 
the framework of the Ahtisaari plan1350, which itself had be backed by key member 
states of the EU, including in the UN Security Council. Second, the European 
Parliament had expressed its firm support for the Ahtisaari plan in general and for the 
establishment of an ESDP mission “contribut[ing] to the implementation” of the 
Ahtisaari plan1351. And third, the mandate of the EULEX was defined by the Council 
of the European Union in exactly the same terms as in the Ahtisaari plan1352. In the 
end, Serbia thus viewed the EULEX as an instrument enabling the application of the 
Ahtisaari plan, and therefore opposed it on the ground that the UN Security Council 
had not given its approval to the plan, and therefore not authorised the deployment of 
                                                 
1349 National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. 24 March 2004. ‘Rezolucija O Kosovu I Metohiji.’ 
1350 The Ahtisaari plan included a provision on a “Eurpean Security and Defence Policy mission” to be 
deployed in support of the rule of law. See art. 13 of United Nations. 26 March 2007. ‘Martti 
Ahtisaari's Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.’ 
1351 European Parliament. 29 March 2007. ‘European Parliament Resolution on the Future of Kosovo 
and the Role of the EU.’ 
1352 Article 13.2 of the Ahtisaari plan is similar to article 2 of the EULEX’s mission statement. 
Compare United Nations. 26 March 2007. ‘Martti Ahtisaari's Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo 
Status Settlement.’ and Council of the European Union. 4 February 2008. ‘Council Joint Action on the 
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, Eulex Kosovo.’ 
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an EU mission in Kosovo1353. Supported by Russia in the UN Security Council, Prime 
Minister Koštunica declared in December 2007: 
 
“it is unacceptable that the illegitimate arrival of an EU mission to the 
province is discussed so that [former UN envoy to Kosovo Martti] Ahtisaari's 
plan for creating a puppet state may be implemented”.1354 
 
In order to overcome the deadlock, the EU, together with the US and the UN, engaged 
“a very intense dialogue with Belgrade” 1355 . The Serbian government publicly 
declared its willingness to accept the EULEX deployment throughout Kosovo if three 
conditions were met: the EULEX would have to seek the UNSC approval; the 
EULEX would remain status neutral; and the EULEX would not be seen as 
implementing the Ahtisaari plan1356. After intensive and lengthy negotiations, these 
conditions were accepted by the EU and its partners in November 2008. In its 
statement on the deployment of the EULEX, the French Presidency, in accordance 
with the UN Secretary General’s report of 24 November 2008, thus declared: 
 
“In the implementation of its mandate, the EULEX Kosovo mission will fully 
respect UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) and will operate under the general 
authority and within the status neutral framework of the UN”.1357 
 
This re-positioning of the EULEX did not lift all the ambiguities constraining the role 
of the international presence in Kosovo, and by far. It provided the EULEX with a 
“compromised authority” and an “ambiguous recognition” issue1358, which severely 
hindered its subsequent performance1359: whereas Pristina authorities considered that 
the EULEX, in accordance with its initial plans, was to assist Kosovo in its unilateral 
implementation of the Ahtisaari plan1360, Belgrade viewed the EULEX as a status-
neutral device, deployed under the authority of the UN, which had nothing to do with 
the Ahtisaari plan.  
 
The outcome of the negotiations was enshrined in an ambiguous report of the UN 
Secretary General approved by the UN Security Council, as part of a so-called “six-
point plan” 1361. To a certain extent disappointed by the mixed signals the EULEX 
                                                 
1353 Point 5, National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. 26 December 2007. ‘Rezolucija Nsrs O 
Zaštiti Suvereniteta, Teritorijalnog Integriteta I Ustavnog Poretka Republike Srbije.’ 
1354 EUobserver. 17.12.2007. ‘EU Kosovo Mission 'Unacceptable' for Serbia.’ 
1355 European Union @ United Nations. 5 November 2008. ‘Summary of Remarks by Euhr Solana to 
EU Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee and Chairs of Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees of 
National Parliaments.’ 
1356 United States Embassy in Belgrade. 22.10.2008. 'Serbia and UN Agree on 6 Point Text on Kosovo'. 
[accessed 30.01.2013] 
1357 Presidency of the Council of the European Union. 28 November 2008. ‘Declaration by the 
Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on the Deployment of Eulex.’ 
1358 Greiçevci, L. 2011. ‘EU Actorness in International Affairs: The Case of Eulex Mission in Kosovo.’ 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society vol.12 (3). 
1359 Džihić, V. and Kramer, H. July 2009. ‘Kosovo after Independence: Is the Eu’s Eulex Mission 
Delivering on Its Promises?’ In International Policy Analysis. 
1360 The 2008 Constitution of Kosovo makes reference to the Ahtisaari plan, which it adopts.  
1361 The six-point plan was a plan negotiated between Serb and the UN officials and included in the UN 
Secretary General report. It detailed recommendations in six policy fields (police, customs, 
transportation and infrastructure, boundaries and Serbian patrimony) in which Belgrade would continue 
to have a say, and reaffirmed the role of the UN in Kosovo and the need to act in accordance with 
UNSC resolution 1244.  
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would send, Kosovo authorities nevertheless accepted the deployment of the EU-led 
mission, as did the EU and Serbia, for different reasons though. The former hailed its 
practical implications, i.e. the possibility to deploy the mission throughout Kosovo, 
while the latter claimed diplomatic victory for the status-neutrality reference. 
According to Serbian Foreign Minister Jeremić, the UN report confirmed indeed that 
 
“the neutral status of EULEX’s engagement […] is a guarantee that not a 
single part of its mandate can be based on the Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo 
independence that the Republic of Serbia has rejected, and that the Security 
Council never approved”.1362 
 
Rather than replacing the UNMIK, the EULEX was accordingly to assist the UN 
mission in its implementation of the six-point plan, in accordance with UNSC 
resolution 1244 and with a chain of command ending up in the Security Council 
rather than Brussels. In December 2008, i.e. ten months after the EU’s Joint Action of 
4 February 2008 launching the EULEX, the EULEX could eventually be deployed. 
After its initial rejection of the EULEX, Serbia’s position by the end of 2008 thus 
shifted towards negotiated acceptance.  
 
In the subsequent years, Serbia scrutinised with great attention the role of the EULEX 
in Kosovo. When the EULEX was deemed to weaken Serbia’s no-independence 
position, it came under fire. During the 2011 North Kosovo crisis, for instance, the 
EULEX was heavily criticised by the Serbian government, who considered that 
Pristina’s forcible seizure of Kosovo crossing points with Serbia had been permitted, 
if not facilitated, by the EULEX. The accusation was formulated by Serbian Foreign 
Minister Jeremić in the UNSC: 
 
“If EULEX and the KFOR participate in what Hashim Thaqi called ‘an 
operation to assume control over territorial integrity of the Republic of 
Kosovo’, they will have gravely violated resolution 1244 (1999) and 
dramatically deviate from the UN’s status neural framework”.1363 
 
Serbia also did not give the EULEX free rein. In many areas, it continued to make 
“purposeful obstruction”, e.g. in the transmission of documents1364 -a sign that its 
acceptance had limitations. 
 
In chosen areas, however, Serbia’s acceptance gradually shifted towards calculated 
support. In the police area, for instance, Serbia signed an agreement with the EULEX 
in August 2009 to facilitate cross-border cooperation. This agreement was a condition 
posed by the EU to enter a visa liberalisation regime1365. In the area of justice, it urged 
the UN Security Council to “upgrade the current support capacities” of the EULEX 
(especially in witness protection), and to enhance the independence of the EULEX 
from Pristina’s “ethnic Albanian institutions”1366, on the ground that many high-
                                                 
1362 B92. 27.11.2008. ‘Eulex Receives Green Light.’ 
1363 Republic of Serbia. 15 September 2011. ‘Address before the United Nations Security Council by 
H.E.Mr. Vuk Jeremic.’ 
1364 United States Embassy in Belgrade. 12.1.2010. 'Serbia Still Not Cooperating Fully with Eulex'. 
[accessed 30.01.2013] 
1365 Ibid.  
1366 Republic of Serbia. 12 May 2011. ‘Address before the United Nations Security Council by H.E.Mr. 
Vuk Jeremic.’ 
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profile indictees in Kosovo are Albanians and former KLA members. Of course 
Belgrade voiced less concerns for the crimes committed by Kosovo Serbs. More 
recently, the Serbian government finally called for strengthening the “executive role” 
of the EULEX in the areas of customs1367, in order to prevent Pristina from gaining 
influence in North Kosovo. This call was formulated in a more general way by 
Serbian Prime Minister Dačić, who requested that the EULEX plays “an executive 
role in the implementation of the agreements reached in Brussels in accordance with 
status neutrality”1368. Rather than genuine, this support to the EULEX is obviously 
determined by utilitarian calculations. But it illustrates nonetheless a shift in Serbia’s 
approach to the EULEX operations in Kosovo. Serbia’s position now conceives itself 
as obstructing cooperation when the EULEX takes actions against Serbia’s no-
independence positions, and as supporting the reinforcement of the mission, when this 
reinforcement undermines the international status of Kosovo. Rather than opposing 
the EULEX in principle, Belgrade would rather turn the EULEX into guarantor of the 
status quo in Kosovo in all status-sensitive issues. Should it lack the capacity to (or 
willingness) to do so, Serbia’s position commends that EULEX should seek assistance 
from the UNMIK, so as to ascertain the international community’s deeper 
engagement in Kosovo1369. 
 
3.4.1.3.2. Customs and border management 
 
Serbia has also inflected its position in the highly symbolical area of customs and 
border management. Although the government continues to oppose the idea of setting 
up a boundary with Kosovo that could be considered as national border, critical steps 
have been made with the deployment of the EULEX in 2009 and through the 
Belgrade-Pristina technical dialogue in 2011-2012. They signal Belgrade’s growing 
acceptance of the idea of physical separation with Kosovo, and its de facto 
abandonment of the idea of partition. Borders, after all, are the physical markers of 
states’ territorial integrity and sovereignty.  
 
Kosovo borders, or boundaries,1370 were initially administrated by UNMIK officers, 
who cooperated with Serbian Customs Service. While the UNMIK retained ultimate 
responsibility for border issues, the KFOR was in charge of the surveillance of the 
green border. In 2007, however, the personal controls at the borders of Kosovo started 
to be operated by the Kosovo Police (KP). Since the KP operational mandate was 
placed under the ultimate authority of the UNMIK, and since KP officers in North 
Kosovo were ethnic Serbs, Serbia did not raise insuperable objections. The KP had a 
limited capacity to control the movement of persons in an out Kosovo anyway. The 
empowerment of the KP at the northern borders of Kosovo, however, only had a 
limited impact on drug-smuggling and trafficking activities in the region. The 
insufficient resources of the KP and UNMIK, as well as the porosity of the green 
border were key impediments. Moreover, the few improvements in this area were 
                                                 
1367 B92. 8.11.2012. ‘“Eulex Must Guarantee Neutrality”.’ 
1368 B92. 16.11.2012. ‘Serbian Pm: Eulex Needs to Have Executive Role.’ See also Republic of Serbia. 
25 September 2012. 'Address by Foreign Minister H.E.Mr. Ivan Mrkic before the Security Council of 
the United Nations'. [accessed 15.2.2013]. 
1369 Republic of Serbia. 21 August 2012. ‘Statement of H.E.Mr. Ivica Dacic before the UN Security 
Council.’ 
1370 Kosovo authorities consider that Kosovo has sovereign borders, whereas Serbian authorities refer 
to the administrative line as boundaries.  
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reversed in 2008, as riots flared up in North Kosovo in response to Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence. Angered by the rumour that North Kosovo’s border 
posts would henceforth be manned by ethnic Albanian officers, a Kosovo Serbian 
crowd destroyed two crossing points and forced the UNMIK to leave. Most of the 
Serbian officers belonging to the KP had resigned, and the deployment of the EULEX 
was blocked by Serbia. In December 2008, Serbian President Tadić evoked the 
possibility of a partition of Kosovo1371, while Kosovo Minister Samardžić declared 
that Serbia “will protect [Kosovo Serbs] just like [it] protects the Serbs in Serbia”1372. 
 
The issue could only be defused after Serbia and the EU came to an agreement in the 
UN. The six-point-plan presented by the UN Secretary General in 2008 confirmed the 
applicability of the UNSC resolution 1244 in the area of border management. The 
EULEX, placed under this mandate, accordingly re-established control over the 
border crossings in North Kosovo in spring 2009. It started to register the goods 
entering in North Kosovo at the most contested locations (gates 1 and 31), but it could 
not ascertain full customs controls due to political circumstance and lack of 
capacities1373. Kosovo customs services, meanwhile, could not access these locations. 
Since it contrasted with the way ordinary borders are operated, Belgrade readily 
carried on with this arrangement. However, Serbian police officers, stationed at the 
administrative line, did not recognise Kosovo passports, and refused to endorse the 
new customs stamps issued with the label “Kosovo - Customs” (previously “UNMIK-
Kosovo Customs”)1374. This gesture put a sudden halt to Kosovo’s exports to and 
through Serbia.  
 
In 2011, the issue was brought on the agenda of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue by the 
EU. But as the first rounds of negotiations did not inflect Serbia’s position, Pristina 
decided on 20 July 2011 to reciprocate Serbia’s non-recognition in trade relations by 
decreeing that Serbia’s customs stamps would no longer be valid in Kosovo1375. 
Overrun, the EULEX could not thoroughly implement the restrictive measure decided 
in Pristina, and the Kosovo government therefore decided to forcibly send its own 
officers at the border crossings. Outraged, the Kosovo Serbs responded by assaulting 
the border facilities and impairing the mobility of the EULEX, KFOR and KP with 
barricades built throughout North Kosovo. Pressured by the EU, which suggested that 
Serbia’s bid for EU candidacy could be jeopardised by the situation in Kosovo, 
President Tadić eventually called for dismantling the barricades, on the ground that  
 
                                                 
1371 B92. 30.9.2008. ‘Tadić Hints at Kosovo Partition.’ 
1372 Associated Press. 17.3.2008. ‘Peacekeepers Battle Serbs in Kosovo.’ 
1373 European Commission. 14 October 2009c. ‘Kosovo (under Unscr 1244/99) 2009 Progress Report.’ 
1374 Trade relations between Serbia and Kosovo were regulated by their joint participation in the 
CEFTA. Kosovo could fully participate in the CEFTA from 2007 but was represented by the UNMIK, 
under the label of “UNMIK on behalf of Kosovo in accordance with UNSC resolution 1244”. After 
declaring independence, Kosovo decided, in accordance with its Constitution, to phase out the 
reference to UNMIK, and started to issue “Kosovo-Customs” stamps. Serbia responded by declaring 
Kosovo’s customs stamps invalid, despite the assessment of UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy, 
Lamberto Zannier, who stated that “Kosovo-Customs” stamps were not violating the UNSC resolution 
1244. See International Crisis Group. 26.8.2010. ‘Kosovo and Serbia after the Icj Opinion.’ In Europe 
Report, vol.206.p. 20-22 
1375 The reciprocation of trade relations was foreseen by the 2006 Central Free Trade Agreement. See 
Hamilton, A. February 2012. ‘The Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue and the North of Kosovo: From Technical 
Arrangements to Political Haggling.’ 
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“the barricades are not contributing to the defence of Serb national interests. 
On the contrary, they are endangering them”. 1376 
 
An agreement was finally reached on 2 September 2011, although North Kosovo 
Serbs continued to defy Belgrade on the barricades, despite the snowy winter. The 
agreement confirmed the usage of customs stamps labelled with “Kosovo Customs”, 
without state symbols.  
 
Shortly after, on 2 December 2011, Belgrade and Pristina sealed another agreement, 
again in the framework of the EU-led technical dialogue. This agreement addressed 
the wider issue of border management. Pressed by Pristina to accept the return of KP 
officers at the northern gates of Kosovo, Serbia sought a way out that would 
undermine Pristina’s claim in the North. Serbia therefore first launched the idea of 
Integrated Border Management (IBM)1377 - a way of organising the horizontal and 
vertical cooperation between the Kosovo, Serbian and international actors present at 
the border crossings, and above all re-empowering the EULEX at the expense of the 
Kosovo police institutions. The EU, a key promoter of IBM cooperation in the 
Western Balkans, welcomed the idea and facilitated the negotiations. The final 
agreement and its protocols entrusted the EULEX with large competences at northern 
border crossing points, but envisioned a growing participation of KP officers, 
including ethnic Albanians, and the creation of an implementation group chaired by 
the EU to ascertain the application of the IBM principles1378. In December 2012, the 
IBM was eventually implemented at the most sensitive border crossings of Jarinja 
(gate 1) and Brnjak (gate 31). It implied the presence, next to KFOR, EULEX officers, 
of KP and Kosovo customs officers on the Kosovo side of the border, and of Serbian 
officers, on the other side. Although the practical role of the EULEX vis-à-vis the KP 
and Kosovo customs officers remain to be determined, this agreement sounds as a 
confirmation of Serbia’s departure from the idea of partition, and it signals its 
acceptance of materialising the physical separation from Kosovo.  
 
The Serbian governments, which negotiated these customs and IBM deals, claimed 
that the agreements are “status neutral”1379. But these were celebrated by Kosovo’s 
Prime Minister as signs of de jure recognition of Kosovo1380, criticised in Serbia by 
more radical nationalists in the opposition. After there conclusion, Former Prime 
Minister Koštunica thus stated 
 
“I strongly advocate that Serbia sends a request to the UN Security Council 
to stop the negotiations under Brussels’ supervision and return the 
negotiation under the full mandate of the Security Council because it is 
envisaged by the Resolution 1244”.1381 
 
These reactions are certainly excessive. But the fact that Serbia (albeit reluctantly) 
concluded and implement these agreements is nonetheless indicative of a substantive 
change in Belgrade’s approach. These agreements, after all, allow the transformation 
                                                 
1376 Balkan Insight. 1.12.2011. ‘Abandon Barricades, Tadic Urges Kosovo Serbs.’ 
1377 International Crisis Group. 19.2.2013. ‘Serbia and Kosovo: The Path to Normalisation.’ In Europe 
Report, vol.223. p. 14. 
1378 B92. 5.12.2011. ‘Agreement on Administrative Border Crossings.’ 
1379 B92. 3.9.2011. ‘"Customs Stamp Agreement Represents Status Neutral Solution".’ 
1380 B92. 7.12.2011. ‘Thaci: Serbia De Jure Recognized Kosovo.’ 
1381 B92. 1.12.2012. ‘Border with Kosovo Is “Unacceptable”.’ 
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of the poorly-manned checkpoints along the administrative line into proper border 
posts with competences in personal control and customs. They also make the prospect 
of territorial partition less likely, and overall, lay the foundation stone of state-to-state 
relations.  
 
3.4.1.3.3. Kosovo’s representation in international fora 
 
Another symbolical area, in which Serbia has inflected its Kosovo policy, is the 
highly sensitive issue of Kosovo’s representation in international fora. Until recently, 
Kosovo was represented in international fora by the UNMIK, which spoke for 
Kosovo authorities and signed agreements on their behalf1382. Kosovo representatives 
could attend to international meetings, but they were placed under the umbrella of the 
UNMIK, in accordance with UNSC resolution 1244. This arrangement was in line 
with Serbia’s view that Kosovo should be denied the exercise of external sovereignty, 
and Pristina accepted as well, at least reluctantly, this ad interim solution. When 
Kosovo declared its independence, however, it enshrined in its Constitution that its 
President shall represent the country externally, sign international agreements and 
lead the country’s foreign policy 1383 . Kosovo started accordingly to question its 
UNMIK chaperonage, arguing that  
 
“the time is over when UNMIK and UNMIK's chief represented Kosovo”.1384 
 
It also claimed that Kosovo representatives had henceforth a right to speak on behalf 
of their own country, and struggled to be accepted on an equal footing in regional 
meetings. Serbia objected to Kosovo’s claim by boycotting the events where Kosovo 
was not represented by the UNMIK1385. But this self-isolationist response ran against 
Serbia’s interests. It furthermore sparked off deep concerns in Brussels, since the 
presence of Serbia in these meetings was deemed essential to support regional 
cooperation, reconciliation and good-neighbourliness. Serbia first inflected its 
position in spring 2010, arguing that it would accept a solution granting Kosovo an 
“asymmetrical” representation. This position did not differ substantially from Serbia’s 
previous commitment to Kosovo’s representation through the UNMIK: 
 
“Our position is that Kosovo cannot participate anywhere without UNMIK, 
since that would violate Resolution 1244”.1386 
 
But it made this commitment more flexible. Kosovo representatives would for 
instance be “escorted by the UNMIK chief” who would speak “before the 
delegation”1387. The Kosovo government understandingly refused this proposal1388, 
and Serbia, pressed by the EU on the eve of an important regional meeting1389, then 
                                                 
1382 For instance the UNMIK, on behalf of Kosovo, signed the CEFTA accession agreement in 
December 2006, and the UNMIK represents Kosovo in the regional cooperation council since February 
2008. 
1383 Arts 1,7,10, Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. 2008. 
1384 B92. 21.12.2008. ‘K. Albanians Puzzled over Representation.’ 
1385 For instance, the inauguration of Croatian President Josipović in February 2010, and the Western 
Balkan conference launching the Brdo process in March 2010. 
1386 B92. 29.4.2010. ‘Belgrade Wants Priština Represented “Asymmetrically”.’ 
1387 Ibid. 
1388 B92. 21.12.2008. ‘K. Albanians Puzzled over Representation.’ 
1389 The EU-Western Balkan summit, planned in June 2010 
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accepted the presence of Kosovo to its side. The use of the Gymnich formula1390, 
signalling a practical solution, made the agreement possible, but it was no panacea.  
 
The EU therefore brought this issue on its agenda in the framework of the Belgrade-
Pristina dialogue, and an agreement was eventually sealed on 24 February 2012, just 
before Serbia received its EU candidate status. The so-called “footnote agreement” 
marks a significant departure from Belgrade’s position towards Kosovo external 
representation. Indeed, it implicitly phases out the UNMIK’s chaperonage, by 
providing that Kosovo may henceforth “participate on its own account and speak for 
itself at all regional meetings”1391. Regional meetings shall not only encompass the 
arrangements whose aim is to “promote cooperation or integration in the Balkan 
region”, it also includes “meetings with EU institutions in the context of the European 
agenda1392. The condition posed to Kosovo’s participation in those meetings, however, 
is the consistent use of an asterisk next to its name, i.e. “Kosovo*”, linked to a 
footnote reading, which reads: “this designation is without prejudice to positions on 
status, and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration 
of independence” 1393 . The agreement finally recommends that the organisers of 
regional meetings refrain from displaying state symbols, save the EU or the host 
country’s1394.  
 
Praised by the EU, the footnote agreement did not clear all the ambiguities 
underpinning Kosovo’s international representation. Divergent interpretations of the 
letter and the spirit of the agreement fuelled new problems, especially in its 
implementation phase1395. For the Kosovo negotiating team, the footnote agreement 
signalled de facto recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Serbia and de jure 
recognition by the EU 1396 . For Serbian President Tadić, the footnote confirmed 
Serbia’s claim regarding the asymmetrical representation of Kosovo1397. Contested 
though it is, this agreement marks a watershed in Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo. 
First, it signals that Belgrade henceforth accepts that Kosovo should no longer be 
represented by the UNMIK, at least in some fora. Second, it paves the way of the 
further changes, since provisions in the agreement may be subject to extensive 
interpretations. A clarification by the EU first concluded that the footnote must not 
always be visible1398, and it remains to be seen whether participation may imply 
membership1399, and what the scope of Kosovo “promoting cooperation or integration 
in the Balkan region” is1400. Of course, Serbia remains firm in its stance that the 
                                                 
1390 The formula prescribes that countries are represented only by the name of their representatives. It 
proscribes the name of the countries and state symbols.  
1391 Point 4, B92. 25.2.2012. ‘Agreement on Regional Representation of Kosovo.’ 
1392 Point 10, Ibid. 
1393 Points 2-3, Ibid. 
1394 Point 7, Ibid. 
1395 Lepore, P. July 2012. ‘Beyond the Asterisk Agreement.’ vol.12. 
1396 UNMIK. 25.2.2012. ‘Media Monitoring -Headlines.’ 
1397 B92. 24.2.2012. ‘President Tadić Says His Policy Has Been "Confirmed".’ 
1398 Serbia walked out of several meetings because of that, for instance, in spring 2012, of a RCC 
meeting in Sarajevo, a regional conference on civil society in Belgrade, and a LGTB rights conference 
in Budvar.  
1399 Serbia claims that participation in regional meetings shall not imply membership. See Republic of 
Serbia. 21 August 2012. ‘Statement of H.E.Mr. Ivica Dacic before the UN Security Council.’ 
1400 See Republic of Serbia. 10 May 2012. ‘Statement by Ms. Jelena Plakalović, UN Fifth Committee, 
Agenda Item 158.’ 
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agreement is an exception conceded to Kosovo and that UNMIK-based representation 
shall remain the rule. As stated by an MFA official,  
 
“It is particularly important that UNMIK continues to represent Kosovo in 
international fora in accordance with Resolution 1244. Accordingly, UNMIK 
representatives should secure their attendance at international meetings and 
conferences to which the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in 
Kosovo representatives are invited, except in cases where specific solutions 
are agreed upon in the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.” 1401 
 
But in agreeing to the footnote arrangement, Serbia’s also placed itself under the 
constraining scrutiny of the EU with regards its implementation, including in those 
areas that require further clarification. Belgrade, then, not only accepted to normalise 
its some specific aspects of its relations with Pristina; it also opened avenues for the 
timely normalisation of a wider scope of its international relations with Kosovo.  
 
3.4.2.  Inferring Europeanisation from the settlement of neighbourly disputes 
 
3.4.2.1. The international framework for the peaceful settlement of disputes 
 
According to the UN Charter, states have a duty to “settle their international disputes 
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice 
are not endangered”1402. This duty is universal, and it is completed by the obligation, 
for all UN members to “refrain from any action which may aggravate” a dispute that 
has not been solved1403. Several documents codify this principle of international law, 
most notably the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States1404 and the comprehensive 1982 
Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes1405. All of 
them view dispute settlement as essential to the maintenance of international peace 
and security –a principle interrelated with other principles of international law, e.g. 
the principle of non-use of force, the principle of self-determination of peoples and 
the principle of sovereign equality.  
 
The interrelation with the principle of self-determination is important for states with 
limited external sovereignty, like Kosovo1406. It makes the rights and obligations of 
UN members states in dispute settlement matters (e.g. Serbia, Macedonia, Greece) 
equally applicable to parties that are not signatories of the UN Charter, inasmuch as 
they claim statehood (e.g. Kosovo).  
 
The sovereign equality principle, reaffirmed by the Manila Declaration, is important 
to Macedonia’s naming issue, since Greece enjoys a better position than Macedonia 
vis-à-vis the EU. The principle, however, commands that all parties to a dispute  
 
                                                 
1401 See also Ibid. 
1402 Art. 2(3), United Nations. 1945. ‘Charter of the United Nations.’ 
1403 United Nations General Assembly. 24 October 1970. ‘Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States.’ 
1404 Ibid. 
1405 United Nations General Assembly. 15 November 1982. ‘Resolution Adopting the Manila 
Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes.’ 
1406 Kosovo, for instance, is not a member of the United Nations.  
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“shall have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the 
international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, 
political or other nature”.1407  
 
It is a premise that is essential to establishing dialogue, appraising the dispute, 
agreeing on a method to settle the dispute and engaging the proceedings.  
 
The means and the procedure used to settle a dispute shall be freely agreed upon by 
the parties1408. But the UN Charter provides an explicit list, consisting of 
 
“negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, 
resort to regional agencies or arrangement, or other peaceful means”.1409 
 
These methods of dispute settlement differ from one another in format –e.g. whether 
negotiations involve third actors, judicial procedures-, and in the type of outcome that 
can be expected to produce –e.g. treaty, binding award or commission’s report1410. 
 
The UN Charter also provides that parties to a dispute may “resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements”1411. This possibility is a direct reference to the chapter VIII 
of the Charter, which provides that the action of the UN may be complemented, if not 
substituted, by regional actors, provided their activities are consistent with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations. If this is the case, the parties shall first 
invoke the settlement procedures as established under the regional framework. Article 
52 of the UN Charter provides indeed that  
 
“The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or 
constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific 
settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such 
regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council”.1412 
 
                                                 
1407 United Nations General Assembly. 24 October 1970. ‘Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States.’ 
1408 United Nations. 1992. ‘Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States.’ 
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When this third party submits its own proposals, holds meetings and intervenes in the negotiations in 
order to reconcile the contending claims, then it undertakes mediation. Conciliation follows the parties’ 
decision to submit their dispute to a non-judicial commission, comprising representatives of the two 
parties, in order to gain a better understanding of each other’s case and envisage a compromise. 
Arbitration implies to submit the dispute to an ad hoc body specifically created to render an award, 
which is binding for the parties. It is then a compulsory means of dispute settlement, just as judicial 
settlement, which supposes that the dispute is submitted to a pre-constituted international court or 
tribunal. United Nations. 1992. ‘Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States.’ 
1411 Art. 33 (1), United Nations. 1945. ‘Charter of the United Nations.’ 
1412 See also Point I.5., United Nations General Assembly. 15 November 1982. ‘Resolution Adopting 
the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes.’ 
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This possibility is remarkable, since it demonstrates the UN’s support for the 
development (and even precedence) of regional ways of doing things in dispute 
settlement matters –a possibility that finds its full expression in Europe.  
 
3.4.2.2. European frameworks for the settlement of neighbourly disputes 
 
The European continent has witnessed the emergence of several regional 
arrangements which can be invoked to settle neighbourly dispute matters in the sense 
of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. First, there is the Council of Europe, which in 
1957 adopted its European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. The 
Convention, as a rule, commits its signatories to submit to the ICJ “all international 
legal disputes” for judicial settlement, including, in particular, those concerning the 
existence of “any fact, which, if established, would constitute a breach of international 
obligations”1413. In certain cases, the parties may first seek to settle their legal dispute 
through conciliation. As regards the disputes that are not legal in character, the 
Convention provides that the parties shall use conciliation, and in case of failure (or 
prior agreement) resort to arbitration1414. The Convention of the Council of Europe 
has hitherto only been invoked in rare occasions, e.g. in the resolution of the South 
Tirol - Alto Adige dispute between Austria and Italy in 1971.  
 
Another regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is the 
OSCE, which “as such, […] provides an important link between European and global 
security”1415. The OSCE offers a relatively formalised dispute settlement mechanisms 
based on mediation, conciliation and arbitration 1416  –the so-called “Valletta 
Mechanism” (which has never been used), Direct Conciliation mechanism (never 
used), and OSCE arbitration mechanism (never used either). Similarly recognised as a 
regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation also provides a framework for international disputes. 
The Nato offers its good offices, after direct negotiations have failed, and, if the 
dispute is legal in nature, that it commands its submission to a judicial tribunal1417.  
 
These regional arrangements complete the UN framework for the settlement of 
international disputes in Europe. However, they can only be invoked by states 
participating in such arrangements. Although Serbia is a member of the Council of 
Europe and a participating state of the OSCE, it is not member of Nato and has not 
ratified the OSCE convention on Conciliation and Arbitration. As for Kosovo, it is not 
participating in any of these frameworks. And Macedonia is not a member of Nato. 
Serbia and Kosovo, therefore, may hardly invoke these regional arrangements in the 
settlement of their dispute. Greece and Macedonia, by contrast, are bound by their 
membership in the Council of Europe and participation in the OSCE, but the Nato 
framework may not be as relevant.  
 
                                                 
1413 Art. 1, Council of Europe. 29 April 1957. ‘European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes.’ 
1414 Chapter II and III, Ibid. 
1415 Point 25, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 1992. ‘Helsinki Summit Declaration.’ 
1416 OSCE. 2011. ‘Osce Mechanisms and Procedures.’ 
1417 North Atlantic Council. December 1956. ‘Resolution on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and 
Differences between Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.’ 
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Although the EU has not declared itself a regional arrangement in the sense of 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, it can be considered as one in many respects, 
including regarding its observance and promotion of the international principle of 
peaceful settlement of disputes1418. After all, the EU’s CFSP intends to “preserve 
peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter”1419. It conceives its role as 
supportive of UN prescriptions, and views the EU’s cooperation with the UN, in all 
respects, as a “priority”1420. The EU, as regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter 
VIII, provides a regional framework for the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes. The member states of the EU all recognise the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice, and the bilateral issues that do not fall under the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and could not be solved at the ministerial level, can 
be submitted to the European Council. The EU, however, also supports the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes in its neighbourhood, where it intends to develop a 
 
“special relationship […] aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good 
neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by 
close and peaceful relations based on cooperation”.1421 
 
Most of the disputes that directly involve the EU fall under an arbitration procedure, 
specifically designed as part of the Stabilisation and Association process1422. The 
others, which are too political or concern neighbourly relations, can be dealt as part of 
the EU’s Political Dialogue with non-EU states. In its 1997 Joint Declaration on 
Political Dialogue, the EU and Macedonia agreed to discuss at the highest level issues 
that “enhanc[e] security and stability in the whole of Europe and, in particular, in the 
region of South Eastern Europe” 1423. In 2003, likewise, the EU and Serbia established 
Political Dialogue with the purpose of “promoting regional cooperation, development 
of good neighbourly relations and fulfilment of obligations under international 
law”1424. Arguably, the EU’s concern for settling neighbourly disputes is connected to 
its promotion of good-neighbourliness through political dialogue –a principle that has 
gradually entered the grey area of the EU’s political criteria and is now projected 
through conditionality. The experience of Cyprus, which joined the EU despite an 
unresolved dispute with Turkey, convinced the EU that dispute settlement is more 
than international obligation, which the EU may promote regionally; it shall become a 
precondition to EU accession.  
 
                                                 
1418 See Blockmans, S. and Ramses A. Wessel. 2011. ‘The European Union and Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes in Its Neighbourhood: The Emergence of a New Regional Security Actor?’ In The European 
Union and Global Emergencies: Law and Policy Aspects eds. Antoniadis, A., et al. p. 90-93; White, N. 
D. 2006. ‘The Ties That Bind: The EU, the UN and International Law.’ Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law vol.37. 
1419 Art. 21, Treaty on European Union. 30 March 2010. 
1420 Council of the European Union. 12 December 2003. ‘European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe 
in a Better World.’ 
1421 Art. 8, Treaty on European Union. 30 March 2010. 
1422 In accordance with a protocol to the Stabilisation and Association agreements concluded by the EU 
with most of the Western Balkan states. 
1423 Council of the European Union. 29 April 1997c. ‘Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue between 
the EU and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.’ 
1424 Council of the European Union. 17 September 2003. ‘Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue 
between the EU and Serbia and Montenegro.’ 
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In the Western Balkans, the expectations of the EU in that matter have gradually been 
strengthened. Until recently, the EU’s enlargement strategy papers, for instance, did 
not mention open disputes as an issue jeopardising the European perspectives of 
Western Balkan states. In 2008, however, the Commission, for the first time, 
acknowledged that  
 
“nearly all regional partners have unresolved bilateral issues with their 
neighbours, including border disputes”.1425  
 
From 2008, it dedicated a specific part of its strategy papers to so-called “bilateral 
questions”, and recalled that the settlement of outstanding issues with neighbouring 
countries was part of the Stabilisation and Association process. At first almost limited 
to border issues, the bilateral questions started to encompass other questions, 
including more sensitive ones (e.g. Kosovo issue and naming issue).  
 
The role that the EU was ready to play also changed in the course of the past few 
years. The Commission, at first, limited itself to “urging all partners to address 
bilateral issues as a priority”, while “monitoring developments”1426. In 2009, however, 
it added that  
 
“where appropriate, the Commission is ready to facilitate the search for 
solutions, at the request of the parties concerned”.1427 
 
This role of facilitator prescribed the resolution of disputes “in conformity with the 
principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations 
Charter, including if necessary jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice”1428. 
While reiterating that dispute settlement “need to be solved by the parties 
concerned”1429, the EU intensified in 2010 its readiness to facilitate the process, 
arguing that “the EU” (and no longer the sole Commission) 
 
“stands ready to facilitate the creation of the necessary political impetus in 
the search for solutions and to support related initiatives”. 1430 
 
Although the nature of the “necessary political impetus” to which the EU would 
contribute is not specified, it certainly pertains to conditionality-related incentives for 
EU accession. While reiterating its support for the UN framework, including, when 
necessary, judicial settlement, the EU added in 2012, that it would also support 
attempts at settling international dispute by “other existing or ad hoc dispute 
settlement bodies”1431. It also called  
 
                                                 
1425 European Commission. 5 November 2008b. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-
2009.’ 
1426 Ibid. 
1427 European Commission. 14 October 2009a. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-
2010.’ 
1428 Ibid. 
1429 European Commission. 9 November 2010a. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-
2011.’ 
1430 Ibid. 
1431 European Commission. 10 October 2012c. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-
2013.’ 
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all parties concerned to address bilateral issues, falling outside areas of EU 
competence and/or contractual obligations towards the EU, in a constructive 
spirit, as early as possible, taking into account overall EU interests and 
values”.1432 
 
All in all, even though the EU recognises that “the responsibility to find solutions” to 
neighbourly disputes falls devolve upon prospective member states1433, these cannot 
ignore the EU’s regional arrangement. From passive monitoring body, the EU has 
become a proactive facilitator, a dedicated amplifier of UN prescriptions under 
Chapter VIII, and through its conditionality policy, possibly, an influent middleman.  
 
3.4.3.  Argumentative analysis 
 
3.4.3.1. Structural analysis 
 
The EU’s commitment to promote the peaceful settlement of international dispute in 
the Western Balkans impregnates its relationship with Serbia and Macedonia. Both 
countries face specific conditions in that matter, displaying cross-country similarities, 
in the sense, for instance, that they command cooperation for its own sake rather than 
imposing the substantive terms of dispute settlement. But they also display important 
differences, which can help explaining why Serbia’s approach towards Kosovo has 
been inflected while Macedonia’s remained stalled.  
 
3.4.3.1.1. Conditionality based on the reminiscence of a community of views (Kosovo 
issue) 
 
First of all, for want of a common position on the Kosovo status or the Macedonia 
naming issue, the EU does not impose any condition on Serbia and Macedonia that 
would prescribe the adoption of a preferred solution (e.g. recognition of Kosovo, or 
relinquishment of Macedonia’s name). This is understandable, considering the 
divergence of views of EU member states in those matters. Nearly half of them, for 
instance, make a relatively consistent use of Macedonia’s constitutional name in their 
bilateral relations1434. These are mostly states that joined the EU later, in 1995 or 
2004/2007. The others, by contrast, make a consistent use of FYROM in their 
multilateral and bilateral relations, and do not support Macedonia’s claim against 
Greece. Most of EU member states, likewise, do not support Serbia in its no-
independence policy towards Pristina. But five of them did not recognise the 
independence of Kosovo and are more supportive of Belgrade’s claim1435. This lack 
of consensus deprives the EU of the possibility to reach a common position on these 
issues.  
 
                                                 
1432 Point 7, Council of the European Union. 5 December 2011. ‘Council Conclusions on Enlargement 
and Stabilisation and Association Process.’ 
1433 European Commission. 14 October 2009a. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-
2010.’ 
1434 According to a content-analysis of the MFA websites of the 27 EU member states, only Austria, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden use the term of “Republic of Macedonia” in a consistent manner. 
Latvia, Portugal and the UK display ambiguities, whereas the other EU member states consistently use 
“FYROM”, “FYR Macedonia” or “FYR/Macedonia”. (Online research carried out in February 2013).  
1435 Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Slovakia and Romania did not recognise Kosovo (as of 2013).  
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This is not to say that there is no EU position at all, even at the embryonic state, upon 
which the EU’s conditionality approach is built. A deeper analysis shows that behind 
its obvious disunity, the EU has kept some memories of institutional unity in favour 
of Kosovo’s independence, whereas no such reminiscence characterises its approach 
to Macedonia’s naming issue. A few years ago, EU member states unanimously 
endorsed the Ahtisaari plan recommending the independence of Kosovo under 
international supervision 1436 . Their endorsement was backed by the EU’s High 
Representative Javier Solana1437 and the European Parliament1438. Of course, this EU 
position was subject to the approval of the UN Security Council, which had to adopt 
the plan and amend the UNSC resolution 1244. This never happened, since Serbia, 
supported by Russia, rejected the plan, and the failure of the Ahtisaari process 
consequently tolled the death knell of the EU’s common position towards Kosovo. 
This experience, however, did not prove fruitless. Although the EU had to erase all its 
reference to the Ahtisaari plan in order to be able to deploy the EULEX in Kosovo, it 
did not fully give up the idea which germinated through the Ahtisaari process. This 
idea (implying the inflection of Serbia’s no-independence position towards the 
Ahtissari’s proposal for supervised independence) remained latent, embedded within 
the institutional memory of EU supranational bodies. And it recurrently resurfaced, 
despite the EU’s official commitment to status-neutrality vowed in 2008 1439 . In 
February 2009, the European Parliament thus adopted a resolution dealing with the 
“role of the EU” in Kosovo, in which it  
 
“encourage[d] those EU Member States which have not already done so to 
recognise the independence of Kosovo”.1440 
 
In 2010, it added that it 
 
“would welcome the recognition by all Member States of the independence of 
Kosovo”.1441 
 
In September 2012, the President of the European Parliament went further, declaring 
that 
 
“the relations between Serbia and Kosovo, as part of a peaceful development, 
must end, the way we see it, in mutual recognition”.1442 
 
The European Parliament rapporteur for Kosovo, Ulrike Lunacek made a similar 
statement a few weeks after, arguing that Serbia should recognise Kosovo, since 
 
                                                 
1436 Council of the European Union. 18 June 2007. ‘Conclusions on the Western Balkans.’ 
1437 NATO Headquarters. 26 February 2007. ‘Joint Press Point with Nato Secretary General, Mr. Jaap 
De Hoop Scheffer and the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. 
Javier Solana.’ 
1438 European Parliament. 15 March 2007. ‘Report on the Future of Kosovo and the Role of the EU.’ 
1439 Presidency of the Council of the European Union. 28 November 2008. ‘Declaration by the 
Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on the Deployment of Eulex.’ 
1440 Point 3, European Parliament. 5 February 2009. ‘European Parliament Resolution on Kosovo and 
the Role of the EU.’ 
1441 Point 1, European Parliament. 8 July 2010. ‘European Parliament Resolution on the European 
Integration Process of Kosovo.’ 
1442 B92. 4.9.2012. ‘Ep Wants Serbia To "Recognize Kosovo", Pm Told.’. Martin Schultz later 
explained that this statement was a personal estimate.  
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“the EU will not allow another Cyprus in the EU [and] will not accept any 
country without defined borders”.1443 
 
These statements belied the deal the Council struck in November 2008 with Serbia in 
the UN to authorise the deployment of the EULEX throughout Kosovo.  
 
The Ahtisaari idea even took root in the Commission, though in a much less 
outspoken way. In its 2012-2013 enlargement strategy paper, for instance, the 
Commission rightfully applied the footnote agreement. It referred to Kosovo* 
“without prejudice to positions on status”, and in the footnote, to the ICJ 2011 ruling 
as well as the UNSC resolution 1244/1999, which guarantees Serbia’s territorial 
integrity. But in the same document, the Commission, for the first time, also called 
Serbia to  
 
“respect[...] the territorial integrity of Kosovo”1444.  
 
This prescription is reminiscent of the recommendations contained in the Ahtisaari 
plan1445. Its resurgence is a challenge to the pragmatic status-neutrality compromise 
found in 2008, and it points out, if need be, the ambiguity of the EU’s engagement in 
Kosovo –an engagement aiming at strengthening Pristina’s internal sovereignty 
(through the EULEX’s assistance to consolidate the rule of law, the police and the 
customs), while denying the status-sensitive implications of this consolidation.  
 
Of course, in enlargement matters, it is not the Commissioners or the Parliamentarians 
who ultimately make decisions on the conditions that Serbia shall meet to join the EU. 
The Council does, and its members, whether they recognised Kosovo or not, are in 
this respect quite vocal: officially, recognition is not a condition for Serbia to join the 
EU, but the normalisation of the relations between Belgrade and Pristina is 1446 . 
Behind closed doors, however, some officials1447, including in Serbia1448, doubt of the 
possibility to lastingly decouple normalisation (which is a process) from recognition 
(which is the usually outcome of normalisation)1449.  
 
Be that as it may, there is here a meaningful difference in the structural conditions 
weighing on Serbia and Macedonia. Although the EU, in neither cases, has an official 
position regarding the terms of their dispute settlement, it used to have one for Serbia, 
carved in the EU’s support for the Ahtisaari proposal. Despite its eventual failure, this 
                                                 
1443 B92. 10.11.2012. ‘No EU without Kosovo Recognition, Ep Rapporteur Claims.’ 
1444 European Commission. 10 October 2012c. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-
2013.’ 
1445 The Commissioner Füle later explained that this reference to Kosovo’s territorial integrity should 
be understood as a rejection of partition. See B92. 11.10.2012. ‘“EU Does Not Want Partition of 
Kosovo”.’ 
1446 This statement has been made publicly at several occasions since 2008, e.g. by the British and 
German, ambassadors to Serbia, the Foreign Ministers of France and Hungary, but also the Head of the 
EU delegation in Serbia, the EU enlargement Commissioner, the European Parliament’s rapporteur for 
Serbia and even the Commission’s President. 
1447 Interview with an Official from the Embassy of the Republic of France to Serbia. Belgrade, 
14/9/2011 
1448 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, Directorate for 
Neighbouring and South-East European Countries. Belgrade, 15/09/2011 
1449 It is questionable that a solution prescribing normalisation without recognition is sustainable. East-
West Germany relations or Taiwan-PR China relations are sometimes cited as example, though.  
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position remained etched in the EU’s institutional memory. This, arguably, 
differentiates the EU’s underlying approach to conditionality in the two cases at hand, 
for the EU never conceived a common position regarding the terms of Macedonia’s 
dispute with Greece1450.  
 
3.4.3.1.2. Conditionality based on instrumental solidarity (naming issue) 
 
Another difference lies in the subsidiary role some EU member states play in the 
absence of EU common position. In the case of Macedonia, most of the EU member 
states have remained relatively passive in this question –they did not advocate a 
specific solution, openly side with one or the other party, or suggest that the EU 
should take a more stringent or lenient position. Certainly, for some of them, 
Macedonia is not a matter of primary concern –their bilateral relations with Skopje 
are irrelevant, and Western Balkan politics is a distant matter. For many others, the 
naming issue is important in character, but it is not a security issue the EU shall get 
directly involved in. As explained by a Slovenian diplomat quoting his colleagues,  
 
“many say: we do not want to bring problems in the EU, so let’s handle that 
in the UN, and we’ll open negotiations for accession when it’s done”.1451 
 
The assumption behind this assessment is that the EU should not import an issue 
which it can address externally. As stated by an EU diplomat in Skopje,  
 
“we have a long history of making mistakes of that kind, i.e. importing 
problems like Cyprus. So, we don’t want to repeat what happened in the 
past”.1452 
 
Only a few member states, in the past ten years, actively engaged in fostering the 
dispute settlement in one way or the other. Their engagement was often sudden, 
arising as those states held the Presidency of the Council of the EU. Getting involved 
in the dispute settlement primarily aimed at gaining international credit for (hopefully) 
succeeding where others failed. Hungary, for instance, prioritised the resolution of 
this question during its Presidency in 2011. Hungarian Prime Minister Orban then 
pointed out the responsibility of Greece in the naming issue fiasco, arguing that  
 
“there is no reason for someone to stop a country from becoming a 
part of Europe. […]. This unnatural state should be resolved and 
Macedonia which has six years of candidate status should become 
member as soon as possible”.1453 
 
Hungary also declared itself to be “prepared to assist the negotiations and to be 
actively included if all sides require that” 1454. Another example is Slovenia, also 
                                                 
1450 Except in the early 1990, before the signature of the Interim Agreement, when the European 
Council concluded that it would recognise the FYROM “under a name which does not include the term 
Macedonia”. European Council. 27 June 1992. ‘European Council Declaration on Former Yugoslavia.’ 
1451 Interview with an Official from the Slovenian Embassy to Macedonia. Skopje, 02/11/2011 
1452 Interview with an Official from Delegation of the European Union to the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. Skopje, 01/11/2011 
1453 EUbusiness. 12.5.2011. ‘Hungary Pledges Support for Macedonia's EU Entry.’ 
1454 Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia. 11.6.2011. ‘Priorities of the Hungarian Presidency with 
Council of the EU Presented in the Macedonian Assembly.’ 
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during its Presidency of the Council. In 2008, Slovenian Foreign Minister Rupel 
reportedly had “a big fight with his Greek counterpart” 1455 on the question, as he 
hosted a meeting with Western Balkan states’ foreign ministers. More recently, 
Slovenia offered to host informal meetings in Ljubljana and to share the lessons it 
drew from the settlement of its own dispute with Croatia1456. But both initiatives 
lacked impetus –perhaps because they were more instrumental than principled, and 
only materialised during the 6-month Presidency. Supportive of Macedonia’s position 
though they were, Slovenia and Hungary considered indeed that the question in 
general terms was a “bilateral issue concerning Macedonia and Greece”1457, for which 
the negotiations had been placed “under the auspices of the UN”1458. Both countries 
accordingly refrained themselves from attempting to drag the EU into the negotiation 
process in a more proactive and durable way.  
 
Greece by contrast, being both EU member state and party to the dispute, actively 
engaged in advocating the use of EU negative conditionality to block Macedonia’s 
integration process. Its conditional approach “no solution, no invitation” lies at the 
crux of Macedonia’s stalled integration processes since 20081459 . This principled 
approach has been uploaded in, and adopted by the Council as a sine qua non for the 
opening of Macedonia’s accession negotiations. Although many EU member states do 
not share Greece’s firm stance against Macedonia, they usually refrain from opposing 
it, out of solidarity. As argued by an EU diplomat,  
 
“there is an element of solidarity amongst the member states. We'll defend 
the members first [i.e. Greece], against the outsiders [i.e. Macedonia], and 
when the latter join, we will defend them against the outsiders as well. There 
is a lack of understanding here about how strong this feeling is. Therefore, it 
is not the question of one state against the other EU member states. It is more, 
that we stand together”.1460 
 
Unexpectedly, this “element of solidarity” has been even more salient since 2008. 
Because it is hardly struck by the economic crisis, most of the EU’s member states 
refrained from questioning Greece’s hardliner position regarding the naming issue. 
Wary of the political instability in Greece, they did not want to risk igniting new 
tensions. According to some accounts, some EU member states even traded their 
support against Macedonia in exchange of Athens’ pledge to carry out economic 
reforms1461. Or they traded it against secret arrangements. According to a diplomatic 
cable from the US embassy in Athens, after the Greek veto in Bucharest, French 
                                                 
1455 Interview with an Official from the Slovenian Embassy to Macedonia. Skopje, 02/11/2011 
1456 Just as Greece, Slovenia at first succeeded to block the accession process of its southern neighbour 
by obtaining from the EU that the settlement of the dispute (concerning the Bay of Piran) becomes a 
condition for resuming the accession negotiations. After almost a year of stalemate, Slovenia 
eventually lifted its veto and accepted to decouple the European perspectives of Croatia from the 
settlement of its bilateral dispute. 
1457 President of the Republic of Slovenia. 'Slovenian President Receives Macedonian President, 
Branko Crvenkovski'. [accessed 15.2.2013]. 
1458 Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia. 11.6.2011. ‘Priorities of the Hungarian Presidency with 
Council of the EU Presented in the Macedonian Assembly.’ 
1459 Interview with an Official from Delegation of the European Union to the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. Skopje, 01/11/2011 
1460 Ibid. 
1461 The name of Germany is cited. Interview with a Senior Officer from the Osce Mission in Skopje. 
Skopje, 12/3/2013 
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President Sarkozy acknowledged that the position of Greece is “legitimate and 
responsible”, while pressing Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis to purchase French 
Rafale fighters and FREMM frigates1462. 
 
These elements of solidarity allowed Greece to literally shape the EU’s conditionality 
regime towards Macedonia and to ascertain the blockade of Skopje’s European 
perspectives since 2008. The European Council conclusions’ directly echo Greece’s 
“no solution, no invitation” approach, when it states 
 
“further steps by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in its progress 
towards the EU are possible, […but] maintaining good neighbourly relations, 
including a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution on the name issue, 
remains essential”.1463  
 
The conclusions of the European Council in the years following 2008 all reiterated the 
“essential” character of this condition, implicitly referring to the naming issue. Since 
the dispute shall be settled in a “mutually acceptable” way, the structure of the EU’s 
conditionality regime towards Macedonia is highly asymmetrical and provides Greece 
with a major asset: further steps in Macedonia’s progress towards the EU eventually 
depend on the positive assent of Greece.  
 
Greece, on the other side, is not willing to convince its counterparts to increase the 
level of direct involvement of the EU in the process of dispute settlement. It sees that  
 
“there is no point in interrupting [the UN mediation process] in order to put 
the EU in charge”.1464 
 
More EU involvement would imply empowering segments of the EU institutional 
design upon which Greece, qua member state, has less control. It could for instance 
imply allowing the High Representative to shape the negotiation process, and possibly, 
to controvert Greece’s “no solution, no invitation” approach. Greece’s caution is well-
grounded. Both the European Parliament and the European Commission have been 
recommending the opening of accession negotiations repeatedly. Whereas the 
Commission merely substantiated its recommendation by arguing that moving the 
accession process to its next stage would “consolidate peace and sustainability of 
reforms”1465, the European Parliament, already in 2006, expressly warned that  
 
“the question of the name of the republic does not constitute an obstacle to its 
further integration into the European fold”.1466 
 
                                                 
1462 United States Embassy in Athens. 9.6.2008. 'Sarkozy Vows Athens'. [accessed 4.3.2013] 
1463 Point 56, European Council. 19/20 June 2008. ‘Conclusions of the Presidency ’. 
1464 Interview with an Official from the Liaison Office of the Hellenic Republic in Skopje. Skopje, 
01/11/2011 
1465 European Commission. 10 October 2012c. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-
2013.’ p. 13. The Commission already recommended the opening of accession negotiations in 2009, 
2010 and 2011. See European Commission. 9 November 2010a. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main 
Challenges 2010-2011.’; European Commission. 12 October 2011c. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main 
Challenges 2011-2012.’; European Commission. 14 October 2009a. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main 
Challenges 2009-2010.’ 
1466 European Parliament. 16 March 2006. ‘European Parliament Resolution on the Commission's 2005 
Enlargement Strategy Paper.’ 
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and later opposed the Greek blockade, arguing in 2009 that 
 
“such outstanding bilateral issues in the Balkans should not obstruct 
accession or take precedence over the process of European integration”.1467 
 
In 2010, the European Parliament furthermore called the EU to get more actively 
involved in the dispute resolution process, and offer its assistance1468. And in 2011, it 
elaborated on (and generalised) its recommendation, calling Commission and the 
Council to  
 
“start developing a generally applicable arbitration mechanism aimed at 
solving bilateral issues between enlargement countries, between Member 
States and enlargement countries and between Member States”.1469 
 
also inviting the High Representative and the Commissioner responsible for 
Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy  
 
“to facilitate an agreement on the name issue and offer political guidance, 
with full respect for the ongoing process of negotiations and the provisions of 
the UN Charter”. 1470 
 
Whether stemming from the European Commission or the European Parliament, these 
recommendations have not been followed by the Council. But a higher degree of 
involvement of the EU in Macedonia’s dispute settlement process would certainly 
weaken Greece’s blocking position1471.  
 
In short, the conditionality dialogue set up by the EU and Macedonia in dispute 
settlement matters is remarkable in many respects. First, it has been seen, it is not 
substantive, since the EU has no prescriptive position on how the “negotiated and 
mutually acceptable” solution should look like. Second, it is less a conditionality 
regime designed collectively by the EU than set of national approaches projected at 
some point by individual EU member states on the EU level. Few member states, 
however, have expressed a consistent interest in the question, except, of course, 
Greece. Understandingly, their relative disinterest has not translated into a 
reinforcement of the role of the EU in the dispute settlement process. Third, the 
current conditionality regime is mainly defined by one EU member state, Greece, 
through the exercise of negative measures (blocking Macedonia’s integration process), 
in accordance with its national approach of “no solution, no invitation”. The other 
member states may not all support Greece’s firm stance, but they do not obstruct it out 
of solidarity, despite the adverse recommendations of the European Commission and 
European Parliament. This configuration, all in all, is far from optimal, for the 
asymmetry in negotiating power, which Greece derives from its membership in the 
                                                 
1467 European Parliament. 12 March 2009. ‘European Parliament Resolution on the 2008 Progress 
Report on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.’ 
1468 European Parliament. 7 February 2010. ‘European Parliament Resolution on the 2009 Progress 
Report on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.’ 
1469 European Parliament. 7 April 2011. ‘European Parliament Resolution on the 2010 Progress Report 
on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.’ 
1470 Ibid. 
1471 Unless Greece succeeds in controlling the EU process from the inside. This argument prevents 
Macedonian from being too optimistic regarding an EU mediation. Interview with a Member of the 
Government of Republic of Skopje. Podgorica, 13/5/2013 
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EU, undermines the external legitimacy of the EU’s conditionality dialogue. If EU 
negative conditions are found to stem from Greece, contra the Commission and the 
Parliament, then failing to meet them is not as much a gesture of objection addressed 
to the EU collectively as to Greece specifically. That is why this configuration, as a 
matter of principle, carries flaws that likely undermine the effectiveness of 
conditionality.  
 
3.4.3.1.3. Conditionality based on the constructive involvement of EU member states 
(Kosovo issue) 
 
The EU’s conditionality regime with Serbia is very different. First, it has been seen 
that even though the EU has no common position on how the solution to the Kosovo 
issue should look like, ideas supporting the Ahtisaari proposal have been etched in the 
EU’s institutional memory. Their resurgence contrasts with the more hollow approach 
the EU adopts towards the naming issue. Secondly, it is remarkable that many (if not 
most of) EU member states have expressed a thorough interest for the Kosovo 
issue1472. This is understandable, since most of the EU member states have civilian 
and military personnel in the field 1473  and are therefore directly affected by the 
outcome of the negotiation process. Of course, this common interest for the Kosovo 
issue does not imply a community of view. EU member states hold different views on 
the Kosovo issue, and as the Council put it in the aftermath of Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence,  
 
“Member States will decide, in accordance with national practice and 
international law, on their relations with Kosovo”.1474 
 
It nonetheless means that EU member states actively engage in the international 
debate on the Kosovo issue, that they interact more purposefully with Serbia at the 
bilateral level in order to support or inflect its national approach, and that they also 
contribute more constructively to shaping the EU’s conditionality regime with Serbia 
at the EU level, despite their disunity. Their very active involvement for the question 
(particularly from the side of Germany) and starkly contentious positions (cf. Cyprus) 
preclude that they settle for an a minima solution. EU member states have instead 
helped designing a conditionality regime that supplements or completes (rather than 
adorns or replaces) their national preferences, while allowing them to continue 
expressing their national preferences.  
 
Cyprus, for instance, is one of the strongest opponents in the EU to Kosovo’s claim 
for independence. It views the case as a precedent potentially supportive of the 
separatist claims of Northern Cyprus. Romania, Spain, Slovakia and Greece concur in 
this argument, all concerned that Kosovo’s precedent could have negative 
implications undermining their own territorial integrity. In 2008, Nicosia, followed by 
the other non-recognisers, thus rejected the plan circulated by Great Britain in the 
Council, which envisioned the creation of a common EU platform to recognise 
                                                 
1472 Interview with an Official from the Embassy of the Republic of Austria to Serbia. Belgrade, 
13/09/2011 
1473 24 EU member states contribute or have contributed to the Nato-led KFOR mission, i.e. all EU 
member states but Cyprus, Latvia and Lithuania. All EU member states but Cyprus contribute to the 
EULEX mission in Kosovo. 
1474 Council of the European Union. 18 February 2008c. ‘Gaerc Conclusions on Kosovo.’ 
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Kosovo’s declaration of independence1475. In 2009, it sent lawyers to The Hague, 
together with Romania and Spain, in order to argue against the legality of Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence. These lawyers, there, faced some of their colleagues 
coming from EU recognising states, sent before the ICJ in order to back Kosovo’s 
claim1476. More recently, Cyprus exchanged official visits at the highest level with 
Serbia, as well as state decorations, and reiterated its outspoken support against 
Kosovo’s independence1477.  
 
The position of Cyprus (and other non-recognisers) here strikingly contrasts with the 
behaviour of some recognisers, which used diplomatic démarches in order to promote 
Kosovo’s independence. France, for instance, lobbied in the Arab world and African 
countries for the recognition of Kosovo’s independence1478, arguing that Kosovo was 
a sui generis case. Together with some partners, it approached Serbia directly in order 
to inflect its border management approach1479. This kind of demarches, interestingly, 
was not strictly conducted at the bilateral level. They often maintained an ambiguity, 
with France, Germany or the UK speaking as EU member states primus intra pares. 
For instance, in a demarche addressed to Serbia in 2008, the United Kingdom seemed 
to speak on behalf of the EU, when it stated  
 
“Serbia, as a country that sees its future as a member of the EU, will have to 
come to terms with [the independence under international supervision of 
Kosovo]. Serbia cannot simultaneously seek rapid progress towards EU 
membership, including the early granting of candidate status, yet impose 
bilateral sanctions on trade, power supplies etc to Kosovo which will be 
destabilising regionally. You cannot simply refuse to cooperate with the EU's 
efforts”. 1480 
 
Clearly, this is not the type of démarches which Cyprus would have joined in 2008. 
There is thus among EU member states, nothing close to the solidarity element that 
has been pinpointed in the EU’s approach to the naming issue. And for good reasons: 
the Kosovo issue does not involve a particular EU member state directly (unlike 
Greece in the naming issue). This gives both recognisers and non-recognisers a 
certain margin of manoeuvre at the EU level to create space for the exercise a richer 
EU conditionality regime towards Serbia.  
 
Cyprus, for instance, did not oppose the deployment of the EULEX in Kosovo and 
most of the non-recognisers even agreed to contribute to the staffing of the EU-led 
mission, despite its ambiguous mandate. The non-recognisers also support the EU-
facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, despite their divergent 
                                                 
1475 United States Embassy in Nicosia. 15.2.2008. 'Fm Taking Hard Line over Garec's Kosovo 
Conclusions'. [accessed 30.01.2013] 
1476 Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom 
presented arguments in favour of the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence at public 
hearings.  
1477 B92. 7.12.2012. ‘Serbia and Cyprus Reiterate Mutual Support.’ 
1478 United States Embassy in Paris. 12.2.2009. 'French Feedback on Kosovo Recognition Strategy'. 
[accessed 30.01.2013] 
1479 United States Embassy in Belgrade. 11.1.2008b. 'Serbia's Kosovo Minister Pledges No Violence 
and No Recognition'. [accessed 22.01.2013] 
1480 Ibid.  
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expectations regarding its outcome. As stated by the President of Cyprus as his 
country held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in December 2012,  
 
“the Republic of Cyprus does not recognize and will not recognize the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo; this is a position of 
principle which is consistent with international law. The solution must be an 
outcome of a mutual bilateral deliberation that will lead to an agreed 
settlement. The solution must respect the territorial integrity of Serbia and be 
approved by the UN Security Council”.1481 
 
Despite (or perhaps because of) the considerable differences in the views EU member 
states hold, the fact that most of them engage in the debate on the Kosovo issue also 
makes EU conditionality more legitimate externally. EU conditionality, in this case, is 
not merely constituted by the expression of a single national approach projected at the 
EU level with the sympathetic consent of other member states. It has to be validated 
internally by actors having antagonistic preferences. Therefore, unlike Macedonia, 
which could argue that the hand of Greece stood behind the EU’s conditionality 
regime, Serbia cannot question the collective character of the conditions posed by the 
EU in dispute settlement matters. This, of course, is no panacea; a community of 
views among EU member states would certainly be make the EU’s condition even 
more legitimate. But in the absence of unity, legitimacy is arguably higher when all 
EU member states get constructively involved in the issue, rather than passively 
expressing their solidarity with a few.  
 
3.4.3.1.4. Macedonia’s incompliance with unspecific obligations 
 
Serbia and Macedonia are not subject to the same type of conditions in dispute 
settlement matters. The expectations the EU has addressed to Macedonia in the past 
ten years are plain as far as the goal is concerned, but they barely address the question 
of how to proceed. The only clue is provided by the EU’s insistence to settle the 
naming issue under the auspices of the UN. There is no intermediary step here and no 
other framework for negotiations. Already in 2002, the European Commission 
underlined in its SAA conditionality report that it was now “urgent […] to finally 
resolve this outstanding issue”1482. In 2005, it therefore called Macedonia to 
 
“find rapidly a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution within the 
framework of UN Security Council resolutions 817/93 and 845/93”.1483 
 
In subsequent years, the Commission reiterated this call, in all relevant proceedings 
(e.g. progress reports, enlargement strategy papers). For want of observable progress, 
the word “rapidly” fell in oblivion, but the Commission’s call remained otherwise 
unchanged. It now reads: 
 
                                                 
1481 Republic of Cyprus. 10 December 2012. ‘The President of the Republic Received Serbian Prime 
Minister.’ 
1482 European Commission. 4 April 2002. ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and 
Association Report 2002.’ 
1483 UN Security Council resolutions 817/93 and 845/93 call Greece and Macedonia for negotiating a 
solution under the auspices of the UN. See European Commission. 9 November 2005a. ‘Analytical 
Report for the Opinion on the Application from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for EU 
Membership.’ 
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“maintaining good neighbourly relations, including a negotiated and 
mutually acceptable solution to the name issue, under the auspices of the UN, 
remains essential”.1484 
 
The Commission was not the only EU institution to call for a mutually acceptable 
solution negotiated under the auspices of the UN. The Council enshrined the same 
expectation in its conclusions on the Western Balkans 1485 , in the European 
partnerships1486, and in the Accession partnership1487. The insistence with which the 
Commission and the Council hint at the UN-mediated negotiation process, despite its 
lack of results, shows how the EU conceives of its conditionality regime with 
Macedonia. In dispute settlement matters, the EU merely conveys international 
obligations and therewith reinforces the compellingness of the UN. It leaves few 
imprints of its own, which would alter the substance or the format of the negotiation 
process, but considerably amplifies the resonance of UN obligations, by conditioning 
the opening of EU accession negotiations with the outcome of a UN-mediated process. 
The EU applies this strict, ex ante conditionality approach without clearly stating, 
however, that dispute settlement has become a sine qua non condition for resuming 
integration1488. In the mid 2000s, the Council repeatedly regretted the absence of 
progress in the UN-mediated progress1489, but Macedonia could nonetheless proceed 
towards more integration and become candidate. In the late 2000s, it welcomed the 
initiation of a high-level dialogue on the issue, but despite the “positive 
developments”1490, the Council did not allow Macedonia to resume its integration 
process. Since Macedonia’s integration process now largely depends on the outcome 
of negotiations carried out in the framework of the UN, the Commission and the 
Council can hardly do more than taking an encouraging posture. As an EU diplomat 
in Skopje explained:  
 
“we do not play an active role in the resolution of the naming issue. Our role 
regarding the name is one of encouragement, seeking to make progress, 
                                                 
1484 European Commission. 12 October 2011c. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-
2012.’ 
1485 E.g. Council of the European Union. 10 December 2007. ‘Gaerc Conclusions on the Western 
Balkans.’; Council of the European Union. 9 December 2008. ‘Conclusions on the Western Balkans.’; 
Council of the European Union. 8 December 2009. ‘Draft Conclusions on the Enlargement and 
Stabilisation and Association Process.’; Council of the European Union. 14 December 2010. 
‘Conclusions on the Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process.’; Council of the European 
Union. 5 December 2011. ‘Council Conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association 
Process.’ 
1486 Council of the European Union. 30 January 2006. ‘Council's Decision on the Principles, Priorities 
and Conditions Contained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro Including Kosovo 
as Defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999.’ 
1487 Council of the European Union. 18 February 2008b. ‘Council Decision on the Principles, Priorities 
and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.’ 
1488 This, in itself, is already a source of ambiguity, since ex ante conditions shall be fulfilled before EU 
accession.  
1489 Council of the European Union. 30 January 2006. ‘Council's Decision on the Principles, Priorities 
and Conditions Contained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro Including Kosovo 
as Defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999.’ 
1490 Council of the European Union. 8 December 2009. ‘Draft Conclusions on the Enlargement and 
Stabilisation and Association Process.’ 
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easing the discussions. We are not sitting in the middle, directly 
involved”.1491 
 
The EU thus settles for calling Macedonia to “intensify”1492 or “renew” it efforts” and 
engage in the UN process, as well as adopting “a constructive approach”1493.  
 
Because it implies an evaluation that creates additional space for conditionality, the 
EU has extended this notion of “constructive approach” in the past few years. In 2007, 
after Skopje renamed its airport Alexander the Great, the EU’s expectation regarding 
the definition of “a constructive approach” became slightly more specific. Noting that 
this event had been received in Greece “as a provocation” 1494 , the Commission 
reformulated the UN principle calling states to “refrain from any action which may 
aggravate”1495 a unresolved dispute, by making it clear that  
 
“actions which could negatively affect good neighbourly relations should be 
avoided”.1496 
 
In 2009, after Skopje named a trans-European section of its motorway after Alexander 
of Macedon, the Commission repeated that this had been received in Greece “as a 
provocation”1497, and criticised in substance such moves for not being constructive 
and contravening the EU’s good-neighbourliness principle. The urban project “Skopje 
2014”, with its gigantic statutes and historicist architecture was handled in a similar 
vein, and attracted the same criticism. For instance, in an interview, EU enlargement 
Commissioner Stefan Füle declared: 
 
“seriously, if you have a neighbour, and I'm not talking about two states now, 
and there is an issue between two of you, whatever the nature of that issue is, 
and you are trying sincerely to solve it, I guess you would avoid doing 
anything that your neighbour might call a provocation. This is simple logic. I 
would expect the government in Skopje to avoid doing things which would be 
called by the other side provocations”.1498 
 
Yet, according to the European Council’s conclusions of 2008 and subsequent years, 
it is not Skopje’s unconstructive approach or purportedly provocative actions that 
justify the current stalemate –and the Council’s decision to postpone the opening of 
accession negotiations: it is the absence of agreement settling the naming issue under 
the auspices of the UN. Since EU conditionality primarily targets the outcome of UN-
                                                 
1491 Interview with an Official from Delegation of the European Union to the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. Skopje, 01/11/2011 
1492 Council of the European Union. 30 January 2006. ‘Council's Decision on the Principles, Priorities 
and Conditions Contained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro Including Kosovo 
as Defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999.’ 
1493 European Commission. 6 November 2007a. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007-
2008.’; Council of the European Union. 10 December 2007. ‘Gaerc Conclusions on the Western 
Balkans.’ 
1494 European Commission. 6 November 2007b. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2007 
Progress Report.’ 
1495 See footnote 1403. 
1496 See for instance the Commission’s progress reports and enlargement strategy papers from 2007 
onwards or the Council’s conclusions on the Western Balkans from 2008 onwards.  
1497 European Commission. 14 October 2009b. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2009 
Progress Report.’ 
1498 EurActiv. 20.6.2011. ‘Füle Shows Macedonia Yellow Card.’ 
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mediated talks, it falls short of effectively preventing the deterioration of the 
negotiating climate stemming from Macedonia’s provocative actions against Greece. 
 
3.4.3.1.5. Serbia’s qualified compliance with rather specific obligations 
 
The EU’s conditionality dialogue with Serbia was, until the Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence, quite similar to that with Macedonia. It also limited itself to the 
promotion of dispute settlement in general terms, insisting on the obligation for Serbia 
to comply with UNSC resolution 1244. Every year, the Commission used to maintain 
in its progress reports that  
 
“the full respect of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 is an obligation for 
Serbia as a UN member. It is also one of the key priorities of the European 
Partnership”.1499 
 
This reference was directed at Belgrade as a reminder that Serbia had committed itself 
to dialogue with Pristina, and that its progress towards the EU now depended on the 
fulfilment of its international obligations1500. In 2005, the Commission clearly linked 
the realms of international law with European politics, as it stated  
 
“as regards the respect of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1244 on Kosovo, Belgrade’s constructive engagement on the Kosovo issue 
will help to advance Serbia and Montenegro’s European perspective, while 
obstruction could turn into an obstacle”. 1501 
 
Since the notion of “constructive engagement” expressly related to the 
implementation of UNSC resolution 1244, the EU did not specify its expectations, 
except to criticise characterised violations, if need be. For instance, the Commission 
(in vain) blamed Belgrade for disrupting the functioning of self-governing institutions 
in Kosovo. It pointed out that deterring Kosovo Serbs from participating in Kosovo 
institutions and elections, and maintaining parallel institutions in Kosovo were “not 
consistent with UNSC resolution 1244” 1502  and fell short of the “constructive 
approach” the EU expected from Serbia 1503 . Until Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence, the EU thus played a role that was comparable with the one it played 
towards Macedonia: the EU amplified the compellingness of UN obligations by 
placing them at the core of its conditionality dialogue with Serbia, but it did not add 
much substance to them.  
 
As the Kosovo status process came to an end, the EU supported the idea of amending 
the UNSC resolution 1244 by passing a new resolution adopting the Ahtisaari 
proposal. The EU’s conditionality regime with Serbia would have then been adapted 
in order to magnify the compellingness of the Ahtisaari plan. But this idea failed to 
materialise in July 2007, as the draft proposal did not receive the approval of the UN 
Security Council. Serbia (backed by Russia) opposed the idea of Kosovo’s supervised 
                                                 
1499 European Commission. 14 November 2007. ‘Serbia 2007 Progress Report.’ 
1500 See Council of the European Union. 30 January 2006. ‘Council's Decision on the Principles, 
Priorities and Conditions Contained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro Including 
Kosovo as Defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999.’ 
1501 European Commission. 9 November 2005b. ‘Enlargement Strategy Paper 2005.’ 
1502 European Commission. 14 October 2009d. ‘Serbia 2009 Progress Report.’ 
1503 European Commission. 8 November 2006b. ‘Serbia 2006 Progress Report.’ 
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independence, and instead, insisted on the need to abide by UNSC resolution 1244. In 
August 2007, Serbia reminded the EU that it had been previously called to “fully 
respect” the UNSC resolution 1244 in its European Partnership; that it would 
therefore make it a priority henceforth and intensify its dialogue with Pristina1504. 
Wary of the status quo, the EU faced a dilemma. Its conditionality regime with Serbia 
had been designed to magnify the compellingness of UNSC resolution 1244, but at 
the same time, it was now the UNSC resolution 1244 which had been invoked by 
Serbia (and Russia) as a means to perpetuate the status quo. The EU did not solve this 
dilemma. The declaration of independence of Kosovo shed light on the EU’s lack of 
unity on that matter. But it started to bracket in its proceedings the references to the 
UNSC resolution 1244 as corner stone of its conditionality regime with Serbia. The 
Commission, for instance, continued to invoke the UNSC resolution 1244 in its 
progress reports, but only as justification for dismantling Serbia’s parallel institutions 
in Kosovo. It ceased to advocate the reinforcement of Belgrade’s dialogue with 
Pristina pursuant UNSC resolution 1244, and increasingly supported it for its own 
sake.  
 
By relaxing its lineage with UNSC resolution 1244, the EU’s conditionality regime 
became somehow less permeable to international politics. In place of the objective 
obligations deriving from UNSC legal acts, it started to emphasise the more amenable 
notion of “constructive approach with regard to Kosovo”1505, a notion subject to 
political appreciation. This new emphasis is best seen in the wording of the 
Commission’s progress reports. Before 2008, these systematically underlined that 
respecting UNSC resolution 1244 was a key priority of Serbia’s European 
partnership 1506 . After 2008, the Commission replaced the reference to UNSC 
resolution 1244 by the following:  
 
“Cooperating constructively on matters relating to Kosovo is a key European 
Partnership priority”.1507 
 
This notion of “constructiveness” was not fully new to the EU’s jargon. It had been 
previously used to designate the intensification of dialogue with Pristina on a number 
of practical issues. Later, it implied the “normalisation of Serbia’s relations with 
Kosovo”1508 under the aegis of the EU, and, more concretely, “taking steps towards a 
visible and sustainable improvement of relations with Kosovo”1509. No doubt that the 
EU, which had supported the Ahtisaari proposal, therewith, has been able to extend its 
own understanding of what a “constructive approach” shall entail.  
 
The EU also used this opportunity to reframe its conditionality regime. It fractionated 
the Kosovo dispute into a series of technical, albeit status-sensitive, issues of lower 
                                                 
1504 Government of the Republic of Serbia. 2 August 2007. ‘Action Plan for Implementation of the 
European Partnership Priorities ’. 
1505 The notion of “constructive approach to Kosovo” is part of Serbia’s European Partnership from 
2006, and was later integrated in nearly all EU documents dealing with the issue (e.g. Enlargement 
strategy papers, progress reports, Council conclusions) 
1506 See footnote 1499.  
1507 European Commission. 14 October 2009d. ‘Serbia 2009 Progress Report.’ 
1508 European Commission. 12 October 2011c. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-
2012.’ 
1509 Council of the European Union. 5 December 2011. ‘Council Conclusions on Enlargement and 
Stabilisation and Association Process.’ 
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intensity, which it gradually brought on the negotiation table, under its mediation. The 
conditionality logic not only applied to the whole (the adoption of a constructive 
approach), but targeted successively each of the intermediary steps. This fractioning 
of the EU conditionality logic is a major difference, if compared with the EU’s 
approach to the naming issue. Success, in Serbia’s case, is not expected to emerge as a 
one-off event, e.g. the signature of a bilateral treaty settling the Kosovo issue. It is 
broken down into intermediary achievements, each being subjects to conditionality.  
 
With regards to the deployment of the EULEX, first, the Commission made it clear in 
2008 that Serbia would have to compromise. In its enlargement strategy paper, it put 
it clearly that 
 
“the EU expects Serbia to take a constructive line on EULEX 
deployment”.1510 
 
But as the government multiplied its rhetorical actions against the EULEX, the tone of 
the EU became more assertive, and pressure mounted to have Serbia comply with EU 
expectations. In March 2008, the EU office in Belgrade and the EU’s Special 
Representative in Kosovo cautioned the Serbian government that it was putting the 
signature of Serbia’s SAA in jeopardy and that Serbia’s aggressive “psychology […] 
would not be forgotten”1511. The EU did not follow through with its threats, as the EU 
member states had precisely worked at decoupling Serbia’s SAA from the EULEX 
issue1512. But since Serbia was now considering applying for EU membership, the EU 
had a new leverage. The EU did not expressly condition Serbia’s candidate status to 
the acceptance of the mission1513, but it implicitly established a link between the two. 
In an address to the European Parliament, the EU’s High Representative Javier Solana 
argued in April 2008 that the deployment of the EULEX throughout Kosovo had to be 
backed by  
 
“every effort to reach out to the Serbian people […], telling them clearly with 
words but also deeds, that we want them to be part of the European 
family”.1514 
 
Following the EU’s insurance that the EULEX was not designed to implement the 
Ahtisaari proposal, that it would be status-neutral and respect UNSC resolution 1244, 
the government of Serbia eventually adopted a decision supporting the deployment of 
the EULEX by the end of 2008. The Commission praised this decision in its 2009 
progress report. But it also warned that  
 
“insufficient cooperation with EULEX make[s] the whole area vulnerable to 
organised crime activities”.1515 
                                                 
1510 European Commission. 5 November 2008b. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-
2009.’ 
1511 United States Embassy in Belgrade. 2.10.2008. 'Serbia: Long-Term Damage to Foreign Relations'. 
[accessed 30.01.2013] 
1512 Parliamentary elections were about to be held in May 2008, and the signature of the SAA in April 
2008 was to benefit pro-EU forces against the more nationalist forces in the government.  
1513 B92. 15.10.2008. ‘“Eulex, EU Accession Not Linked”.’ 
1514 Council of the European Union. 8 April 2008. ‘Address by Javier Solana, EU High Representative 
for the CFSP to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament ’. 
1515 European Commission. 14 October 2009d. ‘Serbia 2009 Progress Report.’ p. 59. 
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Accepting the deployment of the EULEX had been a step forwards, duly rewarded in 
words and deeds, but it was not a panacea –more had to be done to fulfil the EU’s 
expectations and support the mandate of the rule of law mission in Kosovo. The 
Commission accordingly toughened its conditionality approach, in particular in the 
field of policing. It posited the signature of a police cooperation agreement as 
requirement for Serbia to qualify for visa liberalisation1516. The agreement was signed 
in August 2009, and in December 2009, Serbia was offered visa liberalisation. The 
agreement was to facilitate the exchange of information between the EULEX and the 
Serbian police and, according to the EULEX, provide “a palpably stronger fight 
against organised crime” in Kosovo1517. Its implementation was closely monitored by 
the Commission, which in 2010, requested further improvements1518.  
 
The EU also used its conditionality approach to inflect Serbia’s position in the field of 
customs and border management. It started to address the issue by linking it to the 
mandate of the EULEX, which could not be effectively exercised in North Kosovo 
without Serbia’s cooperation. In its 2009 progress report, the Commission rightfully 
noted that  
 
“the lack of full customs operations in that area prevents the efficient fight 
against organised crime”.1519 
 
To mitigate this flaw, the role of the EULEX at Kosovo’s northern border was to be 
strengthened, in particular at Gate 1 and 31. The EULEX, according to the EU Special 
Representative in Kosovo, Pieter Feith, would assist Kosovo authorities, in 
accordance with EU standards and best practices, by introducing customs control and 
efficiently collecting tax revenues “in the whole of Kosovo” and therewith make sure 
that “Kosovo becomes a unique customs territory”1520. The problem, however, was 
that the EULEX, in the field, encountered tremendous difficulties in assisting Kosovo 
authorities, since Kosovo police and customs services could not access its northern 
borderlands. In 2010 and 2011, the Commission, backed by the Council1521, therefore 
called Serbia to  
 
“cooperate actively with EULEX in order for it to exercise its functions in all 
parts of Kosovo”.1522 
 
The Commission also became increasingly critical towards Serbia's refusal to 
recognise Kosovo's customs stamps. Reminding Belgrade that the stamps, according 
to the UNMIK, were in accordance with UNSC resolution 1244, it expressed “serious 
concerns” about the issue already in 20091523. In March 2010, Belgrade responded to 
                                                 
1516 United States Embassy in Belgrade. 12.1.2010. 'Serbia Still Not Cooperating Fully with Eulex'. 
[accessed 30.01.2013] 
1517 B92. 11.9.2009. ‘Mup-Eulex Protocol Signed.’ 
1518 European Commission. 9 November 2010c. ‘Serbia 2010 Progress Report.’ 
1519 European Commission. 14 October 2009d. ‘Serbia 2009 Progress Report.’ p. 59. 
1520 B92. 12.2.2009. ‘Feith Backs Establishment of Customs.’ 
1521 Council of the European Union. 8 December 2009. ‘Draft Conclusions on the Enlargement and 
Stabilisation and Association Process.’ 
1522 European Commission. 12 October 2011a. ‘Analytical Report for the Opinion on Serbia's 
Application for Membership of the European Union.’ 
1523 European Commission. 14 October 2009d. ‘Serbia 2009 Progress Report.’ 
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by accepting to seek a solution “in the course of 2011”1524. One year later, the issue 
was indeed brought on the negotiation table, in the framework of the EU-facilitated 
dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, but no agreement could be found. The 
deterioration of the situation in North Kosovo, following Pristina’s failed attempt to 
forcibly take over the control of Kosovo’s borders in the North, led the EU to 
accentuate its conditionality approach. Germany proved especially keen on pushing 
Belgrade to normalise its relations with Pristina in those matters1525. At stake was the 
Commission’s opinion regarding Serbia’s application for EU membership. The EU 
first called Serbian politicians to calm down the rhetorical attacks against the EULEX, 
which was accused of having assisted Pristina in its North Kosovo operation1526, and 
to show “maximum restraint”1527. Second, it demanded that the question of Kosovo’s 
customs stamps be at last settled –which implied that Serbia, despite the political 
turmoil, should not give up dialoguing with Pristina1528. As stated by the EU’s High 
Representative Catherine Ashton,  
 
“A return to dialogue remains the only way for Belgrade and Pristina to 
resolve the underlying issues […]. The European Union expects to see rapid 
and substantive progress”.1529  
 
Finally, it insisted on the need for the Serbian government to fully support the 
EULEX, demanding in particular the dismantlement of the barricades erected by 
Kosovo Serbs in the North. This request, already formulated in the past1530, was 
backed by the Council, who attached 
 
“great importance to EULEX and KFOR being unhindered in the execution 
of their mandates”.1531 
 
The barricades were disrupting EULEX operations in North Kosovo, including in 
customs matter, and fuelling criminal activities. In order to ascertain the proper 
management of North Kosovo borders, the Council, backed by the Commission and 
with the support of the Serbian government, brought the issue of integrated border 
management on the negotiation table. Both issues (customs stamps recognition and 
IBM) were discussed in September-December 2011 as part of the EU-facilitated 
dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. Both were subject to hard conditionality 
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measures. Serbian Deputy Prime Minister for European integration, for instance, 
referred to the EU’s conditional approach regarding the customs stamps issue as 
“blackmailing” Serbia on Kosovo. He blamed the EU for  
 
“tak[ing] advantage of the expectation of obtaining EU candidate status to 
potentially put inappropriate pressure on us, to try to pull out something that 
crosses the red lines of our policy”.1532 
 
As for the second issue, the unhindered execution of EULEX’s tasks in Kosovo and 
the IBM dimension, Serbian top officials soon recognised that no progress could be 
made towards EU candidacy without a clear signal in that direction1533.  
 
Following the inflection of Serbia’s position in customs stamps issue and the 
conclusion of an agreement in September 2011, the Commission gave a positive 
opinion recommending that Serbia be granted the candidate status. Shortly before the 
Council’s meeting in December 2011, Serbia also inflected its position on the IBM 
issue, in the hope that the Commission’s recommendation would be followed. The 
Council, indeed, welcomed the “progress to date” accomplished by Serbia in the 
Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, especially on customs and IBM1534. But it decided to grant 
Serbia the candidate status only a few months later, in March 2012, after observing 
that the agreements had been concluded in good faith (with the goal of being 
implemented), that Serbia resumed its active cooperation with the EULEX and above 
all, that Serbia inflect its position on Kosovo’s regional representation issue.  
 
The EU started to address the issue of Kosovo’s participation and representation in 
regional and international fora shortly before Kosovo’s declaration of impendence. In 
its 2007 progress report, the Commission noted for the first time that Serbia 
 
“needs to show a more constructive approach towards Kosovo's 
participation in regional initiatives and international fora”.1535 
 
Contra Belgrade, which purported that Kosovo had to be represented through the 
UNMIK in all international settings, the Commission was concerned by the difficult 
participation of Kosovo authorities in regional initiatives, especially the SEECP, 
Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) and CEFTA. In the aftermath of Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence, the Commission therefore expressed its willingness to  
 
“explore all avenues to promote Kosovo's involvement in regional 
cooperation”.1536 
 
In the meantime, Serbia started to boycott the regional meetings, where Kosovo was 
invited as equal. This fed the Commission’s critique against Serbia, which on the one 
side failed to properly sustain its own participation in regional meetings, and on the 
other side, continued to harm key regional initiatives, by undermining their relations 
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with Kosovo and hindering their intent to advance regional cooperation and 
development in the Western Balkans1537. The Commission therefore urged the parties 
to “reach a pragmatic solution” in 20091538, and in 2010, to find “an acceptable and 
sustainable solution” to the issue “as soon as possible”1539. The Commission added  
 
“this is essential for inclusive and functioning regional cooperation”. 1540 
 
Despite these calls, Belgrade stood firm against it, rejecting any deviation from its 
initial position. Serbian President Tadić increasingly came under the EU’s fire, and 
publicly admitted that pressures were exerted to inflect Serbia’s position. For instance, 
before the UN Security Council, he declared  
 
“Kosovo can and should participate in multilateral and regional fora in the 
presence of UNMIK officials, who speak first—and with either the “UNMIK-
Kosovo” nameplate, or a personalized one. No other arrangements will work, 
despite all pressures to the contrary”.”1541 
 
The pressures he referred to in 2010 came from the Commission, but also from 
particular member states, e.g. Germany, who were very keen on conditioning Serbia’s 
candidate status with an agreement on Kosovo’s representation1542. In March 2010, 
the Serbian government nonetheless agreed to “seek a solution” lifting this obstacle in 
the course of 20111543. Meanwhile, the pressure continued to mount. The European 
Parliament called Belgrade to compromise on the issue 1544 ; the Commission 
toughened its tone by implying that Belgrade’ s attitude was not only unconstructive, 
but that it was expressly contravening the 
 
“principles of inclusive and functioning regional cooperation, [and] 
undermining regional cooperation generally”. 1545  
 
The Commission criticised in particular the fact that the Serbia’s intransigence was 
holding up the signature of an EU-Western Balkans Transport Community Treaty. 
The Serbian government accordingly started to inflect its position, arguing that 
Kosovo should be allowed participate in regional initiatives, provided it was 
represented with “asymmetric elements”1546. This inflection created some space for 
negotiations, and the EU accordingly brought the very sensitive issue on the 
negotiation table in November 2011. The Commission had, despite its critical 
assessment, rendered a positive opinion on Serbia’s application for membership, and 
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the Council was about to convene. No agreement, however, could be reached, and the 
Council then postponed its decision on Serbia’s candidate status. In its conclusions, it 
made it clear that it 
 
“the Council expects Serbia to address the question of regional 
cooperation”.1547 
 
This implied reaching an agreement on inclusive regional cooperation with Kosovo. 
Only then would the Council consider validating the Commission’s recommendation 
on Serbia’s candidate status. No doubt that this strict conditional approach put the 
Serbian government under great pressure. In order to defuse the accusations coming 
from the nationalists, Serbian President Tadić stated in December 2011 that he would 
resist the  
 
“the pressures which someone in Europe plans to exert on Belgrade and me 
can only be a hindrance rather than help”.1548 
 
But faced with the risk a new disavowal of the EU on the eve of general elections in 
Serbia, the Serbian government eventually agreed on a deal on 24 February 2012. The 
agreement concluded under the patronage of the EU’s High Representative Catherine 
Ashton, came as a last minute event, ensuing after lengthy negotiations and ending up 
just a few hours before the General Affairs Council convened to discuss Serbia’s 
candidate status. This agreement was decisive in the Council’s decision to grant 
Serbia the status of candidate, confirmed by the European Council in March 20121549. 
In the subsequent months, the Commission continued to monitor the implementation 
of the footnote agreement. It noted that the initial interpretation of the agreement by 
Serbian authorities had been too restrictive, and clarified its expectations1550. The new 
instructions, adopted in September 2012 by the new government, complied with the 
EU requirement that the footnote should be visible in documents, but not on 
nameplates1551.  
 
3.4.3.1.6. Different types of conditionality, different achievements 
 
These recent achievements follow a practice of conditionality that fundamentally 
differs from the structural conditions governing the EU’s conditional dialogue with 
Macedonia. These differences may help understanding why Macedonia’s position 
remained impervious to change, whereas Serbia’s approach to the Kosovo issue got 
inflected at least in some respects.  
 
Until the failure of the Ahtisaari process, the EU’s conditionality dialogue with Serbia 
did not prove more effective than with Macedonia. The EU, for instance, met great 
difficulties in the deployment of the EULEX. But the fact that EU member states and 
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institutions, at one point, all concurred in supporting the Ahtisaari plan certainly 
marked the EU’s collective memory. However contentious EU member states are 
today with regards to the Kosovo issue, their debate at the EU level builds on the 
aborted proposal of Martti Ahtisaari. This preliminary agreement on the terms of 
dispute settlement channelled, rather than silenced, the energies of EU member states; 
it helped the EU redefining its role in the negotiating process –not solely as a faithful 
amplifier of the UN, but as a more autonomous mediator; and, at the operational level, 
it helped the EU drawing the contours of the EU’s conditionality regime towards 
Serbia, by fractioning the Kosovo issue into a series of technical, albeit status-
sensitive, issues of lower intensity, which it gradually brought on the negotiation table. 
The mediation between Belgrade and Pristina, in which the EU engaged in 2011 
capitalises on the characteristics of this EU’s advanced conditionality approach. In 
order to make further steps towards the EU, Serbia systematically had to demonstrate 
its readiness to constructively contribute to the EU-mediated dialogue, not by solving 
the Kosovo issue altogether, but by agreeing to find a common ground with Pristina in 
a number of status-sensitive domains. That was, and still is, “of crucial importance” 
for the Council1552.  
 
This approach starkly contrasts with the EU’s first generation conditionality measures 
used in Macedonia. In place of an embryonic consensus on the terms of dispute 
settlement, the position of the EU with regards to the naming issue is shaped by the 
relative disinterest of the majority of the member states and a sense of solidarity with 
Greece, which is both EU member state and party to the dispute. Rather than 
searching a more active involvement, the EU limits itself to magnifying the 
compellingness of the UN-mediated process. As the latter did not yield results in 
years, its conditionality approach lacks the impetus –and the autonomy-, that could 
inflect Macedonia’s position. Worst, because it conditions further progress in terms of 
integration on the outcome of the UN-led negotiations, rather than on the constructive 
character of Macedonia’s participation in the negotiation process or its readiness to 
reach intermediary steps, the EU’s conditionality regime can barely deter Macedonia 
from provocative acts. With or without them, Macedonia remains blocked on its EU 
integration path. On the top of that, the internally (not to speak of externally) 
asymmetric design of the conditionality regime (with Greece chiefly determining the 
EU’s conditions for lifting the Macedonia’s stalemate) brings about an external 
legitimacy issue, which is avoided in the EU’s approach to Serbia through the active 
participation of non-recognisers in the EU’s conditionality dialogue.  
 
3.4.3.2. Dispositional analysis 
 
Serbia’s dispute with Pristina and Macedonia’s bone of contention with Greece are 
foreign policy issues that occupy an important place in Serbia and Macedonia’s 
domestic politics. Governments are tempted to present dispute settlement as zero-sum 
games, rather than seeking to maximise collective utility; political parties regularly 
use these issues for electoral purposes in an attempt at discrediting their contestants; 
and public opinions usually react emotionally to their accusations. Politicians, all in 
all, do have an interest in maintaining the status quo, rather than engaging 
constructively in the settlement of the dispute. Their individualistic preferences 
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constrain the inflection of Serbia and Macedonia’s approaches and the emergence of 
dispositions amenable to compromise.  
 
But European integration is also a matter that considerably permeates domestic 
politics in Serbia and Macedonia. And advocating the status quo for electoral 
purposes or demonising the other party to the dispute certainly collides with the EU’s 
expectations in dispute settlement matters. The EU, after all, provides a framework 
within which national interest may be redefined so that EU-related collective interests 
take precedence over individualistic preferences. Ceteris paribus, concerns over 
regional stability, good neighbourliness and EU membership, in other words, shall 
prevail over concerns over relative losses, national pride and fears of electoral defeats.  
 
Serbia and Macedonia’s politicians were not initially predisposed to make such an 
arbitrage. After all, they had to wait until 2003 to be offered unambiguous “European 
perspectives”1553. But despite the gradual definition of EU integration as strategic 
objective in both countries, it is notable that dispositions prioritising individualistic 
concerns never really lost ground. In dispute settlement matters, national interests 
have become compatible with European integration, but their core has not been 
redefined through the prism of European integration. That is a pity, since the 
ideational transformation of the way “national” interests are define arguably lies at the 
crux of Serbia and Macedonia’s disposition to engage dialogue, in a European 
constructive spirit, with, respectively, Kosovo and Greece.  
 
3.4.3.2.1. The domestic politics of dispute settlement in Macedonia 
 
In Macedonia, first, there has been little substantive debate on the naming issue since 
the beginning of the stalemate. Despite its important implications, the National 
Assembly of Macedonia never really addressed the question. At two occasions, it 
issued a declaration. In 2008, it reacted to the veto of Greece at the Bucharest Summit, 
and in 2012, on the eve of its Chicago Summit, it vainly called Nato to respect its 
“open doors” principle and the 2011 ICJ ruling1554. These declarations, however, did 
not emerge as the result of parliamentarian debates involving constructively the 
opposition. They were drawn by Macedonia’s ruling party in order to back the 
Government’s approach, and had little concern for the opposition’s participation in 
the process. As reported by a leader of the opposition,  
 
“we have never had a really substantive debate about [the naming issue] in 
the Parliament in the last four years. There were several initiatives, all of 
them coming from the opposition, and all of them were rejected by the 
Parliament’s majority”.1555 
 
Rather than discussing the Government’s policy, the National Assembly swiftly 
validated the posture of the majoritarian party, the VMRO-DPMNE, and its leader, 
and Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski. Since it coming to power in 2006, the VMRO-
DPMNE has pursued a policy of nation-building seeking to establish a genealogical 
                                                 
1553 Presidency of the Council of the European Union. 21 June 2003. ‘Thessaloniki EU-Western 
Balkans Summit Declaration.’ 
1554 Balkan Insight. 25.4.2012. ‘Macedonia Draws up Declaration on Nato Bid.’ 
1555 Interview with a Member of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia and National Council for 
European Integration. Skopje, 07/03/2011 
 277
link between today’s Macedonians and the Kingdom of Macedon. Its identity politics 
have promoted the use of historicist references to antique Macedonia in political 
discourses, with the questionable argument that “one of the fundamental human rights 
is the right to identity, the right to self-identification”1556. This infuriated Greece, 
whose officials noted in 2011 that:  
 
“since the Gruevski government, things have worsened considerably. […] 
This government acts very sentimentally. It defines everything in ethno-
historical terms, which the precedent government did not”.1557 
 
Rather than playing the temperance card with Greece in order to gain international 
credit, the ruling party has applied since 2006 a nationalist approach and taken a hard 
line on the naming issue. It therewith gained domestic political popularity and won 
every election since 2006. The government and the ruling party usually present 
themselves as the true defenders of the Macedonian nation. After the party won the 
2006 parliamentary elections, the government started to rename Skopje’s airport 
“Alexander the Great Airport” and Macedonia’s transversal highway “Philip II 
Highway”. In 2008, it promised its voters that it would organise a referendum on any 
agreement reached with Greece on the naming issue, while pledging to 
 
 “find a solution, which does not undermine state and national interests”.1558  
 
and claiming that  
 
“Macedonia should not have to choose between its name and its accession to 
the EU”.1559 
 
These political moves, which (vainly) aimed at putting Greece under pressure1560, 
increased the popularity of the ruling party. With the flagship project “Skopje 2014”, 
initiated by Macedonia’s Prime Minister Gruevski in 2009, the naming issue took an 
even wider ethno-national dimension. The government was not only to defend 
Macedonia’s position with regards to the naming issue; it was to rejuvenate and 
promote the alleged culture, language and history of Macedonia. As stated by 
Macedonian President Ivanov, elected in 2009 as VMRO-DPMNE candidate,  
 
“every solution that contributes to altering the reference to our language and 
our uniqueness is unacceptable for Macedonia”.1561 
 
Following the new setback suffered by Macedonia at the margin of the Nato’s 
Chicago Summit in 2012, Macedonian Prime Minister Gruevski accused Greece of 
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committing a “political genocide” against Macedonians1562, and declared, in reference 
to his “Skopje 2014” project: 
 
“If we irritate them, what word can be used for the things they are doing to 
us? There is no greater irritation than 20 years of blocking, denial, 
underestimation, financial damage to the people and the country, even 
tension. This is not irritation, but a crime against a nation and a state.”1563 
 
And, in the same vein, in a statement before the UN General Assembly,  
 
“Imagine the virtual state that my citizens find themselves in, blackmailed, 
with a blocked development and perspective – because of the blockages from 
our southern neighbour to enter the Euro-Atlantic institutions, just because 
for what we are, i.e. what we feel like”.1564 
 
It is clear, from these statements and actions, that Macedonia’s ruling party since 
2006 has not actively promoted an inclusive approach to the naming issue. Through 
its historicist quest for precedence, it gains domestic support by antagonising Greece. 
Its use of identity politics underlines Macedonia’s belonging to Europe, but, 
interestingly, in a way that seems to exclude Greece. For instance, ahead of the 
Chicago Summit, Macedonian Prime Minister Gruevski challenged the EU 
membership of Greece, as he declared in an implicit reference to Greece that his 
country 
 
“will continue to act with principle, in a much more European manner 
compared to certain EU member-states”.1565  
 
Much of Macedonia’s inflexible approach in dispute settlement matters can be traced 
back to the ruling party’s emphasis on nation-building since 2006. It is also backed by 
the Macedonian Orthodox Church, whose Metropolitan declared in 2010 that “the 
holy Macedonian name” was “given by God” and mentioned, as such, over seventy 
times in the Bible1566. And the VMRO-DPMNE can also count on the strong albeit 
declining opposition of a majority of Macedonians to any change in the country’s 
name1567.  
 
More interested in staying in power, the coalition partner of the VMRO-DPMNE, the 
Albanian party of the BDI has failed to make any substantive contribution to the 
resolution of the naming issue. As it agreed to form a coalition with the VMRO-
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DPMNE in 2008, the BDI first gave its senior coalition partner carte blanche to 
address the naming issue. Wary that the hard line chosen by the VMRO-DPMNE may 
lastingly impair Macedonia’s chance to join Nato and the EU, the BDI conditioned in 
2009 its support to the resolution of the naming issue within 6 months1568. His leader, 
Ali Ahmeti, warned the VMRO-DPMNE that the Albanians in Macedonia would not 
tolerate to be stuck on their path towards Nato and the EU for a question should be 
dealt with as a technical rather than political problem1569 . But as the ultimatum 
expired, the BDI did not break the coalition, arguing that such a move would not be 
helpful. The BDI repeated its ultimatum in 2011, after the new victory of VMRO-
DPMNE1570, and again forwent leaving the ruling coalition after the deadline expired. 
Despite its inclination to compromise, the BDI showed that it would rather stay in the 
ruling coalition than pressure its senior partner, the VMRO-DPMNE.  
 
Even the opposition in Macedonia does not substantively challenge the government’s 
approach to the naming issue. For good reason, as stated by a leader of the opposition 
in 2006:  
 
“let me see who is going to be manly enough to tell the public that the name 
is going to be changed”1571.  
 
Under the leadership of Radmila Šekerinska, the main opposition party, the SDSM, 
did advocate more flexibility in order to enable the country to join Nato and the 
EU 1572 . During the 2008 campaign (and shortly after Nato’s non-invitation in 
Bucharest in April), the SDSM proposed, for instance, to secure the adhesion of 
Macedonia to Nato within six month1573. Her proposal implied the subordination of 
Macedonia’s individualistic preferences to its EU commitment. But it collapsed in 
front of the VMRO-DPMNE’s hard line, and the opposition party suffered a serious 
electoral setback in June 2008. In September 2008, Radmila Šekerinska, as a 
consequence, left the party’s leadership and was replaced in 2009 by the former 
President of Macedonia, Branko Crvenkoski, who sought to regain the credit lost 
among its voters by presenting himself less amenable to compromise with Greece. 
Under his leadership, the SDSM has sent ambiguous signals, presumably in order to 
regain popularity. In June 2010, on the one side, it proposed to call a referendum on 
any agreement the government would seal with Greece. Branko Crvenkoski had 
previously opposed this idea, on the ground that it made an agreement more difficult 
to achieve1574. But on the other side, by releasing confidential documents showing that 
the VMRO-DPMNE had opposed a solution in 2005 that would have benefited 
Macedonia, the SDSM tried in 2012 to cast doubt on the capacity of the ruling party 
to rationally engage in dispute settlement.  
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Macedonia’s political scene, in short, conveys endogenous dispositions that tend to 
undermine the strategic character of EU integration, and give precedence to the 
individualistic, tactical preferences of the parties. The lack of substantive political 
debate on the naming issue; the linkage operated by the ruling party between the 
naming issue and Macedonia’s nation-building; the domination of the nationalist hard 
liners in Macedonia’s domestic politics, and their popular support as well as their 
dubbing by the Church; the predominance of electoral concerns over strategic 
interests in partisan politics, and the lack of inclusive approach to dispute settlement 
negatively predispose Macedonia’s readiness to constructively engage in dispute 
settlement.  
 
3.4.3.2.2. The domestic politics of dispute settlement in Serbia 
 
Serbia’s endogenous dispositions to settle the Kosovo dispute did not prove more 
amenable to compromise. As soon as the public debate lapsed into Kosovo-related 
matters, Serbian politicians usually gave up on the strategic character of the EU 
integration objective. EU accession remained important throughout the past ten years, 
but not as important, domestically, as Serbia’s commitment to the defence of Kosovo.  
 
Before 2008, there was no political consensus on the strategic character of Serbia’s 
integration in the EU. Serbia’s ruling coalitions were led by the DSS, a nationalist 
party that vocally criticised the EU and the US and presented the Kosovo question as 
fundamentally incompatible with EU membership1575. The founding leader of the 
DSS, Vojislav Koštunica, was President of Serbia between 2000 and 2003, and Prime 
Minister between March 2004 and July 2008. Under his leadership, Serbia underwent 
some important reforms, but its relationship with the EU remained strained by its lack 
of cooperation with the ICTY, and, more generally, by the principled limitations the 
government put to Serbia’s integration in the EU. These limitations stemmed from the 
precedence given by Prime Minister Koštunica to Serbia’s national preferences, 
defined in individualistic terms, over its EU integration objective, defined in more 
collective terms. For him, it was clear that Serbia would not accept anything implying 
Kosovo’s independence even if that meant giving up Serbia’s plan to join the EU1576. 
In 2007, Koštunica accordingly objected to the EU’s plan to support the Ahtisaari 
proposal in the UN Security Council, and later in the same year, he opposed the 
deployment of the EULEX in Kosovo, which he deemed illegal1577. The coalition 
Koštunica formed between 2004 and 2007 in order to govern Serbia included other 
nationalist, Euro-sceptical parties, e.g. New Serbia, but it had to cope with an even 
more radical opposition on its right wing, the SRS party. Majoritarian in the 
Parliament, the nationalist, populist and revisionist SRS opposed Serbia’s integration 
in the EU, and advocated a tougher approach to the Kosovo issue –including the 
threat of the use of force1578. In these conditions, it was difficult to imagine Serbia 
allowing the deployment of the EULEX mission in Kosovo, since both the ruling 
                                                 
1575 United States Embassy in Belgrade. 11.1.2008a. 'Prime Minister Charts Collision Course with Nato 
and Europe'. [accessed 4.3.2013]; Obradović-Wochnik, J. and Wochnik, A. 2012. ‘Europeanising the 
‘Kosovo Question’: Serbia’s Policies in the Context of EU Integration.’ West European Politics vol.35 
(5). 
1576 SETimes. 1.8.2006. ‘Kostunica Says Kosovo More Important Than EU Membership ’ 
1577 B92. 27.12.2007. ‘Koštunica Decries “Illegal” EU Kosovo Mission.’ 
1578 SETimes. 1.8.2006. ‘Kostunica Says Kosovo More Important Than EU Membership ’ 
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party, the DSS, and the strongest party in Serbia, the SRS (though in the opposition), 
viewed the EULEX as a mission designed to implement the supervised independence 
of Kosovo. In this respect, almost the whole political spectrum in Serbia subordinated 
EU accession to the defence of Kosovo –an arbitrage that constrained Serbia’s 
approach to dispute settlement.  
 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2007 had internal repercussions in 
Serbia’s political landscape. The radicalisation of most of Serbia’s political parties 
and their readiness to give up Serbia’s integration in the EU nonetheless opened an 
opportunity window for pro-EU parties like the DS. In March 2008 the ruling 
coalition, formed between the DSS and the DS after the 2007 parliamentary elections, 
collapsed. The reason invoked by the leader of the DS, also President of Serbia since 
2004, Boris Tadić, was that  
 
“there was no agreement regarding further EU integration”.1579 
 
Serbia was about to sign its SAA with the EU, but Prime Minister Koštunica, wary of 
loosing ground on the Kosovo issue, refused to commit his country unless EU 
member states recognised in the SAA that Kosovo is part of Serbia. For him, 
 
“every further step towards the SAA will imply our indirect recognition of 
Kosovo independence”.1580 
 
New elections were staged in May 2008, during which the DS campaigned “For a 
European Serbia”. The victory of the DS, overtaking both the nationalist DSS and 
SRS in the Parliament, and the re-election, by a narrow margin, of Boris Tadić as 
President (against the SRS candidate Tomislav Nikolić) created new space for 
addressing the Kosovo issue. Under the leadership of Boris Tadić, Serbia sought to 
reconcile both its commitment to the EU and its defence of Kosovo. As stated by 
President Tadić himself,  
 
“The policy of DS is very clear. We received the support of the citizens in the 
presidential elections and I am obligated to implement that. This policy is for 
Kosovo and the EU”.1581 
 
If the mandate of the DS seemed clear at first sight, in practice, it was enshroud with a 
veil of elusiveness as to the means to embrace the EU while retaining Kosovo. The 
margin of manoeuvre was not large. But at least, the new government did not posit its 
preference of Kosovo over the EU as ab initio position. It simply remained elusive, 
giving officially the precedence to none of the two strategic objectives, and avoided 
their bundling.  
 
A solution could be found in this context on the deployment of the EULEX by the end 
of 2008. The proposal advanced by President Tadić 1582 reflected his Janus-faced 
commitment to both EU integration and the Kosovo. On the one side, by entrenching 
                                                 
1579 B92. 10.3.2008. ‘Tadić: Lack of Agreement on EU Toppled Government.’ 
1580 B92. 4.4.2008. ‘Koštunica: EU Membership Not on Agenda.’ 
1581 B92. 10.3.2008. ‘Tadić: Lack of Agreement on EU Toppled Government.’ 
1582 based on three conditions –that the EULEX receives the approval of the UN Security Council, that 
it respects a status-neutral mandate and that it does not seek to implement the Ahtisaari proposal. 
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the EULEX in the UN framework, Serbia ascertained that Kosovo would continue to 
be governed by UNSC resolution 1244. On the other side, by allowing the 
deployment of the EU-led mission in Kosovo, President Tadić lifted a key obstacle 
standing on the Serbia’s way towards the EU, while gaining credit for this step 
forwards. EU’s Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn praised President Tadić 
“constructive approach” to the deployment of the EULEX in Kosovo, whilst leaders 
in the opposition accused him of “a stab in the back of the defence of Kosovo”1583. In 
the following years, President Tadić sought to preserve his margin of manoeuvre in 
Serbian politics, urging the EU not to push Serbia for choosing between EU accession 
and Kosovo.  
 
Despite the split of the SRS in October 2008, which gave birth to a more EU-
acceptant (albeit no less nationalist) SNS party, the pressure remained high on the 
government to give the Kosovo issue precedence over EU integration. This claim 
came from most of the opposition parties, some political factions within the DS as 
well as the Serbian Orthodox Church1584. The Church, for instance, openly opposed 
President Tadić’s call in December 2011 for dismantling the barricades that had 
hindered the operations of the EULEX in North Kosovo, and called the government  
 
“not to abandon the people of Old Serbia for the sake of a chimera called the 
country's status of candidate for EU membership”.1585. 
 
Within the ruling party, the DS also had its hardliners. Serbian Foreign Minister 
Jeremić, for instance, pursued a foreign policy that was largely determined by 
Serbia’s approach to Kosovo. Under his leadership, his ministry directed a 
considerable amount of energy at hampering the international recognition of Kosovo, 
and little attention was paid comparatively to supporting the SEIO responsible for 
European affairs1586. Serbian Foreign Minister Jeremić also made it repeatedly clear 
that Serbia would “only join the EU with its territorial integrity intact”1587. His blunter 
rhetorics often contrasted with President Tadić’s more elusive statements1588. 
 
Walking the thin line reconciling EU demands for normalising Belgrade’s relations 
with Pristina without acknowledging the de facto independence of the former 
province was also very difficult because the electorate in Serbia unambiguously stood 
in favour of the defence of Kosovo. This gave President Tadić little margin of 
manoeuvre in the negotiating process, and his elusiveness as for Serbia’s actual 
priority, eventually harmed his popularity. Disavowed by the Council in December 
2011, which postponed its decision on Serbia’s candidacy in the EU, President Tadić 
also fell under the fire of the hardliners, who accused him of deserting North Kosovo 
Serbs. His last minute agreement on Kosovo’s representation in regional fora left a 
bitter taste in the electorate –the taste of being blackmailed by the EU, which fuelled 
Serbia’s growing Euroscepticism. 
                                                 
1583 SETimes. 20.10.2008. ‘Eulex Deployment Agreement Possible, Tadic Says.’ 
1584 Interview with a Research Fellow, Formerly at the Institute for International Politics and 
Economics. Belgrade, 13/09/2011 
1585 B92. 2.12.2011. ‘Church: EU Has Alternative, Serbs Should Persevere.’ 
1586 Interview with a Director from the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Belgrade, 01/03/2011 
1587 United States Embassy in Belgrade. 22.4.2008. 'Foreign Minister: Serbia Must Choose EU, but 
Only with Kosovo'. [accessed 22.01.2013] 
1588 Interview with an Official from the Embassy of the Republic of Austria to Serbia. Belgrade, 
13/09/2011 
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In May 2012, Boris Tadić and his party eventually lost the parliamentary and 
presidential elections in Serbia. Tomislav Nikolić, who had headed the SRS in the 
absence of Vojislav Šešelj until the party split in 2008, became President of Serbia. 
His party, the SNS, won the parliamentary elections and formed a coalition with the 
SPS, the party Milošević founded in 1990. His leader, Ivica Dačić became Prime 
Minister. Although the 2012 elections brought nationalist forces to power, they did 
not signify a reversal of Serbia’s approach to Kosovo. The ruling coalition, under the 
leadership of President Nikolić, did not turn back the clock and overturn the 
achievements of the previous government, despite its attacks against the agreements 
sealed under the aegis of the EU. More generally, it maintained the dual commitment 
of embracing the EU while retaining Kosovo, but repeatedly stated that if it had to 
choose, it would not give up on Kosovo. In the words of Serbian President Nikolić: 
 
“it is a hypothetical question whether somebody will set this condition or not 
but I am not ashamed and I am not running away from the responsibility to 
say that I am not on the list of people who would accept going down the EU 
integration path and giving up on Kosovo and Metohija”.1589 
 
Or, in the same vein, in an address before the General Assembly, 
 
“we are more and more frequently forced by the powerful and mighty to face 
a tough choice to give up Kosovo and Metohija or EU membership. What 
kind of a choice is that? Am I to tell our citizens that they are going to live 
better if they abandon themselves?”.1590 
 
Nikolić’s disposition differs from Koštunica’s because it is not EU-sceptical in 
principle and leaves space for negotiations, provided those do not address the Kosovo 
status issue. It is in that sense less principled, and more pragmatic. President Nikolić’s 
disposition also differs from the approach of Boris Tadić because it is less elusive on 
the arbitrage the ruling coalition would make, should Serbia have to choose between 
Kosovo and the EU1591. But instead of openly challenging the EU by discarding ab 
initio any efforts that would be vain if it was to end up with giving up on Kosovo, the 
ruling coalition adopts a comforting tone, insisting publicly on the fact that the EU 
does not posit the recognition of Kosovo’s independence as precondition for Serbia’s 
membership1592; that the EU-facilitated dialogue is no threat to Serbia’s territorial 
integrity; and that it is in Serbia’s best national interest to proceed with the 
dialogue1593. As stated by Serbian President Nikolić in the UN General Assembly in 
2012,  
 
“Serbia cannot move forward without Kosovo and Metohija, and the 
inhabitants of Kosovo and Metohija cannot move forward without Serbia. We 
strongly desire that the talks continue in good faith and with good intentions, 
taking into account, among other things, that it is important to keep the 
dynamics of the European integration of Serbia and of the Western Balkans 
                                                 
1589 B92. 5.9.2012. ‘"Recognition of Kosovo Not EU Condition".’ 
1590 Republic of Serbia. 25 September 2012. ‘Address before the United Nations General Assembly by 
H.E.Mr. Tomislav Nikolić.’ 
1591 B92. 28.8.2012. ‘President: EU Is Priority but Not at All Costs.’ 
1592 EUobserver. 14.6.2012. ‘Nikolic: EU Does Not Demand Kosovo Recognition.’ 
1593 See, for instance, B92. 18.10.2012. ‘Dačić to Discuss Kosovo Dialogue in Brussels.’ 
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as a whole in order to ensure progress and stability of the entire region in the 
long term”.1594 
 
With no major political opponent to the negotiation process1595, the ruling coalition is 
under less domestic pressure than the previous government. This gives the governing 
coalition a certain margin of manoeuvre, since it is not easily accusable of treason. 
Despite its less favourable dispositions vis-à-vis an EU accession vs. Kosovo 
recognition arbitrage, the ruling coalition can thus allow itself to follow a more 
pragmatic approach, focusing for instance on the well-being of the Serbs (in Serbia 
and Kosovo) rather than opposing Kosovo’s independence. Meanwhile, in order to 
avoid losing ground in the electorate, the ruling coalition argues that every step made 
towards the EU (in the form of an agreement normalising Belgrade’s relations with 
Pristina) is not a step away from Kosovo. With regards to the agreement on Kosovo’s 
representation, Serbian Prime Minister thus assured that  
 
“I underline that they are without a doubt status-neutral and accord with 
resolution 1244 (1999). As a point of fact, the participation of the Pristina 
authorities as a non-state actor is restricted to meetings in regional fora”.1596 
 
While the precedent government had permanently to demonstrate its dedication to the 
defence of Kosovo, the present government, interestingly, focuses on less symbolical 
issues, e.g. gaining legislative and executive rights for Kosovo Serbs, where some 
progress can be achieved. 
 
3.4.3.2.3. Exogenous dispositions fostering/impairing dispute settlement 
 
Domestic politics, it has been seen, does not predispose Serbia and Macedonia’s 
political leaders in favour of dispute settlement. Their dedication to European 
integration usually looses its strategic character, when the EU addresses issues related 
to good neighbourly relations with Kosovo (for Serbia) or Greece (for Macedonia). 
And their concerns for collective security often give precedence to individualistic 
attempts at achieving relative, rather than positional gains. In the absence of 
consistent reference to European approaches to dispute settlement, compliance has 
then more explanatory power than adherence. This is not to say that no disposition 
fostering adherence, rather than compliance, with European approaches ever emerged. 
A closer look at the structure of the interactions within the negotiating framework 
suggests that socialisation and persuasion may have played a role, albeit limited, in 
inflecting Macedonia and Serbia’s approaches to, respectively, the naming and the 
Kosovo issue, in one way or another.  
 
It is clear, indeed, that the structure of Serbia’s interaction framework is more 
amenable to have a socialising effect on Serbia’s representatives than the structure of 
Macedonia’s interaction framework. Macedonia’s representatives usually do not meet 
face to face with the representatives of Greece to discuss the naming issue. Their 
                                                 
1594 Republic of Serbia. 25 September 2012. ‘Address before the United Nations General Assembly by 
H.E.Mr. Tomislav Nikolić.’ 
1595 Most of the parties agreed on the government’s 2012 Kosovo platform. The Church, North Kosovo 
politicians and the electorate, however, remain wary of any agreement reached by the government. 
1596 Republic of Serbia. 21 August 2012. ‘Address before the United Nations General Assembly by 
Prime Minister H.E.Mr. Ivica Dacic.’ 
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meetings are mostly brief informal encounters, taking place “out of courtesy” on the 
sidelines of international Conferences or Summits1597. Instead of meeting face to face 
at regular intervals, the UN Special Envoy Matthew Nimetz travels to Skopje and 
Athens successively in order to mediate the dispute and also meets the representatives 
of Macedonia and Greece in New York. In Skopje, channels of communications 
between the Greek Liaison Office and the government of Macedonia have shrunk, 
according to an official from Greece, especially since the VMRO-DPMNE governs 
the country. As reported by the same official: 
 
“I have asked repeatedly to be received by the Macedonia’s [sic.] Foreign 
Minister, but he declined every time. Of course, FYROM’s government 
accepts to meet me, because Greece is FYROM’s first investor. But they 
receive us informally, at the party, at the Presidency, etc…”1598 
 
The absence of permanent, face to face form of communication between Macedonia 
and Greece on the naming issue certainly precludes direct socialisation. Physically 
and communicatively apart, the parties do not directly exchange views, nor do they 
develop an intersubjective understanding of what a collective way of settling a 
disputes could be. 
 
The situation is drastically different in Serbia’s case, at least since the establishment 
of the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. Between March 2011 
and March 2012, Serbia’s representatives have met their Kosovo counterparts at 
regular intervals in Brussels, at nine occasions, and conducted face to face negotiation 
in the presence of the EU’s mediator and EEAS Counsellor Robert Cooper. After an 
eight-month interruption due to the elections in Serbia, the dialogue resumed in 
October 2012, at the prime-ministerial level and under the mediation of the EU’s High 
Representative Catherine Ashton herself. Between October 2012 and March 2013, 
Serbian Prime Minister Dačić met his Kosovo counterpart Thaçi at six occasions, i.e. 
once every month in Brussels1599.  
 
Of course the fact that the parties met face to face was no guarantee of success. In 
2006, Serbia and Kosovo participated in similar meetings, under the mediation of 
Martti Ahtisaari, but the negotiations ended up in a deadlock. But these face to face 
meetings under the aegis of the EU, whether symbolic or substantive, are instrumental 
in building confidence between the parties, and beyond that, other intersubjective 
understandings, including on good neighbourliness or constructiveness. Being 
amenable to socialisation (without prejudice to compliance), the interaction format of 
the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina may have, in other word, 
                                                 
1597 For instance, Macedonian President Ivanov met Greek Prime Minister Papaendreou in December 
2009 on the sidelines of the Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, in May 2010 on the sidelines 
of the EU-Latin America Summit in Madrid, in September 2010 on the sidelines of the 65th UN 
General Assembly plenary meeting in New York, in December 2010 on the sidelines of the OSCE 
Summit in Astana. Likewise, Prime Minister Gruevski met his Greek counterpart in June 2011 in 
Brussels after Papandreou attended the European Council and Gruevski attended the EPP Summit, and 
in September 2012 at the sidelines on the sidelines of a UNGA meeting in New York. Athens News 
Agency. 23.9.2010. ‘Greek Pm Papandreou Meets Fyrom President Ivanov, Attends 65th UN General 
Assembly Opening Session.’ 
1598 Interview with an Official from the Liaison Office of the Hellenic Republic in Skopje. Skopje, 
01/11/2011 
1599 See European Union External Action. 'News'. [accessed 7.3.2013]. 
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also contributed to some extent to inflect Serbia’s understandings in dispute 
settlement. Taking into account the case of Macedonia, it is questionable that Serbia’s 
representatives could have achieved the intersubjective understanding of what 
“constructive cooperation” means without these intense interactions with both Kosovo 
and EU representatives.  
 
Compliance can also be facilitated through persuasion. When the EU frames its 
expectations in dispute settlement matters in such way that these resonate with the 
causal and principled beliefs of national governments, then local actors are more 
amenable to adhere to the EU’s approaches and adopt them as their own. This has 
been the case, to some extent, in 2008, when the EU and Serbia discussed the 
deployment of the EULEX throughout Kosovo. As it first launched the EULEX, in 
February 2008, the EU mandated the mission with the task of “assist[ing] Kosovo 
authorities, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress 
towards sustainability and accountability”1600. Beyond this operational mandate, the 
deployment of the EULEX and the reconfiguration of the UNMIK were to “guarantee 
stability in the Balkans”1601. Meanwhile, in the United Nations, the representatives of 
Serbia, who blocked the deployment of the mission for want of mandate of the UN 
Security Council, kept on cautioning with great affection that Kosovo’s security 
situation was teetering on the brink of collapse. They dramatised that the Serbs living 
in Kosovo where victim of  
 
“segregation […] force[d] to live in darkness and in constant fear for their 
lives”.1602 
 
And therefore called the international security presence in Kosovo, as well as the UN, 
pursuant UNSC resolution 1244, to  
 
“demonstrate particular sensitivity toward the Kosovo Serb community”.1603 
 
Notwithstanding the strong affection which underpinned these statements, there were 
clear complementarities between Serbia’s concerns for the security of the Serbs in 
Kosovo and the mandate of the EU-led rule of law mission. But these 
complementarities had not been brought forwards in the initial plans of EULEX 
deployment. In an attempt to relax the deadlock, which Serbia and the EU faced in the 
UN in 2008, the EU started to adapt its discourse, emphasising that the EULEX 
deployment would help rebuild security in the North, and above all, benefit to all 
communities. In October 2008, the Chief of the EULEX Yves de Kermabon thus 
explained that if the Serbian government 
 
                                                 
1600 Council of the European Union. 16 February 2008. ‘Kosovo: Council Establishes an EU Rule of 
Law Mission, Appoints an EU Special Representative ’. 
1601 Council of the European Union. 18 July 2008. ‘Summary of Intervention of Javier Solana, EU High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy before the Meeting of International 
Organisations Active on the Ground in Kosovo (EU,Nato,UN,Osce).’ 
1602 Republic of Serbia. 18 February 2008. ‘Address before the United Nations Security Council by 
H.E.Mr. Boris Tadić.’ 
1603 Republic of Serbia. 14 February 2008. ‘Address before the United Nations Security Council by 
H.E.Mr. Vuk Jeremic.’ 
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“wants to stop smuggling and corruption in northern Kosovo, it needs to get 
rid once and for all of these fanatics who are still controlling a part of the 
population”.1604 
 
And, in a similar vein, also in October 2008, the Council started to insist in its 
declarations that  
 
“the deployment of the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) 
throughout Kosovo is of benefit to all the communities in Kosovo”.1605 
 
This emphasis on producing benefits for “all the communities in Kosovo”, “regardless 
of their ethnic origin”, quickly became a leitmotiv in the official jargon of the EU1606. 
Of course, the EU did not exclusively target the Serbs with its new emphasis. But it 
addressed a strong signal to Belgrade, since its concern for “all the communities in 
Kosovo” better resonated with Serbian causal belief that international actions had to 
be undertaken in order to protect the Serbs in Kosovo, and with its principled belief 
that Kosovo Serbs suffered from insecurity. By reframing its discourse in more 
explicitly inclusive terms, the EU certainly facilitated the agreement it reached with 
Serbia in November 2008 on the deployment of the EULEX. Persuaded of the 
appropriateness of the agreement, Serbian Foreign Minister Jeremić explained that 
one of its largest achievements was that 
 
“it creates the conditions to protect the well-being of Serbs and other gravely 
endangered communities in Kosovo”. 1607 
 
But persuasion did not occur as a one-way transaction. In the course of the 
negotiations, Serbia also succeeded in inflecting the EU’s position on the deployment 
of the EULEX in Kosovo. The result of this inflection, beyond the physical 
deployment of the EU-led mission, was the construction, under the aegis of the UN 
Secretary General, of an intersubjective understanding framing the deployment of the 
EULEX under the authority of the UN. However fragile, ambiguous and internally 
inconsistent, the emergence of this negotiated understanding lifted Serbia’s opposition 
to the deployment of the EULEX, and predisposed Serbian actors to take a more 
acceptant stance towards EULEX operations in North Kosovo.  
 
In its Joint Action of 4 February 2008, the Council did not place the EULEX under 
the authority of the United Nations1608. This was not because the EU intended to shun 
the Security Council, but simply because the initial plan for the deployment of the 
EULEX had been developed in the framework of the Ahtisaari process, which 
however, could not be endorsed by the Security Council owing to Serbia’s rejection. 
Of course, placing the EULEX under the authority of the UN, pursuant UNSC 
                                                 
1604 B92. 17.10.2008. ‘Eulex: EU-Belgrade Agreement Soon.’ 
1605 Council of the European Union. 22 October 2008. ‘Joint Press Statement by the United States of 
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1606 Council of the European Union. 5 December 2008. ‘Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the 
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1607 Republic of Serbia. 26 November 2008. ‘Address before the United Nations Security Council by 
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resolution 1244, significantly constrained the latitude left to the EU in defining the 
mandate of its rule of law mission. For instance, it implied taking over the KFOR’s 
commitment status-neutrality –a commitment the EU would better have eluded, since 
most of its member states had expressly recognised Kosovo’s independence.  
 
Despite their contentious viewpoints, Serbian representatives made it clear, from the 
beginning, that there was room for an agreement, and that Serbia was not 
fundamentally against the EULEX. Serbian Foreign Minister Jeremić thus stated in 
March 2008, 
 
“it is not that the EU is unwelcome in our southern province. For we 
welcome, as a matter of principle, any demonstration of Europe’s deepening 
commitment to our country, including Kosovo. But there has to be a clear 
mandate for any such commitment –and this can only be achieved by getting 
the approval of the Security Council”.1609 
 
In November 2008, the EU eventually accepted Serbia’s set of conditions 1610 . 
Belgrade celebrated this diplomatic victory, arguing that this inflection had been 
central in its decision to lift its opposition to the EULEX deployment. According to 
Serbian Foreign Minister Jeremić 
 
“what has always been a crucial condition for our acceptance of 
reconfiguration is a clear and binding commitment by the European Union—
confirmed in the Security Council—to be fully status neutral, and completely 
anchor its presence in Kosovo under the authority of the United Nations, in 
conformity with resolution 1244 (1999)”.1611 
 
Negotiations had been lengthy and “difficult”1612, but their outcome was a framework 
(however dysfunctional it would prove), to which Serbia had adhered, i.e. which 
resonated with both its causal understandings (i.e. the deployment of the EULEX does 
not prejudge of Kosovo’s status) and principled beliefs (the status of Kosovo is 
determined by UNSC resolution 1244). This adherence to the negotiations’ outcome 
had been facilitated by the fact that the EU had directly engaged in negotiations, with 
the active participation of EU non-recognising member states like Spain1613. It was 
not an outcome imposed through mere conditionality, but something, as reported by a 
government official, achieved through 
 
“dialogue, exchange, as a two-side process, on an equal footing[…], which 
makes that we cannot be always treated as small kids. Rather we want to be 
perceived as an equal partner in achieving a mutually acceptable 
solution”.1614 
                                                 
1609 Republic of Serbia. 11 March 2008. ‘Address before the United Nations Security Council by 
H.E.Mr. Vuk Jeremic.’ 
1610 the EULEX would have to seek the UNSC approval; the EULEX would remain status neutral; and 
the EULEX would not be seen as implementing the Ahtisaari plan. 
1611 Republic of Serbia. 26 November 2008. ‘Address before the United Nations Security Council by 
H.E.Mr. Vuk Jeremic.’ 
1612 Ibid. 
1613 Interview with an Official from the Embassy of the Republic of Austria to Serbia. Belgrade, 
13/09/2011 
1614 Interview with an Official from the European Integration Office, Government of the Republic of 
Serbia. Belgrade, 14/09/2011 
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Of course, such a negotiated agreement was not optimal, and it came with concessions 
that proved detrimental to the functioning of the EULEX in the field. But, for Serbia, 
it laid the foundation of a more horizontal relationship with the EU1615. Through 
negotiations, Serbia succeeded to upload its national preference on the EU level –a 
relatively rare occurrence, according to the literature. This achievement, usually 
reserved to EU member states, implied that some important aspects of the EU’s 
approach to Kosovo (with respect to the EULEX in general and to the reference to 
UNSC resolution 1244 in particular) were to bear the imprint of Serbian preferences –
an achievement that understandingly fostered later dispositions towards adherence. 
 
When, on the other side, the EU frames its expectations in such a way that they 
antagonise one of the parties to the dispute, then, one cannot expect conditionality to 
turn into persuasion. Unlike Serbia in 2008, Macedonia could never seriously engage 
dialogue with the EU in order to negotiate the conditionality framework, to which it 
was subject in dispute settlement matters. Greece kept the upper-hand, despite 
Macedonia’s protests, as illustrated by Macedonian President Ivanov’s declaration 
following the decision of the Council to postpone for the fourth time the opening of 
EU accession negotiations in December 2012: 
 
“I am personally disappointed with the outcome of this year's Summit in 
Brussels. […] It seems that the old, worn-out Balkan manners, Balkan 
interests, aspirations and divisions still persist and are imposed on the 
outcomes of the European Union summits”.1616 
 
The fact that the EU’s approach to Macedonia’s naming issue, overall, is framed by 
the position of Greece, projected at the EU level with the solidarity-based consent of 
EU member, leaves to Macedonia’s officials little room for engaging dialogue with 
the EU on its naming dispute. There is also little chance that the EU’s conditions in 
that matter resonate with Macedonia’s understandings, since the terms of these 
conditions are perceived as dictated by the other party to the dispute, Greece.  
 
3.4.3.3. Intentional analysis 
 
The actual settlement of bilateral dispute cannot ensue through structural forces and 
dispositional preferences. It requires the agency of the actors involved in the 
negotiating process. Of course, the motives underpinning this agency often bear the 
seal of structural forces and dispositional preferences, and the former may often be 
inferred from the latter. But a more cautious analysis of these motives and intentions 
may sometimes reveal important but overlooked causes and reasons for action.  
 
Macedonia, for instance, has dedicated much effort in trying to level the asymmetrical 
playing field in which it pursued its negotiations, rather than considering possible 
inflections for its position. It did so by looking for external supports, ready to take 
side. Within the EU, Macedonia continues to plead its case at the bilateral level, 
                                                 
1615 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Directorate 
General for the European Union. Belgrade, 12/09/2011 
1616 Republic of Macedonia. 18 December 2012. 'Annual Address by the President H.E.Mr. Gjorgje 
Ivanov in the National Assembly of Macedonia'. [accessed 15.2.2013]. 
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seeking Germany’s support for instance1617. At the EU level, it also called for a more 
active engagement of European institutions, but primarily in order to tame Greece. As 
stated by Macedonian Foreign Minister Milošoski,  
 
“We do not feel that the EU should replace the ongoing process within the 
UN, but we think that a greater attention could increase the level of 
motivation of both the Republic of Macedonia and Greece […], because we 
are under the impression ¨that there is a lack of true substantial motivation to 
overcome the dispute in the Hellenic Republic […]”.1618 
 
In the absence of clearer involvement of the EU, the support of the US, received in 
2004, has been no negligible achievement. In the past ten years, Macedonia has taken 
good care of its relations with the US, hoping that Washington will increase its 
pressure Athens1619. For instance, it introduced, with this intention, an exception to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, applicable to US citizens arrested in Macedonia, which does 
not comply with the EU’s acquis1620.  
 
More generally, convinced of being well within their rights, Macedonian leaders 
conduct the negotiations on the naming issue with the intention of prevailing by 
reason, not necessarily finding a negotiated compromise. They, incidentally, often 
speak of the naming issue as “irrational” or “absurd”, and complain of Greece’s 
“unreasonable” and “irrational” stance1621. Since their intention is to prevail, they are 
tempted to discard the proposals made by the UN Envoy Matthew Nimetz altogether 
(as does Greece), instead of specifying the conditions which they would deem 
acceptable. Only few contributions have been made in that sense, e.g. the possibility 
of bringing the case before the ICJ1622. For many Macedonians, finally, there is simply 
no dispute with Greece, which can be solved through negotiations and compromise, 
since it is “impossible for a state/nation to have a dispute over its own name and self-
identification”1623. What politicians can at best achieve is to explain Greece how 
absurd its claims are. Of course, such premises can only cast doubt on Macedonian’s 
motivation to engage in the negotiation process.  
 
Serbia’s intentions admit some similarities here. Serbia also seeks to secure the 
support of third parties against Kosovo’s independence –most notably Russia. But 
whereas Macedonia genuinely strove for obtaining the support of the US against 
Greece, Serbia rather plays its Russian card as a negotiating chip, i.e. a tactical threat. 
Before becoming Prime Minister, Ivica Dačić thus cautioned the EU that  
 
                                                 
1617 BBC News. 25.2.2012. ‘Gruevski: "I Seek the Support of the Chancellor" ’ 
1618 Dnevnik. 11.11.2010. ‘Europe Should Help About the Name, Too: Interview with Antonio 
Milososki, Foreign Minister and Chairman of Council of Europe, by Hristo Ivanovski.’ 
1619 See for instance MIC. 'Obama Promises Ivanov He Will Talk to Papandreou About Naming Issue'. 
[accessed 13.12.2012]. 
1620 Interview with an Official from the Secretariat for European Integration, Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia. Skopje, 01/11/2011 
1621 Republic of Macedonia. 9-11 November 2012. 'Address by the President H.E.Mr. Gjorgje Ivanov at 
the International Conference "Leaving Europe's Waiting Room"'. [accessed 15.2.2013]. 
1622 Balkan Insight. 11.11.2009. ‘Macedonia Suggests Croatia-Slovenia Model.’ 
1623 Vankovska, B. 2010. ‘David Vs. Goliath: The Macedonian Position(S) in the Socalled 'Name 
Dispute' with Greece.’ Südosteuropa: Zeitschrift für Politik und Gesellschaft vol.58 (3). 
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“if the EU and America fail to understand our position and are always taking 
the side of ethnic Albanians, it is to be expected that a political option will 
come to power that might turn to Russia”.1624 
 
But most of these warnings, as well as those aimed at reviving the Non-Aligned 
Movement went unheeded or became dead letter1625. For Serbian governments, since 
2008, all committed themselves to support the integration of their country in the EU, 
including by intensifying their dialogue with Pristina’s authorities. As stated by Prime 
Minister Dačić,  
 
“our aim is to get a date for the beginning of negotiations with the EU. We 
cannot fight if we are outside the process, and common sense tells us the EU 
is our logical choice”.1626 
 
This unambiguous commitment does not imply that Serbia would be ready to give up 
Kosovo, if the EU posited it as condition. But it shows the motivation with which 
Serbian elites engage in the Belgrade-Pristina’s dialogue –a motivation pegged to 
concrete goals, which does not elude the possibility of negotiating a compromise. Of 
course, the form that this compromise shall take remains undetermined. But Serbian 
officials already carried out a series of comparative surveys in the EU in order to 
identify possible models for an eventual agreement, or at least, learn from their 
experience1627. These concern, for instance, Northern Ireland’s “double sovereignty”, 
South Tyrol’s autonomous status in Italy or the “two Germanys” system of 1972, or in 
any case, a model that, according to then-President Tadić, 
 
“should be European, in the sense that it would ensure peace and solve the 
everyday problems of the people”.1628 
 
Unlike Macedonia, Serbia’s engagement in the Kosovo negotiation process is 
motivated by intentions often directly connected to European integration. Such 
intentions certainly increase the leverage of the EU in fostering changes in Serbia’s 
foreign policy approaches through compliance, socialisation or persuasion. 
 
3.4.4.  Summary of the findings 
 
Serbia and Macedonia both have unresolved disputes with their neighbours. But none 
of them has had as critical implications as the “naming issue” between Macedonia and 
Greece and the “Kosovo issue” between Belgrade and Pristina. The naming issue is 
responsible for the derailment in 2008 of Macedonia’s European and Euro-Atlantic 
perspectives. In order to resolve the naming dispute, Macedonia and Greece did not 
resort to the EU. They have conducted several rounds of negotiations in the past 15 
years under the auspices of the United Nations. None of them, however, has proven 
fruitful. Instead of inflecting its foreign policy towards approaches more amenable to 
dispute settlement, Macedonia has maintained its dubious antiquisation policy at 
                                                 
1624 B92. 15.2.2012. ‘"Next Government Might Turn to Russia".’ 
1625 Interview with an Official from the Embassy of the Republic of Austria to Serbia. Belgrade, 
13/09/2011 
1626 EurActiv. 11.1.2013. ‘Serbia Redefines Its Kosovo Policy.’ 
1627 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, Directorate for 
Neighbouring and South-East European Countries. Belgrade, 15/09/2011 
1628 EurActiv. 21.12.2011. ‘Serbia Looks to Irish 'Dual' Model for Kosovo.’ 
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home and become more assertive abroad. Greece, meanwhile, has upheld its “no 
solution, no invitation” policy and continues to hamper Macedonia’s membership in 
international organisations, at the risk of breaching international law.  
 
Although it still stands firm for a solution envisaging “anything but independence” 
and has enshrined its “no-independence position” in the Constitution in 2006, Serbia, 
by contrast, has witnessed major changes in its approach to the Kosovo issue. The 
retaliatory measures it implemented after Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 
February 2007 did not hold water for a very long time. In order to avoid its self-
ostracisation, Belgrade lifted them a few months after their introduction, and 
transferred its struggle in the realm of international law. The ICJ, however, did not 
deliver an opinion that responded to its expectations, and instead of allowing it to 
revive the UN talks on the status of Kosovo in 2010, Serbia had to settle for a new 
round of negotiations, facilitated by the EU, on technical matters only. Serbia’s 
approach to the Kosovo issue has changed in at least three respects. First, regarding 
the deployment of the EULEX mission in Kosovo, Serbia’s position shifted in 2009 
from sheer hostility to negotiated acceptance and calculated support. In 2007, Serbia 
used to oppose the deployment of the EULEX, which it considered as an instrument 
to implement the Ahtisaari plan. Today, it views the EULEX as a possible guarantor 
of the status quo, and a means to undermine the international status of Kosovo. 
Second, in the field of customs and border management, Serbia has demonstrated a 
growing acceptance of the idea of physical separation with Kosovo, and the de facto 
abandonment of the idea of partition. In the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue, 
Serbia has concluded several agreements, which allow the transformation of the 
poorly-manned checkpoints along the administrative line into proper border posts 
with competences in personal control and customs. These make the prospect of 
Kosovo’s territorial partition less likely, and overall, lay the foundation stone of state-
to-state relations. Regarding Kosovo’s representation in international fora, finally, 
Serbia signed an agreement with Pristina under the aegis of the EU, which marks a 
watershed in Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo. First, it signals that Belgrade 
henceforth accepts that Kosovo should no longer be represented by the UNMIK, at 
least in some fora. Second, it paves the way of the further changes, since provisions in 
the agreement may be subject to extensive interpretations. And third, it places Serbia 
under the constraining scrutiny of the EU with regards the implementation of the 
agreement. 
 
Settling neighbourly dispute first and foremost responds to an imperative of 
international law. It is a normative principle related to others (e.g. non-use of force, 
self-determination, sovereign equality), promoted by the UN Charter (e.g. through the 
use of negotiations, mediation, arbitration) and applicable, whenever possible, in the 
framework of regional arrangements (in the sense of Chapter VIII). In Europe, dispute 
settlement may take place within several regional frameworks –e.g. the Council of 
Europe, the OSCE and Nato. All of them offer specific norms and ways of doing 
things. But none can be conclusively invoked in the case of the naming issue and the 
Kosovo issue. Although the EU has not declared itself a regional arrangement in the 
sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, it can be considered as one in many respects. 
The EU, in particular, promotes the settlement of neighbourly disputes as part of its 
political dialogue with non-EU states. It readily connects it to its good 
neighbourliness principle –a principle that has gradually entered the grey area of the 
EU’s political criteria and is now projected through conditionality. Therewith, the EU 
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has become a proactive facilitator, a dedicated amplifier of UN prescriptions under 
Chapter VIII, and through its conditionality policy, possibly, an influent (f)actor. It is, 
arguably, from the use of this European framework for dispute settlement that 
Europeanisation can be inferred in Serbia and Macedonia. 
 
Compliance, according to this study, has played a major role in the reorientation of 
Serbia’s foreign policy approach towards Kosovo. This is because the EU has set up a 
very specific type of conditionality regime with Serbia, which significantly differs 
from Macedonia’s. And also because conditionality, en l’état, is not applicable to the 
other party to the naming issue, Greece (owing to its status of member of the EU). 
Key differences between the two conditionality regimes may in fact explain why 
Serbia’s achievements in dispute settlement matters have been so contrastingly high, 
whereas Macedonia’s record remains disappointing.  
 
First, there is the fact that the EU’s conditionality regime towards Serbia is 
impregnated by the reminiscence of an earlier community of views. In 2007, the EU 
collectively supported the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo’s supervised independence. The 
plan failed, but not without leaving traces in the EU’s institutional memory. Despite 
the current disunity of EU member states, and despite the EU’s reluctant commitment 
to “status-neutrality”, the Ahtisaari plan continues to frame the EU’s approach to 
Serbia’s Kosovo issue. More importantly, it provides a normative (albeit unsaid) 
teleology to the EU’s conditionality regime towards Serbia. Towards Macedonia, by 
contrast, there is no sign of such reminiscence of a community of views. The EU, in 
the past, never adopted a collective, prescriptive position regarding the settlement of 
the naming issue, and it never ventured explaining what the “negotiated and mutually 
acceptable” solution should look like.  
 
Second, there is the fact that the EU’s conditionality regime towards Macedonia is 
based on the EU’s solidarity principle with Greece, even though this contradicts the 
international principle of sovereign equality. This EU solidarity principle has gained 
impetus since 2008 and the economic crisis. Wary of the political instability in Greece, 
most EU member states now refrain from questioning Greece’s hardliner position 
against Macedonia, or even seek to trade their support in the naming issue in 
exchange of economic reforms. Besides, few member states have ever expressed a 
consistent interest in the question, except, of course, Greece. And this relative 
disinterest, understandingly, has not translated into a reinforcement of the role of the 
EU in the dispute settlement process. On the opposite, it has opened avenues for 
Greece’s instrumental use of the EU in order to pressure Skopje, pursuant its “no 
solution, no invitation” policy. In fact, the other member states may not all support 
Greece’s firm stance, but they do not obstruct it out of solidarity, despite the adverse 
recommendations of the European Commission and European Parliament. This 
configuration, all in all, is far from optimal, for the asymmetry in negotiating power, 
which Greece derives from its membership in the EU, undermines the external 
legitimacy of the EU’s conditionality dialogue (not least because of the issue of 
sovereign equality). If EU negative conditions are found to stem from Greece, contra 
the Commission and the Parliament, then failing to meet them is not as much a 
gesture of objection addressed to the EU collectively as to Greece specifically. That is 
why this configuration, as a matter of principle, carries flaws that arguably undermine 
the effectiveness of conditionality.  
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The EU’s conditionality regime towards Serbia, third, also critically differs from 
Macedonia because of the constructive engagement of EU member states. It is indeed 
remarkable that many (if not most of) EU member states have expressed a thorough 
interest for the Kosovo issue. Of course, this common interest does not imply a 
community of view. But it means nonetheless that EU member states actively engage 
in the international debate on the Kosovo issue. Unlike Macedonia, there is among 
EU member states, nothing close to the solidarity principle regarding the Kosovo 
issue, supposing the passive endorsement of the national position of one member state. 
And for good reason: the Kosovo issue does not involve a particular EU member state 
directly. This fact gives both recognisers and non-recognisers a certain margin of 
manoeuvre to create space at the EU level for the exercise a richer EU conditionality 
regime towards Serbia. Despite (or perhaps because of) the considerable differences 
in the views EU member states hold, the fact that most of them engage in the debate 
on the Kosovo issue also makes EU conditionality more legitimate externally. Unlike 
Macedonia, which could argue that the hand of Greece stands behind the EU’s 
conditionality regime, Serbia cannot question the collective character of the 
conditions posed by the EU in dispute settlement matters. 
 
Macedonia’s incompliance, fifth, can be analysed in the light of EU obligations 
lacking specificity. The insistence with which the Commission and the Council hint at 
the UN-mediated negotiation process, despite its lack of results, shows how the EU 
conceives of its conditionality regime with Macedonia. In dispute settlement matters, 
the EU merely conveys international obligations and therewith reinforces the 
compellingness of the UN. It leaves few imprints of its own, which would alter the 
substance or the format of the negotiation process, but considerably amplifies the 
resonance of UN obligations, by conditioning the opening of EU accession 
negotiations with the outcome of an UN-mediated process. However, since EU 
conditionality primarily targets the outcome of UN-mediated talks, it falls short of 
effectively preventing the deterioration of the negotiating climate stemming from 
Macedonia’s provocative actions against Greece. 
 
This characteristic of the EU’s conditionality dialogue, sixth, can be contrasted with 
Serbia’s qualified compliance with rather specific obligations. Until Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence the EU’s conditionality dialogue with Serbia was quite 
similar to Macedonia. It also limited itself to the promotion of dispute settlement in 
general terms, insisting on the obligation for Serbia to comply with UNSC resolution 
1244. But following the failure of the Ahtisaari process, the EU reframed its 
conditionality regime, ceased to insist on UNSC resolution 1244, and increasingly 
supported dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina for its own sake. It soon 
established a conditional link between Serbia’s candidacy in the EU and its 
acceptance of the EULEX, posited the signature of a police cooperation agreement 
with the EULEX as requirement for Serbia to qualify for visa liberalisation and 
ultimately, fractionated the Kosovo dispute into a series of technical, albeit status-
sensitive, issues of lower intensity, which it gradually brought on the negotiation table, 
under its mediation. This departure from the international framework originally set up 
by the UN and this fractioning of the EU conditionality logic is a major difference to 
the EU’s approach to the naming issue. The EU accordingly used its conditionality 
approach to inflect Serbia’s position in the field of customs and border management. 
It started to address the issue by linking it to the mandate of the EULEX, which could 
not be effectively exercised in North Kosovo without Serbia’s cooperation. Both 
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issues were settled in 2011 under the auspices of the EU, just before the Commission 
released its opinion regarding Serbia’s application for EU membership. A few months 
after, the other agreement on Kosovo’s representation was reached in the same way, 
just before the Council released its decision to grant Serbia the candidate status. For 
every step, the EU, backed by some member states (e.g. Germany), made it clear that 
it expected Serbia to inflect its position and reach an agreement in order to progress 
towards the EU.  
 
If structural forces did play an essential role in dispute settlement matters, a closer 
look at Serbia and Macedonia’s dispositions shows, first, that domestic politics hardly 
facilitated any achievement in the area. In Serbia and in Macedonia, there has been no 
shift in the way the naming issue and the Kosovo issue are securitised. They continue 
to be given precedence, swiftly elude the strategic character of European integration 
and, often, are also used for electoral purposes. In Macedonia, national interests have 
generally been reframed in a way that is compatible with European approaches. The 
naming issue, however, is a sensitive exception. Under the VMRO-DPMNE 
government, the naming issue has been used in a nation-building perspective that does 
not resonate with European norms, objectives and approaches. In Serbia, EU 
accession has remained important throughout the past ten years, but not more 
important, domestically, as Serbia’s commitment to the defence of Kosovo, regardless 
of the government in exercise. That is why Serbian leaders usually urge the EU not to 
push Serbia to choose between EU accession and Kosovo. The use of blunt 
conditionality since 2011 has left in this regard a bitter taste in the electorate –the 
taste of being blackmailed by the EU, which fuelled Serbia’s growing Euroscepticism. 
The situation changed slightly with the electoral victory of nationalist forces in 2012. 
With no major political opponent to the negotiation process, the new ruling coalition 
is under less domestic pressure than the previous government. Despite its less 
favourable predispositions vis-à-vis an EU accession vs. Kosovo recognition arbitrage, 
the ruling coalition may allow itself to follow a more pragmatic approach. 
 
If domestic politics, it has been seen, did not predispose Serbia and Macedonia’s 
political leaders in favour of dispute settlement, these have nonetheless been 
amenable, to a limited extent, to socialisation. The face-to-face meetings staged by the 
EU in its mediation between Belgrade and Pristina may have been a valuable 
contribution, and not only to confidence-building. The regular meetings have allowed 
the formation of mutual understandings, e.g. regarding the EU’s expectations and the 
definition of key concepts such as normalisation. These mutual understandings are 
still missing in Macedonia and Greece’s systems of beliefs, and the absence of direct 
involvement of the EU in the negotiation process on the naming issue may thus help 
understanding this lack of inclination in Skopje.  
 
Persuasion also played a certain role in the case of Serbia. When the EU frames its 
expectations in dispute settlement matters in such way that these resonate with the 
causal and principled beliefs of national governments, then local actors prove more 
amenable to adhere to the EU’s approaches and adopt them as their own. This has 
been the case, to some extent, in 2008, when the EU and Serbia discussed the 
deployment of the EULEX throughout Kosovo. By reframing its discourse so as to 
target all the inhabitants of Kosovo (and not only Kosovo Albanians), the EU 
facilitated the agreement it reached with Serbia in November 2008 on the deployment 
of the rule of law mission. But persuasion did not occur as a one-way transaction. In 
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the course of the negotiations, Serbia also succeeded in inflecting the EU’s position 
on the deployment of the EULEX in Kosovo, by convincing the EU to place the 
EULEX under the authority of the UN. When, on the other side, the EU frames its 
expectations in such a way that they antagonise one of the parties to the dispute, then, 
one cannot expect conditionality to turn into persuasion. Unlike Serbia in 2008, 
Macedonia could never seriously engage dialogue with the EU in order to negotiate 
the conditionality framework, to which it was subject in dispute settlement matters. 
The EU, therefore, failed to extend its understanding of a “constructive approach” to 
good neighbourly relations to Macedonia.  
 
At the intentional level, finally, on should note that Macedonian leaders are usually 
convinced of being well within their rights. Therefore, they approach negotiations on 
the naming issue with the intention of prevailing by reason, not necessarily finding a 
negotiated compromise. Serbian leaders, by contrast, have engaged in the EU-
facilitated dialogue with motives directly connected to European integration. They 
have pegged to concrete goals, and do not elude the possibility of negotiating a 
compromise. Of course, they also seek to secure the support of third parties against 
Kosovo’s independence –most notably Russia. But whereas Macedonia genuinely 
strove for obtaining the support of the US against Greece, Serbia rather plays its 
Russian card as a negotiating chip. Such intentions certainly increase the leverage of 
the EU in fostering changes in Serbia’s foreign policy approaches through compliance, 
socialisation or persuasion. 
 
3.5. Changes in Serbia and Macedonia’s systems of arms export 
controls 
 
This section examines some aspects of the instrument and output dimensions of 
Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy. It explores, more specifically, Serbia and 
Macedonia’s changing regimes of arms export controls, infers Europeanisation from 
the role of the EU in amplifying international norms in the field, and enquires into the 
structural, dispositional and intentional forces that led to Serbia and Macedonia’s 1) 
gradual adoption of EU legislations in the field; 2) growing participation in 
international arms embargoes; and 3) more transparent reporting in arms export. It 
should be kept in mind, here, that Serbia and Macedonia’s systems of arms export 
controls differ in an essential manner –their international relevance. Unlike 
Macedonia, which barely exports arms, Serbia is an historical producer in the field. 
The analysis will take into account this important difference. 
 
3.5.1.  Descriptive analysis 
 
3.5.1.1. Relevance of arms export controls in foreign policy 
 
Arms control played a major role during the Cold War. In a bi-polar world, the US 
and the Soviet Union controlled the proliferation of weapons technology within their 
own sphere of influence1629. Their goal was to provide their allies with the amount of 
security-related equipment they needed, whilst preventing the divulgation of advanced 
technologies to the enemy. Cooperative systems of arms control, defined as “a process 
                                                 
1629 Ivry, D. 1999. ‘Transition from Balance of Power to Cooperative System.’ In A Future Arms 
Control Agenda, eds. Anthony, I. and Rotfeld, A. D. 
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by which states develop a common instrument that can be applied in order to address 
mutually agreed security problems”1630, only emerged after the end of the Cold War. 
More inclusive, they aimed at breaking the security dilemma by means of 
international agreements on restrictions imposed on the production, stockpiling and 
proliferation of weapons1631. An important component in these cooperative systems is 
the control of arms export, i.e. the control of cross-border movements of security-
related items, including their transit, trans-shipment and brokering1632. It is widely 
recognised that free, unregulated trade in arms can have “negative externalities on 
national security”1633. Failures to effectively control the export of military equipment 
are known to contribute to their proliferation, to undermine international security and 
to weaken democratic governance.  
 
Systems of arms export controls are an interesting field of exploration for foreign 
policy analysts. They have a military, defence policy-related, an economic, industry-
related, but also a political, foreign policy-related, dimension. They typically involve 
several ministries, including the MFA, which plays an important role, for instance in 
the issuance of arms trade licenses. These systems build on a set of criteria 
determining the conditions under which export licenses are delivered. These criteria 
give a glimpse of the normative framework informing foreign policy decisions. In 
Europe, the criteria upon which many states (members or not of the EU) rely to 
regulate their trade in arms, are determined in accordance with the EU’s 1998 Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports1634 and its successor, the EU’s 2008 common position 
defining common rules governing control exports of military technology and 
equipment1635.  
 
Systems of arms export controls are interesting for another reason. They have 
practical, foreign-policy oriented applications, allowing states to signal concerns 
about specific targets. By controlling arms export, and possibly denying the 
permission for a particular export to take place, states may help “placing limits on the 
capabilities available to other states” 1636 . Arms export controls, for instance, 
contribute to the effective enforcement of arms embargoes. Systems of arms export 
controls, finally, can be designed to guarantee a certain level of accountability in 
foreign policy matters. Through the involvement of the parliament, which passes the 
legislations required to operate arms export controls, and through the publication of 
                                                 
1630 Anthony, I. 1999. ‘Arms Export Controls.’ In A Future Arms Control Agenda, eds. Anthony, I. and 
Rotfeld, A. D. 
1631 Several factors have contributed to the emergence of these cooperative systems of arms control, e.g. 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction falling in the arsenal of unpredictable states; the 
growing importance qualitative, as opposed to quantitative threats in international security; the decline 
in democratic countries of defence spending; the outbreak of internal conflicts, as in Yugoslavia; and 
the institutional fragmentation of European security, which marked an important step with 
establishment of the CFSP and ESDP. 
1632 Holtom, P. and Micic, I. 2012. ‘European Union Arms Export Control Outreach Activities in 
Eastern and South Eastern Europe.’ SIPRI Non-Proliferation Papers vol.14. 
1633 Levine, P. L. and Smith, R. 2000. ‘The Arms Trade Game: From Laissez-Faire to a Common 
Defence Policy.’ Oxford Economic Papers vol.52 (2). 
1634 Council of the European Union. 5 June 1998. ‘European Union Code of Conduct on Arms 
Exports.’ 
1635 Council of the European Union. 8 December 2008. ‘Council Common Position Defining Rules 
Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment.’ 
1636 Anthony, I. 1999. ‘Arms Export Controls.’ In A Future Arms Control Agenda, eds. Anthony, I. and 
Rotfeld, A. D. 
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reports on trade in arms, systems of arms export controls can help consolidating 
democratic governance in a field that usually escape peoples’ scrutiny.  
 
3.5.1.2. Gradual adoption of EU legislations in arms export controls 
 
Over the past fifteen years, Serbia and Macedonia have modified their national 
legislations so as to gradually adopt international best practices in the field of arms 
and dual-use items export controls. In Europe, one of the key instigators in this area 
has been the EU1637. Already in 1998, through its Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 
the EU endeavoured to set “high common standards” in the management of 
conventional arms1638. In 2000, it created a Community regime regulating the export 
of dual-use items1639; in 2003, it took further action to control arms brokering1640, in 
2008, it revised and upgraded its 1998 Code of conduct on arms exports through a 
new legislation deepening and widening its scope of application1641; and in 2009, it 
did the same for the export of dual-use items1642. This EU framework has participated 
in the constitution of a European armament policy which is not restricted to EU 
member states. As seen in Table 20, Serbia and Macedonia have gradually, albeit 
unevenly, aligned themselves with the EU’s legislation in this area.  
 
Table 20: Serbia and Macedonia’s alignment with EU frameworks in arms export controls 
 
EU Macedonia Serbia 
1998 Code of conduct1643 November 2004 February/March 2005*  November 2008 
2000 Council regulation (dual-use items)1644 September 2005 February / March 2005* 
2003 Common position (arms brokering)1645 June 2005 February 2005*  
2008 Common position (arms exports)1646 July 2010 no alignment 
2009 Council regulation (dual-use items)1647 End of 2010 no alignment 
* partial alignment 
                                                 
1637 This section only deals with the licit trade in conventional arms and dual-use items. It does not 
cover the specific fight against illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, which the EU, together 
with the OSCE and the UN, supports, and which Serbia and Macedonia have also incorporated in their 
domestic agenda. Nor does it cover the EU’s specific fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and terrorism and its support for legally binding international or regional arms trade treaty. 
1638 Council of the European Union. 5 June 1998. ‘European Union Code of Conduct on Arms 
Exports.’ 
1639 Council of the European Union. 22 June 2000. ‘Council Regulation Setting up a Community 
Regime for the Control of Exports of Dual-Use Items and Technology.’ 
1640 Council of the European Union. 23 June 2003. ‘Council Common Position on the Control of Arms 
Brokering.’ 
1641 Council of the European Union. 8 December 2008. ‘Council Common Position Defining Rules 
Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment.’ 
1642 Council of the European Union. 5 May 2009. ‘Council Regulation Setting up a Community Regime 
for the Control of Exports, Transfer, Brokering and Transit of Dual-Use Items.’ 
1643 Council of the European Union. 5 June 1998. ‘European Union Code of Conduct on Arms 
Exports.’ 
1644 Council of the European Union. 22 June 2000. ‘Council Regulation Setting up a Community 
Regime for the Control of Exports of Dual-Use Items and Technology.’ 
1645 Council of the European Union. 23 June 2003. ‘Council Common Position on the Control of Arms 
Brokering.’ 
1646 Council of the European Union. 8 December 2008. ‘Council Common Position Defining Rules 
Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment.’ 
1647 Council of the European Union. 5 May 2009. ‘Council Regulation Setting up a Community Regime 
for the Control of Exports, Transfer, Brokering and Transit of Dual-Use Items.’ 
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3.5.1.2.1. Adoption of the EU’s Code of conduct on arms exports 
 
Macedonia and Serbia first aligned their legislative frameworks with the EU’s 1998 
Code of conduct on arms exports (hereafter 1998 Code). The 1998 Code includes a 
list of eight criteria, which EU member states agreed on observing when they make 
decisions on authorising the export of arms and military equipment. Four of these 
criteria contain sine qua non obligations, i.e. no export licence shall be approved and 
no equipment shall be transferred if (1) the intended transfer breaches international 
obligations1648; (2) the intended recipient is known for its serious violations of human 
rights and might use the exported arms for the purpose of internal repression; (3) the 
export provokes or prolongs armed conflicts or aggravates existing tensions; and (4) 
the intended recipient might use the exported arms to attack its neighbours. The 1998 
Code further lists four criteria, which should merely be taken into account, i.e. (5) the 
individual position of friendly and allied countries towards the intended recipient; (6) 
the nature of the alliances of the intended recipient as well at its attitude towards 
terrorism; (7) the possibility that the equipment exported might be diverted within the 
intended recipient’s country or re-exported; and (8) the compatibility of the military 
technology and equipment exported with the resources made available for socio-
economic development in the intended recipient’s country.  
 
These eight criteria were devised as minimum standards in the management of 
conventional arms exports, but they are also applicable to dual-use items, “where 
there are grounds for believing that end-users […] will be armed forces or internal 
security forces”1649. In order to clearly delineate the scope of application of the 1998 
Code, a common list of military equipment (hereafter EU Military List) was 
established (supplemented by a common list for dual-use items) 1650 . Regularly 
updated by the Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM), 
the list details 22 categories of armament subject to the 1998 Code. In addition to 
establishing a criteria-based licensing regime of arms export controls and defining 
their scope of application, the EU’s 1998 Code also established consultation and 
notification mechanisms for export license denials and committed EU member states 
to transparently exchange information, in particular through the production and 
publication of annual reports.  
 
Politically binding, the 1998 Code, as well as the Military List, aimed to “reinforce 
cooperation and to promote convergence in the field of conventional arms exports”1651. 
In order to avoid the circumvention of UN, EU or OSCE embargoes on arms exports 
and limit illicit arms transfers, the Council extended the applicability of the 1998 
                                                 
1648 in particular if it breaches EU member states’ commitment to enforce UN, OSCE and EU arms 
embargoes. 
1649 Council of the European Union. 5 June 1998. ‘European Union Code of Conduct on Arms 
Exports.’ 
1650 The first EU Military List was adopted on 13 June 2000 and the first Dual-Use List was adopted on 
22 June 2000 See Council of the European Union. 13 June 2000. ‘Council Declaration Issued on the 
Occasion of the Adoption of the Common List of Military Equipment Covered by the European Union 
Code of Conduct on Arms Export.’; Council of the European Union. 22 June 2000. ‘Council 
Regulation Setting up a Community Regime for the Control of Exports of Dual-Use Items and 
Technology.’ 
1651 Council of the European Union. 5 June 1998. ‘European Union Code of Conduct on Arms 
Exports.’ 
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Code of Conduct to brokering activities, which henceforth would be subject to 
criteria-based licensing1652. In 2008, the EU’s 1998 Code was replaced by a new 
legislation deepening and widening its scope of application1653.  
 
Legally binding1654, the 2008 Common Position extended to non-physical exports the 
obligations pertaining to criteria-based licensing (e.g. to brokering activities, transit, 
transhipment and intangible transfers of technology) and insisted on vetting arms 
exports’ end-user prior to granting the license1655. It also toughened the sine qua non 
criterion banning arms export to countries violating human rights, by adding an 
explicit reference to violations of humanitarian law, increasing its indispensability and 
easing its applicability1656.  
 
Although both the EU’s 1998 Code and 2008 Common Position were designed by and 
for EU member states, they in fact contemplated broader horizons. The EU’s Code, 
for instance, foresaw that EU member states shall “use their best endeavours to 
encourage other arms exporting states to subscribe to [its] principles”1657. An indeed, 
a few years after, both Serbia and Macedonia inserted references to the 1998 Code in 
their national legislations. On 1st November 2004, the government of Macedonia 
issued a formal “decision on unilateral acceptance of the principles and criteria of the 
EU Code of conduct on arms exports”1658; in June 2005, it adhered to the Common 
Position on the control of arms brokering1659; in December 2006, it incorporated the 
EU’s Military List in its legislative body 1660 ; and in July 2010, it adopted an 
“Information on acceptance” of the EU’s 2008 Common Position”1661. Macedonia 
thus secured the formal harmonisation of its legal framework with the EU in a 
relatively short time. It did so unilaterally, by simply declaring the acceptance of the 
whole body of EU rules and practices.  
 
Serbia took a more circumvolutory path. It did not straightforwardly align itself with 
EU rules and practices, but built up its own legislation, gradually reducing the gaps 
between national and EU norms. On 17 February 2005, the Serbian Parliament passed 
a Law on foreign trade in weapons, which harmonised Serbian national list of 
                                                 
1652 Council of the European Union. 23 June 2003. ‘Council Common Position on the Control of Arms 
Brokering.’ 
1653 Council of the European Union. 8 December 2008. ‘Council Common Position Defining Rules 
Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment.’ 
1654 The 2008 Common Position is legally binding according to art. 29 TEU. However, the difference 
with the politically binding 1998’s Code is not obvious, since the ECJ has no jurisdiction over CFSP 
issues. See Michel, Q. and Tsukanova, M. July 2011. ‘The European Union Export Control Regime of 
Arms: Comment of the Legislation: Article-by-Article.’  
1655 Bromley, M. 2012. ‘The Review of the EU Common Position on Arms Exports: Prospects for 
Strenghtening Controls.’ In Non-Proliferation Papers, vol.7. 
1656 Michel, Q. and Tsukanova, M. July 2011. ‘The European Union Export Control Regime of Arms: 
Comment of the Legislation: Article-by-Article.’ 
1657 Operative provisions, art. 11. Council of the European Union. 5 June 1998. ‘European Union Code 
of Conduct on Arms Exports.’ 
1658 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. June 2006. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2005.’ 
1659 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. March 2006. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of 
the Acquis Communautaire.’; South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons. 2009. ‘Regional Report on Arms Export in 2007.’ 
1660 Republic of Macedonia. 2010. ‘Information on the National Legislation Concerning the Transfer of 
Arms, Military Equipment and Dual·Use-Goods and Technologies.’ 
1661 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. April 2010. ‘Monthly Progress Brief on the European 
Integration of the Republic of Macedonia for April 2010.’ 
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controlled goods with the EU’s Military List1662. This law also established an arms 
export control system which acknowledged the EU’s 1998 Code, while, however, 
retaining legal precedence 1663 . It covered brokering activities, without, however, 
making reference to the EU’s 2003 Common position on arms brokering or adopting 
the EU’s definition of brokering. Shortly after, on 17 March 2005, the Council of 
Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro issued a decree “incorporating the principles and 
criteria” of the EU’s 1998 Code1664. But, again, this decree was not tantamount to 
Macedonia’s unilateral full acceptance of the EU’s 1998 Code. It differed from the 
EU’s 1998 code in substantive terms, relaxing two of the sine qua non criteria posited 
by the EU1665. Serbia’s decree did not expressly ban arms exports to countries subject 
to EU sanctions, e.g. EU arms embargoes (criterion 1) and it introduced an exception 
to export limitations for humanitarian reasons, when “internal measures [are] 
undertaken for the purpose of fighting terrorism or other forms of criminal activities” 
(criterion 2)1666. In order to further its alignment, the government of Serbia eventually 
adopted on 20 November 2008 a “decision on accepting the criteria from the EU Code 
of conduct on arms export”1667. But in the meantime, the Council was finalising its 
2008 Common Position, toughening the wording of its second criteria (on human 
rights), i.e. the criteria which Serbia at first relaxed in 2005, when it partly aligned 
with the EU’s 1998 Code. This toughening of the EU’s concerns for human rights did 
not allow Serbia to align itself straightforwardly with the EU’s new legislation. In 
2012, it still did not count among thirds countries that “have officially aligned 
themselves with the criteria and principles of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP”1668 
or have adopted the EU’s approach to control arms brokering activities.  
 
3.5.1.2.2. Adoption of the EU’s legislation setting up a Community regime for the 
control of exports of dual-use items 
 
Because they are no military equipment per se but yet, can be used for both civil and 
military purposes, dual-use items are subject to a particular regime in the EU. 
Established in 20001669 , replaced in 20091670  and recurrently amended, the EU’s 
Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items provides that no such 
item shall leave the EU customs territory without an export authorisation. In order to 
define the scope of application of the Community regime, the Council devised a 
                                                 
1662 Art. 3 Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro. 17 February 2005. ‘Law on Foreign Trade in 
Weaponry, Military Equipment and Dual-Use Goods.’ 
1663 Art. 21(3), Ibid. 
1664 The decree on criteria for issuing licenses for the export of weapons, military equipment and dual-
use goods (Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro, no.7/2005), cit. in Government of the Republic 
of Serbia. October 2008. ‘National Programme for Integration with the European Union.’ 
1665 The decree also adds new factors to take into account, e.g. the protection of domestic armed forces 
(criterion 5) and the political relations between the trading partners.  
1666 Council of Ministers of the State Union of Serbia and Macedonia. 17 March 2005. ‘Decree on 
Criteria for Issuing Licenses for the Export of Weapons, Military Equipment and Dual-Use Goods.’ 
1667 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons. 2011b. ‘Regional Report on Arms Export in 2009.’ p. 71. 
1668 These countries are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro 
and Norway. See Council of the European Union. 14 December 2012. ‘Fourteenth Annual Report 
According to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.’ p. 1. 
1669 Council of the European Union. 22 June 2000. ‘Council Regulation Setting up a Community 
Regime for the Control of Exports of Dual-Use Items and Technology.’ 
1670 Council of the European Union. 5 May 2009. ‘Council Regulation Setting up a Community Regime 
for the Control of Exports, Transfer, Brokering and Transit of Dual-Use Items.’ 
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regularly updated, non-exhaustive list of dual-use items subject to export 
authorisation (the so-called Dual-Use List). The member states kept their prerogatives 
on decisions to issue such authorisations, but the EU introduced certain requirements 
and conditions in order to establish a minimum standard in the management of export 
controls and to foster convergence. For instance, a member state cannot grant an 
export authorisation without having clarifying who the end-user is; it shall ascertain 
that the intended export does not violate international obligations, and more generally, 
must give consideration to the eight criteria set up in the EU’s 1998 Code and 2008 
Common Position on arms control1671.  
 
Again, Macedonia swiftly adopted the EU’s acquis in dual-use items export controls. 
The National Assembly passed a law in September 20051672 , which harmonised 
Macedonian legislations with the 2000 Council regulation and its amendments1673. 
The law established a Commission to oversee the implementation of dual-use export 
controls1674, and tasked the government to adopt the EU’s Dual-Use List1675. This was 
done by December 2005. The List in use is a verbatim translation of the EU’s Dual-
Use List1676. In subsequent years, Macedonia kept updating its legislation so as to 
entirely transpose the modifications introduced in the EU’s Community regime and 
Dual-Use List1677. By the end of 2010, it transposed the 2009 Council regulation 
replacing and upgrading the EU’s Common regime for the control of dual-use items 
exports1678. Macedonia faced some implementation problems at first, due to limited 
administrative capacities1679, insufficient inter-agency coordination and a persistent 
lack of transparency in the area1680, but capacity-building in the field have eventually 
removed these flaws from Macedonia’s agenda1681.  
                                                 
1671 Art. 8c and 12c of respectively Council of the European Union. 22 June 2000. ‘Council Regulation 
Setting up a Community Regime for the Control of Exports of Dual-Use Items and Technology.’; 
Council of the European Union. 5 May 2009. ‘Council Regulation Setting up a Community Regime for 
the Control of Exports, Transfer, Brokering and Transit of Dual-Use Items.’ 
1672 Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia. 19 September 2005. ‘Law for Controlling Export of 
Goods and Technologies with Dual Use.’ 
1673 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. May 2007. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2006.’ 
1674 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. April 2007. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of 
the Acquis Communautaire.’ p. 309. 
1675 Art. 5 Saferworld. October 2007a. ‘Measuring Up? Arms Transfer Controls in Fyr Macedonia.’ p. 
11. 
1676 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons. 2006. ‘Analysis of National Legislation on Arms Exports and Transfers in the Western 
Balkans.’ p. 56. 
1677 European Commission. 10 October 2012a. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2012 
Progress Report.’ 
1678 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. 28 December 2010. ‘Национална Програма За 
Усвојување На Правото На Европската Унија.’ p. 378. 
1679 European Commission. 14 October 2009b. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2009 
Progress Report.’ 
1680 Just as for arms export controls, Macedonia used to operate three different systems of controls of 
dual-use items export, each guided by its own set of rules and managed by its own ministry (MoD, MoI 
and MoE in cooperation with the MFA). The domestic transposition of the EU’s regime for dual-use 
items export controls implied an administrative re-organisation of the control system, an operative 
emphasis on inter-agency coordination and more transparency in the flow of information (e.g. through 
standardisation). See South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons. 2006. ‘Analysis of National Legislation on Arms Exports and Transfers in the 
Western Balkans.’ p. 55. 
1681 European Commission. 10 October 2012a. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2012 
Progress Report.’ 
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Serbia’s legal framework for the control of dual-use items exports, being the same as 
for arms exports, only transposed parts of the EU’s acquis. Adopted respectively in 
February and March 2005, the Law on foreign trade in weapons, military equipment 
and dual-Use goods and the Decree on criteria for issuing licenses for the export of 
weapons, military equipment and dual-use goods designate dual-use items as 
controlled goods1682, and make their export subject to criteria-based authorisation. But 
in the absence of direct reference to the 2000 Council regulation setting up the 
Community regime, some important flaws and legal discrepancies remained 
unaddressed1683. Unlike Macedonia, Serbia did not rush to try to solve these issues. It 
did not adopt the EU’s Dual-Use List before 20101684, but established instead in 2008 
a Special Working Group tasked with the identification of dual-use goods 1685 . 
Macedonia had also established such a body in 2005, but since it had adopted the 
EU’s Dual-Use List, its Commission rather dealt with implementation issues. Until 
the adoption of the EU’s Dual-Use List in 2010, Serbia’s Special Working Group, by 
contrast, redundantly parallelled, rather than followed-up, the work of COARM. For 
want of the necessary capacities (especially experts), Serbia fell short of developing 
its control regime1686. In 2010, it then adopted the EU’s Dual-Use List and eventually 
envisioned the alignment of its legal framework with the 2000 Council regulation 
(although the Community regime is now ruled by the 2009 Council regulation)1687. 
But the permanence of shortages in Serbia’s administrative capacities, the lack of 
properly trained staff still undermines the country’s implementation of its (albeit 
harmonised) control regime1688.  
 
3.5.1.3. Participation in international arms embargoes 
 
One of the purposes of cooperative systems of arms export controls is the effective 
enforcement of arms embargoes, an important instrument of states’ national foreign 
policies. By prohibiting the transfer of arms and related equipment to specific 
countries, and possibly extending the prohibition to dual-use items exports and 
brokering activities, states can signal their disapproval collectively in order to coerce 
other states to change their behaviour. They can help constraining the flow of military 
equipment to conflict areas and hinder escalation. Or they can help limiting the 
resources available for the purpose of internal repression. Arms embargoes can, in 
other words, both be used against those regimes which jeopardise international or 
regional security, or against governments importing arms to commit serious violations 
of human rights. Arms embargoes usually target state actors, but in some cases, they 
may also apply to non-state actors (e.g. Al Qaeda); they can be used alone, or be 
                                                 
1682 Art. 3 Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro. 17 February 2005. ‘Law on Foreign Trade in 
Weaponry, Military Equipment and Dual-Use Goods.’ 
1683 For instance, the Serbian 2005 legislation was weak on transposing “catch-all” clauses, i.e. 
procedures to place dual-use goods not listed in the Dual-Use List under the export control regime. See 
Saferworld. October 2007b. ‘Measuring Up? Arms Transfer Controls in Serbia.’ 
1684 Republic of Serbia. 2010. ‘Annual Report on the Transfers of Controlled Goods in 2010.’ 
1685 Government of the Republic of Serbia. December 2009. ‘National Programme for Integration with 
the European Union.’ 
1686 Government of the Republic of Serbia. October 2008. ‘National Programme for Integration with 
the European Union.’ p. 818. 
1687 Government of the Republic of Serbia. December 2009. ‘National Programme for Integration with 
the European Union.’ 
1688 European Commission. 10 October 2012b. ‘Serbia 2012 Progress Report.’ 
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combined with other sanctions, e.g. restrictions on admission (visa or travel ban) and 
economic and financial sanctions (e.g. embargo on diamonds imports, freezing of 
accounts). Arms embargoes are usually imposed by the United Nations, based on a 
resolution of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII, but not only. In 1992, for 
instance, the OSCE imposed an embargo on arms deliveries to forces engaged in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Azerbaijan/Armenia)1689.  
 
In recent years, the EU also imposed an increasing number of sanctions, whether on 
an autonomous basis or in response to UNSC resolutions 1690 . Despite this and 
paradoxically, its member states remained meanwhile the third largest arms exporter 
worldwide, just behind the US and Russia1691. These sanctions were decided in the 
framework of the CFSP, usually through the adoption of a Common position1692. In 
order to ascertain a consistent imposition of its sanctions, the Council drafted in 2003 
a set of guidelines applying to restrictive measures in general and arms embargoes in 
particular1693 . Updated in 20051694 , the document provides technical guidance. It 
defines sanctions, states their objective, lists the possible exemptions and reviews 
specific issues related to competences and jurisdictions. Another document, adopted 
in 2004, provides a policy framework for the use of EU sanctions1695. These two sets 
of documents institutionalise the EU’s sanctions policy, and have direct implications 
in terms of arms export controls. The EU’s 1998 Code of conduct, after all, provides 
that no arms export license shall be issued (bar limited exceptions), if the country of 
destination is targeted by UN, OSCE or EU mandated arms embargoes. The same 
applies to dual-use items and brokering activities. The spectrum of the items, the 
transfer of which is prohibited, depends on the scope of the restrictive measure 
imposed by the EU. Imposed on “arms, munitions and military equipment”, the 
embargo is considered of “full scope”; no item on listed on the EU’s Military List 
may be exported and special authorisations are required for dual-use items. Imposed 
on “arms and munitions”, it is considered as less than full scope, and it is then only 
applicable to specific items of the EU’s control list1696. Though decided at the EU 
level, the enforcement of these sanctions falls under the competence of EU member 
states.  
 
                                                 
1689 The OSCE arms embargo received the support of the UN Security Council, but unlike many other 
embargoes, it is not binding under the UN Charter.  
1690 In addition to implementing UN-mandated arms embargoes, the EU thus imposed between 1998 
and 2012 30 embargoes on arms in its autonomous capacity. 19 of them are still in force (e.g. on China, 
Belarus, Burma and Syria). See SIPRI. 'Arms Embargoes Database'. [accessed 26.03.2013]. 
1691 Together, the member states of the EU accounted in 2011 for one fourth of world’s arms exports, 
just behind Russia (28%) and the US (31%). The EU’s largest arms exporters are France, Germany and 
the UK. See SIPRI. 'Sipri Arms Transfers Database'. [accessed 27.8.2013]. 
1692 The legal basis depends of the nature of the sanctions and the targets covered by them. Restrictive 
measures are usually based on art. 215 TFEU (ex 301 TEC). But since arms and military equipment are 
excluded from the scope of application of the EU’s commercial policy, a different legal basis applies, 
which places embargoes on arms under the responsibility of EU member states. Arms embargoes are 
therefore implemented by EU member states, pursuant art. 296 of the TEU.  
1693 Council of the European Union. 2 December 2005b. ‘Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation 
of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security 
Policy ’. 
1694 Ibid. 
1695 Council of the European Union. 2 December 2005a. ‘Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive 
Measures (Sanctions) ’. 
1696 Anthony, I. 2002. ‘Sanctions Applied by the European Union and the United Nations.’ In Sipri 
Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, ed. SIPRI. p. 212. 
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The EU’s decisions to enforce arms embargoes concern mostly EU member states, 
but not only. Since December 2003, Macedonia, upon invitation of the Council, 
readily joins the EU’s common positions imposing sanctions, including on arms 
transfers. In 2004, for instance, it aligned itself with the EU’s embargo on arms, 
ammunition and military equipment against Sudan1697. Decisions on alignment were 
at first taken on an ad hoc basis by the Macedonian government. The competent 
ministries were responsible for applying the government’s decision, but they did not 
rely on specific guidelines, e.g. for their assessment of the risks associated with the 
proposed exports or for the proper coordination of their action1698. The control lists 
they had at their disposal in order to conform to the EU’s common positions were not 
the same as the EU’s Lists (until 2007 for military items and 2010 for dual-use items). 
The result, then, was an unequal, sometimes even incoherent, enforcement of the 
EU’s common positions. The lack of administrative resources and the incapacity to 
coordinate restrictive measures worsened Macedonia’s record, even though this pitfall 
was not fundamentally problematic considering the negligibility of Macedonia’s arms 
exports.  
 
In August 2004, the Macedonian government therefore decided to strengthen the 
coordinative role of the MFA. It was tasked with the elaboration of draft decisions, 
taking into account the competences of the respective ministries1699 . In order to 
consolidate the legal basis underlying the transposition of EU common positions, the 
MFA initiated in 2005 a procedure for drafting a Law on international restrictive 
measures. The draft law, submitted to Brussels for comment1700, defined international 
restrictive measures, provided the procedures for their implementation, delineated the 
competences of each agency, explained the way they should coordinate their actions, 
laid down monitoring mechanisms and detailed how data should be collected and 
exchanged1701. The law, adopted in March 2007 was to apply to all sanctions passed 
by UN under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (legally binding), to “legal acts of the 
European Union”, whether autonomous or not, and to legal acts passed by other 
international organisations, of which Macedonia is a member (e.g. the OSCE)1702. It 
increased the inter-agency coordination of arms export controls, improved the 
capacity of the competent authorities to identify and collectively acting on concerns, 
and as a matter of fact, rightly transposed the EU’s acquis in the area. Following the 
adoption of the law, one person was designated in the MFA’s Unit for CFSP to 
monitor the implementation of restrictive measures 1703 . In 2010, a body was 
additionally set up to specifically address cross-agency coordination issues and help 
                                                 
1697 Republic of Macedonia. 2005. ‘Answers of the Republic of Macedonia to the EU Questionnaire 
Delivered by the European Commission.’ 
1698 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons. 2006. ‘Analysis of National Legislation on Arms Exports and Transfers in the Western 
Balkans.’ 
1699 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. June 2006. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2005.’ 
1700 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons. 2006. ‘Analysis of National Legislation on Arms Exports and Transfers in the Western 
Balkans.’ p. 58. 
1701 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. May 2007. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2006.’ 
1702 Art. 2, Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia. 2007. ‘Law on International Restrictive Measures.’ 
1703 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. March 2008. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of 
the Acquis Communautaire.’ 
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monitoring the implementation of restrictive measures1704. A decision was also taken 
to establish, within the MFA, a Register collecting the government’s decisions on the 
introduction of international restrictive measures. After ten years of reforms, 
Macedonia’s record in this area has come close to the best practices promoted by the 
EU. Its administrative capacities have been strengthened, its legislative framework 
has been adjusted and the EU’s common positions are now systematically 
implemented by national authorities. The remaining weaknesses concern the 
coordination of their action and the application of restrictive measures to brokering 
activities. But considering the small amount of arms transferred annually by 
Macedonia, these weaknesses are not essential to the effective enforcement of 
collective sanctions.  
 
Serbia, on the other side, has not introduced any specific legislation relating to the 
implementation of restrictive measures. In the absence of specific legislation, the 
government has upheld a relatively free hand in the conduct of its arms transfer policy 
with states otherwise targeted by international sanctions. Until recently, Serbia’s 
participation in international sanctions against third countries was subject to the sole 
appreciation of the MFA, which was responsible for gathering information, and the 
government, which took the decision on an ad hoc basis. These decisions expectedly 
took into account the importance of the armament industry in Serbia, Belgrade’s 
relationship with Russia and some of its most disputed allies, as well as Serbia’s 
participation in the non-aligned movement. Only in 2005 did Serbia establish an 
obligation to control its arms exports so as to enforce international restrictive 
measures1705. But the obligation, reportedly, did not apply to EU arms embargoes –
only to restrictive measures imposed by the UN or recommended by the OSCE –and 
not without exceptions to the rule. For instance, in 2007, the Serbian government 
authorised the export of SALW to Armenia1706, despite the recommendation of the 
MFA, which pointed at the OSCE embargo on the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and 
notwithstanding the 2005 decree obliging the government to respect its international 
commitments.  
 
Although Serbia’s legislation does not specifically applies to sanctions adopted 
autonomously by the EU (i.e. without mandate of the UN Security Council), Serbia’s 
state authorities reportedly take into account the EU’s restrictive measures in their 
policy process. According to an MFA official, Serbia observes most of the EU’s 
common positions1707; yet  
 
                                                 
1704 It consists of representatives of the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Finance. Government of the Republic of 
Macedonia. 2012. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis Communautaire.’ 
1705 Criterion One, Council of Ministers of the State Union of Serbia and Macedonia. 17 March 2005. 
‘Decree on Criteria for Issuing Licenses for the Export of Weapons, Military Equipment and Dual-Use 
Goods.’ 
1706 The export was US$ 2.55 million worth. See Saferworld. October 2007b. ‘Measuring Up? Arms 
Transfer Controls in Serbia.’ 
1707 Interview with an Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Directorate 
General for the European Union. Belgrade, 12/09/2011 
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“no precise evidence exists concerning the number of restrictive measures 
introduced by the European Union, which the Republic of Serbia has 
implemented”.1708 
 
In some cases, Serbia was found being exporting arms to countries upon which the 
EU had autonomously imposed an embargo for human rights reasons. Until 2007, the 
military in Rangoon was one of Serbia’s main buyers of arms and military 
equipment 1709 , despite an EU common position prohibiting arms transfers to 
Myanmar1710. Serbia had yet adopted the 2005 EU-inspired decree positing human 
rights as one of the criteria that shall guide arms exports. But the government did not 
align itself with the EU on that matter and refused to terminate the licenses issued 
prior to the decree. It only applied tougher restrictions on arms transfers to the license 
proposals submitted after the 2005 decree1711. In 2007, Serbia also exported a few 
machineguns to the Democratic Republic of Congo 1712 , despite the EU’s arms 
embargo1713, and it exported military equipment in 2009 to Vietnam through China1714, 
which is also under EU embargo1715.  
 
In 2005, the MFA nonetheless initiated a revision of Serbian legislation in the area. 
The plan was to draft a Law on international restrictive measures adopting “the 
standards and practices of the European Union and reinforcing transparency 
measures”, based on “the experiences of those countries which have already adopted 
this Law [e.g. Macedonia in 2007], and in accordance with the EU’s [2004] Basic 
Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures”1716. This project, however, did not 
materialise. In 2012, there was still no specific legislation regulating on restrictive 
measures, no rules prescribing the alignment with EU common positions in case of 
arms embargoes, no administrative structures specifically dedicated to the 
implementation of international sanctions, and a lack of inter-agency coordination in 
the enforcement of current restrictions1717.  
 
3.5.1.4. More transparent reporting in arms export 
 
Arms have long been traded under the veil of secrecy. In order to ensure the effective 
implementation of controlling measures, avoid the circumvention of restrictions, 
                                                 
1708 Republic of Serbia. 2011. ‘Answers of the Republic of Serbia to the EU Questionnaire Delivered 
by the European Commission.’ 
1709 It was the second country of destination in terms of arms licenses and the first partner in terms of 
actual transfers, with actual exports worth US$ 13.3 million. Republic of Serbia. 2009. ‘Annual Report 
on the Realization of Foreign Trade Transfers of Controlled Goods for 2007.’ 
1710 Council of the European Union. 28 October 1996. ‘Common Position Defined by the Council on 
the Basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, on Burma/Myanmar ’. 
1711 Saferworld. October 2007b. ‘Measuring Up? Arms Transfer Controls in Serbia.’ 
1712 Republic of Serbia. 2009. ‘Annual Report on the Realization of Foreign Trade Transfers of 
Controlled Goods for 2007.’ 
1713 Council of the European Union. 21 October 2002. ‘Common Position on the Supply of Certain 
Equipment into the Democratic Republic of Congo.’ 
1714 Republic of Serbia. June 2011. ‘Annual Report on the Transfers of Controlled Goods in 2009.’ 
1715 European Council. 27 June 1989. ‘Council of Ministers Declaration on China.’ 
1716 Republic of Serbia. 2011. ‘Answers of the Republic of Serbia to the EU Questionnaire Delivered 
by the European Commission.’ 
1717 European Commission. 12 October 2011a. ‘Analytical Report for the Opinion on Serbia's 
Application for Membership of the European Union.’; European Commission. 10 October 2012b. 
‘Serbia 2012 Progress Report.’ 
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consolidate cooperative approaches at the international level and guarantee some form 
of accountability, a minimum of transparency is required. Without transparency, 
governments are given a free hand in arms trade –they may secretively export arms 
regardless of their end-users’ intentions; violate international obligations without 
other governments’ knowing; and they may surreptitiously flout the promises they 
made to their electorate without risking political sanctions. The same goes for dual-
use items, which can be used, for instance, to engineer weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). National parliaments and NGOs have therefore been the first, in Europe, to 
call governments to produce reports on arms exports and demand greater oversight in 
the field, with some remarkable success already in the 1980s1718. Their call gradually 
gained ground in the EU, because no control arms regime can be effective without the 
exchange of data on controls among the participant to the regime.  
 
That is why the 1998 Code of conduct on arms export created specific obligations for 
EU member states to collect, exchange and report information on arms exports1719. 
This obligation was extended to the export of dual-use items in 20001720 and arms 
brokering activities in 20031721. It was designed to ensure peer-pressure and dissuade 
EU governments from accepting contracts, for which, for instance, the license had 
been denied by another member state. Many member states of the EU started to issue 
their first national reports on arms export controls in the end of the 1990s. Most of 
these national reports were made publicly accessible, but the amount and quality of 
their data were very variable, and generally lower than in those reports produced in 
non-EU Europe1722. Parts of the data were soon compiled into an annually published 
EU arms report, in accordance with the EU’s prescriptions negotiated in the COARM. 
The scope of these prescriptions evolved with the EU’s legal framework1723.  
 
Initially intended to be confidential, the EU’s annual arms report became public 
“following pressure from the European Parliament, non-governmental organizations 
and the 1999 Finnish Presidency” 1724 . These EU arms reports now include 
information about the quantity and financial value of both arms export licenses and 
actual arms exports, about arms export denials, and brokering licences1725. Data on 
arms export licenses give indication of compliance with national arms export criteria. 
They enable to know whether a government has authorised the export of a particular 
arms to a particular country. Data on actual arms exports inform other states on the 
evolution of third states’ stockpiling of weaponry, and help them pre-empting 
destabilising effects by adapting their own arms export policy. Data on arms export 
denials inform other states on the inappropriateness of a particular transaction in the 
                                                 
1718 For instance, Sweden was the first European countries to publish a report on its arms export in 1984. 
Italy is also legally bound, since 1990, to submit an annual report to the Parliament. See Weber, H. and 
Bromley, M. March 2011. ‘National Reports on Arms Exports.’ In SIPRI Fact Sheet. 
1719 Operative provision, point 8, Council of the European Union. 5 June 1998. ‘European Union Code 
of Conduct on Arms Exports.’ 
1720 Art. 15, Council of the European Union. 22 June 2000. ‘Council Regulation Setting up a 
Community Regime for the Control of Exports of Dual-Use Items and Technology.’ 
1721 Art. 5, Council of the European Union. 23 June 2003. ‘Council Common Position on the Control of 
Arms Brokering.’ 
1722 Weber, H. and Bromley, M. March 2011. ‘National Reports on Arms Exports.’ In SIPRI Fact Sheet. 
1723 Data on arms brokering activities, for instance, were included in the EU arms reports following the 
2008 common position.  
1724 Bromley, M. 2012. ‘The Review of the EU Common Position on Arms Exports: Prospects for 
Strenghtening Controls.’ In Non-Proliferation Papers, vol.7. 
1725 Weber, H. and Bromley, M. March 2011. ‘National Reports on Arms Exports.’ In SIPRI Fact Sheet. 
 309
light of the criteria previously agreed upon. It hinders the circumvention of collective 
restrictions through door-to-door sourcing, and informs other states on the criterion of 
which the transaction fell short. Data on arms brokering, finally, give indication on 
the deals concluded by operators as intermediary, and help implementing arms 
embargoes. In order to ascertain a common and more specific understanding of the 
information reported, the EU obligation provides that these four types of data should 
be disaggregated in the 22 categories of the EU Military List, and also presented by 
intended destination. In order to preserve the anonymity of the buyers, arms reports 
often fail to present disaggregated data. These data are essential to give indication 
enabling informed decision and allow real scrutiny.  
 
This practice of transparent reporting on arms export controls has been adopted by 
Macedonia and Serbia shortly after their respective alignment with the EU’s 1998 
Code on arms export, i.e. in 2004 and 2005. Before that, arms export controls were a 
matter lying in the hands of the government and military and no data were released. 
The EU’s 1998 Code marked a watershed in this respect. Macedonia’s unilateral 
alignment in 2004 and Serbia’s new Law on foreign trade in weapons in 2005 brought 
the two countries closer to the EU’s practice. On paper, Macedonia’s alignment 
implied that it should provide the same type of data as EU member states, so that 
other EU governments may scrutinise Macedonia’s commitment. In practice, it 
implied the transmission and publication of these data. Serbia had more latitude in this 
respect, since it did not formally align itself with the 1998 Code. Its reporting policy 
was determined by the 2005 Law on foreign trade in weapons and dual-use items. On 
paper, the government was obliged to produce and adopt an annual report providing 
information on issued, denied and revoked licenses, and to inform the Parliament1726. 
In practice, however, despite less stringent commitments, Serbia proved much more 
amenable to publish information on its arms exports than Macedonia. The difference 
can be felt in both in the quantity and quality of information published. 
 
In June 2006, Macedonia published its first report1727 (covering 2005), followed in 
May 2007 by a second report 1728  covering the 2006 period. These publications 
constituted an important step forwards, but the initiative suddenly came to an end1729. 
No national arms report has been published ever since –which raises questions on the 
government’s will to assert its accountability in that field1730. Of course, Macedonia is 
no large exporter. In 2005 and 2006 its arms transfers boiled down to a few rifles, 
ammunitions and mortars exported to Bulgaria, the US, Serbia Montenegro, Israel, 
                                                 
1726 Art. 28(3), Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro. 17 February 2005. ‘Law on Foreign Trade in 
Weaponry, Military Equipment and Dual-Use Goods.’ 
1727 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. June 2006. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2005.’ 
1728 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. May 2007. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2006.’ 
1729 Official data on Macedonia’s arms exports can still be found (up to 2010) through the EU-
supported South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SEESAC), but they only present the number and value of licenses issued, broken down by 
country of destination and when applicable items according to the EU’s Military List. They do not 
include information on actual exports, brokering activities, and essentially, denials. See for instance, for 
2009, South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons. 2011b. ‘Regional Report on Arms Export in 2009.’  
1730 According to Macedonia’s government, a third national arms report has been elaborated and 
communicated to the European Commission and Council of the EU. This information could not be 
verified, and no information leaked to support it. Even if such a third report exists, it has not been made 
public, which indeed casts doubt on the government’s accountability. See Government of the Republic 
of Serbia. December 2009. ‘National Programme for Integration with the European Union.’ 
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Albania and a few others; a dozen of arms transiting from or to Greece; and one dual-
use item dispatched to Lithuania in 20051731. But the negligibility of these transactions 
does not justify the fact that Macedonia, despite its initial commitment, has ceased to 
publish its annual arms reports.  
 
Serbia, on the other side, published its first report in November 2007 (covering the 
2005-2006 period1732), and then, it issued four other annual reports covering the 2007-
2010 period. Although the reports are published with a considerable time-lag (the last 
report, covering 2010, was published in July 2012), it is much easier to keep track of 
Serbia’s arms export’s policy than Macedonia. Of course, Serbia’s arms exports are 
by no means comparable to Macedonia’s. Serbia has inherited Yugoslavia’s industrial 
capacities and it is well integrated in the global arms market. In the past few years, 
Serbia issued more than 350 arms and dual-use items export licenses per year for a 
value of around 800 million dollar in 2010 alone1733. The size of the exports certainly 
justifies the need for more accountability in the sector.  
 
Serbia and Macedonia also communicated different types of information in their 
reports. In its 2005 and 2006 reports, Macedonia published information on the number 
of licenses issued for arms export and on actual exports (including transit), but it did 
not give their financial valuation and did not categorise the data according to EU (or 
Macedonia’s) Military List. More importantly, the reports contained no information at 
all on export denials and brokering activities (but they included detailed information 
on dual-use items transfers). Serbia’s arms reports, by contrast contained all these 
missing information from 2005 to 2010. For instance, in 2009, Serbia rejected 6 
applications for arms export licenses, for a total amount of 18 million dollar. One of 
the applications concerned 50.000 M92 sub-machine guns (belonging to the 1st 
category of the EU’s Military List), priced 13,3 million dollar. The applicant and end-
user was the Libyan military, and the denial was grounded on “incomplete 
documentation” (e.g. lack of end-user certificate)1734. Meanwhile, no EU member 
state published so detailed information on denials1735. Serbia’s arms reports also 
include some basic aggregated information on brokering activities (since 2007), as 
well as extensive information on dual-use items transfers. All in all, it is remarkable 
that, despite its lack of legal approximation with the EU’s CFSP acquis in arms export 
controls, Serbia demonstrates a more transparent approach to reporting than 
Macedonia: it keeps publishing arms reports since 2007.  
 
3.5.2.  Inferring Europeanisation 
 
Trade in arms has always been closely associated with states’ prerogatives for 
national security. That is why governments, wary of losing ground, have often 
welcomed cooperative approaches to arms export controls with great caution. They 
feared that international obligations in this field would constrain the pursuit of their 
                                                 
1731 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. June 2006. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2005.’; 
Government of the Republic of Macedonia. May 2007. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2006.’ 
1732 Republic of Serbia. 2007. ‘Annual Report on the Realization of Foreign Trade Transfers of 
Controlled Goods for 2005 and 2006.’ 
1733 Republic of Serbia. 2012. ‘Annual Report on the Transfers of Controlled Goods in 2010.’ 
1734 Republic of Serbia. June 2011. ‘Annual Report on the Transfers of Controlled Goods in 2009.’ 
1735 Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania and Spain published extensive information on 
denials, but they did not specify the end-user or the reason for denial. See Weber, H. and Bromley, M. 
March 2011. ‘National Reports on Arms Exports.’ In SIPRI Fact Sheet. p. 5. 
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arms export policy and be a hindrance to the use of one of their most cherished 
foreign policy instruments. This is not to say that no norm at all ever emerged at the 
international level in this area.  
 
3.5.2.1. The EU outreach framework 
 
At first fully exempted from the scope of application of the European treaties1736, 
arms export controls entered the EU’s CFSP acquis in the end of the 1990s. The rules 
introduced by the EU were designed by and for EU member states, but not only. On 
paper, the 1998 Code provided that  
 
“the Member States will use their best endeavours to encourage other arms 
exporting states to subscribe to the principles of the Code of Conduct”.1737 
 
But in practice, they demonstrated little interest in diffusing EU best practices. In the 
early 2000s, the COARM barely discussed this issue in its meetings, and only a few 
seminars were funded by the EU in order to promote the adoption of EU legislations 
in non-EU Europe1738. The interest for associating non-EU states only grew in the mid 
2000s. A comparison between the 1998 Code and 2008 Common illustrates this shift. 
Whereas the former only stated an objective, the latter additionally substantiated how 
EU member states shall promote EU best practices in arms export controls:  
 
“Member States shall use their best endeavours to encourage other States 
which export military technology or equipment to apply the criteria of this 
Common Position. They shall regularly exchange experiences with those 
third states applying the criteria on their military technology and equipment 
export control policies and on the application of the criteria”.1739 
 
In order to foster this exchange of experience, the EU initiated different types of 
activities. It first continued (and intensified) the outreach activities it had previously 
launched to inform other states on EU practices, principles and standards in arms 
export controls, e.g. through the organisation of seminars or workshops raising 
awareness1740. Second, it deepened its engagement by creating an institutionalised 
framework within which the EU would help third countries implementing particular 
practices or attaining EU standards. For that purpose, the EU adopted in 2008 a joint 
action1741, replaced in 20091742, indicating different ways of assisting third countries, 
e.g. by helping them drafting and implementing legislation, training their staff, and 
                                                 
1736 Art. 223.b., Treaty of Rome. 25 March 1957. 
1737 Art. 11., operative provisions, Council of the European Union. 5 June 1998. ‘European Union Code 
of Conduct on Arms Exports.’ 
1738 Holtom, P. and Micic, I. 2012. ‘European Union Arms Export Control Outreach Activities in 
Eastern and South Eastern Europe.’ SIPRI Non-Proliferation Papers vol.14. 
1739 Art. 11., Council of the European Union. 8 December 2008. ‘Council Common Position Defining 
Rules Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment.’ 
1740 Holtom, P. and Micic, I. 2012. ‘European Union Arms Export Control Outreach Activities in 
Eastern and South Eastern Europe.’ SIPRI Non-Proliferation Papers vol.14. p. 2. 
1741 Council of the European Union. 17 March 2008. ‘Council Joint Action on Support for EU 
Activities in Order to Promote the Control of Arms Exports and the Principles and Criteria of the EU 
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports among Third Countries.’ 
1742 Council of the European Union. 22 December 2009. ‘Council Decision on Support for EU 
Activities in Order to Promote the Control of Arms Exports and the Principles and Criteria of Common 
Position 2008/944/CFSP among Third Countries.’ 
 312
elaborating national reports on arms exports. The German Federal Office of Economic 
and Export Control (BAFA) was designated in 2009 as the body responsible for the 
technical implementation of the assistance projects. More recently, the EU finally 
sought created room for a more active participation from third countries by 
associating them to its arms export control system. In 2011, it launched the idea of an 
information exchange mechanism that would allow EU member states and third 
countries aligning with EU common positions (e.g. on arms embargoes) to exchange 
relevant information on arms export controls1743. In 2012, the EU, thus allowed Serbia 
to participate in its political dialogue on arms export controls1744.  
 
These instruments (outreach, assistance and association) are all designed with the 
purpose of promoting the criteria and principles of the EU’s arms export controls 
policy among third countries. But to what extent can we consider that these criteria 
and principles are genuinely EU criteria and principles? These have not been created 
ex nihilo by the EU. They emerged in an international and regional context, in which 
the idea of controlling arms exports had already taken root; i.e. in a context in which 
there were already existing schemes of inter-governmental cooperation and in which 
states, like Serbia and Macedonia, and international actors, like the EU were already 
jointly partaking. It would be misleading, therefore, to assume that these EU norms, 
which Serbia and Macedonia have adopted at different degrees, have been created, 
genuinely, “by the EU”. They are the focal reflection of international and regional 
norms too. What bears the genuine mark of the “EU”, then, is not so much the 
normative substance of the messages diffused by the EU. It is the EU’s emphasis on 
their observance, which amplifies and enhances the transformative potential of 
international and regional signals and fosters their diffusion.  
 
3.5.2.2. EU norms vs. international treaty obligations 
 
Arms export controls remain a policy field where international cooperation is 
indispensable, but international norms are rare. There is, as a matter of fact, a 
multitude of arms export policies worldwide –some being restrictive and transparent, 
others being lax and secretive. But there is no international principle of law 
demanding the harmonisation of states’ criteria-based regimes, and no international 
treaty setting international standards of transparency in arms export policy. There are 
yet a few international obligations and regional initiatives informing both the EU and 
Serbia and Macedonia’s arms export policies.  
 
There is first an obligation stemming from the Charter of the United Nations, which 
stipulates that 
 
“all Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it 
takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving 
                                                 
1743 Council of the European Union. 30 December 2011. ‘Thirteen Annual Report According to Article 
8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.’ 
1744 These meetings enable the exchange of information on export policies to specific destinations, 
compliance and control issues. Before 2009, they were known as COARM-Troika meetings. The EU 
holds political dialogue meetings only with Norway, Russia, Ukraine, Canada and the US, and since 
2012 Serbia. Council of the European Union. 14 December 2012. ‘Fourteenth Annual Report 
According to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.’ 
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assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive 
or enforcement action”.1745 
 
This obligation first implies that EU member states, as well as Serbia and Macedonia, 
shall be capable of controlling their arms exports. Otherwise they would not be able to 
“refrain from giving assistance” to states against which the UN enforces an arms 
embargo. The second aspect of this obligation is more explicit. It commits UN 
member states to support UN actions, including, more specifically, when the UN 
decrees sanctions (e.g. arms embargoes). This UN obligation has been expressly 
adopted by the EU as sine qua non criterion for delivering arms export licences1746. 
But it is not per se an EU norm. Serbia and Macedonia, qua UN member states, were 
already bound to respect this obligation under the UN Charter. The EU’s 1998 Code 
and third countries’ alignment with it, therefore, did not bring anything substantively 
new in this respect. The legal obligation they contain pre-existed their inclusion in the 
EU’s framework1747. They reflect the fact that the EU has always considered the UN 
as “the prime sanctioning actor” in international security1748. 
 
Beside the few alterations in the scope of the obligation imposed by the UN1749, the 
EU does not leave much substantive imprint in this area. But the inclusion of 
international obligations in the realm of the CFSP, and their translation into EU law, 
makes these commitments more compelling. In order to assure a unified interpretation 
of UN sanctions, the EU usually incorporates the resolutions passed by the UN 
Security Council into the EU law in the form of a Council’s common position1750. 
Failures to enforce UN sanctions, then, entail a breach of EU law –a breach against 
which the EU may act with more determination and less hindrance than the UN 
Security Council.  
 
The EU applies the same logic with other international obligations. Its 1998 Code lists 
series of international treaties, the observance of which shall guide governments’ 
decisions on arms export licensing 1751 . Any violation of these legally binding 
agreements is due to have negative implications imposed on the violators, through the 
agency of the UN Security Council, of course, acting under international law, but also 
(and above all) through the more purposive agency of the EU.  
                                                 
1745 Art. 2 (5), United Nations. 1945. ‘Charter of the United Nations.’ 
1746 Criterion one of the EU’s 1998 Code is entitled: “Respect for the international commitments of 
Member States, in particular the sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council”. It further states: “an 
export licence should be refused if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia: (a)the international 
obligations of Member States and their commitments to enforce UN, OSCE and EU arms embargoes”. 
Council of the European Union. 5 June 1998. ‘European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.’ 
1747 The situation was/is different for non members of the UN, e.g. the Federal Republic of Germany 
until 1973 or Kosovo today, because the EU (through the Treaty of Rome for the former and through 
its SAp for the latter) actually introduced obligations which would not [have] exist[ed] outside the 
EU’s framework.  
1748 Kreutz, J. 2005. ‘Hard Measures by a Soft Power? Sanctions Policy of the European Union 1981-
2004.’ vol.45. 
1749 For instance, the EU decreed an arms embargo against Sudan (1669-2001), while other measures 
were taken by the UN. Ibid. 
1750 Point 3.1.3, Council of the European Union. 29 April 2009. ‘ User's Guide to Council Common 
Position 2008/944/CFSP Defining Common Rules Governing the Control of Exports of Military 
Technology and Equipment.’ 
1751 The Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT), the biological ad toxin weapons 
convention (BTWC) and the Chemical weapons convention (CWC).  
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3.5.2.3. EU norms vs. international humanitarian customary law obligations 
 
The same logic applies to the EU’s promotion of human rights and international 
humanitarian law. The EU’s 1998 Code posits as sine qua non criterion that human 
rights shall be respected in the country of final destination1752. The 2008 Common 
Position additionally commands that arms export licenses shall be denied when there 
is a “clear risk […] of serious violations of international humanitarian law”1753. These 
obligations are no EU obligation per se. They are principles of international 
customary law creating erga omnes obligations, the resonance of which, however, has 
been amplified by the EU’s collective system of arms export controls. Arms exports 
arguably enter the scope of application of the Geneva Convention, which commit 
states  
 
“to undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in 
all circumstances”.1754  
 
This commitment suggests that the parties, which fail to prohibit the export of arms in 
countries flouting human rights and international humanitarian law, also fail to 
observe their obligation under international law. It is here a matter of customary law, 
for which a non-restrictive interpretation is prescribed: the prohibition of arms 
transfers, the use of which is per se contrary to humanitarian rules, shall also apply to 
transfers among states that are not involved in an armed conflict1755. This principle 
shall also apply to arms transfers intended to flout human rights. As emphasised by 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: 
 
“many arms exports may be used for the violation of human rights over 
which the exporting country has no control, except to refuse to export arms 
which could be used for domestic repression”.1756 
 
The existence of this international principle of customary law shall not devaluate the 
EU’s initiative in promoting its diffusion. The EU did not “create” from scratch its 
“number-two” (humanitarian) criterion. But its re-utterance by the Council, and its 
designation as sine qua non criterion in the EU’s system of arms export controls, is of 
great value. It strengthens the compellingness of international obligations in the field, 
as well as the epistemic credibility of the other actors involved in this area. The EU, in 
its User’s Guide accompanying the 1998 Code, for instance, does not define the term 
of “serious violations” in an unambiguous manner. It does not provide a list of 
offences, nor does it specify the point from which characterised violations become 
“serious”. Rather than substituting itself to exiting definitions and characterisations, 
the EU calls for acknowledging their epistemic validity. The User’s Guide provides 
                                                 
1752 Criterion 2, Council of the European Union. 5 June 1998. ‘European Union Code of Conduct on 
Arms Exports.’ 
1753 Council of the European Union. 8 December 2008. ‘Council Common Position Defining Rules 
Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment.’ 
1754 Art. 1, Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 12 
August 1949. 
1755 Brehm, M. 2005. ‘Conventional Arms Transfers in the Light of Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law.’ Doctoral thesis. 
1756 Point 5, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 27 December 1989. ‘Arms Sales and 
Human Rights.’ 
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the following: when regional bodies (e.g. the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, 
the EU) raise serious concerns over violations human rights; when the situation in the 
country of export shows signs of “grave breach” of humanitarian law, as defined by 
the Geneva Convention1757; or when there are signs of “crimes against humanity”, as 
defined by the Rome Statute1758, then the participants to the 1998 Code shall deny the 
issuance of arms export licenses1759. What matters most for the EU here is not to 
construct and diffuse its own definitions –it is to amplify the diffusion of already 
existing norms.  
 
Where the EU action also makes a difference is in its adoption of sanctions outside 
the framework of UN decisions, usually following concerns over human rights. 
Although the EU readily admits its preference for enticing change through incentives 
rather than sanctions, it recognised, already in 2001, that negative measures “may be 
appropriate” when third countries demonstrate no genuine commitment to dialogue 
and consultation1760. But here again, EU autonomous sanctions shall not be seen in 
isolation of their international normative context. As explained in the EU’s policy 
framework,  
 
“the Council is committed to using sanctions as part of an integrated, 
comprehensive policy approach which […] could even involve, as a last 
resort, the use of coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter”.1761  
 
EU sanctions may not always aim to implement UNSC resolutions, but even when 
they are imposed on an autonomous basis, i.e. without UN mandate, they respond to 
violations of international principles (including human rights) also enshrined in the 
UN Charter. Thus, the EU’s emphasis on human rights and humanitarian law in arms 
export controls is an amplification of these principles, rather than sheer creation.  
 
3.5.2.4. EU norms vs. international best practices 
 
The EU applies a similar logic in transparency matters, where international norms are 
not as binding, legally, as treaty obligations or international customary law. By 
creating an obligation to report on arms transfers, the 1998 Code of conduct is 
certainly progressive. Before, the only regimes that existed in transparency matters 
were based on voluntary participation. In 1991, the United Nations established such a 
regime through the creation of a Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) under 
                                                 
1757 Art. 147 defines grave breaches of humanitarian law as acts “committed against persons or property 
protected by the present Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation 
or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the 
forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial 
prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of 
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”. Geneva 
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 12 August 1949. 
1758 Art. 7, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 17 July 1998. 
1759 Michel, Q. and Tsukanova, M. July 2011. ‘The European Union Export Control Regime of Arms: 
Comment of the Legislation: Article-by-Article.’ 
1760 European Commission. 8 May 2001. ‘The European Union's Role in Promoting Human Rights and 
Democratisation in Third Countries.’ p. 8. 
1761 Council of the European Union. 2 December 2005a. ‘Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive 
Measures (Sanctions) ’. 
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the aegis of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). Its aim, 
like the EU’s 1998, was to  
 
“prevent the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, including 
conventional arms, in order to promote stability and strengthen regional or 
international peace and security”.1762  
 
The UN Register, of course, was not designed to be as exhaustive as its EU 
counterparts (i.e. the national and EU arms reports elaborated in accordance with the 
EU’s Code of conduct). It only contains data on arms export volumes, does not cover 
all types of military equipment1763, and it does not cover brokering activities. But the 
creation of the UNROCA in the early 1990s arguably raised the international interest 
for transparency matters in arms trade. Most of EU member states participate in this 
Register, as well as Macedonia (but not Serbia).  
 
In addition to the UNROCA, the UNODA harbours since 2002 another voluntary 
platform, aiming at fostering  
 
“the exchange of national legislation, regulations and procedures on the 
transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology, [so 
as to] contribute to mutual understanding and confidence among Member 
States”.1764 
 
Both Serbia and Macedonia (as well as most of EU member states) participate in the 
platform. The promotion of transparency in armament, then, is not the preserve of the 
EU.  
 
Sometimes, the EU “imports” the practices established by other regional settings, and 
adopts them, “where appropriate”, as its own, in accordance with its own 
principles1765. Its 2000 Community regime for the control of export of dual-use items, 
for instance, emerged in an international context, which already promoted the control 
of dual-use items exports. A key instrument in this area was the Wassenaar 
Arrangement (WA), established in 1995 in order to promote “transparency and greater 
responsibility with regard to transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and 
technologies”1766. Politically binding, the WA begets the elaboration of a “List of 
Dual-Use Goods and Technology”, for which WA countries shall maintain effective 
export controls1767. This WA Dual-Use List is based on a set of criteria, the validity of 
which the EU implicitly acknowledges by incorporating the items listed by the WA 
into its own Dual-Use List1768. Although Serbia and Macedonia are not participating 
                                                 
1762 United Nations General Assembly. 6 December 1991. ‘Resolution on Transparency in Armaments.’ 
1763 Only the most lethal ones are included in the Register (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, 
large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and missiles and missile 
launcher). Small arms and light weapons have just entered the Register recently. Other items, as well as 
technology and dual-use goods a are not included.  
1764 United Nations General Assembly. 30 December 2002a. ‘Resolution on National Legislation on 
Transfer of Arms, Military Equipment and Dual-Use Goods and Technology ’. 
1765 Operative provisions, art. 5. Council of the European Union. 5 June 1998. ‘European Union Code 
of Conduct on Arms Exports.’ 
1766 Wassenaar Arrangement. 12 July 1996. ‘Press Statement.’ 
1767 WA countries include most but not all EU member states (e.g. Cyprus) 
1768 See for instance Point 6.§2., Council of the European Union. 14 December 2012. ‘Fourteenth 
Annual Report According to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.’ 
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in the WA, their alignment with the EU’s 2000 Common regulation then necessarily 
brings them closer to the WA. No wonder then that both countries, since their 
alignment in 2005 with the EU’s 2000 Common regulation, now strive for joining the 
WA1769.  
 
It is in this context that the Europeanisation of Serbia and Macedonia’s arms control 
policy shall be understood. The EU certainly matters in the promotion of progressive 
norms in the area. But its contribution should not be overestimated. Most of the norms, 
which the EU seeks to diffuse, have populated the international domain for many 
years. The contribution of the EU, then, is not one of a norm-shaper. It rather boils 
down to amplifying their signal and inflating their compellingness.  
 
3.5.3.  Argumentative analysis 
 
3.5.3.1. Structural analysis 
 
The criteria, principles and practices constituting the EU’s system of arms export 
controls are part of the EU’s CFSP acquis. They convey obligations of a political and 
legal nature, applicable to all EU member states engaged in the transfer of arms and 
dual-use items: they command the adoption of certain standards, in the issuance of 
export licenses and in transparent reporting, and the effective enforcement of 
collective sanctions, whether decreed autonomously by the EU or deriving from UN 
resolutions. Though only applicable to EU member states, these obligations have 
become a matter of concern for would-be member states as well. This is little 
surprising, since the EU has included arms export controls in its conditionality 
dialogue with prospective member states.  
 
Legalistically speaking, EU obligations in the area remain limited. Serbia and 
Macedonia, being non-EU states, are not bound by EU law, unlike actual EU member 
states1770. But the realisation of their EU accession prospect certainly depends on the 
harmonisation of their national legislation, including in the field of arms export 
controls. As EU candidate states, Serbia and Macedonia are explicitly “required to 
apply the EU regime” in dual-use items export controls1771. They shall similarly adopt 
the criteria and principles promulgated in the 1998 Code of conduct on arms exports, 
and make sure to “apply, monitor and control the implementation of EU sanctions and 
restrictive measures”1772, just as EU member states do. It is, in fact in this area that the 
EU’s conditionality approach towards Serbia and Macedonia has been the most 
                                                 
1769 Macedonia started to express its interest for the WA in 2006 and formally asked to be associated to 
the WA in 2011 (through the WA Outreach programme). Serbia formally applied for WA membership 
in 2008. 
1770 Their Stabilisation and Association Agreement specifically excluded the “production of, or trade in, 
arms, munitions or war materials” from the scope of the treaty, “provided that such measures do not 
impair the conditions of competition in respect of products not intended for specifically military 
purposes”. Art. 116 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and 
their Member States of the one part and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of the other part. 
26 March 2001. Art. 127 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities 
and their Member States of the one part and the Republic of Serbia of the other part. 22 January 2008. 
1771 European Commission. 'Dual Use'. [accessed 15.2.2013]. 
1772 European Commission. 7 June 2004. ‘Main Administrative Structures Required for Implementation 
of the Acquis.’ p. 87. 
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demanding. In its questionnaire addressed to Serbia (in 2010)1773 and Macedonia (in 
2004) 1774 , the Commission specifically requested detailed information on the 
applicants’ sanctions policy. Among the questions asked (31.C.), the Commission 
enquired into the applicants’ trade in arms with countries against which the EU 
maintains arms embargoes, and their administrative and legal capacities to implement 
international sanctions. These questions give clear indication of the EU’s expectations 
in harmonisation matters.  
 
3.5.3.1.1. Macedonia: straightforward harmonisation through compliance  
 
Macedonia started to acknowledge the EU’s expectations in this area already in 2004, 
in the context of its application to EU membership. It has ever since maintained an 
intense conditionality dialogue with the EU, in all the dimensions relevant to arms 
export controls, especially sanctions policy. In 2006, Macedonia, for the first time, 
acknowledged its duty, as EU candidate state, to “harmonise its national practices 
with EU legislation concerning CFSP” in the area1775. This duty had roots in the 
political dialogue the EU had set up with Macedonia already in 1997. One of its 
objectives was to  
 
“bringing about mutual understanding and increasing convergence on 
international issues, and in particular on those matters likely to have 
substantial effects on one of the other Party”.1776 
 
Arms export controls, obviously, were one of those matters. But in the absence of 
conditionality dialogue on this specific issue 1777 , Macedonia did not consider 
harmonising its legislation until it started to prepare its application for EU 
membership1778. CFSP issues had mostly been left aside in Macedonia’s SAp, but it 
was definitely included in the accession process1779. Macedonia then waited until 
2004 to unilaterally accept the EU’s 1998 Code of conduct on arms exports. As 
declared by the government itself:  
 
“As part of the process of gradual adoption and introduction of the CFSP 
acquis into the national legislation, the Government of the Republic of 
Macedonia at its session of 1 November 2004 adopted the Decision on 
Unilateral Acceptance of the European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports of 
8 June 1998. Although the Code is a politically-binding instrument and 
Macedonia is not a member of the EU, the Government has ever since 
                                                 
1773 European Commission. 2010e. ‘Questionnaire Delivered by the European Commission to the 
Republic of Serbia.’ 
1774 European Commission. 2004. ‘Questionnaire Delivered by the European Commission to the 
Republic of Macedonia.’ 
1775 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. June 2006. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2005.’ 
1776 Point 1.4., Council of the European Union. 29 April 1997c. ‘Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue 
between the EU and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.’ 
1777 The EU’s SAA annual reports, which reviewed Macedonia’s progress until 2004, do not include 
CFSP issues.  
1778 Macedonia formally applied for EU membership in March 2004.  
1779 The Commission, for instance, explicitly asked Macedonia in October 2004 if it had “legislation in 
place […] in line with the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports” and if it had “plans to modify the 
existing legislation”. See Chapter 27 Common foreign and security policy, question number 7, 
Republic of Macedonia. 2005. ‘Answers of the Republic of Macedonia to the EU Questionnaire 
Delivered by the European Commission.’ p. 33/53. 
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evaluated all requests for authorization of exports of weapons and military 
equipment in line with the criteria established by the Code”.1780 
 
The same logic guided Macedonia’s alignment with the EU’s 2008 Common position 
on arms export –a logic commanding timely “compliance” and “harmonisation” with 
the new rules promulgated by the EU in the area1781. Effectively bound, through 
conditionality, to “increasing convergence on international issues”1782, Macedonia 
could neither procrastinate nor tergiversate. It had to keep pace with the changes 
affecting the EU’s legislation in the area, in order to realise its EU accession prospects.  
 
The same applied to Macedonia’s adoption of EU criteria, principles and practices in 
the field of dual-use items export controls. As the government was drafting its 2005 
Law on dual-use items in line with the EU’s 2000 Council regulation setting up a 
Community regime in the area, it gave the following rationale: 
 
“Since the country is in the process of association to the European Union, 
there is also a need for full harmonization of the national legislation with the 
corpus of international instruments in this field”.1783  
 
Macedonia had been dialoguing with the EU on political issues since 1997, but in the 
absence of a more specific conditionality approach on the issue, no attention had been 
paid to harmonising the legislation so far. As the Commission submitted its 
Questionnaire to the government of Macedonia in October 2004, however, the 
situation changed. Foreign policy issues ceased to be excluded from the EU’s scrutiny, 
and the Commission started to be specifically interested in Macedonia’s system of 
dual-use items export controls1784. From this point on, compliance with EU norms 
became meaningful. In 2008, Macedonia likewise justified the updating of its 
legislation on dual-use items export controls by the necessity to keep harmonising its 
national legislations with the EU’s changing Community regime1785.  
 
A very similar logic of compliance sheds light on Macedonia’s unstable commitment 
to transparent reporting. In 2006, for the first time, Macedonia acknowledged its duty 
to publish national reports, stating the following: 
 
“Macedonia unilaterally accepted the European Code of Conduct on Arms 
Exports in November 2004. As such, it is obliged to explain the practical 
conduct of its arms export control policy to its partners and make sure that it 
                                                 
1780 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. June 2006. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2005.’ 
1781 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. 2012. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of the 
Acquis Communautaire.’ p. 332. 
1782 Point 1.4., Council of the European Union. 29 April 1997c. ‘Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue 
between the EU and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.’ 
1783 Republic of Macedonia. May 2003. ‘ Report of the Republic of Macedonia on the Implementation 
of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.’ 
1784 The Commission explicitly asked Macedonia in October 2004 whether it participated or intended to 
participate in the different international regimes concerning, inter alia, dual-use technology. See 
Chapter 27 Common foreign and security policy, question number 4, Republic of Macedonia. 2005. 
‘Answers of the Republic of Macedonia to the EU Questionnaire Delivered by the European 
Commission.’ p. 26/53. 
1785 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. March 2008. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of 
the Acquis Communautaire.’ 
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is responsible and reliable, to share accurate information in a timely manner 
and cooperate on the matter in the spirit of transparency and good will”1786.  
 
Macedonia’s sudden interest for transparent reporting directly followed up on its 
adoption of the EU’s 1998 Code. Macedonia also complied the following year with 
the EU’s practice, but it then relaxed its commitment, without the EU raising 
eyebrows1787. In the absence of conditionality dialogue on this specific issue1788, 
compliance with the provision of the 1998 Code on transparent reporting did not last 
long. This shortcoming shows the importance, for compliance to be achieved, of 
sustaining a conditionality approach that is constant and specific.  
 
A very good illustration of this requirement is provided in the field of international 
sanctions, where the weight of EU normative structures is more significant than in 
other dimensions of arms export controls. EU conditionality, in this field, is not 
limited to ensuring that EU candidate states harmonise their legislation. It applies 
throughout the policy process, with en emphasis on the actual and effective 
implementation of EU sanctions. The harmonisation of Macedonia’s sanctions policy 
should, again, be understood in the framework of the EU-Macedonia political 
dialogue aiming at “increasing convergence on international issues”1789. But in the 
absence of conditionality dialogue on this specific issue1790, Macedonia did much pay 
attention to harmonising its legislation and systematically implementing EU sanctions. 
The watershed, again, came with the Commission’s questionnaire submitted in 2004, 
which raised a series of questions on Macedonia’s capacity of, and efficiency in, 
implementing EU sanctions 1791 . In 2005, the Commission went further in the 
expression of conditionality, noting that Macedonia “will need to adjust its 
administrative capacity to EU standards” and “clarify its legal framework” 1792. The 
government responded to that purpose by initiating a procedure for drafting a law on 
international restrictive measures1793, guaranteeing the effective implementation of 
EU sanctions “pursuant to the EU standards”1794. The EU’s insistence to increase the 
legal capacity and the efficiency of Macedonia’s sanctions policy1795 led Skopje to 
actually treat the issue as “short-term priority”1796, and the law was indeed passed in 
March 2007, i.e. less than two years after the EU shared its first concerns.  
                                                 
1786 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. June 2006. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2005.’ p. 2. 
1787 No mention is made in EU documents relating to Macedonia’s European integration to the absence 
of published arms export reports since 2007.  
1788 The fact that Macedonia has failed to publish arms report since 2007 has not ever been critically 
addressed the Commission. The negligible amounts of armament traded by Macedonia may explain 
this permissiveness. 
1789 Point 1.4., Council of the European Union. 29 April 1997c. ‘Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue 
between the EU and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.’ 
1790 The SAp did not include sanctions policy in its conditionality framework.  
1791 See Chapter 27 Common foreign and security policy, question number 8 and 9, Republic of 
Macedonia. 2005. ‘Answers of the Republic of Macedonia to the EU Questionnaire Delivered by the 
European Commission.’ p. 37/53-38/53. 
1792 European Commission. 9 November 2005a. ‘Analytical Report for the Opinion on the Application 
from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for EU Membership.’ 
1793 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. June 2006. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2005.’ 
1794 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. March 2006. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of 
the Acquis Communautaire.’ 
1795 European Commission. 8 November 2006a. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2006 
Progress Report.’ 
1796 Point 3.31.2., Government of the Republic of Macedonia. April 2007. ‘National Programme for the 
Adoption of the Acquis Communautaire.’ 
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With the adoption of the law, the structural weight of EU norms did not disappear. It 
shifted towards making sure that Macedonia would effectively “implement the 
legislation for enforcement of the common position in the field of international 
restrictive measures”1797. The Commission advocated in 2008 “further coordination 
between the competent authorities” 1798 , and Macedonia, a few months after, 
responded by the creation for this purpose of a working group within the MFA in 
charge of reviewing the implementation of EU and international sanctions1799. In 2011, 
the Commission accordingly praised Macedonia’s readiness to follow its 
instructions1800. Conditionality certainly lies at the crux of Macedonia’s convergence 
in sanctions policy. And the role of the Commission therein, as a major source of 
structural forces, cannot be underestimated. But its regular engagement was also 
supported by the Council, which enshrined in Macedonia’s accession partnership the 
obligation to “implement the legislation for enforcement of the common position in 
the field of international restrictive measures”1801, and by the European Parliament, 
which for instance in 2011 reminded “Macedonia of its obligation to adhere to the 
CFSP Common Positions, especially those referring to restrictive measures”1802. The 
emphasis those EU institutions put on compliance with this obligation is paramount. It 
is the only obligation stated under Chapter 31 in Macedonia’s accession 
partnership1803, and it is presented as major achievement in most of Macedonian 
government’s national programmes for integration in the EU1804.  
 
All in all, the conditionality dialogue, which Macedonia maintained with the EU, 
shows that Macedonian authorities have been very receptive to EU recommendations; 
that compliance with EU criteria, principles and practices played an important role in 
adjusting Macedonia’s arms export policy to EU standards; and that conditionality 
proved most effective when it was specific and consistent. The significance of 
compliance as a mechanism of Europeanisation is far from negligible, even in the 
subjective perceptions of Macedonian officials. As stated by one of them in the MFA, 
responsible for the implementation of restrictive measures,  
 
“on some issues, we are simply asked to do something, or not to do specific 
things, and to align ourselves, if we want to do so. This is something which is 
                                                 
1797 Council of the European Union. 18 February 2008b. ‘Council Decision on the Principles, Priorities 
and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.’ 
1798 European Commission. 5 November 2008c. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2008 
Progress Report.’ 
1799 European Commission. 9 November 2010b. ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2010 
Progress Report.’ 
1800 European Commission. 12 October 2011c. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-
2012.’ 
1801 Council of the European Union. 18 February 2008b. ‘Council Decision on the Principles, Priorities 
and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.’ 
1802 European Parliament. 7 April 2011. ‘European Parliament Resolution on the 2010 Progress Report 
on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.’ 
1803 Council of the European Union. 18 February 2008b. ‘Council Decision on the Principles, Priorities 
and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.’ 
1804 See for instance Government of the Republic of Serbia. December 2009. ‘National Programme for 
Integration with the European Union.’ 
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more one-sided process. We have not been invited to discuss specifically the 
content of the instruments, it's more a take-it-or-leave-it approach” 1805. 
 
This “take-it-or-leave-it approach”, characterising the EU’s conditionality dialogue 
with Macedonia in this field, arguably also explains Macedonia’s predilection for fast-
track, direct, unreflexive harmonisation. Rather than seeking to negotiate the 
adaptation of their domestic rules to EU standards, Macedonian authorities have been 
prone to adopt EU legislations as a whole, importing them directly in their legislative 
body as if they had been conceived within their own regulatory system. They have 
also been prone to literally translate their content exhaustively, rather than re-writing 
it on the basis of what existed before. They have finally been prone to comply with 
EU recommendations, as if they stemmed from their own governance structures, and 
abstained from questioning their appropriateness. This approach, facilitated by the 
intensity of the EU’s conditionality dialogue in most dimensions, arguably paved the 
way of Macedonia’s fast-track harmonisation. But it notably differed from Serbia.  
 
3.5.3.1.2.  Serbia: (partial) harmonisation without compliance 
 
Arms export controls have long been ignored by the EU’s conditionality dialogue 
with Serbia. Until 2011, the EU made no mention of purported obligations in the area, 
despite its regular communications on Serbia’s adoption of the CSFP acquis. Of 
course, Belgrade also committed itself to “increasing convergence on international 
issues” through political dialogue with the EU, but it did so much later than 
Macedonia, in September 20031806. And this commitment was very general: it could 
hardly be used as a basis for the exercise of conditionality in the field of arms export 
controls. Until Serbia prepared its submission to become an EU candidate, 
harmonisation in the field took mostly place outside of the EU’s conditionality 
scrutiny. The partial alignment with the EU’s 1998 Code of conduct on arm exports 
and Council regulation on dual-use items in 2005, the initiation of the legal process 
concerning the adoption of the law on restrictive measures, also in 2005, and the 
publication of detailed arms reports from 2007, then, cannot be explained through 
mere compliance. Serbia had expressed a general objective in 2003 regarding 
“increasing convergence”; but it was not specifically obliged to follow up on it in this 
specific area. In fact, the Commission’s progress reports bear no marks of Serbia’s 
(non) compliance with EU criteria, principles and practices in arms export controls. 
The only recommendation formally expressed by the EU in this area comes after 2011, 
when Serbia responded to the Commission’s questionnaire and became EU candidate 
state. It acknowledged the fact that “Serbia implements United Nations Security 
Council restrictive measures”, but noted, however, that  
 
“there is no system for tracking its implementation of EU restrictive 
measures. Serbia needs to establish a consistent approach and consolidated 
data in this connection” 1807.  
 
                                                 
1805 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
CFSP Unit. Skopje, 07/03/2011 
1806 Council of the European Union. 17 September 2003. ‘Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue 
between the EU and Serbia and Montenegro.’ 
1807 European Commission. 12 October 2011a. ‘Analytical Report for the Opinion on Serbia's 
Application for Membership of the European Union.’ 
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This recommendation, for the first time, addressed a specific issue: Serbia’s failure 
since 2005 to pass a law on restrictive measures, which would “bring the existing 
legislation in line with EU standards and practices” 1808. Apart from this, there is little 
substance, even today, in the EU’s conditionality dialogue with Serbia in arms export 
controls, even though occasionally and “on important issues typically related to 
human rights”, EU member states did launch diplomatic demarches to ascertain 
Serbia’s effective enforcement of EU collective sanctions, with some success (against 
Myanmar in 2007)1809. 
 
Compliance can then hardly explain the changes observed in Serbia’s arms export 
controls policy. Still, the idea of complying with EU standards is sometimes 
suggested as a rationale in Serbian official documents. But this idea is advocated 
unilaterally, not in response to EU demands or conditions, which shatters the validity 
of the claim. In 2007, for instance, Serbia argued that its first arms report was 
intended to  
 
“providing an overview of export and import control of weapons, military 
equipment and dual-use goods in line with recommendations, standards and 
codes of conduct of the European Union”.1810 
 
But Serbia had not accepted the EU’s 1998 Code by giving it legal precedence over 
national legislation. The publication of its first arms report, thus, primarily responded 
to obligations under domestic law. In spring 2008, Serbia had not fully aligned itself 
or unconditionally accepted the EU’s 1998 Code. But this lack of approximation was 
not considered as an issue, since Serbia was not bound to do so under EU 
conditionality. The Serbia’s SAA excluded “trade in arms, munitions and war 
materials […]” from its scope of application 1811 , and the Commission was still 
refraining from reviewing Serbia’s progress in this area. Yet, in October 2008, the 
government stated that Serbia was “making efforts to harmonise its activities and 
legislation with the standards of the EU in the field of arms control”1812, and indeed, 
in November 2008, it adhered to the EU’s Code of conduct. Compliance, here again, 
cannot conclusively explain Serbia’s behaviour, even though it is sometimes 
implicitly exposed as rationale by Serbian governmental actors, as a sign of their 
commitment to European integration. 
 
3.5.3.2. Dispositional analysis 
 
Serbia and Macedonia first considered aligning their respective systems of arms 
export controls with the EU in the mid-2000s1813. At that time, they did not participate 
                                                 
1808 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. 'Arms Control, Non-Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Export Controls Аnd Оther Activities'. [accessed 6.4.2013]. 
1809 Interview with an Official from the Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia, 
Political Section. Belgrade, 16/09/2011 
1810 Republic of Serbia. 2007. ‘Annual Report on the Realization of Foreign Trade Transfers of 
Controlled Goods for 2005 and 2006.’ p. 1. 
1811 Art. 127 b., Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their 
Member States of the one part and the Republic of Serbia of the other part. 22 January 2008. 
1812 Government of the Republic of Serbia. October 2008. ‘National Programme for Integration with 
the European Union.’ 
1813 Macedonia declared its unilateral acceptance of the EU’s 1998 Code on 1st November 2004. Serbia 
adopted two legal acts, bringing its national legislation close to the Code, in February and March 2005.  
 324
in COARM meetings (not even as observers), and they did not discuss issues related 
to arms export controls with the EU in a structured manner. None of them had 
acquired the insider’s understanding of the cooperative approach other member states, 
convening regularly in Brussels, had developed over years. Since they were not 
involved in the process of shaping the EU’s arms export control system, they were, in 
a word, less socialised with EU practices and criteria. This is not to say that Serbia 
and Macedonia were bluntly “discovering” these norms; that their socialisation would 
have to start from scratch.  
 
Serbia and Macedonia had, to start with, already practiced harmonisation in other 
policy fields. They were participating in the SAp and were familiar with EU 
principles. Most importantly, they had committed themselves to EU integration. The 
reform of their national system of arms export controls, thus, did not take place in a 
normative vacuum. It ensued as part of a dynamic, running for years, which sustained 
general dispositions in favour of European integration. And there is indeed a 
correspondence between the dynamic of EU integration in the Western Balkans and 
some of the major steps accomplished by Serbia and Macedonia with respect to the 
adoption of key EU legislations in the area.  
 
3.5.3.2.1.  Macedonia’s unequivocal adherence to CFSP principles 
 
Shortly before it had initiated its reform in arms export controls (in November 
2004)1814, Macedonia had formally applied for EU membership (in March 2004). Its 
application was being reviewed in Brussels precisely at the same time that the reform 
gained impetus. In October 2004, the Commission transmitted to Skopje its 
questionnaire (which included a few questions on arms export controls); in January 
2005, Macedonia finalised its answers to the questionnaire; in November 2005, it 
received a positive recommendation from the Commission, and in December 2005, it 
was granted the status of EU candidate. The EU dynamic, at this point of the 
accession process, did not pay much attention to CFSP issues. But in spite of this, 
there is little doubt that the general atmosphere that prevailed at that time predisposed 
the would-be candidate of Macedonia to demonstrate its readiness to extensively 
adopt EU norms. After all, Macedonia laid the foundation of its unilateral 
participation in the EU’s system of arms export controls precisely at the same time 
that it was taking a major institutional step towards the EU.  
 
Conditionality, it has been seen, certainly played an important role in guiding the 
concrete steps in the reform process. But contextual forces, stimulated by the dynamic 
of European integration, also mattered. They fuelled dispositions incidentally 
facilitating the reform process, most notably, by associating Macedonia’s adherence 
to EU norms with its endogenous support for the CFSP. As explained by the 
government on the eve of Macedonia’s being granting the candidate status,  
 
                                                 
1814 Unilateral acceptance of the EU’s Code of conduct in November 2004, alignment with the 
Common position on arms brokering in June 2005 and the Council’s regulation on dual-use items in 
September 2005, incorporation of the EU’s control lists in its national system of arms control in 
December 2005 for dual-use items and December 2006 for arms, initiation of a procedure in 2005, 
which ended up with the adoption of a law on restrictive measures in line with the EU’s sanctions 
policy in March 2007, and publication of its first arms export report in June 2006. 
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“The Republic of Macedonia has begun to undertake the required activities 
to be ready and able to support the relevant specific policies of the Union in 
the field of CFSP and ESDP. Falling within this framework, for example, is 
the unilateral acceptance of the European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports 
(01.11.2004)”.1815 
 
As Macedonia was coming closer to the EU, it advocated more support for the CFSP 
–and this, according to the Macedonian government, implied the harmonisation of 
Macedonia’s system of arms export controls. This rationale for harmonisation had 
deeper roots than conditionality. It presumed that Macedonia shared with the EU the 
principled belief that strengthening the CFSP and ESDP were appropriate actions for 
would-be member states; and that EU criteria and practices in arms export controls 
echoed EU principles, to which Macedonia had already adhered in the course of its 
decade-long experience with the EU. It presumed, moreover, that Macedonia shared 
with the EU the causal belief that aligning itself with the EU’s Code of conduct on 
arms export, for instance, would indeed strengthen the EU’s CFSP externally, e.g. in 
the effective implementation of EU sanctions. A clear illustration of this belief was 
given by the government of Macedonia, which prior to the 2007 Law on restrictive 
measures, declared:  
 
“Guided by the commitment to support the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy [Macedonia has] adopted and adhered to the Common Positions, 
Declarations, and Demarches of the European Union including those 
imposing sanctions and arms embargoes”.1816 
 
Harmonisation, then, was also intended to share the EU’s responsibility in the area 
and to contribute to the CFSP. It was seen as appropriate, considering Macedonia’s 
outspoken intention to join the EU, and not merely as instrumentally necessary, 
following the EU’s exercise of conditionality.  
 
3.5.3.2.2. Serbia’s more equivocal adherence to CSFP principles 
 
In Serbia, the EU dynamic has also affected the propensity to advance harmonisation 
in arms export controls. Belgrade took a first major, albeit partial step towards the 
harmonisation of its arms export policy in 2005. It adopted decrees bringing Serbian 
legislation partially in line with the EU’s 1998 Code of conduct on arms export and 
the 2000 Council regulation on dual-use items; it adopted the EU Military List (but 
not the Dual-Use List), and initiated a procedure to clarify the legal framework of its 
sanctions policy (to no avail). A second step was taken after a two-to-three year halt, 
in 2007-2008. Serbia published its first arms report with a one-year delay1817 (in 
November 2007), and the government declared its full acceptance of the EU’s Code 
of conduct (in November 2008). Harmonisation then came to a halt. Shortly before it 
took its first step, the Serbian government, interestingly, was engaged in preparing the 
opening of SAA negotiations –a milestone on the road to EU accession. In October 
                                                 
1815 Republic of Macedonia. September 2005. ‘Answers of to Additional Questions Referring to the 
Economic Criteria and the Chapters of the Acquis.’ 
1816 Republic of Macedonia. May 2005. ‘Report of the Republic of Macedonia on the Implementation 
of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.’ 
1817 No report was published in 2006 to cover the 2005 period. But the report published in 2007 covered 
both 2005 and 2006.  
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2004, the Council had welcomed the Commission’s intention to launch a feasibility 
report1818; in April 2005, the Commission gave a positive assessment to the opening 
of SAA negotiations1819; and in October 2005, the EU accordingly launched its SAA 
negotiations with Serbia. Because it implied a renewed emphasis on harmonisation, 
this momentum certainly placed the 2005 reform under favourable auspices. The EU 
dynamic created a context in which Serbian actors could demonstrate their disposition 
to EU integration by intensifying their efforts at harmonising Serbian rules and 
practices, including in policy fields that were not directly covered by the SAA, i.e. 
arms export controls. Rather than waiting for the EU’s exercise of conditionality, 
Serbia launched the reform knowing that “EU believes that it is necessary to apply the 
EU Code of Conduct in the field of arms export”1820. Its anticipation of the reform 
demonstrated that  
 
“Serbia is aware that the best way to promote the interests of its citizens is an 
active approach, initiative and creativity in the area of foreign and security 
policy, which will also contribute to the EU's efforts for strengthening its 
global position”.1821 
 
This statement reminds Macedonia’s argument that would-be member states should 
contribute to the CFSP by taking decisive actions supportive of the EU’s arms export 
controls policy. It was nonetheless tempered by another strategic priority, setting 
limits to Serbia’s support of the CFSP: the defence of its national interests –e.g. in 
connection to the Kosovo issue and its international allies. Serbia’s national security 
strategy clearly framed the limits of harmonisation, when it stated in 2009: 
 
“Taking into account the interest of preserving its own territorial integrity 
and sovereignty, the Republic of Serbia will largely harmonize its foreign and 
security policy with the positions and activities of the EU in all the major 
issues of global, European and regional character”.1822 
 
This conditional commitment to supporting the CFSP was no novelty. It was already 
there, impregnating the dispositional context in which the reform of Serbia’s arms 
export controls system took place. In 2005, the national strategy for accession to the 
European Union provided   
  
“[…] along with preserving and promoting of national interests […] Serbia 
will tend to align its foreign policy as much as possible with the principles of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (CFSP)”.1823 
 
Serbia, in other words, did not see the CSFP as paramount for its foreign policy. It 
reserved the right to deviate from its general orientation, when alignment is deemed to 
                                                 
1818 Council of the European Union. 11 October 2004. ‘Press Release of the 2609th Gaerc Meeting.’ p. 
23. 
1819 European Commission. 12 April 2005. ‘Communication from the Commission on the Preparedness 
of Serbia and Montenegro to Negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European 
Union ’. 
1820 Government of the Republic of Serbia. May 2005. ‘National Strategy of Serbia for the Serbia and 
Montenegro's Accession to the European Union.’ p. 24. 
1821 Ibid. p. 47. 
1822 Republic of Serbia. October 2009. ‘National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia.’ 
1823 Government of the Republic of Serbia. May 2005. ‘National Strategy of Serbia for the Serbia and 
Montenegro's Accession to the European Union.’ 
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jeopardise the pursuit of its national interests. This more equivocal doctrine helps 
understanding why Serbia was not disposed on the onset of the 2005 reform to 
unilaterally declare its full, unconditional acceptance of EU criteria on arms export 
controls. 
 
Besides, in a context of political cohabitation, the reform in Serbia could hardly end 
up with the full, one-off alignment of Serbian rules and practices with the EU. The 
election of the reformist, pro-EU candidate Boris Tadić at the Presidency of Serbia in 
June 2004 certainly fuelled the EU dynamic in 2004 and Serbia’s overall dispositions 
to harmonisation. But it took place a few months after the formation of a new 
government, in March 2004, headed by a more Euro-sceptical, more pro-Russian 
figure, Vojislav Koštunica. Whereas President Tadić put EU affairs very high on 
Serbia’s agenda, Prime Minister Koštunica became increasingly wary of EU 
integration1824. The 2005 law and decree on arms export controls incidentally reflect 
these internal tensions: they do not proclaim the unilateral acceptance of EU criteria, 
principles and practices. They reproduce most of the verbatim of the EU legislation, 
but do not create a direct link subordinating domestic legislations to EU law. They 
also relax some of the EU’s criteria, possibly to accommodate Serbia’s special 
relationship with NAM countries and Russia1825. The end product of the 2005 reform 
is harmonisation with Serbian characteristics.  
 
The second step in Serbia’s reform process started by the end of 2007, just after SAA 
negotiations resumed. SAA negotiations had been interrupted in May 2006 due to 
insufficient progress on Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY. No wonder that little 
efforts were consented between May 2006 and June 2007 to bring Serbia’s system of 
arms export controls more in line with the EU: the dynamic of European integration 
had lost momentum. The re-election of President Tadić in February 2008 and the 
victory of his party campaigning “For a European Serbia” in the parliamentary 
elections of May 2008 re-launched the European integration dynamic, and the 
formation of a pro-EU government lifted key obstacles in the executive. In November 
2008, the new government accordingly declared its acceptance of the EU’s 1998 Code 
of conduct. The EU momentum, however, did not last long. Serbia’s diplomacy soon 
turned away its attention towards the Kosovo issue. With Serbia’s dual commitment 
to safeguarding Kosovo on the one side and progressing on European integration, 
internal tensions rose again in Serbia, which weakened the upholding of the EU 
dynamic. These ups-and-downs in Serbian politics do not explain Serbia’s hesitant 
harmonisation. But they certainly help understanding why the pace of the arms export 
policy reform in Serbia has been unsteady, and why it has not been completed yet1826.  
 
3.5.3.2.3. European vs. international norms: adherence to what? 
 
                                                 
1824 International Crisis Group. 22.7.2004. ‘Serbia's Changing Political Landscape.’ In Europe Briefing. 
1825 Relaxing the EU human rights criterion (e.g. by creating exceptions for violations of human rights 
in response to terrorism) and relaxing the commitment to enforce international sanctions (e.g. by 
omitting to include EU autonomous sanctions in the scope of application of the decree) gave more 
latitude to the Serbian government to deal with questionable situations (e.g. Myanmar on human rights 
and Armenia/Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict). 
1826 Serbia has not adjusted its legislation with the EU’s state-of-the-art legislation in the field, namely 
the 2009 Council regulation on dual-use items and the 2008 Common position in arms exports.  
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Serbia and Macedonia’s reforms however, also built on another normative context. 
Serbia and Macedonia, it has been argued, were not “discovering” EU criteria and 
practices. They had already encountered a softer version of them in the realm of 
international law (see section 3.5.2). This encounter was valuable, since it implied that 
Serbia and Macedonia had foreknowledge of EU norms; that the norms they would 
adopt could resonate with their own system of belief. Harmonisation, then, would not 
only build on the European integration dynamic. It would also build on the 
international context.  
 
This disposition can easily be identified in Macedonia’s official statements. Often, the 
rationale given by governmental officials to their country’s alignment with EU criteria, 
principles and practices, exceeds the realm of European integration and casts its lens 
over the international system. The government of Macedonia, for instance, argued in 
2006 that, independently of its EU accession prospects, it was its  
 
“strong belief that the promotion of responsible export control and arms 
transfers strengthens global and especially regional security”.1827 
 
This belief could easily find an expression in the straightforward adoption of EU nec 
plus ultra norms. Their adopting would not only serve the country’s accession 
prospects; it would be a meaningful “contribution to the non-proliferation of WMD 
and fight against terrorism” 1828. Because the norms diffused by the EU are not, in 
substance, different from international norms (despite their amplification), adopting 
them, according to Macedonian officials, amounted to “strengthening international 
peace and fulfilling the country’s obligations stemming from international treaties”1829. 
This collusion of EU-related objectives (supporting the CFSP) and global concerns 
(about strengthening international security) is most visible in Macedonia’s arms 
reports addressed to the UN. In those reports, Macedonia systematically responds to 
concerns over the “effective implementation of arms embargoes decided by the UN 
Security Council in accordance with the UN Charter” by detailing its commitment to 
EU criteria, principles and practices1830. One might argue that Macedonia’s answers 
are off topic, since the UN does not recognise the EU’s system of arms export 
controls as one of its instruments. But because the scope of EU restrictive measures 
include UN sanctions without being restricted to them, emphasising the enforcement 
of the former signals a broader commitment to international security. For Macedonia, 
adopting EU norms, in other words, is a means to demonstrate one’s willingness to  
 
“be identified in the international system as active contributors in the 
security sphere. Not only by the EU and its member states, but by all the 
international community”.1831  
 
                                                 
1827 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. June 2006. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2005.’ p. 2. 
1828 Ibid. 
1829 Ibid. 
1830 Republic of Macedonia. 31 March 2008. ‘2008 Report on Implementation of the United Nations 
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects.’ 
1831 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
CFSP Unit. Skopje, 07/03/2011 
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Europeanisation, for Macedonia, is way of assuming international responsibilities, not 
as future member of the EU, of course, but also as present member of the international 
community.  
 
Serbia is not different in this respect, save the relative salience of its dispositions 
towards the international community. Its commitment to international obligations as 
rationale for the adoption of EU norms stands at the forefront of its line of arguments. 
Concerning the adoption of its 2005 law and decree, which copied most of the 
provisions of the EU’s Code of conduct on arms export, Serbia argued that the reform, 
first of all, “provided for the harmonization of the national legislation with the 
international regulations and standards in this area” 1832 . In the UN, Serbia also 
stressed its commitment to international law as key rationale for the reforms, rather 
than its dedication to EU integration. For instance, in 2011, a representative declared 
 
“strongly convinced that international cooperation is the key to the progress 
in resolving the issues on the agenda of the conventional arms control, my 
country joined a large number of international instruments in this area and 
has taken extensive legislative, regulatory and practical measures at the 
national level for the implementation of the obligations that it has 
assumed”.1833 
 
Unlike Macedonia, which readily, explicitly and thoroughly evokes its acceptance EU 
norms as a proof of its commitment to international law, Serbia demonstrates more 
reserve. Where appropriate, it mentions its acceptance of EU criteria, principles and 
practices, but not as a testimony for respectability. When it presents it legislative 
framework, for instance, Serbia insists on its adherence to international law, its 
observance of UN obligations, OSCE documents, and only then EU positions and 
regulations1834 . The vast majority of Serbian documents on arms export controls, 
including the 2005 decrees, follow this ordering. International norms are, and remain 
paramount for Serbia. As explained by a member of the governing coalition in Serbia, 
 
“adaptation is something that […] we also would have to do without the EU. 
It is not only because of the EU that we […] improve things here”.1835 
 
Because they are supportive of international security, Serbia is inclined to adhere to 
EU criteria and practices. But it would be misleading to believe that Serbia’s 
dispositions draw the country closer to the EU notwithstanding the international 
context, because it is precisely this international context and its interaction with the 
EU which disposes Serbia to harmonisation. This disposition helps understanding 
why Serbia has mostly been reluctant to create a direct link between EU law and its 
domestic legislation: Europeanisation, for Serbia, is a derivative of the country’s 
adherence to international norms. 
 
3.5.3.3. Intentional analysis 
                                                 
1832 Republic of Serbia. 2012. ‘Annual Report on the Transfers of Controlled Goods in 2010.’ 
1833 Republic of Serbia. 18 October 2011. ‘Statement by Ms. Danijela Cubrilo, Second Secretary, 66th 
Session of UN General Assemby, First Committee, Thematic Debate on Conventional Weapons.’ 
1834 Republic of Serbia. 13 May 2010. ‘Strategy on Small Arms and Light Weapons Control in the 
Republic of Serbia for the Period 2010-2015.’ 
1835 Interview with an Official from the Delegation of the Parliament of Serbia in the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. Belgrade, 12/09/2011 
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At the intentional level, the reform of Serbia and Macedonia’s systems of arms export 
controls was facilitated by the EU’s outreach and assistance activities in the Western 
Balkans. These activities have promoted the exchange of experience in the area, and 
therewith enabled Serbia and Macedonia’s actors to learn how to materialise their 
dispositions and conform to EU conditions.  
 
3.5.3.3.1. Ideational factors enabling harmonisation –gaining (free) knowledge 
 
Serbia and Macedonia’s actors in the field, often, lacked the technical expertise and 
administrative resources necessary to enforce arms export controls in general, and to 
participate in complex, well-institutionalised cooperative systems of arms export 
controls in particular. They gained more specific knowledge of the EU’s scheme from 
2004, after the COARM despatched letters to the authorities of Serbia and 
Montenegro and Macedonia, reminding them of the contents of the Code and  
 
“enquiring to what extent their national rules and legislation mirrored the 
requirements of the Code, and whether they were interested in discussing the 
practical implementation of the Code with the European Union”. 1836 
 
Belgrade and Skopje welcomed the EU’s outreach initiative, and reportedly 
“expressed interest in discussing the practical implementation of the Code with the 
European Union” 1837 . Both countries had just aligned, or were about to align 
themselves (at least partly) with the EU’s Code.  
 
In order facilitate access to information-sharing, the EU and its member states 
organised a series of COARM outreach seminars convening representatives from all 
Western Balkan states1838. These seminars were generally organised by the member 
state holding the EU rotating Presidency of the Council, or sometimes by another 
member state (e.g. Romania in 2005, Bulgaria and Hungary in 2006), possibly in 
cooperation with the third countries (e.g. Austria and the US in 2010). Through these 
seminars, the EU exchanged general information on a series of issues, concerning 
namely the implementation of the Code, the interpretation of EU criteria, the 
transposition of EU acquis, the control of arms brokering activities and the 
establishment of transparent reporting procedures. In addition to informing them, the 
EU set up channels of informal communication with Serbia and Macedonia. Those 
received in April 2006 a list of officials in EU member states and EU institutions 
designated as “points of contact” in order to respond to questions arising in daily 
licensing procedures1839. In 2007, the Council Secretariat finally provided translations 
of the User’s Guide accompanying the 1998 Code in order to clarify its content. These 
initiatives did not target specifically Serbia and Macedonia, but they helped bridging 
the informational gaps that could have hindered their inclination to adopt EU rules 
and practices.  
                                                 
1836 Council of the European Union. 23 December 2005. ‘Seventh Annual Report According to Article 
8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.’ p. 2. 
1837 Ibid. 
1838 See Council of the European Union. 16 October 2006. ‘Eighth Annual Report According to 
Operative Provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Export.’ p. 2. and all the 
following reports.  
1839 Ibid. 
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Serbia and Macedonia also gained practical assistance from the EU and its member 
states. When it aligned itself in November 2004 with the EU’s Code of conduct on 
arms exports, Macedonia had little expertise and few resources available in the area. 
The issuance of a declaration on the unilateral acceptance of the Code was then most 
economical: it required little legal advice concerning the transposition of the Code 
while guaranteeing its full legal effect. Considering the negligibility of its arms 
exports, Macedonia only dealt with implementation issues post hoc. It participated in 
a COARM outreach seminar organised in Skopje by the Romanian government in 
February 2005, which dealt with political and legal issues1840, and organised training 
seminars for its representatives from relevant ministries (MFA, MoD, Ministry of 
Interior, Ministry of Economy and customs administration)1841. These also attended a 
series of workshops organised by the Regional Arms Control Verification and 
Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC)1842. These workshops and activities 
responded to Macedonia’s call for “improving [its] understanding of the EU’s 
Code”1843. In 2010, the country upgraded the scope of application of its arms export 
controls so as to conform to the EU’s Common position replacing the 1998 Code. As 
explained in an information note, the upgrade was motivated by the fact that 
 
“in this manner, the brokering of trade in, and transit of weapons in military 
equipment and the related non-material technologies will be better 
regulated”.1844 
 
An exchange of staff, organised by Portugal, Poland and the Czech Republic in 2011 
and 2012 enabled Macedonian officials to benefit from EU member states’ experience 
and learn from their practices in implementing the 2008 Common position1845.  
 
The situation was slightly different for the adoption of the 2005 Law on dual-use 
items, which transposed the 2000 Council regulation. Before drafting the law, 
Macedonia explored various solutions in force in European countries (UK, Italy, 
Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, but also Croatia and Switzerland)1846. 
These countries were “used as references” in the preparation of the law, taking into 
account that the transposition should be “adjusted to the specifics of our legal and 
political system” 1847. In May 2006, shortly after the adoption of the law, Macedonia 
organised an outreach meeting for industrial partners potentially affected by the law in 
                                                 
1840 Ibid. 
1841 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. May 2007. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2006.’ 
1842 A project launched in the framework of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. In 2007, one of 
these workshop was specifically designed to improve Western Balkan states’ understanding of the 
EU’s 1998 Code. See Republic of Macedonia. 31 March 2008. ‘2008 Report on Implementation of the 
United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms 
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.’ 
1843 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
CFSP Unit. Skopje, 07/03/2011 
1844 Republic of Macedonia. 2010. ‘Information on the National Legislation Concerning the Transfer of 
Arms, Military Equipment and Dual·Use-Goods and Technologies.’ 
1845 Council of the European Union. 30 December 2011. ‘Thirteen Annual Report According to Article 
8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.’ 
1846 Republic of Macedonia. May 2003. ‘ Report of the Republic of Macedonia on the Implementation 
of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.’ 
1847 Ibid. 
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order to answer questions arising from implementation issues1848. Further meetings 
were organised on post hoc basis to address implementation issues.  
 
Macedonia’s request for EU assistance was most comprehensive in the field of 
international sanctions. In 2005, Macedonia’s MFA initiated a procedure for drafting 
a Law on International Restrictive Measures. As explained by a MP,  
 
“the Law on Restrictions was seen as more technical. It aligned, not with 
acquis, but with certain elements of the CFSP. […] There was not one recipe, 
so we compared with several member states and countries from the 
region.”.1849 
 
In addition to this legal prospection, Macedonia requested the assistance of the EU. It 
appealed for the organisation of a TAIEX seminar1850, and asked the Commission to 
review (and comment) the first draft of the Law in the first half of 20061851. As 
explained by a MFA official,  
 
“we have asked for the  expertise and guidance of the European Commission 
and we have asked specifically for TAIEX instruments for European actors in 
this fields to help us in Skopje with this legislation. We have also sent draft 
legislation to the European Commission and to the Council not for approval, 
but more for friendly advice”.1852 
 
A few months after, the Law of restrictive measures was adopted. It satisfied 
Macedonia’s key intent to bring its legislation regulating sanctions in full conformity 
with EU dispositions. In order to deal with implementation issues, Macedonia later 
requested to organise another TAIEX seminar, open to all Western Balkan states1853. 
The lack of domestic expertise, e.g. regarding the human rights situation in countries 
willing to purchase arms, and the limited resources it had at its disposal to effectively 
control the few arms it exported could hardly be addressed without capitalising on 
others’ experiences. The TAIEX regional seminar, intended for ministries, institutions 
and state administrative bodies in charge of the implementation of international 
restrictive measures, eventually took place in Skopje in December 20111854.  
 
Serbia, unlike Macedonia, did not issue a declaration on the unilateral acceptance of 
the EU’s Code of conduct. Instead, it designed a new legislation, very much inspired 
from the Code, and which incorporated most of EU norms. This path was less 
economical in terms of legal expertise, but it could be envisioned, since Serbia had 
both the will and the capabilities to tailor its arms export controls reform in a more 
                                                 
1848 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. June 2006. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2005.’ 
1849 Interview with a Member of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia and National Council for 
European Integration. Skopje, 07/03/2011 
1850 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. June 2006. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2005.’ 
1851 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons. 2006. ‘Analysis of National Legislation on Arms Exports and Transfers in the Western 
Balkans.’ p. 58. 
1852 Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, 
CFSP Unit. Skopje, 07/03/2011 
1853 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. February 2010. ‘Monthly Progress Brief on the 
European Integration of the Republic of Macedonia for January 2010.’ 
1854 Government of the Republic of Macedonia. 2012. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of the 
Acquis Communautaire.’ 
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autonomous fashion. Its will echoes its inclination to support the EU’s CFSP, “taking 
into account the interest of preserving its own territorial integrity and sovereignty”1855. 
As for its capabilities, some were already available in the different ministries (since 
Serbia already operated arms export controls before 2005), while others were received 
from the EU and other partners, in the form of legal assistance. Serbia accordingly 
prepared its 2005 legislation on arms export controls with the aim, along the 
safeguard of Serbia’s national interests, to  
 
“modernize the existing solutions and readjust to new developments in the 
regulatory frameworks of the EU and other relevant international 
organizations”.1856 
 
In order to identify which readjustments were necessary, Serbian authorities consulted 
the representatives of several governmental agencies, e.g. from the United Kingdom 
and the United States. They organised working visits, short training sessions and 
theme discussions and received at these occasions several “suggestions for the 
improvement of the draft text and its harmonization with EU laws”1857. Following the 
adoption of the law in February/March 2005, Serbia then also took part in post hoc 
assistance activities. The UK hosted a visit of officials from Serbia and Montenegro in 
order to address issues related to the implementation of the Code of Conduct and 
licensing procedures 1858 . Poland reiterated this experience, when it organised a 
bilateral meeting in May 2006 dealing with inter-agency co-operation issues in arms 
export controls and with the obligations associated with EU membership and 
participation in the Wassenaar Arrangement1859. It accordingly started to issue annual 
arms reports, noting that their publication “has increased the transparency of Serbia’s 
arms exports while also improving the government’s ability to monitor arms imports 
and exports”1860. In 2009, Serbia finally received the assistance of the government of 
the United States 1861 . In 2008 and 2009, Serbia thus participated to 20 training 
activities1862.  
 
3.5.3.3.2. Material factors constraining harmonisation –bearing the cost of reform 
 
                                                 
1855 Republic of Serbia. October 2009. ‘National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia.’ 
1856 Republic of Serbia. 18 October 2011. ‘Statement by Ms. Danijela Cubrilo, Second Secretary, 66th 
Session of UN General Assemby, First Committee, Thematic Debate on Conventional Weapons.’ 
1857 State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. 2004. ‘Report of Serbia and Montenegro on the 
Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the 
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.’ 
1858 Council of the European Union. 16 October 2006. ‘Eighth Annual Report According to Operative 
Provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Export.’ p. 346. 
1859 Council of the European Union. 26 October 2007. ‘Ninth Annual Report According to Operative 
Provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Export.’ p. 329. 
1860 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons. 2011a. ‘The Development of National and Regional Reports on Arms Exports in the EU and 
South Eastern Europe.’ 
1861 Through its EXBS (Export Control and Related Border Security) programme. The EXBS is a US-
funded project, which seeks to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced 
conventional weapons by helping to build effective national export control systems. United States 
Department of State. 'The Exbs Program'. [accessed 26.03.2012]. 
1862 Amongst which courses, workshops, trainings and regional courses. Government of the Republic of 
Serbia. December 2009. ‘National Programme for Integration with the European Union.’ p. 262. 
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Among the factors, which may constrain the adoption of more stringent rules in arms 
export controls, one should finally evoke the actual cost of the reform. The 
harmonisation of Macedonia’s legislation had little economic implications. After all, 
Macedonia is a very small producer and exporter of conventional weapons1863. Its 
arms exports and transfers of dual-use items were, and still are, negligible. Adopting 
more stringent norms in the field, then, was unlikely to have any negative impact on 
Macedonian economy. It was, for this reason, “more or less cost-free”1864.  
 
In Serbia, by contrast, the weight of the arms industry in the economy was relatively 
much higher. Belgrade has a long history of cooperation with NAM countries in the 
field of armament. Before its dissolution, it was one of the key exporters of military 
equipment to third world countries, including to non-democratic countries like Burma. 
And many manufacturers were located in today’s Serbia. Denying arms export 
licenses to such regimes, thus, is not totally cost-free for Belgrade. Politically, first, it 
implies a departure from practices established a long time ago, with the risk of 
disruption good relations. Serbia’s violation of EU arms embargo against Myanmar in 
2007 should be understood in this historical context. As explained by an official, the 
military in Myanmar is “dependent on our logistical support”1865. Economically then, 
with the adoption of EU criteria and practices, Serbian arms industries incurred 
financial shortfalls. More stringent norms for arms export controls may indeed result 
in fewer recipients authorised and fewer arms export contracts concluded. In order to 
pressure the government to authorise the export of arms to Armenia (despite an OSCE 
embargo due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and despite the recommendation of 
the MFA), the labour unions of the Zastava Oruzje arms manufacturer organised in 
2007 high-profile protests, with outstanding success1866.  
 
3.5.4.  Summary of the findings 
 
Through the adoption of the EU legislation in the field of arms export controls, 
sanctions policy and transparent reporting, Serbia and Macedonia have given up some 
of their national prerogatives. Decisions that used to be made at the national level are 
now increasingly influenced by decisions taken at the EU level. Before the adoption 
of the EU legislation in that area, Serbia and Macedonia’s arms export regime were 
not conceived as relying on criteria-based evaluations. Arms could be transferred 
under the veil of secrecy and end up (knowingly or not) in the hands of questionable 
end-users. The military was responsible for the controls and the regime guaranteed 
little accountability. With the (partial) adoption of the EU’s legislation in the area, 
arms export controls in Serbia and Macedonia have been regulated. The civilian 
authorities, amongst which the MFA, have come to play a central role, as well as 
inter-agency coordination, in regulating arms exports. Normative criteria, elaborated 
at the EU level as a reflection of international norms, have been introduced in the 
realm of domestic law, as a means to assess the appropriateness of arms exports. 
                                                 
1863 It was, until recently, not producing arms domestically. See Government of the Republic of 
Macedonia. June 2006. ‘Annual Arms Export Report 2005.’ Its only manufacturer “Suvenir”, was not 
allowed to export its production until 2010. See MINA. 7.7.2010. ‘230 Employees in Samokov Get 
Their Jobs Back.’ 
1864 Interview with an Official from Delegation of the European Union to the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. Skopje, 01/11/2011 
1865 cit. in BIRN. 3.10.2007. ‘Serbia's Arms Exports to Myanmar (Burma) "Legal".’ 
1866 Saferworld. October 2007b. ‘Measuring Up? Arms Transfer Controls in Serbia.’ 
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Decisions taken at the EU level to impose restrictive measures, whether autonomously 
or not, on potential arms buyers have come to be recognised as equally binding as UN 
sanctions. And transparency in armament, once given little attention, has been 
adopted as best practice.  
 
Of course these developments have not affected Serbia and Macedonia in a perfectly 
symmetric manner. Both started to reform their arms export policy and harmonise 
their legislation with the EU in the mid-2000s. But with notable differences. 
Macedonia, on the one side, fully and swiftly aligned itself with the EU’s Code of 
conduct. It proceeded by simply declaring its acceptance of the whole body of EU 
rules and practices or adopting laws fully in line with the EU’s acquis (concerning the 
exports of dual-use items or the enforcement of restrictive measures). Serbia, on the 
other side, took a more circumvolutory path. It partially transposed EU norms, but did 
not seek to create a direct link between EU and domestic law. It preferred re-funding 
its system of arms export controls, taking into account the EU’s regime, without 
acknowledging the precedence of the EU’s system. More importantly, it deviated 
from EU standards in two respects: the binding force of EU sanctions and the EU’s 
concern over violations of human rights. Only later did it seek to gradually reduce the 
normative discrepancy between its criteria and the EU’s –and with mixed results: its 
criteria for export licensing have not been upgraded (e.g. with respect to violation of 
humanitarian law) and the government, in the absence of specific law on restrictive 
measures, has upheld a relatively free hand in the conduct of its arms transfer policy 
with states otherwise targeted by international sanctions (in particular by the EU). 
Interestingly, however, Serbia has proved much more amenable to publishing 
information on its arms exports than Macedonia. The difference can be felt in both the 
quantity and quality of the information published. 
 
Inferring Europeanisation from the adoption of EU rules, principles and practices is 
tempting. After all, the EU’s interest for associating non-EU states in its arms export 
policy blossomed in the mid 2000s. At that time, the EU had conceived of different 
types of instruments (outreach, assistance and association) in order to promote in non-
EU Europe the adoption of its criteria, principles and practices of arms export controls. 
The EU (and its instruments) certainly mattered in the promotion of progressive 
norms in the area (although this progress should be nuanced in light of the 
performance of the member states of the EU as arms exporters). But their contribution 
should not be overestimated. Most of the norms, which the EU sought to diffuse, have 
populated international relations for a long time. They often strongly resemble 
international norms, and the genuine contribution of the EU, then, is not substantive in 
nature. Speaking of Europeanisation, in this context of international diffusion, would 
be misleading. The EU’s genuine contribution, in fact is to amplify the 
compellingness of existing norms.  
 
The EU, first of all, amplifies international treaty obligations pertaining to arms 
export controls, by integrating them in the realm of EU law. In an EU context, failures 
to enforce UN sanctions, for instance, entail a breach of EU law –a breach against 
which the EU may act with more political weight than the UN Security Council. The 
EU, second, amplifies the compellingness obligations deriving from international 
customary law in the field of human rights and humanitarian law, and it reinforces the 
epistemic credibility of specialised institutions involved in this area. In an EU context, 
failures to demonstrate restraint in arms exports, when human rights are seriously 
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compromised in the country of the intended recipient, for instance, entail a breach of 
EU law –a breach that cannot be sanctioned otherwise. Third, the EU amplifies the 
exemplarity of international best practices, such as transparent reporting in arms 
export controls. Sometimes, it “imports” the standards and practices established by 
other regional settings, e.g. the Wassenaar Arrangement.  
 
Notwithstanding this caveat, the analysis of the EU’s conditionality dialogue with 
Macedonia shows that Macedonian authorities have been very receptive to EU 
recommendations; that compliance with EU criteria, principles and practices has 
helped re-shaping and harmonising Macedonia’s system of arms control, and that 
conditionality has proved most effective when it was constant and specific. The EU’s 
“take-it-or-leave-it approach” characterising this conditionality dialogue with 
Macedonia, arguably also explains Macedonia’s predilection for fast-track, 
straightforward harmonisation. A major difference between Serbia and Macedonia’s 
conditionality approaches is that arms export controls have long been ignored by the 
EU’s conditionality dialogue with Serbia. Until 2011, the EU made no mention of 
purported obligations in the area, despite its regular communications on Serbia’s 
adoption of the CSFP acquis. Compliance, as a result, cannot conclusively explain the 
partial harmonisation of Serbia’s system of arms export controls. 
 
The analysis of Serbia and Macedonia’s dispositions sheds supplementary light on the 
forces that drove harmonisation. Macedonia’s reform started precisely as the 
European integration dynamic gained momentum, i.e. shortly after the country 
applied for EU membership. Through the reform, Macedonia could demonstrate its 
straightforward commitment to EU integration, its unconditional support for the CFSP, 
and therewith show it already shared key EU principled and causal understandings. 
Macedonia also viewed in the reform a guarantee for its international respectability, 
since the criteria and practices it adopted were paragon. These dispositions, as well as 
the negligible cost of the reform (considering the negligibility of Macedonia arms 
exports), help understanding why the reform in Macedonia has been so swift, and why 
it has been carried out so as to bind Macedonia’s system so closely to the EU. In 
Serbia, the reform process, it has been seen, has been more hesitant. The more 
equivocal commitment of Serbia to support the CFSP along its national interests, as 
well as the ups-and-downs in the EU-Serbia relationship did not dispose the Serbian 
government to consistently and unconditionally profess harmonisation and anticipate 
alignment. Political divisions concerning Serbia’s most strategic interest have not 
enabled Serbia to uphold its EU momentum without discontinuity and have 
incidentally affected the impetus of the reform in arms control exports. The reform 
process, however, has been facilitated by the pre-adherence of Serbia to international 
norms, with which EU criteria and practices are believed to resonate. Whereas 
Europeanisation, for Macedonia, is a way of demonstrating one’s readiness to assume 
international responsibilities, for Serbia, it is a derivative of the country’s adherence 
to international norms.  
 
At the intentional level, finally, the reform of Serbia and Macedonia’s systems of 
arms export controls was indeed facilitated by the EU’s outreach and assistance 
activities in the Western Balkans. These activities have promoted the exchange of 
experience in the area, and therewith enabled Serbia and Macedonia’s actors to learn 
how to materialise their dispositions and conform to EU conditions, where appropriate. 
Serbia and Macedonia’s participation in EU outreach initiatives have helped bridging 
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the informational gaps that could have otherwise hindered their inclination to adopt 
EU rules and practices. Their requests for assistance, which focussed on 
implementation issues, have helped them reshaping their system of arms export 
controls. A notable difference between the two countries, however, can be observed. 
Considering its lack of domestic resources, whenever possible, Macedonia opted for 
the most economical method of alignment: the adoption of a declaration of unilateral 
acceptance (which did not require EU assistance). Serbia, by contrast, opted for 
tailoring a new law regulating its system of arms export controls (which required EU 
assistance). The relative significance of the armament industry in Serbia, both in a 
historical and economic perspective, however, remained a factor constraining the 
adoption of more stringent criteria. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
Twenty years of Europeanisation studies have not produced a single coherent field of 
research. Perhaps Europeanisation research is not meant to become one. What unites 
Europeanisation researchers, after all, is a shared interest for a phenomenon they 
cannot consensually define, and a joint commitment to explain a heterogeneous series 
of social phenomena. No wonder that knowledge on Europeanisation has not been so 
much cumulative. Instead of reflecting on Europeanisation, many researchers 
primarily reflect on their object of research (e.g. europeanised politics, polity or 
policy). Sometimes, they simply use the label as a catch-all word, as if its meaning 
was already set once and for all; as if it did not require more reflexive thoughts. Or 
they use it as an umbrella, to signal a thematic affiliation. Too little attention, overall, 
is paid to what Europeanisation is, and what it entails. 
 
That is why more reflection on Europeanisation is required. The literature review, in 
this thesis has shown that the conceptual debate over the meaning of Europeanisation 
is far from settled. Thousands of scientific contributions populate the field, and yet 
Europeanisation remains too contested to serve as organising concept1867. Those who 
claim that Europeanisation is a “model-building, not a definitional challenge”1868 
overlook the necessity to reflect on concepts before engaging in empirical and 
theoretical work. This reflection has been a common thread in this thesis, and it will 
guide this conclusion too. 
 
4.1. Conceptual refinement 
 
Concept formation in this thesis has been primarily driven by the definiendum. Instead 
of positing a definition of Europeanisation right at the beginning, the author chose to 
problematise the conceptual delineation of the phenomenon he aimed at researching. 
His claim was that conceptual refinement should build on empirical findings. The 
author then adopted a large, poorly bounded definition of Europeanisation as working 
basis. He defined Europeanisation in section 2.1.2 as “a process of institutional 
change induced by a variety of actors interacting across different levels of governance 
within a European interaction structure”. By means of this definition, the author 
delved into a range of empirical phenomena in social life, which could be designated 
as instances of Europeanisation. Their properties will now help the author re-
conceptualising Europeanisation in a hopefully refined way.  
 
4.1.1. Shifting paradigms: the definiendum 
 
4.1.1.1. Departing from EU integration perspectives 
 
The leading narrative usually underpinning the conceptualisation of Europeanisation 
is informed by EU integration studies. It roughly equates “Europe” with the EU. For 
one, the labels of “Europe” and “EU” are often used indiscriminately in the 
European/EU integration literature, especially in their adjectival form. The confusion 
is more than semantic. It is one conflating the geo-political space of “Europe” with 
                                                 
1867 Kassim, H. 2000. ‘Conclusion.’ In The National Co-Ordination of EU Policy: The Domestic Level, 
eds. Kassim, H., et al. p. 235-238. 
1868 Olsen, J. P. 2007. Europe in Search of Political Order: An Institutional Perspective.  chap. 3. 
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the political object of “the EU”. And yet, in many strands of the literature, 
Europeanisation continues to be seen as the “logical outgrowth” of EU integration 
theories 1869 . Its conceptions often bear the mark of EU integration. The idea of 
adaptational change, for instance, often presumes an on-going process of integration. 
There would not be any adaptation without need for adaptation, and any need for 
adaptation without the systemic changes caused by EU integration. This restrictive 
understanding of Europeanisation suggests that the conceptual domain of 
Europeanisation starts and ends at the conceptual boundaries of EU integration, which 
is at best contestable.  
 
EU integration and Europeanisation are logically connected, indeed. But the 
conceptual world of Europeanisation is larger and opener than the conceptual world of 
EU integration. Therefore, reducing Europeanisation to an implication of EU 
integration is intrinsically flawed. Often, it has been shown in this thesis, the EU is 
not the norm-maker, which EU integration theorists tend to assume. In a few cases, 
e.g. the appointment of European Correspondents or systematic foreign policy 
alignments, the EU did genuinely create a peculiar way of doing things. But in many 
other cases, like in arms export controls, in the promotion of good neighbourliness 
and conflict resolution or in the support for technical capacity-building, the EU 
merely transferred pre-existing norms (though with an imprint of its own), in a way 
that is only loosely connected to EU integration. The EU, more often than not, rather 
acted as an intervening variable. This finding is a caveat. If the attributedness of the 
norms that mattered for Europeanisation is shared rather than owned, then there is no 
reason to assume the EU’s normative precedence in Europeanisation research. And 
there is no reason to assume that the EU is the only cause of Europeanisation.  
 
Relying on EU integration perspectives to conceptualise Europeanisation is a 
hindrance to the sound development of Europeanisation research for further reasons. 
First, the conceptual coalescence of the European and EU spaces neglects the spatial 
domain that exists between the two concepts –a “non-EU Europe” domain that 
Europeanisation research has no reason to discard. What about those European states 
with no outspoken perspective of EU accession (e.g. Macedonia before 2000)? And 
what about those policy fields that escape the realm of EU integration (e.g. foreign 
policy, to some extent)? Second, EU integration perspectives seem to indicate that 
Europe shall necessarily head towards its institutional apex, the reified EU, and that 
that the former (Europe) is only a poor (albeit transitory) reflection of the latter (the 
EU). But Europeanisation, it has been shown in this thesis, does not necessarily 
indicate a normative progress in Europe’s ecology. The exclusive alignment 
procedure introduced by the EU in the OSCE, for instance, raised concerns among 
many non-EU states, including Serbia, for being detrimental to the spirit of 
intergovernmentalism that prevailed in the OSCE. Because of their normative bias, 
EU integration perspectives are tempted to overlook this ambiguity. They 
(questionably) view Europeanisation (understood as EU-isation) as necessarily good. 
Third, the nature of the EU has profoundly changed in recent years, becoming 
decreasingly homogenous internally and increasingly intertwined externally1870. This 
makes the EU becoming increasingly closer to “Europe”, unlike (or in parallel to) 
                                                 
1869 Caporaso, J. A. 2007. ‘The Three Worlds of Regional Integration Theory.’ In Europeanization: 
New Research Agendas, eds. Graziano, P. and Vink, M. P. p. 23. 
1870 e.g. Dyson, K. H. F. and Goetz, K. H. 2003. ‘Living with Europe: Power, Constraint and 
Contestation.’ Proceedings of the British Academy vol.119. p. 21. 
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what most Europeanisation and EU integration studies seek to demonstrate, i.e. the 
reversed dynamic of “wider Europe” increasingly mirroring the EU. In this thesis, for 
instance, it has been shown that EU norms sometimes originate from or are 
transferred through regional settings. These regional settings are organisations distinct 
from the EU, with which they share cross-memberships. And they play a role in 
Europeanisation that cannot be neglected (e.g. Nato in the field of diplomatic 
communication networks; the Wassenaar Agreement in arms export controls, the 
SEECP in good-neighbourliness issues). There is an inter-organisational dimension in 
Europeanisation at the regional level, which cannot be properly captured by 
conceptions of Europeanisation grounded on EU integration perspectives.  
 
This set of reasons underscores the growing inadequacy of the EU integration 
paradigm in capturing the transformation of European states in contemporary politics. 
It also indicates that concept formation would perhaps gain in being re-constructed 
through an alternative approach –European governance. 
 
4.1.1.2. European governance instead of EU integration 
 
European governance perspectives conceptualise Europe as political and social order, 
or more prosaically, a system of formal and informal rules1871. Unlike EU integration 
approaches, governance perspectives do not arbitrarily set boundaries to the system of 
rules they analyse: European governance may for instance include actors with no EU 
accession perspective, or/and emanate from institutions such as Nato or the Council of 
Europe, which are distinct from the EU. The EU may play an important role in 
European governance, but it is not posited as definitional feature. European 
governance perspectives, finally, do not provide the European system of rules with a 
teleological design. They do not imply that Europe necessarily heads towards more 
integration.  
 
This does not make European governance approaches less contested than EU 
integration approaches. As stated by Diez, “any description of European governance 
participates in the struggle to fix the latter’s meaning”1872. European governance is a 
contested notion because there is no consensus on what governance requires in terms 
of territoriality, sovereignty and society. Classical governance, for instance, is 
premised on the legitimate exercise of power within a clearly demarcated territory 
(the state), which is also the container of a congruent society (the nation). Therein, 
hard territoriality, exclusive sovereignty and embedded society are mutually co-
defining concepts. This understanding of governance is challenged by postmodernists, 
who argue that governance need not be territorial, and even when it is, “the prevailing 
concept of territory need not entail mutual exclusion”1873. Governance, for instance 
may be exercised across multiple levels of government, in which case sovereignty is 
                                                 
1871 e.g. Kohler-Koch, B. and Eising, R. 1999. The Transformation of Governance in the European 
Union; Sandholtz, W. and Stone Sweet, A. eds. 1998. European Integration and Supranational 
Governance; Olsen, J. P. 2007. Europe in Search of Political Order: An Institutional Perspective. 
1872 Diez, T. 2001. ‘Speaking “Europe: The Politics of Integration Discourses.’ In The Social 
Construction of Europe, eds. Christiansen, T., et al. p. 91. 
1873 Ruggie, G. J. 1993. ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations.’ International Organization vol.41 (1). p. 149; Agnew, J. 1994. ‘The Territorial Trap: The 
Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory.’ Review of International Political 
Economy vol.1 (1). 
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shared and human societies are nested rather than contained1874. Governance may 
even span across networks, in which case territoriality is fragmented and sovereignty 
de-territorialised1875. These different conceptions of governance reflect certain facets 
of Europe’s polity. And they bring about different conceptions of Europeanisation1876.  
 
The first conception of Europeanisation they bring about is premised on a 
Westphalian conception of European governance. In the Westphalian ideal-type, 
“Europe” is fragmented into sovereign states that neatly occupy the continental space. 
State boundaries are defined on the basis of hard territoriality by the unambiguous 
disjunction of what is “inside” and what is “outside” of the state1877. In the inside, the 
State is sovereign –it can “claim absolute and final authority over a wide range of 
issues”1878. It contains the society, which legitimates its authority. In the outside, 
states have no sovereign right to act, but they nevertheless seek to influence the 
domestic politics of peer sovereign states through the exercise of their foreign policy. 
This makes sovereign states both inceptors and receptors of external influences. But 
most importantly, it makes them the prime actors and incontrovertible channels of 
institutional change. In Westphalian Europe, states, thus, are transitive, proactive 
“europeanisers”, i.e. they incept the transformation of the system of rules governing 
their relations. This conception places the Europeanisation explanandum at the 
European level, where institutional change takes place, and its explanans at the 
domestic level, where changes originate from. The challenge for Europeanisation 
students, then, is to “identify the actors, and the motivations and forces that determine 
[the] choices” 1879 that state actors make when they build supranational and inter-
governmental institutions, “construct[…] systems of meanings and collective 
understandings”1880, “elevat[e… their] policy-making”1881 or project[…] their national 
preferences and approaches onto the European level” 1882 . Westphalian 
conceptions of European governance, in a word, pave the way of vertical, bottom-up 
conceptions of Europeanisation.  
 
Another conception of Europeanisation flows from neo-Westphalian conceptions of 
European governance. The neo-Westphalian ideal-type shares some assumptions with 
Westphalia, especially its commitment to hard territoriality, but it contemplates 
                                                 
1874 Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. 2001. Multi-Level Governance and European Integration. 
1875 Eising, R. and Kohler-Koch, B. 1999. ‘Network Governance in the European Union.’ In The 
Transformation of Governance in the European Union, eds. Kohler-Koch, B. and Eising, R; Ansell, C. 
2000. ‘The Networked Polity: Regional Development in Western Europe.’ Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy and Administration vol.13 (3). 
1876 Marciacq, F. 2012b. ‘The Political Geographies of Europeanisation: Mapping the Contested 
Conceptions of Europeanisation.’ Journal of Contemporary European Research vol.8 (1). 
1877 Caporaso, J. A. 2000. ‘Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and 
Sovereignty.’ International Studies Review vol.2 (2). p. 10. 
1878 Biersteker, T. J. 2002. ‘State, Sovereignty and Territory.’ In Handbook of International Relations, 
eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 167. 
1879 Olsen, J. P. 2002. ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization.’ Journal of Common Market Studies 
vol.40 (5). p. 929. 
1880 Sedelmeier, U. 2004. ‘Collective Identity.’ In Contemporary European Foreign Policy, eds. 
Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 127. 
1881 Jørgensen, K. E. 2004. ‘European Foreign Policy: Conceptualising the Domain.’ In Contemporary 
European Foreign Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, W., et al. p. 50. 
1882 Bulmer, S. and Burch, M. 2000. ‘The Europeanisation of British Central Government.’ In 
Transforming British Government, ed. Rhodes, R. A. W. p. 3. 
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Europe’s space from a very different politico-geographical scale1883. Here, Europe, or 
more adequately the EU, is conceptualised as a supranational proto-state. Internally, 
supranational rules enable Community actors to exert supreme authority over a wide 
range of issues and penetrate states’ domestic polities. Externally, the EU proto-state 
projects its interests through the conduct of a European foreign policy in its 
idiosyncratic capacity of “international actor”1884. The distinction between internal 
and external action is assumed to be unambiguous, since European external borders 
are posited “recognizable, even impregnable”1885. That is why the neo-Westphalian 
ideal-type applies to the EU so well, and not so much to “Europe’s” fuzzier polity. In 
neo-Westphalia, it is the proto-statal system of rules giving shape to European internal 
and external governance that delineates the space of Europeanisation. This system of 
rules places the explanandum of Europeanisation at the domestic level, where 
institutional change takes place and its explanans at the European level, where 
changes originate from. Europeanisation then denotes a transitive, albeit passive, 
process of institutional change: states are no europeanisers; they are europeanised by 
the EU proto-state. In neo-Westphalia, Europeanisation has both an internal and an 
external dimension. Internally, it involves the transformation of territorial states, the 
restructuring of their functions and the internalisation by domestic actors of EU norms 
and values1886. Externally, it denotes the “projection of internal solutions” towards 
non-EU states1887. Neo-Westphalian conceptions of European governance, in a word, 
pave the way of vertical, top-down conceptions of Europeanisation. 
 
The third conception of Europeanisation flaws from post-Westphalian conceptions of 
European governance. In post-Westphalia, Europe is conceptualised as “EUrope”, i.e. 
the “first truly postmodern international political form”1888. Societies, therein, are 
heteronomous, given the “blurring of territoriality”1889 and the “growing irrelevance 
of states”1890 . Borders are characteristically permeable, leaky1891  and “fuzzy”1892 . 
Post-Westphalia therefore rejects a conceptualisation of Europeanisation that would 
be premised on the ontological emergence or pre-existence of a référentiel, and 
                                                 
1883 Scott, J. and van Houtum, H. 2009. ‘Reflections on EU Territoriality and the 'Bordering of 
Europe'.’ Political Geography vol.28. p. 271. 
1884 Ginsberg, R. H. 1999. ‘Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: 
Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap.’ Journal of Common Market Studies 
vol.37 (3). 
1885 Christiansen, T., et al. 2000. ‘Fuzzy Politics around Fuzzy Borders: The European Union's 'near 
Abroad'.’ Cooperation and Conflict vol.35 (4). p. 389. 
1886 Checkel, J. T. 2001. ‘The Europeanization of Citizenship?’ In Transforming Europe: 
Europeanization and Domestic Change, eds. Green Cowles, M., et al. 
1887 Lavenex, S. and Ucarer, E. M. 2004. ‘The External Dimension of Europeanization -the Case of 
Immigration Policies.’ Cooperation and Conflict vol.39 (4); Olsen, J. P. 2002. ‘The Many Faces of 
Europeanization.’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol.40 (5). p. 937ff. 
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Relations.’ International Organization vol.41 (1). p. 142. 
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Order.’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol.34 (1). p. 21. 
1892 Christiansen, T., et al. 2000. ‘Fuzzy Politics around Fuzzy Borders: The European Union's 'near 
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prefers referring to Europeanisation as occurring through EUrope, a multi-
dimensional arena, or “transfer platform”1893. This arena accordingly fosters all sorts 
of interactions between and among national, subnational, supranational and 
transnational actors, in directions that are not solely hierarchical. Europeanisation, in 
post-Westphalia, is an “interactive, ongoing and mutually constitutive process of 
‘europeanising’ and ‘europeanised’ countries”1894. Post-Westphalian conceptions of 
European governance, in a word, pave the way of horizontal conceptions of 
Europeanisation.  
 
It is, arguably, within this third ideal-type that Europeanisation can best benefit from 
conceptual refinement. Bottom-up and top-down governance, it has been 
demonstrated in this thesis, do matter. For instance, when Serbia struggles with the 
EU for the EULEX to strictly observe the UNSCR 1244, it projects its national 
approach on the EU level and seeks to “europeanise” its foreign policy approach 
regarding the Kosovo issue. Conceptions of Europeanisation based on Westphalian 
governance capture very well this phenomenon. When, on the other side, the EU 
expects that an agreement between Belgrade and Pristina is reached in order to allow 
further progress on Serbia’s integration, then, the phenomenon is typically one that 
could erupt in neo-Westphalian Europe. These examples show that Westphalian and 
neo-Westphalian assumptions may be of heuristical utility to Europeanisation 
researchers in some cases. 
 
But what about these changes facilitated by interactions between EU member states 
and Serbia or Macedonia? What about, for instance, the flows of information 
circulating informally in the premises of the UNGA in New York or the OSCE in 
Vienna or the transfer of Slovenia’s experiences to Serbia and Macedonia in capacity-
building matters? Can these be captured by conceptions of Europeanisation premised 
on Westphalian and neo-Westphalian conceptions of European governance? Although 
part of the Westphalian realm of the inter-national, these relations would not be what 
they are if there were not woven in European structures. And what about the role of 
inter-organisational interactions too? Cross-memberships at the inter-national level 
make national governance fuzzier, do they not? Post-Westphalia does not deny that 
Westphalian and neo-Westphalian conceptions of European governance are 
sometimes relevant to approach Europeanisation. It only claims that these conceptions 
are special cases and that Europeanisation, more generally, should be premised on a 
wider ontology.  
 
4.1.1.3. Departing from structuralist approaches 
 
Structuralist approaches dominate Europeanisation research, but for good reasons: 
they also dominate EU integration theories. With a departure from the latter, 
Europeanisation research, arguably, would gain a freer hand in epistemology. 
Structuralist approaches generally presume that causal factors are exogenous to the 
phenomenon they analyse. They pave the way of conceptions of Europeanisation that 
clearly identify the source and the locus of change as two separate objects. For 
instance, EU rules are presumed to affect domestic policy. Or national approaches are 
                                                 
1893 Bulmer, S. and Radaelli, C. M. 2004. ‘The Europeanisation of National Policy?’ Queen’s Papers 
on Europeanisation vol.2004 (1). 
1894 Major, C. 2005. ‘Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy – Undermining or Rescuing the 
Nation State?’ Politics vol.25 (3). p. 175. 
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presumed to affect EU foreign policy. This dichotomy, however, is not backed by 
much empirical support. This thesis has shown that EU rules often derive from 
international norms or principles. It is then a mistake to reify their purported impact 
on domestic structures as if it stemmed from the EU. Serbia’s partial compliance with 
EU positions on arms embargoes cannot be understood in isolation of the Serbia’s 
commitment to UN principles: the former is an implication of the latter. And again, 
the role of other member states, whether proactive or inspirational, cannot be 
overlooked, despite the fact that the source and the locus of change are located at the 
same level of governance. That is why conceptions of Europeanisation, arguably, 
should refrain themselves from positing the locus of the source of change in their 
definition. Europeanisation, it has been shown in this thesis, is the product of 
interactions between a wide range of actors, located at different levels of governance. 
Identifying them should be part of the enquiry.  
 
Instead of relying exclusively on structuralist approaches, it would be wiser, then, to 
accept the claim that the reasons for change, sometimes, cannot be isolated from the 
phenomenon one seeks to explain. Macedonia’s organisational reform, for instance, 
was launched in 2005, as EU integration gained momentum. The dispositions that 
prevailed at that time were in favour of the EU; they played an essential role in the 
reform process. But they cannot be identified as causal factors, since they were 
endogenous to actors’ beliefs. Sheer rationalism, in that matter, is deceptive –it 
suggests that Europeanisation is a phenomenon necessarily driven by causal factors. 
This might be true, in special cases, e.g. when there is an explicit, specific and 
genuinely distinct requirement emanating from the EU. But it would be ill-advised to 
consider that as a rule. Conceptions of Europeanisation, instead, should create room 
for investigating both causal and non-causal, i.e. constitutive, forces. A departure 
from structuralist perspectives and sheer rationalism may contribute to achieve that 
goal. Bringing back actors in Europeanisation research would be a welcome step, 
because it would help redefining Europeanisation as a phenomenon resulting from the 
dialectal interplay of structure and agency –and not as a consequence of the reified 
power of structures over agents.  
 
4.1.2. Proposal for conceptual refinement: the definiens 
 
Conceptions of Europeanisation, it has been shown, should place European 
governance at the centre of their conceptual domain, whilst acknowledging the 
contestability of their borders: what Europeanisation denotes depends to a large extent 
on how “Europe” is conceived. If one accepts that Europe is an object that is distinct, 
ontologically, from the EU, then Europeanisation should not be conflated with EU-
isation (although the latter may be a special case of the former). It has also been seen 
that conceptions of Europeanisation should refrain from positing the locus of the 
source of change in their definition and that they should create room for investigating 
forces that are both causal and constitutive.  
 
In his conclusion, the author therefore proposes to conceptualise Europeanisation as 
denoting the transformation of political systems based on national governance 
into systems constituted by actors operating through the prism of European 
governance.  
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Governance, here, is defined as “the authority to make, implement, and enforce rules 
in a specified policy domain”1895. This authority may, in some cases, be encapsulated 
at the national (in Westphalian conceptions of governance) or EU level (in neo-
Westphalian conceptions). But as a general rule, it is located, and shared, across 
different levels of governance and sometimes rooted outside the EU’s polity (in 
accordance with post-Westphalian assumptions). This acknowledgment shall prevent 
researchers from assuming the separatedness of national and European governance, 
and from reifying European governance as emanating from a genuine, well bounded 
EU object. 
 
This definition of Europeanisation is consistent with the conceptual hypothesis 
formerly adopted in the conceptual framework of the thesis as working basis, i.e. “a 
process of institutional change induced by a variety of actors interacting across 
different levels of governance within a European interaction structure”. First, it is 
about “institutional change”, since the tentative definition uses the neighbouring 
notion of “transformation”. Transformation refers here to soul-deep changes in 
national political systems, with a shift from national to European governance. This 
definition places the explanandum of Europeanisation at the domestic level (as 
opposed to European integration). What is transformed here is the political system (i.e. 
the politics, policies and polities) of states that were based on national governance 
principles. The tentative definition does not specify where the explanans of 
Europeanisation might be located (this should be researched empirically).  
 
Second, the tentative definition is about actors. These should be considered as the 
purposive architects of the transformation of Europe’s political order. This premise is 
a prescription for adopting a form of ontological individualism in the research that 
does not focus on a category of subjects associated with one particular level of 
governance. National executives, EU Commissioners, members of the European 
Parliament or key officials in other regional organisations may all act, in a given 
context, as actors vis-à-vis Europeanisation. In order to establish whether and when 
they operate “through the prism of European governance”, a measure of 
interpretivism is required. Since European governance remains a contested notion, an 
appraisal of its meaning in a given context is necessarily contingent of actors’ own 
understandings1896. This definitional claim is a challenge to the predominance of 
structuralist approaches in the field.  
 
Third, Europeanisation, in the tentative definition, is about actors “interacting across 
different levels of governance within a European interaction structure”, since it is 
premised on post-Westphalian and dialectal conceptions of European governance. 
Post-Westphalia provides that European governance is multi-layered, with authority 
shared across different levels, and dialectal approaches provide that national 
governance structures are constitutive of European governance structures, and that 
there is no such thing as a distinct, unique and well-bounded cause for 
Europeanisation.  
 
                                                 
1895 Smith, M. E. 2004c. Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation. 
p. 176. 
1896 Their decisions, in fact, may be rooted in subjective beliefs with no material reality whatsoever. For 
instance, it has been shown that Serbian and Macedonian actors overestimate the compulsiveness of 
alignment in the OSCE according to the EU.  
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The tentative definition presented here contrasts with other researchers’ definitions in 
important respects. Unlike bottom-up definitions of Europeanisation1897, it demarcates 
the specific domain of Europeanisation vis-à-vis neighbouring concepts in a hopefully 
refined way by placing the explanandum at the domestic level. Whereas EU 
integration is about changes at the European level, Europeanisation denotes the 
transformation of national political systems. Unlike many top-down definitions of 
Europeanisation1898, it does not reify the impact of EU integration as definitional 
attribute of Europeanisation. On the contrary, the tentative definition clearly 
differentiate Europeanisation from EU-isation by calling researchers to preliminarily 
discuss the contested notion of European governance –a notion that, again, is only 
reducible to EU governance when researchers openly subscribe to neo-Westphalian 
assumptions. This discussion should not elude the issue of norm attributability. Unlike 
the many definitions interested in “the impact of the EU accession process on national 
patterns of governance”1899, the tentative definition problematises the genuine origin 
of the norms transferred in the framework of European governance. It thus does not 
prejudge the role of the EU in producing domestic change vis-à-vis other variables, 
and also refrains from restrictively conceiving of Europeanisation as resulting from 
EU top-down adaptational pressures1900.  
 
4.2. The phenomenon of Europeanisation 
 
In order to shed more light on what Europeanisation entails in phenomenal terms, the 
following section reflects on the empirical findings presented in this thesis in the light 
of the tentative definition. It argues that Europeanisation entails more intersubjectivity 
in national beliefs, more nodality between organisations and more homogeneity 
across systems, despite persistent variations. 
 
4.2.1. What Europeanisation entails 
 
4.2.1.1. More intersubjectivity 
 
Political systems, which are based on national governance principles, usually rely on 
their own set of causal and principled beliefs. These beliefs are objective when they 
depict a reality which any observer would subscribe to (e.g. Serbia’s recognition of 
Kosovo independence would entail a physical loss of territory). They are subjective 
when the reality they depict is contingent of the observer (e.g. Alexander the Great is 
part of Macedonia’s identity). And they are intersubjective when the reality they 
depict is shared by a like-minded community of regional or inter-national observers 
                                                 
1897 e.g. Europeanisation defined as the “emergence and development at the European level of distinct 
structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political 
problem-solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in 
the creation of authoritative rules”. Risse, T., et al. 2001. ‘Europeanization and Domestic Change: 
Introduction.’ In Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change, eds. Green Cowles, 
M., et al. p. 3. 
1898 e.g. Europeanisation defined as “change in the core domestic institutions of governance as a 
consequence of the development of European-level institutions, identities and policies”. Olsen, J. P. 
2007. Europe in Search of Political Order: An Institutional Perspective. p. 7.  
1899 Grabbe, H. 2001a. ‘How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion 
and Diversity ’ Journal of European Public Policy vol.8 (6). p. 1014. 
1900 Börzel, T. A. 2003. ‘How the European Union Interacts with Its Member States ’ In Reihe 
Politikwissenschaft 93. 
 347
(e.g. arms controls contribute to international security). Objective, subjective and 
intersubjective beliefs all inform decisions taken in the realm of national governance. 
These beliefs are amenable to change –not only in contents, but also in proportions. 
Through cooperation among Europeans, intersubjective beliefs may be substituted to 
subjective ones as rationale for political action. This substitution goes hand in hand 
with a redefinition of national interests. These interests, formerly individualistic and 
relative, come to be redefined in positional and collective terms. 
 
Europeanisation precisely entails this sort of transformation. The shift from national 
to European governance it denotes suggests a transformation in the system of beliefs 
used by national actors in order to make decisions. Subjective beliefs, which cannot 
be shared, are gradually replaced by intersubjective understandings, and national 
interests, once owned, are progressively redefined and become shared across the 
community. This intersubjectivity lies at the crux of actors “operating through the 
prism of European governance”. But this prism, of course, is not an objective 
construct, which actors could simply adopt as archetype for their transformation, and 
which any observer could concur in picturing. European governance, it has been 
shown, often remains a contested concept, and it is always subject to individual 
interpretations. That is why this transformation of the subjective into the 
intersubjective should be understood as an interactive process, entailing the creation, 
possible re-negotiation, reproduction and diffusion of shared beliefs. Intersubjectivity 
may imply the mere adherence to pre-existing norms without their renegotiation. But 
it may also be more dialectal –requiring the creation of a shared belief that did not 
exist, or the redefinition of a belief that pre-existed. 
 
The empirical findings presented in this thesis back this argument. In many instances, 
it was found that key contents in Serbia and Macedonia’s systems of beliefs 
underwent critical changes over the past 15 years. Decisions that used to be based on 
subjective beliefs, and interests that used to be defined in individualistic terms, have 
given way, to some extent, to rationales based on European intersubjective 
understandings. These intersubjective understandings have become the norm guiding 
Macedonia’s diplomatic behaviour in the OSCE and UNGA. When it aligns itself 
with EU positions, Macedonia not only expresses its passive adherence to EU norms; 
it asserts that it shares the EU’s foreign policy objectives as well. The very action of 
alignment, then, is given a collective teleology, which thoroughly permeates, if not 
shapes, Macedonia’s national interests. This coalescence of national and European 
foreign policy objectives illustrates the intersubjectivity underpinning Macedonia’s 
diplomatic behaviour in international fora. The lesser degree of Europeanisation of 
Serbia’s diplomacy in this field is consistent with this observation. Alignment, in the 
case of Serbia, is a norm that occasionally deserves transgression. Transgression, here, 
should not be seen as illegitimate. It simply responds to national priorities, which on 
some issues, remain unshared. The belief that reciprocating the support of Russia, Iran 
or Belarus for Serbia’s position against Kosovo independence is preferable to 
systematic alignment with the EU in the UNGA, for instance, illustrates that the 
transformation of national beliefs into intersubjective understanding is not automatic. 
On key issues of Serbia’s foreign policy, individualistic approaches continue to thwart 
the redefinition of national approaches in collective terms, and this impediment is a 
visible limitation to the Europeanisation of Serbia’s foreign policy. 
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Serbia and Macedonia’s system of beliefs has also been transformed in dispute 
resolution matters, despite critical limitations. A key example is Serbia’s negotiated 
acceptance of the deployment of the EULEX in 2008. In order to overcome the 
stalemate, the EU reframed its expectations (and the mandate of the EULEX) so that 
they could resonate with Serbia’s causal and principled beliefs. Only then did key 
actors in Serbia prove amenable to adhere to the EU’s approaches and adopt them as 
their own. Because the EU had to inflect its own position and give up its outspoken 
support to the Ahtisaari Plan, intersubjectivity was here premised on the renegotiation 
of existing beliefs. Europeanisation, by contrast, failed in a large extent in Macedonia. 
Despite several rounds of negotiations, no shared understanding ever emerged 
between Macedonia and Greece as for what adopting a “constructive approach” to 
good neighbourly relations should mean. In the absence thereof, both parties 
continued to advance their subjective beliefs, give precedence to individualistic 
interests and pursue relative gains.  
 
Further examples can be evoked. In border disputes resolution matters, it has been 
demonstrated that good neighbourly relations have come to be considered in Serbia 
and Macedonia as a principle constitutive of what European integration stands for. 
The national interest, concerned with relative gains and losses in territorial 
demarcations, has often been redefined in more collective terms, following the credo 
that good neighbours having settled all disputes is what will make a peaceful Europe. 
In arms export controls, finally, this transformation of the subjective into the 
intersubjective is best illustrated by Macedonia’s full acceptance of the EU’s 
principled and causal understandings in the field. It contrasts with Serbia’s partial 
adherence to EU standards –a sign illustrative of the lesser level of Europeanisation of 
its arms export controls regime. 
 
Observing more intersubjectivity in national beliefs, however, may not suffice to 
evidence the phenomenon of Europeanisation. When Serbia, in 2010, sought to revive 
the UN talks on the status of Kosovo, its objective was underpinned by the 
intersubjective belief that the United Nations had the legitimate authority to resolve 
international issues (even if that meant perpetuating the stalemate). Instead, it settled 
for a new round of negotiations facilitated by the EU and with an agenda tackling 
technical, issue-sensitive questions. Here, Europeanisation ensued through the 
negotiated transformation of intersubjective beliefs shared within the UN community 
into intersubjective beliefs shared by Europeans, or more accurately, by “actors 
operating through the prism of European governance”. What shall then matter in the 
transformation of national systems of beliefs is not necessarily the type of belief that 
is transformed (whether subjective or intersubjective), it is rather the set of shared 
understandings that emerges and constitutes the “prism of European governance”.  
 
There is, however, a grey area in this phenomenon. If European governance is more 
than EU governance, then, there is the possibility that EU intersubjective beliefs 
conflict with the beliefs shared by the same actors when they operate in the different 
frameworks. It has been shown, for instance, that, Serbia’s frequency of declaratory 
alignment decreased in 2010-2011. An important factor explaining this decline, it has 
been shown, was Serbia’s need to reciprocate third countries’ support against 
Kosovo’s independence. But Serbian officials also gave another reason for their 
occasional refusal to align –a reason similarly advanced by Switzerland or Turkey. 
They argued that the new alignment mechanism offered by the EU since 2010 (the so-
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called exclusive alignment procedure) contradicts the principle of sovereign equality 
promoted by the OSCE. The new mechanism not only continues to deprive non-EU 
states from actively participating in the elaboration of draft statements; when they 
align, it also prevents them from issuing supplementary statements in their national 
capacity. This restrictive approach to alignment raises legitimate concerns about the 
EU’s alleged attempt at imposing on the OSCE its own agenda by muting its non-EU 
partners –a belief that illustrates the internal contradictions sometimes characterising 
the emergence of intersubjectivity in Europe. In the absence of understandings shared 
across European organisations on that matter, it would be arbitrary to assume that EU 
rules take precedence over OSCE rules; that EU intersubjectivity, normatively, is 
superior to OSCE intersubjectivity; and then, that failure to align with EU statements 
is indicative of non-Europeanisation. In occasional cases, non-alignment with the EU 
also had a European, collective teleology –but just not that advocated by the EU.  
 
4.2.1.2. More nodality 
 
Political systems that are based on national governance principles, usually sustain a 
strict distinction between what is inside and what is outside the system. In the inside, 
there are national actors shaping state’s domestic polity, policies and politics. In the 
outside, there is an environment populated by international organisations, third 
countries and non-statal actors. At the interface, there are actors pursuing foreign 
policy objectives, seeking to influence their environment. These actors connect the 
political systems with their environment in a peculiar way. On the one hand, they 
liaise with the outside world, have representative functions and engage in negotiations 
with international partners. They create bridges, in a word, between the inside and the 
outside. On the other hand, these actors pay much attention to ensure that no 
sovereign right is breached, that international organisations and other states do not 
interfere with domestic affairs, and in a word, that the divide between the inside and 
the outside is well-maintained.  
 
Europeanisation entails a remarkable transformation of this interface. Through the 
creation of nodal connections, Europeanisation entails the blurring of the divide 
between the inside and the outside, the domestic and the European. Instead of being 
mutually exclusive, these notions become mutually constitutive: European actors 
inform domestic affairs and increasingly act as domestic actors; national actors inform 
European affairs and increasingly act as European actors. This nodality across 
political organisations transforms the way political systems relate to their environment. 
It makes national governance fuzzier, because of the coalescence of political spaces, 
and European governance increasingly important for the logic of political action, 
including in states’ most sovereign prerogative, i.e. foreign policy.  
 
The empirical findings presented in this thesis back this argument pertinently. The 
changes that have affected Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy organisation over 
the past 15 years indicate a transformation of the interface between the domestic and 
the European. Much has been done, for one, to build up the administrative capacities 
of Serbia and Macedonia’s institutions responsible for the coordination of domestic 
and European policy processes. Specific bodies, placed under the direct authority of 
the Prime Minister, were established in both countries (SEA in Macedonia, SEIO in 
Serbia) in order to manage inter-sectoral coordination and offer professional training 
on European governance. These have become important nodes. Through their network 
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of operational, functionally specialised ramifications, they promote European 
governance in every Ministry. In Macedonia, this nodality is even more developed 
than in Serbia. It has anchored the EU’s CFSP/ESDP in the organisational design of 
the country’s MFA and MoD, as an organic part of them. When decisions are taken in 
Macedonia’s MFA, these bodies ascertain that actors operate through the prism of 
European governance. Outside the walls of the MFA, the coalescence of national and 
European foreign policy processes has taken another path. On OSCE issues, for 
instance, foreign policy decisions are decreasingly taken by the MFA units 
responsible for OSCE matters in the capital. Coordination with the EU occurs directly 
on the spot, in Vienna, with the intervention of an EU officer responsible for handling 
the alignment mechanism. The representatives of Serbia and above all Macedonia in 
Vienna increasingly serve as physical nodes in the system. They graft their home 
institutions in their European environment. 
 
More nodality across national and European organisations builds up actors’ capacity 
to operate through the prism of European governance. The de-concentration of foreign 
policy processes and the empowerment of actors committed to European governance 
in national institutions facilitate the circulation of information across levels of 
governance and makes political systems more permeable. Decisions that used to be 
made at the national level, for instance regarding arms export controls, are now 
increasingly based on decisions taken at the European level. This is most visible in 
Macedonia, where EU decisions to impose restrictive measures, whether 
autonomously or not, on potential arms buyers have come to be recognised as equally 
binding as UN sanctions.  
 
4.2.1.3. More homogeneity 
 
Political systems, which are based on national governance principles, do not strive for 
blurring cross-national differences. They often accommodate their specificities as an 
expression of sovereignty, and therefore remain relatively impervious to the idea of 
homogenisation, e.g. the acquisition of common properties. This is not to say that 
national governance is incompatible with policy convergence or institutional 
isomorphism. Cooperation between like-minded countries or political actions guided 
by parallel problem pressures may lead to convergent changes without actors shifting 
their commitment from national to European governance. Political systems based on 
national governance principles may even reach a certain level of homogeneity, but 
then, only incidentally, as an epiphenomenon in Europe’s political ecology. 
 
Europeanisation entails here a different sort of convergence, leading to a different sort 
of homogeneity –a purposive one. When actors in Europe rely on intersubjective 
beliefs to make decisions and when they interact across boundaries that are blurred by 
increasing nodality, then cross-national differences are bound to fade away. Common 
premises for political action and coalescent organisations do not preclude their 
persistence, but they make them less likely. Why, after all, should cross-national 
differences be maintained, if political systems in Europe witness the loosening of their 
commitment to national governance principles? How could they be maintained, if the 
emerging post-Westphalian political order challenges the very notion of “cross-
national” differences? As domestic actors shift the logic of their political action from 
national to European governance, they accept challenging elements in their political 
system, which pertain to national governance. If those elements are a hindrance in the 
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on-going transformation, then convergence becomes purposive. At the collective level, 
this leads to homogeneity in Europe.  
 
The empirical findings presented in this thesis back this argument. First, there is 
Serbia and Macedonia’s quasi systematic alignment with EU positions in the UNGA 
and OSCE. This development illustrates how diplomatic behaviours tend to converge 
in Europe under the leadership of the EU. Then, there is the legal harmonisation of 
Serbia and Macedonia’s arms export controls policy. The adoption of normative 
criteria common to other regimes in Europe is a visible mark of their inclination 
towards more homogeneity. There is also the adoption of European standards in 
diplomatic communication policy, which is a prerequisite elaborated by Nato but later 
posited by the EU in order to the secure the exchange of classified information in 
CFSP/ESDP matters. The adoption of European standards has been accompanied by 
the modernisation of Serbia and Macedonia’s internal and external communication 
networks. Even in more sensitive matters, as the Kosovo issue for Serbia, recent 
developments indicate a moderate convergence of views. In 2009, Serbia’s position 
regarding the deployment of the EULEX mission in Kosovo shifted from sheer 
hostility to negotiated acceptance and more recently, to calculated support. In the field 
of customs and border management, it demonstrated a growing acceptance of the idea 
of physical separation with Kosovo, and the de facto abandonment of the idea of 
partition. Regarding the issue of Kosovo’s international representation, it took a more 
acceptant turn with the signature of the footnote agreement in 2012. These inflections 
in Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo were all achieved in the course of the EU 
facilitated negotiations process between Belgrade and Pristina. They illustrate 
Serbia’s readiness to find a compromise, i.e. a middle ground, towards which different 
views could converge.  
 
Convergence, it has been shown, has often been commanded, guided, facilitated or 
inspired by the EU. But assuming that the EU is the point of reference towards which 
Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy converge would be excessive. First, there is 
convergence with multiple points of convergence. In organisational reforms, for 
instance, Macedonia examined how Slovenia built up its capacities for inter- and 
intra-sectoral coordination and emulated the Slovenian model. But the Slovenian 
model is by no means the EU’s point of reference in organisational matters. Likewise, 
in border dispute affairs, Serbia looked for possible solutions in a territorial struggle 
opposing Portugal and Spain. This bone of contention is not a point of reference in 
European governance. Second, there is convergence towards European positions, even 
without EU position. The best illustration of this phenomenon is non-EU states’ 
voting behaviour in the UNGA. Unanimity among EU member states, it has been 
found, certainly enhances the propensity that Serbia and Macedonia align themselves 
with the position of the EU. But disunity among EU member states on specific issues, 
i.e. the absence of EU unanimous voting position, often, is no impediment to Serbia 
and Macedonia’s alignment with the majority of European states. Third, there is 
convergence towards EU positions, which in fact are the positions of particular 
member states. The conditionality regime imposed to Serbia with regards to the 
normalisation of its relations with Kosovo, for instance, cannot be understood without 
underlining the contributions (and expectations) of Germany. And the membership of 
Greece in the EU and in Nato is pivotal to understand the stalemate faced by 
Macedonia in its path towards European integration. In the latter case, the position of 
the EU (and Nato) is not a position of the community of states –it is the position of 
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one member state projecting its approach on the collective level. There is, finally, 
convergence towards EU positions, which, in reality, are no genuine “EU” positions. 
In many fields of foreign policy, the EU, it has been found, is no norm-maker. It 
transmits international norms and principles that pre-exist, and sometimes only leave 
an imprint (e.g. by increasing their compellingness and stringency). Serbia and 
Macedonia’s support for good neighbourly relations, for instance, is not contingent on 
their adherence to EU norms. As a matter of fact, border disputes may equally be 
resolved on the basis of a shared commitment to international law. The role of the EU, 
again, is often more subtle than that of a point of convergence. Because of this 
fuzziness, it would be ill-suited to speak of convergence as leading to uniformity. 
 
4.2.2. What Europeanisation does not entail 
 
4.2.2.1. Uniformity 
 
If the EU cannot be considered, ontologically, as the point of reference towards which 
political systems converge in Europe, then Europeanisation is unlikely to entail 
uniformity, i.e. the adoption of a single set of properties designated (e.g. by the EU) as 
the one form (uni-forma). The multiplicity of the points of convergence, their possible 
absence, their fuzziness and indeterminate lineage make it difficult to think of 
Europeanisation as a process conflating Europe with the EU. And claiming that 
Europeanisation entails uniformity, then, would be illusory, at best. The persistence of 
different levels of governance in post-Westphalian Europe, the co-existence of 
international organisations in Europe with cross-memberships and the joint 
enmeshment of European states and organisations in international normative 
structures make the interactions between European polities more complex. Reducing 
their transformation to some sort of unification is appealing, but it brackets a range of 
research questions, which Europeanisation researchers have no reason to discard. 
What, for instance, does Serbia’s critique against the EU’s exclusive alignment 
mechanism in the OSCE tell us about Europeanisation? Did the EU’s principle of 
good neighbourliness really matter in the resolution of Macedonia’s border dispute 
with Kosovo? Is the growth of Macedonia’s diplomatic network really indicative of 
Europeanisation? What was the role of cross-national communications in the 
organisational reform of Macedonia in the mid-2000s? And what was the role of Nato 
in the modernisation of diplomatic communication networks promoted by the EU 
through its conditionality regime? Positing uniformity as a manifestation of 
Europeanisation tends to assume that the EU provides a one-size-fit-them all model of 
transformation, which European states can simply acquire. It neglects to pay attention 
to the ontological reality of the model, and when it exists, to its genuineness. When it 
is aimed at demonstrating that European polities are tending towards uniformity, 
inferring Europeanisation merely from convergence is a methodological illusion.  
 
Moreover, Europeanisation entails variations in the process of transformation, i.e. in 
time, timing and tempo. It is clear, from the research, that transformation did not 
affect Serbia and Macedonia at the same time. It started, in general terms, earlier in 
Macedonia, than in Serbia. Macedonia’s MFA organisational reform, for instance, 
was mostly accomplished by 2005, but it only started in Serbia in the late 2000s. The 
same is true for the reform of Serbia and Macedonia’s arms export regimes and for 
the demarcation of their respective territorial borders. The fact that the two countries, 
at a given time, were located at different institutional distances from the EU may 
 353
explain some of these differences. Macedonia and Serbia did not sign their SAA at the 
same time (2001 for the former, 2008 for the latter) and they were not granted EU 
candidate status at the same time (2005 for the former, 2012 for the latter). Sometimes, 
Europeanisation entailed differences in time, but similarities in timing. Serbia and 
Macedonia, for instance both carried out their MFA organisational reforms as part of 
their application process for EU membership. But this is no rule. Unlike Macedonia, 
which transformed its regime of arms exports as part of this application process, 
Serbia initiated its reform as part of its SAA pre-negotiations. In organisational 
matters, it has been shown that Serbia, in 2010, faced demands by the EU that were 
more specific than Macedonia in 2004. There are, finally, differences in the tempo of 
the transformation. Within the past two or three years, Serbia has witnessed a 
remarkable transformation of its approach towards the Kosovo issue. In this relatively 
short time, Serbia inflected some of its key positions on the issue. Macedonia, by 
contrast, did not inflect its position regarding the naming issue over the past ten to 
fifteen years. The tempo of transformation also differed in border dispute resolution 
matters. Whereas Macedonia’s border disputes have been resolved in a timely manner 
(e.g. most lately as part of the Kosovo recognition process), the processes involving 
Serbia have taken a much slower pace. The same is true in arms export controls. 
Whereas Macedonia fully aligned its legislation with the EU’s Code of conduct by 
simply declaring in 2004 its acceptance of the whole body of EU rules and practices, 
Serbia took a more circumvolutory path. It started by partially transposing EU norms, 
but without creating a direct link between EU and domestic law. Serbia’s reform, as a 
result, lasted more than three years, compared to a few months for Macedonia.  
 
4.2.2.2. Ineluctability 
 
Europeanisation does not entail a transformation based on sequential, irreversible 
developments, culminating, for instance, with the neo-Westphalian unification of 
European polities. It is, as a matter of fact, a non finite process, constantly subject to 
renegotiations. It has been shown that the prism of European governance is not an 
objective construct –that it might be subject to individual interpretations and also 
evolve over time. In foreign policy matters, what European governance means today, 
after all, is not the same as what it meant in the 1990s. For one, the direct involvement 
of the EU in the negotiation process between Belgrade and Pristina is an innovative 
development. It created an opportunity to extend the scope of Europeanisation in an 
issue area that was primarily driven by national governance principles. This is where 
European integration is important to European governance and Europeanisation: it 
fuels systemic changes in European contexts, which reverberate in Europe’s ecology.  
 
This is not to say that Europeanisation is bound to follow the achievements of 
European integration. The research has shown, in many instances, that 
Europeanisation is not ineluctable. Despite mounting pressures, Macedonia did not 
inflect its foreign policy position on the naming issue. And the EU did not get more 
involved in the negotiation process unlike its experience with Serbia and Kosovo from 
2010. Sometimes, Europeanisation just failed. For instance, in border dispute 
resolution matters, the EU endeavoured to bring forwards possible changes in Serbia’s 
approaches, but in vain. It did not succeed in lifting the deadlock maintained by 
Serbia’s insistence on linking its Montenegrin border issue with its Kosovo’s non-
recognition policy. And sometimes, Europeanisation also depends on others. Serbia, 
for instance, did not succeed in launching negotiations with Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
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order to settle its border disputes also because of the institutional complexities of the 
Bosnian state. Even when it is a success, there is the possibility that Europeanisation 
is reversed, that national governance re-gains impetus and actors become reluctant to 
continue operating through the prism of European governance. The best illustration of 
this phenomenon of de-Europeanisation is Serbia’s dis-alignment from EU unanimity 
positions in the UNGA since 2006, and its gradual re-alignment with Russia.  
 
4.3. A multi-theoretical approach to Europeanisation 
 
4.3.1. Causality issues 
 
Causality is an issue that often remains under-addressed in Europeanisation studies1901. 
This is because the field is dominated by top-down research strategies, designed with 
the purpose of checking deductively the influence of (questionably) preselected 
variables (usually EU integration). These research strategies assume the logical 
separatedness of the independent and dependent variable and, too often, ascribe the 
monopoly of causal powers to the sole EU. This thesis, by contrast, relied on a 
bottom-bottom more inductive research strategy. It did not assume that the 
independent and dependent variables are ontologically different and therefore treated 
the EU as an exogenous variables amongst others. Starting from the explanandum 
rather than a hypothetical explanans, the author of this thesis had more freedom to 
gauge the actual forces at play in the transformation of national political systems. 
Inductive reasoning, for that matter, aroused the idea that causality is rarely 
straightforward as deductive research strategies might suggest; that the causal 
power1902 of the EU should neither be prejudged nor overestimated; and that variables, 
sometimes, are ontologically proximate, though logically separate. 
 
4.3.1.1. Simple causality 
 
In a few cases, it has been possible to draw simple inferences suggesting 
straightforward EU-driven causality. It has been the case, for instance, when 
alignment with EU positions in the UNGA and OSCE was found to occur as a result 
of foreign policy coordination. The introduction of the alignment mechanism as part 
of non-EU states’ conditionality regimes certainly explains why Serbia and 
Macedonia purposively consider the positions of the EU before voting in the UNGA 
or issuing a statement in the OSCE. It explains, to a limited extent though, the 
increasing homogeneity in Europe’s political ecology. The same is true of Serbia and 
Macedonia’s administrative capacities, which have been built up with the purpose of 
intensifying coordination with EU structures and policies. The expectations of the EU 
in that area and the requirements arising in Serbia and Macedonia from a mode of 
governance purposively shifting towards European governance certainly explains, to a 
                                                 
1901 Until the recent contribution by Exadaktylos, T. and Radaelli, C. M. eds. 2012. Research Design in 
European Studies: Establishing Causality in Europeanization. 
1902 The critical realist notion of “causal powers”, repeatedly used in this conclusion, was proposed by 
the Rom Harré in the 1970s, as a critique against neopositivism. It is based on the assumption that that 
perception is not exhaustive, and that unobservables may act as theoretical objects known by what they 
do (and not by mere observation of what they are). The theory of causal powers provides that a given 
social phenomenon is produced by the interaction of multiple factors (both dependent and independent 
from the phenomenon observed). These factors have structural properties, but none of them alone can 
account for the emergence of the phenomenon.  
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limited extent though, the increase in organisational nodality that has been described 
as manifestation of Europeanisation. And it is finally true, again to a limited extent, of 
the development of good neighbourly relations in the Western Balkans. By promoting 
the settlement of neighbourly disputes as part of its political dialogue with non-EU 
states and connecting it to its good neighbourliness principle (a principle that has 
gradually entered the grey area of the EU’s political criteria and is now projected 
through conditionality), the EU seeks to gain causal powers in the area. Some 
achievements, e.g. in the case of Serbia’s negotiations with Kosovo in the framework 
of the EU facilitated dialogue, cannot be understood without acknowledging the 
pivotal role of the EU (or its member states acting under the veil of the EU). EU-
driven causality, in other words, sometimes helps drawing conclusive inferences 
regarding the emergence of more intersubjectivity in non-EU Europe.  
 
When the EU takes the leadership in shaping Europe’s political order, or when it 
frames a normative context in which domestic actors conflate European governance 
with EU governance, then causality may be inferred in an easier way from the EU’s 
neo-Westphalian posture. The transformation of national political systems, i.e. the 
gain of homogeneity, nodality and intersubjectivity recorded across European non-EU 
states, in this conditional understanding, primarily occurs because domestic actors are 
ready to subscribe to a European mode of governance giving normative precedence to 
the EU. It is because the EU, in some cases, can be treated as neo-Westphalian 
political order, that simple causality can be invoked to explain particular aspects of 
Europeanisation. But simple causality is not the rule. More often than not, causal 
powers are multifaceted, only revealed by complex inferences. Inter-
organisationalism and normative contexts (both domestic and international) often 
stand behind the phenomenon of Europeanisation in such a way that they cannot be 
isolated from the EU’s causal power.  
 
4.3.1.2. Complex causality 
 
Inferring causality in Europeanisation research is complex for a good reason: it is best 
approached through complexes of variables. There is, indeed, no such thing as a 
unique, ontologically distinct independent variable exerting its causal power over 
national political systems. In a few cases, the decisive influence of the EU might be 
invoked in an attempt to establish simple causality. But this influence remains a 
theoretical object with no materiality to which one might ascribe causal powers. Even 
there, it is, in fact, the social structure in which this influence is embedded that has 
causal powers. And this social structure rarely allows conceiving reductively 
European governance as the exercise of EU supranational authority. It has been 
shown, for instance, that the EU’s alignment mechanism has been instrumental in 
increasing the homogeneity of diplomatic behaviours across non-EU Europe. But 
without the intensified communications between Serbia and Macedonia on the one 
side and particular EU member states on the other side (e.g. Slovenia); without the 
preliminary formation of shared understandings between Serbia and Macedonia on the 
one side and the EU on the other side (e.g. regarding the promotion of human rights); 
and without the perceived resonance of EU positions with Serbia and Macedonia’s 
commitment to international norms, it is doubtful that the EU’s alignment mechanism 
would suffice to cause alignment. That is why, even in those instances best amenable 
to be premised on neo-Westphalian conceptions of Europe, researchers would be 
wiser to think about Europeanisation in terms of complex of variables.  
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This is, of course, most indispensable in those research areas that do not fit neo-
Westphalian conceptions of European governance –e.g. in most parts of foreign 
policy. Establishing simple causality, therein, is at best a heuristical depiction of a 
simpler complex of variables. These variables (dependent, independent) are not 
always separate, ontologically. For instance, in matters of border dispute settlement, it 
has been demonstrated, that the EU, as a matter of fact, exerts little influence. 
Domestic factors (e.g. the political agenda of the ruling coalition in Macedonia) 
remained prevalent in those cases where an achievement could be recorded. Domestic 
factors, in other words, were instrumental to allow the Europeanisation of border 
regimes –i.e. the transformation of domestic structures. More importantly, in most of 
the occurrences of Europeanisation which have been documented, it has been shown 
that the variables at stake (dependent, independent) were not even separate, logically. 
Europeanisation, as an increase in intersubjectivity (explanandum) often required to 
build on prior-intersubjectivity. One of the reasons invoked by Macedonian officials 
for their alignment with EU positions in the UNGA and OSCE, for instance, was the 
causal belief that they contribute, thereby, to strengthen European foreign policy. This 
causal belief, however, was presumed on the principled belief that Europe is a force 
for good: it presumed some prior form of intersubjectivity. The same reasons for 
action have been invoked in most of the other dimensions of foreign policy studied in 
this thesis. Organisational reforms in Serbia and Macedonia, or arms export controls 
reforms in the two countries, for instance, were to a large extent also driven by 
dispositions positing EU accession as national strategic objective. These dispositions 
had no causal power, since they often did not even call for a specific course of action. 
But they were part of the complex of variables resulting in Europeanisation, as factors 
guiding actors’ decision to operate through the prism of European governance. Their 
logical un-separatedness from the explanandum should not be an impediment to 
increase the explanatory power of the explanans.  
 
Causality is also complex because it is multiple. One of the major finding in this 
thesis is that there is an inter-organisational dimension to Europeanisation. In several 
cases, it was found that the transformation of Serbia and Macedonia’s political 
systems did not originate from domestic actors’ interactions with the EU, but from 
social structures including inter-organisational interactions. Building up diplomatic 
communications network, for instance, responded to domestic actors’ will and duty to 
intensify the nodal connections between national and EU structures. But it also (and 
above all) responded to Nato’s requirements in the framework of the PfP –a 
requirement that has been taken over by the EU. The same is true in arms export 
controls. The standards for transparent reporting, to which Serbia and Macedonia 
adhere, both stem from the EU’s armament policy and the Wassenaar Arrangement –
an organisation which Serbia and Macedonia wish to join. In fact, is has been seen 
that the EU “imports” the standards of Wassenaar Arrangement before projecting 
them in the framework of its conditionality regime. The inter-organisational lineage of 
European norms in these two examples makes any claim for simple causality 
disputable, at best.  
 
Causality is complex, in fact, because it is shared. It has been shown, throughout the 
thesis, that almost any inference of Europeanisation should be nuanced by the fact that 
most of European norms merely echo international norms. With respect to good 
neighbourliness, the EU left only a few imprints of its own in the transfer of UN 
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obligations. These imprints were not substantive –they magnified the compellingness 
of general principles of international law. In dispute settlement matters, the EU also 
relied on UN prescriptions in its attempt to mediate Serbia’s dispute with Kosovo and 
Macedonia’s dispute with Greece. It considerably amplified the resonance of UN 
obligations by conditioning further progress on Serbia and Macedonia’s accession 
process to the resolution of the disputes. But it did not genuinely “create” the 
normative expectations it projected. In arms export controls regimes, the standards 
promoted by the EU, in fact, are the focal reflections of international and regional 
norms. What the EU can genuinely be credited for is the scheme aiming at fostering 
the shift away from national governance principles in arms export controls by means 
of its outreach, assistance and association instruments. Or, alternatively, the 
translation of international law into European law. In an EU context, failures to 
enforce UN sanctions, for instance, entail a breach of EU law –a breach against which 
the EU may act with more political weight than the UN Security Council. In an EU 
context, failures to demonstrate restraint in arms exports, when human rights are 
seriously compromised in the country of the intended recipient, also entail a breach of 
EU law –a breach that is not sanctioned otherwise.  
 
Causality, finally, is complex because it cannot be blindly established through 
deductive reasoning. The deceptive case of the extension of Serbia and Macedonia’s 
diplomatic network illustrates this claim. By reifying the EU as sole point of reference, 
bracketing other determinants, and implicitly positing EU integration as primary 
source of change, deductive approaches tend to overestimate the salience of the EU 
independent variable. They would readily indicate developments in Serbia and 
Macedonia’s diplomatic networks, from which Europeanisation, actually, should not 
be inferred. The research showed that changes in Serbia and Macedonia’s diplomatic 
networks were in fact primarily driven by economic motives and bilateral relations 
with third countries. Little credit can be lent to actors’ assertions that such changes 
respond to the EU’s perceived expectations.  
 
Complex causality makes Europeanisation research little amenable to grand 
theorisation or straightforward modelling. This is because it can rarely be inferred 
from an individual, well-bounded variable, identifiable as independent. It emerges, as 
a rule, from a complex of intervening variables, the configuration of which is not 
necessarily generalisable. Resources availability, for instance, is one of these 
variables: it matters to understand Europeanisation in Serbia and Macedonia, but has 
no causal power on its own. It has been shown, indeed, that Macedonia’s lack of 
expertise on specific issues in the OSCE increased its propensity to rely on the EU’s 
and align itself with EU positions. Facing a lack of expertise on similar issues, Serbia 
was found to react conversely by abstaining from issuing a statement on the question 
or refraining from aligning itself with the EU. In the absence of empirical 
generalisation regarding the causal power of individual variables, no general 
explanation can be conclusively inferred from small-n study observations. Complex 
causality, in a word, makes causal powers case-specific. This is not to say that 
Europeanisation research cannot benefit from theoretical insights. Identifying the 
empirical variables that matter across cases is a prerequisite for the production of 
cumulative knowledge. In this thesis, these suggest that Europeanisation would gain 
in being understood as political learning.  
 
 
 358
 
4.3.2. Europeanisation as political learning 
 
Learning has been part of the lexicon of Europeanisation researchers for several years. 
It is commonly identified as a mechanism of Europeanisation –one amongst others. 
Rather than subsuming learning to Europeanisation, this thesis, in its conclusion, 
argues that Europeanisation is a special kind of (political) learning. It furthermore 
argues that learning theories are a fertile ground to reflect on complex causality in 
Europeanisation research and that further bridges should be built with educational 
studies. 
 
A convincing way of presenting the different mechanisms of Europeanisation is to 
draw from the philosophical work of Prawat and Floden 1903 . These scholars 
differentiate three types of learning, underpinned by different ontological and 
epistemological positions: “mechanistic”, “contextual” and “organismic” learning1904. 
All of them find solid empirical support from the findings presented in this thesis –an 
indication that Europeanisation ensues concomitantly through multiple channels of 
political learning. 
 
Learning can best be defined as a “process in which individual or collective actors 
acquire knowledge that leads to a change in their behaviour in changed institutional 
arrangements”1905 . In the context of Europeanisation, learning is, arguably, what 
makes actors who used to be committed to national governance principles start and 
keep operating through the prism of European governance. It is, in other words, the 
theoretical force driving the transformation of political systems in Europe.  
 
The type of knowledge individual or collective actors acquire in the context of 
Europeanisation pertains to both political ends and political means to an end. 
Learning political ends means redefining one’s national objectives and strategic 
priorities, e.g. making them amenable to more intersubjectivity. When Serbia, for 
instance, agreed on the accord with Kosovo on customs and borders, it inflected one 
of its core positions regarding the idea of physical separation. Learning political 
means to an end, by contrast, only implies the search of a solution intended to 
mitigate dissatisfaction, e.g. with the lack of nodal connections with European 
structures. When Macedonia, for instance settled for adopting the EU’s CFSP acquis, 
it surveyed the organisational designs of other member states to set up the structures 
necessary for inter- and intra-sectoral coordination.  
 
Given the specific context, in which they operate, at the ever blurring interface 
between the domestic and the European, and the dynamic of regional and global 
integration that is at play in Europe, the individual and collective actors implied in 
learning processes necessarily operate in an ever changing institutional environment. 
As Serbia and Macedonia progress towards EU accession, for instance, they are 
                                                 
1903 Prawat, R. S. and Floden, R. E. 1994. ‘Philosophical Perspectives on Constructivist Views of 
Learning.’ Educational Psychology vol.29 (1). 
1904 The term of “mechanistic”, proposed by Prawat and Floden, evokes an authoritative transfer of 
knowledge. The term of “contextual” evokes a more interactive process and “organismic” hints at 
learners’ self-propelled search for knowledge. 
1905 Siebenhüner, B. and Suplie, J. 2005. ‘Implementing the Access and Benefit-Sharing Provisions of 
the Cbd: A Case for Institutional Learning.’ Ecological Economics vol.53. p. 511. 
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expected to get acquainted with new rules, new ways of doing and to adopt more 
stringent norms. Likewise, as the EU attempts to take a more assertive posture in the 
OSCE, it redesigns its alignment mechanism so as to prevent non-EU states from 
making supplementary statements. Exogenous variables, in this ever changing context, 
make learning –and Europeanisation- potentially infinite.  
 
The EU is usually treated in the Europeanisation literature as norm-maker, i.e. as 
diffusing “standard[s] of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity”1906. 
Would-be member states, like Serbia and Macedonia, are typically identified as norm-
takers: they are expected to acquire the EU’s knowledge and adjust their legal and 
political system accordingly. The dichotomy, on which the bulk of the 
Europeanisation literature is premised, lacks empirical support. It has been shown in 
this thesis that Europeanisation does not always imply norm-taking. Serbia, for 
instance, negotiated the deployment of the EULEX in Kosovo by conditioning its 
acceptance of the EU Mission to the redefinition of its mandate in accordance with the 
principle of status-neutrality. In so doing, it contributed to shape the EU’s standard, 
and did not merely act as norm-taker. More generally, it has been argued that 
sometimes, Europeanisation occurs despite the absence of EU norms in the field (as in 
the case of Serbia and Macedonia’s organisation reforms). Equating Europeanisation 
with norm-taking, in this context, is a special case in the more complex process of 
learning, at best. 
 
This dichotomy is even more problematic if one looks at the norm-making part of the 
relationship. The EU certainly acts as a source of knowledge in many issue-areas. It 
has the expertise, the normative frameworks and the willingness to share, or diffuse, 
these contents through the EU accession process. But this prima facie role of norm-
maker shall not prevent Europeanisation researchers from problematising the making 
of European norms, i.e. wondering where national actors actually learn from. In this 
thesis, it appeared that often, national actors learnt from other sources, but through the 
EU. They learn international principles of law from international normative contexts 
(e.g. on good neighbourly relations); they learn best practices from peers (e.g. in the 
field of organisational reforms); and they learn international standards from inter-
organisational interactions (e.g. in the field of diplomatic communication networks).  
 
A few remarks should be made about inter-organisational sources of knowledge, since 
these are due to gain impetus. With the creation of the CFSP in the 1990s and its 
subsequent consolidation, the EU has developed an enhanced capacity to cooperate 
with international organisations (IOs). Interactions between the EU and an increasing 
number of IOs have become richer, thicker, and they are now in a process of inter-
organisational institutionalisation. In foreign and security matters, inter-organisational 
cooperation has been increasingly moving “beyond the dyad into more complex 
configurations”1907. As a result, the boundaries of these organisations have become 
“ambiguous and fluid […], and they tend to penetrate and permeate each other”1908. 
This has been documented at several occasions in this thesis: EU-UN, EU-Nato, EU-
                                                 
1906 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. 1998. ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.’ 
International Organization vol.52 (4). p. 891. 
1907 Biermann, R. 2008. ‘Towards a Theory of Inter-Organizational Networking: The Euro-Atlantic 
Security Institutions Interacting.’ The Review of International Organizations vol.3 (2). p. 152. 
1908 Jonsson, C. 1986. ‘Interorganization Theory and International Organization.’ International Studies 
Quarterly vol.30 (1). p. 40. 
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OSCE and EU-Wassenaar Arrangement relations. More often than not, the EU does 
not play the role of norm-maker; it transmits the norms originating from other IOs, 
transfers their substantive contents while increasing, generally, their compellingness. 
Europeanisation, as a result, often implies that actors learn through the EU rather than 
from the EU.  
 
4.3.2.1. Europeanisation as mechanistic learning 
 
The first type of learning identified by Prawat and Floden is underpinned by an 
objectivist epistemology: learners consider a belief worth learning, inasmuch as it 
rightly depicts how the world works out there. This dualist approach places much 
emphasis on the causal powers of environmental structures. Knowledge, after all, 
should mirror the world. It should reflect the objective properties of the learners’ 
environment, which being the only source of knowledge, is “the key determinant of 
behavior”1909. In the end, what matters most is the extrinsic acquisition (from the 
outside world) of knowledge so that internal beliefs and actors’ behaviour “correlate 
with or correspond to those structures afforded by the environment”1910.  
 
In the context of Europeanisation studies, mechanistic learning implies that actors 
previously committed to national governance principles, start or continue operating 
through the prism of European governance because of structural, objective necessities. 
Many of these are imposed on them through their country’s conditionality regime 
with the EU. They are of political and legal nature, but not only. Socially constructed 
norms, when they are taken for granted by potential learners, start being considered as 
given. All of them command compliance as a means of increasing the correspondence 
between domestic and European structures and processes. Mechanistic learning, in 
this understanding, is then premised on the existence of political misfits –it is a 
straightforward attempt to remedy the dissatisfaction that is caused by them. 
Mechanistic learning therefore resonates with the idea of adaptational change 
promoted by the goodness of fit model –whether in its rational choice, sociological or 
historical institutionalist variant. Both exogenise the rationale of Europeanisation at 
the structural level and conceive of it as an objective necessity imposed upon national 
actors (notwithstanding the configuration of the complex of variable for the former 
and the set of intervening variables for the latter).  
 
The thesis, or more specifically its structural analysis, backs the argument that 
Europeanisation, in particular cases, did ensue through mechanistic learning. Under 
certain circumstances, structural necessities were found to have causal powers. First, 
there should be some foreseeable reward to induce the painful process of 
mechanistic learning, and possibly too, some form of oversight. In diplomatic 
alignment matters, it has been shown that Macedonia accepted compliance as a rule of 
the European integration game on the ground that it increased its chances to join the 
EU. It viewed alignments as a duty with prospective rewards that cannot be outbid. 
Macedonia, after all, is politically very dependent on the EU and third countries have 
little political leverage on it. Serbia, by contrast, first considered alignment as a right 
without duty (between 2003 and 2006), and later as a duty with uncertain and, as a 
matter of fact relatively modest, rewards. After aligning itself intensively with the EU, 
                                                 
1909 Prawat, R. S. and Floden, R. E. 1994. ‘Philosophical Perspectives on Constructivist Views of 
Learning.’ Educational Psychology vol.29 (1). p. 41. 
1910 Ibid. p. 38. 
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it started to question the assumption that sheer compliance is always rewarded, and 
gradually called for a more critical appraisal of the alignment mechanism. Serbia’s 
lesser dependency on the EU also made it more amenable to reciprocate third 
countries’ support on the Kosovo issue against EU positions. From 2007, Serbia has 
thus invested a considerable amount of diplomatic capital in its relationship with 
Russia –a capital it diverted from its commitment to European governance. In fact, the 
structural analysis showed that compliance is most likely when the anticipated reward 
is very concrete. On Serbia’s Kosovo issue, for instance, the Commission implicitly 
established a link already in 2008 between its recommendation for candidate status 
and the country’s acceptance of the EULEX mission. In 2009, it posited the signature 
of a police cooperation agreement between Belgrade and the EULEX as requirement 
for Serbia to qualify for visa liberalisation. And in 2012, the Council conditioned its 
approval of Serbia’s candidate status to the conclusion of an agreement on the 
representation of Kosovo in regional fora. These demands were all met, often shortly 
before the deadline, because the reward offered by the EU ultimately outbid the initial 
reluctance of Serbia’s foreign policy actors. Of course, this reluctance may be resilient 
and continue to hinder the adaptational process. In arms controls policy, for instance, 
it has been shown that the harmonisation of national legislations has been partly 
dictated by EU conditionality. Serbia and Macedonia’s actors expect it to be rewarded 
by further progress on European integration in the field. But the costs involved by the 
reform are not the same for Macedonia, which barely exports arms, and Serbia, which 
has an whole economic sector dependent on arms exports. The lesser reward 
anticipated by Serbia’s actors in this field certainly substantiates Serbia’s failure to 
bring in full correspondence its arms export policy with the structures afforded by the 
EU. Being offered a foreseeable reward, however, may not suffice to induce 
mechanistic learning. In order to make sure that the reforms are carried out, the 
imposition of European oversight may be necessary. In matters of diplomatic 
alignment, it has been shown that Macedonia (already in 2004) and Serbia (only later, 
in 2010) have been required to account for their failures to align with EU positions in 
the OSCE and UNGA. This requirement did not play an essential role in motivating 
alignment, but it made non-alignment more costly. In diplomatic communications 
matters and in border dispute settlement matters, likewise, the progress made by 
Serbia and Macedonia have been closely monitored by the Commission. The EU 
Questionnaire was a watershed in this respect: it materialised the EU’s expectations in 
a series of issue-areas and opened them to the oversight of a European body. When 
the EU failed to control harmonisation, then mechanistic learning lost its impetus. 
Macedonia, for instance, ceased to publish arms reports after 2007 without the 
Commission raising eyebrows.  
 
The second factor facilitating mechanistic learning is the perceived objectivity of 
the normative contents projected through the prism of European governance. 
When structural necessities are perceived as unconditional, they impose themselves 
on domestic actors without being discussed, negotiated and internalised. Their quasi 
materiality leaves no choice to domestic actors –it negates their agency and dictates 
their behaviour. National approaches that are incongruent with European ones are 
adjusted, as the sheer reflection of the structural power of the European context. As 
prospective EU member states, Serbia and Macedonia, for instance, are explicitly 
required to apply the EU’s regime in dual-use items export policy. They are also 
required to increase the convergence towards the EU of their positions on 
international issues. Macedonia, it has been shown in this thesis, viewed both 
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obligations in the field as unconditional. That is why the country did not neither 
procrastinate nor tergiversate as it harmonised its national legislation with the EU’s 
changing Community regime on dual-use items. That is why, more generally, it gave 
preference to the fast-track, direct, unreflexive harmonisation of its arms export policy. 
And that is also why the cognitive process activated while Macedonian diplomats read 
EU draft statements in the OSCE before aligning, as a rule, assumes the 
appropriateness of the EU’s statement, even in the absence of expertise in the matter 
tackled in the statement. In both cases, alignment and harmonisation have become 
norms that hardly admit exceptions. Serbia, by contrast, views alignment in the OSCE 
and UNGA as a norm that occasionally deserves transgression, e.g. when the EU 
copes with an issue that involving countries East of Vienna. It does not objectivise the 
obligations stemming from European structures to the same extent as Macedonia. In 
arms export policy matters, likewise, Serbia did adapt its national legislation. But it 
preferred incremental changes to the one-off exhaustive transfer of normative contents, 
and it remained wary of giving unconditional precedence to European norms. That 
wariness made Serbian actors less amenable to mechanistic learning. Interestingly, the 
EU, at several occasions, attempted to foster the objectivisation of its norms to 
enhance mechanistic learning. It did so, with a certain success, by linking obligations 
that were not perceived as unconditional with approaches perceived as objective 
necessities. The EU, for instance, sought to increase the weight of its conditionality 
leverage by connecting its call to conclude the 2009 border agreement between 
Macedonia and Kosovo to the need to adopt its acquis communautaire relating to 
integrated border management. It also used issue-linkages in order to inflect Serbia’s 
position towards Kosovo in the field of customs and border management by linking 
the result of the negotiations with Pristina to Serbia’s prior commitment to ensure that 
the EULEX can fulfil its mandate throughout Kosovo. Another way used by the EU in 
an attempt at objectivising its norms and foster mechanistic learning was its attempt at 
reframing its expectations in technical rather than political terms. The object of 
negotiations, in so doing, gained in materiality –and room could be created for 
mechanistic learning. The EU used this device to foster the settlement of the border 
dispute between Kosovo and Macedonia in 2009, and more prominently, in its attempt 
to normalise the relations between Serbia and Kosovo since 2011.  
 
The third factor facilitating mechanistic learning is the specificity of the 
normative contents projected through the prism of European governance and 
their consistency. Structural necessities that are specific, goal-oriented and well-
bounded are more likely to impose themselves on domestic actors and to induce 
compliance. In sanctions policy or diplomatic communications networks matters, for 
instance, it has been shown that conditionality proved very effective because it was 
mostly specific and consistent. The EU’s expectations regarding Serbia’s arms export 
controls policy, by contrast, lacked specificity until 2011 and no wonder then that the 
country failed to comply with EU standards until very recently. In transparent 
reporting matters, likewise, the EU’s Code on conduct on arms exports did not 
provide a list of specific requirements. After aligning itself with the code of conduct 
and publishing two reports, Macedonia’s commitment to share information eventually 
eroded in 2007. In organisational matters, it has also been seen that Serbia and 
Macedonia’s reforms had little to do with compliance. The demands formulated by 
the EU in that area, often, were too vague to induce mechanistic learning. In a few 
cases, these demands were very specific, e.g. regarding the appointment of the 
European Correspondent or Political Director. But in the absence of substantiation, 
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they have led to shallow changes. The other dimension that is important here is 
consistency. It has been shown that the lack of cohesion among EU member states in 
diplomatic matters almost systematically gave rise to Serbia’s wariness regarding the 
appropriateness of alignment in the OSCE and UNGA. The same goes for 
Macedonia’s position vis-à-vis the naming issue. Since no member state expressed a 
consistent interest in the question, expect Greece of course, the EU’s conditionality 
dialogue with Macedonia fell short of inducing any changes in Macedonia’s position. 
This observation contrasts with the EU’s approach towards Serbia’s Kosovo issue. It 
has been shown indeed that even though the EU has no common position on how the 
solution to the Kosovo issue should look like, ideas supporting the Ahtisaari proposal 
have been etched in the EU’s institutional memory. Theses ideas (implying the 
inflection of Serbia’s no-independence position) were found to have germinated in the 
past few years. They now impregnate the approaches of key EU member states as 
well as those of EU supranational bodies. Their resurgence contrasts with the more 
shallow approach the EU has adopted towards the naming issue for the past 15 years. 
More generally, it is remarkable that the absence of consensus at the EU level usually 
casts doubt on the materiality of European structures in non-EU states. Serbia (in the 
case of diplomatic alignment) and Macedonia (in the case of the naming issue) readily 
interpreted this structural weakness (in the form of inconsistency) as a free hand given 
to national actors to recover some of their agency. Besides, in diplomatic alignment 
matters, i.e. in an environment, where interpersonal relationships are essential, the 
system of rotating Presidencies is a supplementary source of instability and a potential 
vector of inconsistency too. Since all Presidencies do not devote the same resources to 
communicate with non-EU states, no wonder that the alignment mechanism does not 
yield consistent results. When decisions are made at bay, in the capital (like in 
Serbia’s case), and not locally in Vienna or New York (like in Macedonia’s case), 
these inconsistencies fail to be mitigated.  
 
4.3.2.2. Europeanisation as contextual learning 
 
The second type of learning identified by Prawat and Floden is rooted in a structural, 
constructivist ontology: learners consider a belief worth learning, inasmuch as it 
discloses how the world works out there. This monist approach places much emphasis 
on the causal powers emanating from the interaction between agents and structures. It 
contrasts with mechanistic learning, because actors do not learn by excavating 
knowledge from their environment in the form of objective truths. What they learn is 
defined “interactively, rather than as the passive registration of stimuli”1911. It is 
interpreted, possibly negotiated and always internalised by actors who are embedded 
in, rather than detached from their environment. Through their interactions with it, 
learners help shaping this environment; they actively participate in the production of 
the structural context from which they derive their knowledge. In contextual learning, 
there is no mind-independent world dictating objective rules of behaviour and no 
world-independent mind to apprehend appropriate courses of action.  
 
In the context of Europeanisation studies, contextual learning implies that actors 
previously committed to national governance principles start or continue operating 
through the prism of European governance because of a shared belief –that this shift 
(desirably) contributes to the advancement of European governance principles 
                                                 
1911 Ibid. p. 39. 
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throughout Europe. This belief is causal, since it assumes that the transformation of 
political systems based on national governance principles ultimately reinforces 
European governance; and it is principled, since it assumes that the advancement of 
European governance is a good thing. It is shared across Europe rather than owned by 
the EU, and permanently reproduced by confirmation of its normative contents (rather 
than existing independently from the believer as an idea). This belief, in a word, only 
acts as theoretical premise for contextual learning as long as non-EU states are 
persuaded by, or adhere to, the appropriateness of the transformation of their political 
systems. Adherence (through norm internalisation or through persuasion), sometimes, 
may be too close to compliance to be conclusively distinguished. When norms stop 
being discussed, when their appropriateness is taken for granted, then causality flows 
more from structural, objectivised variables than from the dialectical interplay of 
domestic actors interacting with structures of European governance. Contextual 
learning cannot be satisfactorily approached through the goodness of fit model, since 
the notion of misfit implies some form of ontological dualism. In order to understand 
why actors accept to shift their mode of governance from the national to the European 
level, one should rather pay attention to the emergence of resonant frames in domestic 
systems of beliefs. Though structural, the rationale of Europeanisation, in contextual 
learning, is rooted in endogenous motives for action.  
 
The thesis, or more specifically its dispositional analysis, backs the argument that 
Europeanisation, in many cases, did ensue through contextual learning. Shared beliefs, 
under certain circumstances, were found to have causal powers. The first factor 
facilitating contextual learning is national actors’ early and purposive 
commitment to European governance principles. When the idea of shifting 
elements of governance onto the European level is shared across national political 
systems long before membership; when it is believed to be appropriate; and more 
importantly, when it is conceived of with the purpose of contributing to the 
development of European governance principles, national actors, then, are most 
amenable to contextual learning. They start and continue operating through the prism 
of European governance not because of objective, structural necessities, but because 
this is how they anticipate national political systems should be transformed, and how 
their contribution to this transformation should look like. The thesis provides a 
plethora of instances pointing at the central role of key dispositions inclining domestic 
actors to adhere to this transformation. In organisation matters, it was seen that the 
reform in Serbia and Macedonia primarily responded to dispositions anticipating the 
countries’ participation in European structures in general and in the CFSP in 
particular. Capacity-building was not only viewed as a means to catch up with other 
states –it was the best way to reinforce the political and diplomatic weight of the EU. 
In matters of diplomatic alignment, likewise, it has been shown that Europeanisation, 
in Macedonia, was primarily driven by the idea of contributing to European foreign 
policy. This idea went beyond Serbia’s lower-scaled intent of proving to the EU one’s 
Europeanness. It was aimed at showing the outer world that there is a “European way 
of doing things”. In fact, even if Macedonia is not a member state of the EU, it has, in 
some respect, developed a “community reflex”, which testifies to the extent to which 
its commitment to European governance principles has been internalised. When the 
EU has no common position on an international issue, Macedonia’s actors usually 
embark in consulting the most EU-minded countries in the search of a proxy position 
with which thay can align. This community reflex, it has been shown, is less 
developed in Serbia –which might help understanding the lower level of 
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Europeanisation of its multilateral diplomacy. Its commitment to develop its 
diplomatic relations with Russia, since 2007, has grown in parallel to (or at the 
expense of) its commitment to European governance. The same goes for Macedonia’s 
adherence to the EU’s arms exports policy in the mid 2000s. Alignment occurred here 
mainly because national actors were committed to the CFSP, to its reinforcement and 
its promotion. Its purposive commitment contrasts with Serbia’s troubled dispositions 
at that time. In a context of political cohabitation (2004-2008) marked by the absence 
of consensus on European integration, the reform of Serbia’s arms exports regime did 
not end up with one-off adherence. In Macedonia, likewise, the naming issue fell 
short of being addressed through the prism of European governance. The ruling elites, 
instead, sought to gain domestic support by antagonising Greece in their quest for 
national-historicist precedence. The lack of political debate on the question, the 
domination of the nationalist hard liners in domestic politics, their popular support as 
well as their dubbing by the Church, and the predominance of electoral concerns 
amongst coalition and opposition parties all cast doubt on Macedonia’s genuine 
commitment to European governance principles in this issue-area.  
 
The second factor facilitating contextual learning is the European momentum. 
Reforms at the national level were found to be facilitated when they took place in a 
context bringing European integration high on the domestic agenda. This European 
momentum did not impose itself on national actors with specific expectations. It 
afforded national actors an impetus to carry on with the transformation of the political 
system. When Macedonia officially applied for EU membership in 2004, it launched 
the reform of its arms export policy. When it was granted the official status of 
candidate country in 2005, it accelerated its organisational reform in the MFA and 
intensified its capacity-building efforts altogether. Serbia, likewise, initiated the 
reform of its arms export policy while preparing the opening of SAA negotiations 
(although the SAA did not directly cover arms export controls). But when the 
European dynamic lost momentum, in 2006-2007, following Serbia’s lack of 
cooperation with the ICTY, its engagement in the field receded. The European 
momentum has also been a factor facilitating the inflection of Serbia’s positions 
towards Kosovo. Despite their disunity, the member states of the EU have remained 
actively engaged in the international debate on the Kosovo issue, not least because of 
the presence of the KFOR and EULEX there. When they make decisions on their 
country’s approach towards Kosovo, Serbian actors cannot neglect this engagement. 
This informs their decisions. In Macedonia, by contrast, the European dynamic lost 
momentum in 2007-2008, after the Council enshrined the approach advocated by 
Greece of “no solution, no invitation” in the naming issue. The stalemate, which 
Macedonia has been facing with regards to its Euro-Atlantic integration ever since, 
has been conducive in this respect to the country’s lack of progress on the naming 
issue (and not only the reverse). The European momentum, however, cannot be kept 
by European structures alone. It is a dynamic fuelled by the interaction of domestic 
actors with European structures. When internal tensions rose in Serbia-Montenegro 
between the two republics after the adoption of the twin-track process in 2004, key 
actors in Serbia’s administration mobilised and advocated the reallocation of 
coordinative resources at the republic level. The dissolution of Serbia-Montenegro in 
2006 gave impetus to their claim. In the absence of European momentum, national 
actors may find it difficult (or unnecessary) to sustain the pace of the reforms. 
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The third factor facilitating contextual learning is the legitimacy of the 
normative contents disclosed by the prism of European governance. Actors are 
more inclined to operate through the prism of European governance if the changes 
this implies are perceived as legitimate. Changes that are perceived as such are more 
likely to be genuine than instrumental ones, and they are more likely to be locked in 
into domestic structures. When Macedonia carried out the reform of its arms export 
regime, it claimed that it was intended to assume its international responsibilities, not 
only as future member of the EU, but also as member of the international community. 
Adherence to the EU’s arms export regime, in a word, was considered a legitimate 
progress in the field. Serbia, by contrast, did not associate the partial alignment of its 
legislation in the area with its adherence to international norms. Unlike Macedonia, it 
did not start inferring the latter from the perceived legitimacy of the EU’s arms export 
policy. In border dispute settlement matters, Macedonia repeatedly claimed that any 
progress in the area would contribute to its shift from European security consumer to 
European security provider. The legitimacy of its intent inclined domestic actors to 
intensify their quest for good neighbourly relations. When national actors, however, 
do not view European governance as a source of legitimate changes, then 
Europeanisation may be impaired. Their wariness is not necessarily ill-grounded. Key 
elements of the EU’s conditionality regime applied to Macedonia, for instance, are 
designed by one EU member state, Greece, which is party to the naming dispute. The 
other member states may not all support Greece’s firm stance, but they do not obstruct 
it out of solidarity, despite the adverse recommendations of the European Commission 
and European Parliament. The asymmetry in negotiating power, which Greece derives 
from its membership in the EU, and the relative disinterest of the other member states 
were found to undermine the legitimacy of the EU’s conditionality dialogue with 
Macedonia, and ultimately its Europeanisation. Serbia, likewise, questioned the 
legitimacy of the EU’s alignment mechanism in diplomatic affairs. It criticised the 
asymmetrical, mono-logical design of the procedure, and the new rule introduced by 
the EU in the OSCE, which proscribes non-EU states’ supplementary statements in 
case of alignment. This design accordingly places non-EU states in a position of 
“good listeners”, while depriving them of their capacity to actively contribute to 
international security. And it therefore put a strain on Serbia’s endogenous will to 
align itself with EU positions. There are, however, effective ways of building up 
legitimacy. Involving, physically, national actors in European processes is one of 
them. It has been shown, indeed, that the structure of the interaction framework in 
which the Kosovo issue is discussed since 2011 is more amenable to have a 
socialising effect on Serbia’s representatives than the structure of Macedonia’s 
interaction framework, which has been put in place a decade ago under the aegis of 
the UN. Face-to-face meetings under the aegis of the EU, in the case of Serbia, have 
been instrumental in building confidence, and beyond that, other intersubjective 
understandings, including on good neighbourliness. Another way of building up 
legitimacy is to make sure that EU integration does not muffle the differences of 
views amongst member states that might exist on international questions. The fact that 
the EU member states that have not recognised the independence of Kosovo support 
the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina increases the legitimacy of 
the EU when it deals with Serbia’s Kosovo issue. Unlike Macedonia, which argues 
that the hand of Greece stands behind its conditionality regime, Serbia can hardly 
question the collective character and the legitimacy of the conditions posed by the EU 
in dispute settlement matters. Of course, this diversity of views is at odd with the 
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notion of cohesion that was found to facilitate mechanistic learning. That means that 
contextual learning does not always accommodate mechanistic learning.  
 
The fourth factor facilitating contextual learning is the resonance with national 
governance approaches of the normative contents disclosed by the prism of 
European governance. Because it narrows the perceived gap between national and 
European governance structures and blurs the divide between the domestic and the 
alien, norm-resonance makes persuasion and adherence easier. It ensues, most visibly, 
through the coalescence of European and national foreign policy objectives and the 
withering of domaines réservés. The thesis provides many examples in this field. It 
has been shown, for instance, that Macedonia readily gives a collective teleology to 
the very action of alignment in the UNGA and OSCE: alignment is not only 
considered as an appropriate action on a given issue. It is also a means to support the 
CFSP more generally, notwithstanding the issue at stake. This objective is internalised 
in Macedonia’s governance structures as a national strategic one. Serbia, by contrast, 
additionally upholds key priorities defined in individualistic rather than collective 
terms. These, belonging to the country’s domaines réservés, mainly pertain to the 
Kosovo issue. Contextual learning, in these circumstances, is more difficult, since the 
European norms, to which Serbia would adhere because of their resonance with 
national approaches related to European integration, sometimes, collide with the 
national approaches related to the Kosovo issue. A similar indication of lesser 
resonance has been found in organisational matters. The prioritisation of the Kosovo 
issue in the agenda of the MFA, it has been shown, monopolised much of the MFA’s 
energy over the past few years, which could not be devoted to reforming, or 
europeanising, the institution. As a result, the shift, which would have introduced 
European governance principles throughout the organisational spectrum of foreign 
affairs, did not take place to a full extent. Another example is provided in border 
dispute matters by Serbia’s refusal to negotiate a border agreement with Montenegro 
because of Podgorica’s attempt to solve its own border dispute directly with Pristina. 
Or, in arms export policy matters, by Serbia’s equivocal doctrine including 
reservations regarding the right to deviate from EU standards, when alignment is 
deemed to jeopardise the pursuit of Serbia’s national interests. Or, more generally, in 
strategic matters. It has been shown, indeed, that Serbian politicians usually gave up 
on the strategic character of the EU integration objective as soon as the public debate 
lapsed into Kosovo-related matters. EU accession remained important for Serbia 
throughout the past ten years, but not as important, domestically, as Serbia’s 
commitment to the defence of Kosovo. All in all, it is clear that the externalities 
produced by national interests impervious to European governance principles in issue-
areas that are otherwise informed by national perspectives resonating with European 
perspectives are a meaningful constraint to Europeanisation. When the weight of these 
externalities increase (e.g. when Macedonia’s ruling party linked the issue of 
nationhood in Macedonia with the naming issue), opportunities for contextual 
learning wither. This relationship, however, can be reversed through persuasion. 
When the EU framed its expectations in dispute settlement matters in such way that 
these resonated with the causal and principled beliefs of Serbian national actors, these 
proved more amenable to adhere to the EU’s approaches and adopt them as their own. 
This has been the case, to some extent, in 2008, when the EU and Serbia discussed the 
deployment of the EULEX throughout Kosovo. Initially conceived of to implement 
the Ahtisaari plan, the purpose of the EULEX was later reframed to underline the fact 
that the mission would also provide security to the Serbs in North Kosovo.  
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4.3.2.3. Europeanisation as organismic learning 
 
The third type of learning identified by Prawat and Floden is rooted in an 
individualistic ontology: learners consider a belief worth learning, inasmuch as it 
alleviates the subjective dissatisfaction caused by a given problem by helping solving 
it. This approach places much emphasis on the causal powers emanating from the 
agency of learners themselves –more specifically, in the way they purposely relate to 
their environment. Organismic learning contrasts with mechanistic and contextual 
learning because it is aimed at the acquisition of pragmatic solutions –it does not 
respond to objective necessities, nor does it build on shared beliefs. The key 
determinant here is actors’ will to curb their subjective dissatisfaction by seeking 
“coherence of our beliefs with each other” 1912  –a process that supposes the 
“endogenous reconstruction […] of unstable, exogenous acquisitions” 1913 . The 
ultimate purpose of organismic learning is not to find the ideal solution to one’s 
problems. It is to learn from others’ (and one’s) experience in order to improve one’s 
position –with or without the active participation from the cognisee’s side. 
 
In the context of Europeanisation studies, organismic learning implies that actors 
previously committed to national governance principles, start or continue operating 
through the prism of European governance because they view this shift as a remedy 
for their dissatisfaction. The dissatisfaction they perceive may be caused by a variety 
of factors, either internal or external. It generally reflects a mismatch between the 
aspirations actors have in a given context (also subject to systemic changes) and their 
achievements in the same context. The response is a goal-oriented, problem solving 
approach to learning, which might take several forms. Lesson-drawing is the rational 
variant of organismic learning. Faced with a policy issue, national actors may settle 
for drawing a lesson from their peers, i.e. seek to transfer “instruments of public 
policy” that are issue- and context-specific into their own policy environment1914. In 
that case, organismic learning implies the preliminary research of policy options, the 
evaluation of their effectiveness in the context they have been implemented and 
finally, the assessment of their transferability. Emulation is the normative variant of 
organismic learning. Unlike lesson-drawing, emulation is more driven by the “desire 
for conformity” with other countries […] than the search for effective solutions to 
given problems”1915. This desire for conformity is so compelling that it makes the 
subjective evaluation of others’ policy success insensitive to the actions taken1916. 
Lesson-drawing and emulation cannot be approached by the goodness of fit model, 
and they are not driven by resonant frames. But they are premised on the 
dissatisfaction of domestic actors regarding specific issues, their readiness to accept 
imperfect solutions, and the availability of policy options in the realm of European 
politics, which might qualify as solution. The congruence of these three variables is a 
potential rationale for Europeanisation.  
 
                                                 
1912 Ibid. p. 38. 
1913 Piaget cit. in Ibid. p. 42. 
1914 Rose, R. 1991. ‘What Is Lesson-Drawing?’ Journal of Public Policy vol.11 (1). 
1915 Holzinger, K. and Knill, C. 2005. ‘Causes and Conditions of Cross-National Policy Convergence.’ 
Journal of European Public Policy vol.12 (5). 
1916 Levitt, B. and March, J. G. 1988. ‘Organizational Learning.’ Annual Review of Sociology vol.14. 
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The thesis, or more specifically its intentional analysis, backs the argument that 
Europeanisation, in a few cases, did ensue through organismic learning. Relieving 
dissatisfaction, under certain circumstances, was found to be a motive underpinning 
national actors’ decisions to shift their mode of governance on the European level. In 
order to facilitate this process, three factors may intervene. National actors, first, 
should be dissatisfied. In the absence of dissatisfaction, it is unlikely that national 
actors take the purposive step of looking for solutions. It has been shown in this thesis 
that resource scarcity is a motive of dissatisfaction for both Serbian and Macedonian 
actors. Systematic challenges (e.g. the rise of global threats) and regional processes 
put existing structures under additional pressures. Being a relatively small country 
with little diplomatic tradition, Macedonia in this respect is more vulnerable than 
Serbia, and it has motives for greater dissatisfaction. It has been shown that 
Macedonia’s diplomatic capacities are limited, at best. Serbia, by contrast, can rely on 
a large network of embassies, a long diplomatic tradition and a diplomatic academy. 
This makes Serbia today less dependent on foreign expertise than Macedonia, and a 
reform of its diplomatic training structures less likely.  
 
National actors, then, should be ready to accept imperfect solutions. Imperfect 
solutions, often, follow pragmatic decisions aimed at relieving (instead of 
extinguishing) dissatisfaction. They are certainly not fulfilling, but the readiness to 
accept them opens new horizons and facilitates decisions introducing changes. No 
wonder that Macedonia did not inflect its naming issue approach in the past fifteen 
years. Convinced of being well within their rights, its representatives have conducted 
the negotiations with Greece with the intention of prevailing by reason, and not 
primarily finding a negotiated compromise. This intention contrasts with those held 
by Serbian negotiators. The latter are pegged with pragmatism to concrete goals, and 
they do not elude the possibility of negotiating a compromise. In diplomatic 
alignment matters, finally, it was found that resource scarcity facilitated 
Europeanisation in the case of Macedonia, but constrained it in the case of Serbia. 
Differences in terms of readiness to accept imperfect solutions might help 
understanding this apparent contradiction. Much of the dissatisfaction aroused by 
resource scarcity in Macedonia was met with resignation. The lack of domestic 
expertise on far-off issues, the tight deadlines for alignment in the OSCE, and the 
relative disinterest of the EU for Macedonia’s views on Balkan questions are all 
dissatisfying. And alignment with EU positions, regrettably, do not solve any of them. 
Yet, it grants Macedonian actors access to European expertise; it spares resources, e.g. 
formerly consumed in drafting statements; and it increases the European and 
international visibility of the country. Serbian actors were found to demonstrate 
contrastingly less readiness in this respect to accept imperfect solutions. European 
expertise, in Serbia, is not viewed as a surrogate for domestic expertise. Serbian actors 
therefore view the alignment mechanism with a certain wariness, especially when it 
deprives them from their capacity to issue parallel statements (as in the OSCE).  
 
The third factor facilitating organismic learning is the availability of information. 
When national actors have access to information, when they meet peers who 
experienced similar sorts of dissatisfaction or faced comparable problems, drawing 
lessons and emulating their experience is likelier. It is no coincidence if Macedonia’s 
level of diplomatic alignment in the OSCE and UNGA is higher than Serbia: the 
representatives of Macedonia participate in the EU’s weekly briefings since 2005; and 
they have been empowered to make decisions locally in Vienna and New York, 
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instead of requesting instructions from the capital. Their direct participation in 
European processes is the assurance of a better access to information, if need be. 
Interactions with peers have been important in many other instances. They were 
pivotal in Serbia and Macedonia’s organisational reform (both emulated the Slovenian 
experience); they gave a new impetus to Serbia’s approach in border dispute matters 
with Croatia (Serbia sought to draw lessons from the Croatian-Slovene dispute over 
the Gulf of Piran); and they helped Serbia and Macedonia reforming their arms export 
controls regime (both explored the solutions in force the UK, Italy, Germany, the 
Czech Republic, Slovenia, but also Croatia and Switzerland). Occasionally, 
organismic learning has been facilitated by means of various programmes, generally 
financed by the EU with the participation of the EU member states. The EU, for one, 
supported Serbia and Macedonia’s search for organisational solutions and it 
conceived of different types of instruments (outreach, assistance and association) in 
order to promote the adoption of its criteria, principles and practices of arms export 
controls. 
 
4.3.2.4. Summary  
 
When national actors, in short, shift their mode of governance from the national to the 
European level as a result of what they perceive as structural, objective necessities, 
then Europeanisation ensues through mechanistic learning. The transformation of 
political systems is then mainly driven by the need to increasing the correspondence 
between domestic and European structures and processes. This takes place, in 
particular, when national actors have a clear incentive to shift their mode of 
governance; when their operations fall under the scrutiny of oversight agencies; when 
they perceive the normative contents projected through the prism of European 
governance as relatively objective and unconditional; when these normative contents 
do not lack specificity and they do not fell short of consistency.  
 
When national actors shift their mode of governance from the national to the 
European level because of a shared belief (with the purpose of advancing European 
governance principles throughout Europe), i.e. when national actors are persuaded by, 
or adhere to, the appropriateness of the transformation of their political systems, then 
Europeanisation ensues through contextual learning. This takes place, in particular, 
when national actors hold an early and purposive commitment to European 
governance principles; when there is a European momentum; when they can 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the normative contents disclosed by the prism of 
European governance; and when European claims are resonant with national 
approaches.  
 
When, finally, national actors shift their mode of governance from the national to the 
European level because they view this shift as a remedy for their dissatisfaction, i.e. 
when seek to draw lessons from or emulate others’ experiences, then Europeanisation 
ensues through organismic learning. This is particularly the case when national actors 
are dissatisfied with specific elements in their political system; when are ready to 
accept imperfect solutions; and when they have access to information from peers.  
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Annex 1: abstract (English) 
 
The Europeanisation of national foreign policy in non-EU Europe. The case of 
Serbia and Macedonia. 
 
With the gradual consolidation of European foreign policy structures and the 
intensification of multi-level interactions in that area, Europeanisation has become a 
pregnant reality for non-EU Europe in general and Serbia and Macedonia in particular. 
What Europeanisation is, what it entails and how it proceeds remain yet subject to 
controversies. This thesis is a contribution to the academic debate. It explores how the 
national foreign policy of Serbia and Macedonia has been transformed over years, and 
uses its empirical findings to reflect on the concept, the phenomenon and mechanisms 
of Europeanisation in non-EU Europe. The thesis adopts an inductive research 
strategy, combining in its empirical part descriptive and argumentative analyses. It 
successively identifies a series of changes in Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy, 
which can be attributed to Europeanisation, and examines the underlying structural, 
dispositional and intentional forces, as well as the factors facilitating and constraining 
the process. It scrutinises several aspects of Serbia and Macedonia’s foreign policy: 
convergence in multilateral diplomacy, organisational reforms, resolution of border 
disputes, inflexions of critical foreign policy positions (Serbia’s Kosovo issue and 
Macedonia’s naming issue) and harmonisation of national systems of arms export 
controls. Its findings question the predominant role usually attributed to the EU and 
the significance of its conditionality policy in the area. They also underline the 
international and inter-organisational dimension of Europeanisation. These findings 
suggest that Europeanisation is best conceptualised through governance approaches 
(as opposed to EU integration approaches), and that it is best defined as “the 
transformation of political systems based on national governance into systems 
constituted by actors operating through the prism of European governance”. 
Europeanisation, as a phenomenon, is found to entail more intersubjectivity, more 
nodality and more homogeneity across political systems. As a process, it is found to 
ensue simultaneously from mechanistic, contextual and organismic learning, i.e. 
respectively, from structural necessities, shared understandings and individual 
dissatisfaction, depending on specific conditions. These findings shed light on the 
contribution of Europeanisation to the (trans)formation Europe’s political order.  
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Annex 2: Zusammenfassung (Deutsch) 
 
Die Europäisierung nationaler Außenpolitik in Nicht-EU Europa am Beispiel 
Serbiens und Mazedoniens 
 
Infolge der allmählichen Festigung der außenpolitischen Strukturen in Europa und der 
Intensivierung der Mehrebeneninteraktionen auf diesem Gebiet ist die Europäisierung 
heute ein prägender Prozeß in Nicht-EU Europa im Allgemeinen und Serbien und 
Mazedonien im Besonderen. Was genau Europäisierung ist, was sie bewirkt und wie 
sie verläuft ist aber noch immer umstritten. Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht 
die Veränderungen der vergangenen Jahre in der nationalen Außenpolitik Serbiens 
und Mazedoniens. Die Arbeit bedient sich eines induktiven Forschungsansatzes und 
kombiniert im empirischen Teil deskriptive und argumentative Analyseverfahren. Auf 
Basis der empirischen Ergebnisse werden das Konzept, das Phänomen und die 
Mechanismen der Europäisierung in Nicht-EU Europa beleuchtet. Die Dissertation 
identifiziert eine Reihe von Veränderungen in der Außenpolitik Serbiens und 
Mazedoniens, die der Europäisierung zugeschrieben werden können, und untersucht 
die strukturellen, dispositionellen und motivationalen Kräfte, sowie die fördernden 
und hemmenden Faktoren, die diesen Prozeß untermauern. Mehrere Aspekte der 
Außenpolitik Serbiens und Mazedoniens werden eingehend untersucht: Konvergenz 
in multilateraler Diplomatie, organisatorische Reformen, Behandlung von 
Grenzstreitigkeiten, Positionswechsel in entscheidenden außenpolitischen Fragen 
(Serbiens Kosovo-Frage und Mazedoniens Streit um den Namen) und 
Harmonisierung der nationalen Systeme für die Kontrolle von Waffenexporten. Die 
Studienergebnisse stellen die vorherrschende Rolle, die der EU für gewöhnlich 
zugeschrieben wird sowie die Aussagekraft des Konditionalitätsansatzes in diesem 
Kontext in Frage. Sie unterstreichen vielmehr die internationale und 
interorganisationelle Dimension der Europäisierung. Die Ergebnisse weisen darauf 
hin, dass der Begriff Europäisierung am besten im Kontext von Governance-Ansätzen 
erklärbar wird – im Gegensatz zu Ansätzen, die sich der EU-Integration als 
Erklärungsgrund bedienen. Definiert wird Europäisierung dann als „Transformation 
von politischen Systemen, die auf nationaler Governance basieren, hin zu Systemen, 
deren Akteure durch das Prisma der europäischen Governance wirken“. Als 
Phänomen führt die Europäisierung zu mehr Intersubjektivität, mehr Nodalität und 
mehr Homogenität. Als Prozeß ergibt sie sich simultan durch mechanistisches, 
kontextuelles und organismisches Lernen, d.h. - je nach den spezifischen 
Bedingungen - aus strukturellen Bedürfnissen, gemeinsamem Verständnis sowie 
individueller Unzufriedenheit. Die vorliegenden Ergebnisse verdeutlichen, dass die 
Europäisierung wesentlich zur Gestaltung und Transformation der politischen 
Ordnung in Europa beiträgt.  
 
 
Stichwörter:  
 
Europäisierung, Außenpolitik, Nicht-EU Europa, Serbien, Mazedonien, Europäische 
Union 
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Annex 3: résumé (français) 
 
L’européanisation des politiques étrangères nationales en Europe hors Union 
européenne. Le cas de la Serbie et de la Macédoine. 
 
La consolidation graduelle des structures européennes de politique étrangère et 
l’intensification des interactions multiniveau dans ce domaine ont fait de 
l’européanisation une réalité incontournable en Europe hors UE, et notamment en 
Serbie et Macédoine. Or ce qu’est l’européanisation, ce qu’elle implique et comment 
elle agit, font encore l’objet d’un vif débat académique, auquel cette thèse entend 
contribuer. Celle-ci étudie la transformation de la politique étrangère serbe et 
macédonienne au fil des ans et utilise ses résultats empiriques afin de mener une 
réflexion sur le concept, le phénomène et les mécanismes d’européanisation en 
Europe hors UE. La thèse adopte une stratégie de recherche inductive, et combine 
dans sa partie empirique des analyses descriptives et argumentatives. Elle identifie 
dans la politique étrangère serbe et macédonienne une série de changements pouvant 
être attribués à l’européanisation, et examine les forces structurelles, dispositionnelles 
et motivationnelles sous-jacentes, de même que les facteurs facilitant ou restreignant 
ces changements. L’étude porte sur plusieurs aspects de la politique étrangère serbe et 
macédonienne: convergence des diplomaties multilatérales, réformes 
organisationnelles, résolution des disputes frontalières, inflexions des positions les 
plus sensibles (question du Kosovo pour la Serbie et question du nom pour la 
Macédoine) et harmonisation des systèmes nationaux de contrôle des exportations 
d’armements. Les résultats de cette étude remettent en cause le rôle prédominant 
habituellement attribué à l’UE et l’importance de sa politique de conditionnalité dans 
ce domaine. Ils soulignent aussi la dimension internationale et inter-organisationnelle 
de l’européanisation. Ces résultats suggèrent de re-conceptualiser l’européanisation 
sur la base d’approches liées à la gouvernance (par opposition à celles liées à 
l’intégration européenne), et de redéfinir l’européanisation comme « transformation 
des systèmes politiques fondés sur une gouvernance nationale en systèmes constitués 
par des acteurs opérant à travers le prisme de la gouvernance européenne ». 
L’européanisation, en tant que phénomène, se manifeste alors par un surcroit 
d’intersubjectivité, de nodalité et d’homogénéité. En tant que processus, elle survient 
au travers d’un triple apprentissage, à la fois mécanistique, contextuel et organismique, 
c'est-à-dire d’un apprentissage induit respectivement par des nécessités structurelles, 
des compréhensions mutuelles et des sources d’insatisfaction individuelle, suivant des 
conditions spécifiques. Ces résultats éclairent la contribution de l’européanisation à la 
(trans)formation de l’ordre politique européen.  
 
 
Mots-clés:  
 
Européanisation, politique étrangère, Europe hors EU, Serbie, Macédoine, Union 
européenne 
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